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Abstract 
 
 
 
Background 
In most socialised health systems there are formal processes that manage resource 
scarcity and set priorities for the allocation of funds to health services. This thesis is 
an empirical bioethics study examining the ethical issues entailed in doctors’ 
participation as technical experts in such priority setting processes. It describes the 
motivations, values, and ethical commitments of doctors who engage in priority 
setting, their ethical experiences and perceptions, and their approach to the matter of 
skills for the role. The thesis makes an empirically derived contribution towards the 
identification of an ethical framework for doctors’ macroallocation work. 
 
Method  
I conducted semi-structured interviews with 20 doctors, each of whom participated in 
macroallocation at one or more levels of the Australian health system. My sampling, 
data-collection, and analysis strategies were closely modelled on grounded moral 
analysis, an iterative empirical bioethics methodology that employs contemporaneous 
interchange between the ethical and empirical to support normative claims grounded 
in practice.  
 
Results 
Applying the principles of grounded moral analysis, I identified that my participants’ 
ideas of the good in macroallocation and their normative insights into the practice 
were 
 vii 
strongly aligned with the three levels of Paul Ricoeur’s ‘little ethics’: ‘aiming at the 
“good life” lived with and for others in just institutions’, and that there were 
deficiencies in the social process of macroallocation that impeded both doctors’ 
achievement of the ethical aim and the just distribution of resources. 
 
Conclusions 
My findings suggest new ways of understanding how doctors’ values, and rhetorical 
and ethical practices might have procedural and substantive impacts on 
macroallocation, and challenge the prevailing assumption that doctors in this milieu 
are motivated primarily by deontological considerations. My empirical bioethics 
approach enabled me to identify in Ricoeur’s ethics an ethical framework for medical 
work in macroallocation that was grounded in the values and ethical intuitions of 
doctors engaged in actions of distributive justice. The concordance between Ricoeur’s 
‘little ethics’ and macroallocation practitioners’ experiences, and its embrace of 
mutuality, suggest that it has the potential to guide practice, support ethical reflection, 
and harmonise deliberative practices amongst actors in macroallocation generally.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
 
 
Chapter One Part 1: Background to the thesis topic and aims 
 
 
 
1.1.1 Introduction 
Citizens are heavily invested in how and to what extent their governments fund health 
care services. One only has to look at recent history to gain a view of the political and 
civic significance of health care resourcing. In the United States of America, for 
example, the signature achievement of Barak Obama’s presidency was the Affordable 
Care Act, and attempting to dismantle it was an early priority of the Trump 
administration; in the United Kingdom, the National Health Service (NHS) took pride 
of place in both the 2012 London Olympic Games opening ceremony and the tactics 
of those who campaigned successfully in 2016 to leave the European Union; and in 
Australia, the Federal Opposition’s impactful ‘mediscare’ campaign, which 
represented the governing parties as a threat to Medicare, the national health 
insurance scheme, almost won it an election in 2016.  
 
Health care consumes a large share of a nation’s resources; in Australia, for example, 
it represents 10.3% of the gross domestic product (GDP) (Australian Institute of 
Health and Welfare, 2017). In the industrialised world, the state generally plays a 
central role in health care, either through the direct provision of health services or via 
legislating and regulating insurance programs and provider standards. Because health 
care is only one of the public goods competing for funding, government decisions that 
 
 
2 
allocate resources to health care come at a cost to other programs that are also valued 
by society (Huddle, 2011a; Landwehr, 2013); likewise, within the health policy area, 
decisions to allocate funds to some individuals generate opportunity costs that are 
borne by others. Because of the import of its consequences, society demands fairness 
in resource allocation. Resource distribution policy and procedure are expected to 
reflect societal values and ethical principles (I. Williams, Dickinson, & Robinson, 
2012, p. 13) and to meet standards of justice and accountability. The focus of this 
thesis is on these ‘macro’ level resource allocation processes, in which doctors have a 
privileged role because their unique clinical and scientific (hereafter ‘technical’) 
expertise makes their advice essential to decision makers. Its moral content means 
that doctors’ participation in distributive justice warrants examination from an ethical 
point of view. In this thesis I analyse doctors’ experiences of the ethical dimensions of 
the technical expert role and propose an empirically derived ethical framework for 
understanding and guiding macroallocation practice. 
 
‘Macro’ level resource allocation – macroallocation – is a governmental process used 
to control health care expenditure (I. Williams et al., 2012, p. 6). It deals with 
decisions about the overall amount to be spent on health care relative to other goods, 
and the distribution of funds amongst healthcare programs and organisations. It is 
characterised as a moral endeavour (Furnham & Ofstein, 1997; N. Kenny & Joffres, 
2008; Kirby & Simpson, 2007) on account of its potential to impact on persons and 
society. Since macroallocation generally entails normative assessments of the needs 
of groups of patients (Bærøe, 2008) and choices between competing policy goals 
(Daniels, 2016), it is often conceptualised as priority setting (Kilner, 2004; Rudolf 
Klein, Day, & Redmayne, 1996). For stylistic variation, I use the terms 
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macroallocation and priority setting interchangeably in this thesis. Following Rudolf 
Klein (2010), I assign to the term ‘rationing’ the effect of priority setting decisions on 
individual patients and call on it rarely in this work.  
 
Neglected until recently, macroallocation is now an area of expanding study in the 
bioethics literature (Brody, 2009, pp. 169-173; Churchill, 2002, p. 63; Emanuel, 2002, 
pp. vii-x; N. Kenny & Joffres, 2008; Light & Hughes, 2001; Wild, 2005), and the 
importance of understanding and exploring norms and practices in macroallocation 
has come to be recognised (Hall et al., 2018; I. Williams et al., 2012, p. 93). To date, 
however, there has been little theoretical or empirical work examining the 
implementation of priority setting systems (Robinson, Dickinson, Williams, et al., 
2011), the institutional conditions in which they are performed (Gibson, Martin, & 
Singer, 2005), the practices and needs of policy makers (Oliver, Lorenc, & Innvær, 
2014), and the values, ethical experiences, and ethical practices of the doctors who 
participate in it as subject matter experts.  
 
1.1.2 Personal and professional perspective on macroallocation 
My interest in the ethical dimensions of doctors’ participation in macroallocation was 
generated over the course of my professional life in the New South Wales (NSW) 
public health system. Coming from a professional background in medicine and health 
service policy and planning, I had the chance to observe doctors’ participation in 
policy making over more than two decades. I noted that doctors spent years on 
committees that advised government on health care spending, expended many of their 
private and professional hours responding to opportunities to shape the development 
of services, and put significant effort into nurturing the relationships necessary to the 
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achievement of at least some of their objectives. I watched as doctors pursued the 
same issue, sometimes using the same strategy, over many years. From my vantage 
point, competition seemed overt, as the ‘tribes’ within the health service used the 
technical expert role in macroallocation to prosecute expansion opportunities. It also 
seemed as if the effort expended by doctors on the role far exceeded the success they 
achieved.  
 
I was troubled by doctors’ partisanship towards their own specialties and interests, 
even as they espoused evidence based medicine (EBM), and I became interested in 
understanding this tension and its potential to impact on the policy process and its 
results. I also wondered whether procedural dysfunctions I observed were related to 
features of doctors’ skills in argumentation and of their – apparently limited – 
understanding of the principles of macroallocation. The matters of sustainability and 
renewal seemed important also, for immediate and future problems seemed likely to 
arise if the vast majority of the expert roles were to be occupied for decades on end by 
doctors of a particular generation. 
 
Ultimately, my interest crystallised around doctors’ experiences of the ethical 
dimensions of this role: How did they come to prioritise it as a commitment? How did 
they accommodate the inevitable obstacles to their achievement in the role? How did 
they deal with role-related conflict? How did they perceive the matter of skills? 
Because I was aware that doctors’ success in resource allocation policy was not 
necessarily in society’s interests and that doctors’ dominance in the process, at the 
expense of other voices, was problematic, I was interested in whether – since the 
doctor’s role as technical expert seemed to be a necessary feature of macroallocation 
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– examining the role through an ethical lens might yield insights capable of informing 
improvements to the process that would enhance medical work and benefit the 
community.  
 
1.1.3 Rationale for this research  
Just distribution of health care resources 
It is almost universal in contemporary western societies to construct healthcare 
resources as scarce and in need of rationing (Light & Hughes, 2001; Robinson et al., 
2011); scarcity is characterised by rising demand in the face of supply constraints and 
is commonly attributed to demographic change – often, in industrialised nations, 
population growth and ageing – rising community expectations (Robinson, Williams, 
Dickinson, Freeman, & Rumbold, 2012), and advances in medical capability.  
 
Equity, or achieving the greatest good for the greatest number through the allocation 
of health care goods, is the usual aim of priority setting (Landwehr, 2013); however 
there are numerous, often opposing, conceptualisations of equity – for example, 
following Rawls’s maximin principle, closing the gap between the disadvantaged and 
the advantaged may be judged preferable to allocating purely according to health care 
need (Biron, Rumbold, & Faden, 2012); and there are other relevant ethical objectives 
– for example, autonomy, human rights – that may cut across the aim of equity (I. 
Williams et al., 2012, p. 15).  
 
These conflicting conceptualisations of justice, and consequent disagreement on 
substantive principles for prioritising (Daniels, 2000; W. R. Smith, 2018; I. Williams 
et al., 2012, p. 13) have led to a focus in macroallocation scholarship and practice on 
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procedural justice approaches to establishing and defending priorities (S. Holm, 1998; 
Landwehr, 2013; Martin, Giacomini, & Singer, 2002; W. R. Smith, 2018). Of these, 
the accountability for reasonableness framework (A4R) (Daniels & Sabin, 2008) is 
the most important model. Like others in its category, it is noticeably silent on the 
ethical responsibility of macroallocation actors for the quality of their deliberative 
interactions, that is, for their social and intellectual performance of the role (Clark & 
Weale, 2012; Wasylenko, 2013); moreover it does not address the medical role. Nor 
are macroallocation procedures transparent about how values are to be brought to bear 
on justice (Dowie, 2007, pp. 577-578), even though it is widely acknowledged that 
values influence  priority setting (Finkel, 2018; Frith, 1999; N. Kenny & Joffres, 
2008; J. R. Williams, 2005, p. 69) and may be in irreconcilable conflict with each 
other (I. Williams et al., 2012, p. 21). That these problems at the intersection of 
human and procedure are underexplored in both the theoretical and applied bioethical 
literatures on macroallocation, suggests that there is a need for empirical study and 
ethical analysis of the phenomenon in order to develop a closer understanding of its 
importance in influencing justice.  
 
As well as deliberative models such as A4R, scholarship and practice in priority 
setting contains an arguably stronger strand that focuses on data-driven decision 
making, for example health economic modeling (Frith, 2017; Ham, 2012, p. vii). 
Although I discuss the tension between these strands in Chapter Five, this thesis 
focuses only on procedures in which deliberation plays a substantial role; and 
although much of the theoretical literature trains its attention onto formal models, this 
research takes into account the reality of macroallocation, in which the application of 
 
 
7 
substantive and procedural principles may be absent, informal, or invisible to 
participants.   
 
Medical ethics perspectives on doctor’s role in macroallocation 
Given the need for resource distribution policy to meet standards of justice and 
accountability, it is essential to try to understand the medical role in it from an ethical 
standpoint. Conventional positions – such as that of Veatch (1990), who states that 
doctors’ economic conflict of interest, particular valuative perspective, unique moral 
norms, and need to preserve patients’ trust, make them unsuited to macroallocation or 
any sort of cost containment – are being challenged by claims that priority setting is 
integral to contemporary medical practice.  
 
The medical technical expert role in policy making and resource allocation features in 
the political science literature, and in some early bioethics scholarship, for example in 
Gillon (1986). However, in the contemporary bioethics literature there is little 
acknowledgment of the role, or of the ethical demands it places on the doctors who 
carry it out. Indeed, the doctor’s role in resource allocation receives curious treatment 
in bioethics. Whereas in matters of clinical ethics bioethical texts direct their gaze 
onto the individual doctor who faces a challenging dilemma, in the matter of resource 
allocation the perspective generally shifts onto the system. This shift tends to be 
achieved by elevating the problem to the societal level and contemplating it from a 
theoretical perspective; in the rare cases where the doctors’ role in the matter is 
addressed, it is presented as a role-responsibility of a small subset of non-clinical 
doctors who specialise in management, such as public health physicians and 
administrators. Attempts to explore the issue from the perspective of the active 
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clinician – in a way analogous to the treatment of other contentions bioethical issues – 
are almost non-existent. That is to say, there is no attempt to proffer frameworks to 
aid ethical reasoning, or norms for practice, that might guide the conduct of individual 
doctors1.  
 
In reality, priority setting procedures, rather than relying on medical managers, of 
necessity engage active clinicians, because they are the ones who hold relevant skills 
and knowledge on complex health care problems within their areas of specialisation. 
It is these doctors who are neglected in the current reference literature. I have been 
able to find no substantive ethical guidance in the broader bioethics literature 
specifically directed towards doctors’ practice as expert advisors in policy making or 
macroallocation, or towards their roles in socially focused activities generally.  
 
The present research aims to respond to this gap by focusing on doctors by whom the 
technical role is absorbed as part of their clinical commitment, an area that is 
acquiring increasing salience in light of the promotion by medical professional 
organisations of doctors’ participation in socially engaged actions, including resource 
allocation, as a professional commitment at the level of the individual doctor – for 
example, by the ABIM Foundation (2004) and the Australian Medical Association 
(2017) – and its consequent inclusion in medical education programs in many 
                                               
1 Influential bioethics texts that take this approach include: ‘The Foundations of 
Bioethics’ (Engelhardt, 1986), ‘A Companion to Bioethics’ (Kuhse & Singer, 2012), 
the Australian textbook, ‘Ethics and Law for the Health Professions’ (Kerridge, Lowe, 
& Stewart, 2013), and ‘Principles of Health Care Ethics’ (Ashcroft & Wiley, 2007), 
which is mildly relieved by Dowie’s (2007) acerbic introduction to his chapter on 
decision analysis. ‘Medical Ethics Today: The BMA’s Handbook of Ethics and Law’ 
lacks a chapter on resource allocation, and priority setting, surprisingly, is not one of 
the 11 circumstances listed in its chapter on ‘doctors with dual obligations’ (British 
Medical Association, 2012). 
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jurisdictions across the globe (Bhate & Loh, 2015; Dharamsi, Ho, Spadafora, & 
Woollard, 2011; Earnest, Wong, & Federico, 2009; Hubinette, Dobson, Voyer, & 
Regehr, 2014; Whitehead, Austin, & Hodges, 2011). Where once these 
responsibilities were assigned to the profession as a whole, they are now represented 
as commitments of its individual members and entail action on their part. This is a 
profound change in emphasis, which has the potential to both alter medical work and 
exacerbate the current practice of privileging medical over community voices in 
health care policy.  
 
These changes bring into relief a lack of clarity about the role, as well as the extent of 
division about the ethics of doctors’ involvement in socially engaged actions (Cassel, 
1985; Croft, Jay, Meslin, Gaffney, & Odell, 2012; Dobson, Voyer, & Regehr, 2012; 
Earnest, Wong, & Federico, 2010; Fischer, 2009; Hubinette, Ajjawi, & Dharamsi, 
2014; Huddle, 2011b, 2014; Jacobs, Greene, & Bindman, 2013; McKie, Shrimpton, 
Hurworth, Bell, & Richardson, 2008; Sklar, 2016; Tilburt & Brody, 2016; Veatch, 
1990), and coincide with a renewed focus on doctors’ navigation of competing 
commitments (Montgomery & Lipworth, 2018b; K. M. Ross & Bernabeo, 2014; 
Sabin, 2000; Tilburt, 2014; Tilburt & Brody, 2016; Wasserman & Wertheimer, 2014).  
 
A small number of scholars – most notable amongst whom is Thomas Huddle 
(Huddle, 2011b, 2013, 2014; Huddle & Maletz, 2011) – have rejected the notion that 
policy focused actions should be a professional commitment of individual doctor; 
however, by far the majority of scholars active in this area, many of whom are 
medical educators, have embraced, or at least, accepted it, although some 
acknowledge that there is a troubling shortage of detail on how it is to be 
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implemented (Earnest et al., 2010; Gruen, Campbell, & Blumenthal, 2006; K. M. 
Ross & Bernabeo, 2014; Tilburt, 2014). In Australia, such a gap can be observed in 
the case of the Australian Medical Association (AMA), which, whilst encouraging 
doctors to become involved in macroallocation, advises them to evaluate the pros and 
cons of each opportunity to do so before committing to it; it does not, however, 
provide any criteria against which to undertake this evaluation (Australian Medical 
Association, 2016).  
 
Ultimately, how socially focussed obligations such as macroallocation can be made to 
fit together with traditional medical professional commitments, most notably 
responsibilities to individual patients, has yet to be resolved (Tilburt, 2014). From the 
standpoint of the doctor, the potentially negative consequence of participating in 
processes whose benefit to society is in doubt, which may not be a core professional 
role, which involves significant personal opportunity costs, and for which one is not 
by skill or inclination equipped, makes expanding doctors’ presence in policy and 
resource allocation an ethical issue of some importance. From the perspective of 
society, the importance of the issue stems from doctors’ influence over the quality of 
the macroallocation procedure and the justice of the resource distributions that ensue.  
 
The present research responds, then, to a number of gaps in the scholarship on 
macroallocation. First, the bioethics literature does not adequately recognise the 
doctor’s role in macroallocation as a professional commitment with ethical 
ramifications; this is problematical given the ethical significance of the just 
distribution of resources and the moral obligation on those who participate in 
macroallocation to be capable of meeting its demands. Second, the ethical 
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frameworks that guide macroallocation give no special attention to the medical role or 
its ethical dimensions; this is problematical because of the influence doctors wield and 
the ethical challenges they face in the role, especially around the matter of role-related 
conflict. Finally, the codes of medical ethics that advocate physician involvement in 
priority setting offer no action guides capable of assisting doctors to perform the role 
ethically; this is problematical at the level of the individual doctor, and even more so 
at the level of the educational programs that are directing the implementation of this 
new professional commitment, for both are deprived of information necessary to a 
complete understanding of the role and its ethical significance. 
 
Whilst formal instruments for guiding action in ethically challenging settings have 
limited impact relative to moral ideals in decisions about medical professional roles 
(Fleming, 2015; Gert, Culver, & Clouser, 2006; Huddle, 2013; Martin & Singer, 
2000; K. M. Ross & Bernabeo, 2014; Veatch, 2012), it is nonetheless important to 
seek a framework to guide ethical practice in the expert role, on the basis that it will 
be available to assist those who enquire, and who may go on to provide ethical 
leadership to others. 
This thesis is a descriptive and normative empirical bioethics study examining 
doctors’ experiences as participants in macroallocation and their moral intuitions 
about the role. It is aimed at addressing the gaps I have identified in the bioethics 
scholarship and at responding to deficiencies in practical ethics support for doctors 
engaging in priority setting. The work aims to describe how doctors perform the role 
and view its ethical qualities, and to identify an empirically derived explanatory and 
normative ethical framework for the practice.   
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1.1.4 Rationale for an empirical bioethics approach to doctors’ engagement in 
macroallocation  
 
As I have outlined above, and will expand throughout this thesis, the literature on the 
role of the doctor in macroallocation lacks both description and ethical analysis. 
Because my interest in doctors’ engagement in macroallocation embraced a desire to 
understand both how the practice is conducted and how it ought to be conducted, I 
elected to conduct an empirical bioethics study using a methodology – grounded 
moral analysis (GMA) – that had the potential to yield descriptive and normative 
findings. I considered, also, that aiming to address both dimensions of the problem 
and to derive useful ethical guidance for doctors would make my research more 
attractive than a purely descriptive study would be, to the doctors that I sought to 
recruit. This approach made particular sense because my location in Sydney Health 
Ethics (previously Centre for Values, Ethics, and the Law in Medicine) would provide 
me with support to develop a project whose ultimate objective was to make a 
normatively relevant contribution. 
 
1.1.5  Rationale for choosing to submit a thesis including publications 
The University of Sydney allows journal papers produced during candidature to be 
included in a PhD thesis. Following discussion with my supervisor, I elected to 
prepare a thesis including publications rather than a traditional chapter-style thesis 
because this approach would allow me to develop and test my research and academic 
writing skills over the course of the degree, engage steadily with thesis production 
throughout my candidature, and make my findings available as soon as possible, 
which seemed important, given the dearth of empirical work in the area. Since my 
work connected a range of disciplines and spoke to diverse audiences, my publication 
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strategy was aimed at exposing my findings to different groups of scholars and 
practitioners. 
 
1.1.6 How this thesis is organised  
This thesis is centred on two qualitative studies: a study, using data collected for a 
research program on Values in Medicine (VIM), that was undertaken in my Centre 
during the years 2009 to 2012, of the motivations and values of doctors who engage in 
physician advocacy, the umbrella under which policy work is often placed in medical 
professional and academic writing; and an interview study I conceived and carried 
out, which focuses on the ethical dimensions of doctors’ participation in 
macroallocation. The thesis is structured around 5 publications arising from this work: 
4 peer reviewed papers and a book chapter.  
 
Chapter One, Introduction, provides the background to the thesis topic and aims. 
Part 1, the present part, sets out an overview of the background and rationale for the 
thesis. 
 
Part 2 of this chapter, Macroallocation in context, describes the phenomenon that is 
the subject of this thesis. It orients the reader to macroallocation in the context of 
health care policy making, describes the role of the technical expert, and discusses the 
theory and practice of procedural justice as it applies to macroallocation. Each of the 
or submitted papers in the empirical chapters contains additional contextual material 
pertinent to the issue in hand. 
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Part 3, Challenges to medical ethics and professionalism in macroallocation 
work, sets out how the ethical challenges entailed in doctors’ technical expert role are 
described in the literature.  
 
Part 4, The empirical research literature on doctors’ experiences of participation 
in macroallocation, reviews the qualitative literature on the ethical dimensions of the 
doctor’s role in macroallocation and identifies where gaps in the literature support the 
case for undertaking the present research. 
 
In Part 5, Doctors’ roles in policy concerning healthcare resource allocation – the 
NSW context, I outline the organisation of health care resource allocation in 
Australia and NSW and set out the opportunities for medical clinicians working in 
NSW to take up the expert role in macroallocation.  
 
The thesis aims and research questions are set out in Part 6 of this chapter. 
 
In Chapter Two, Methodology and Methods, I describe the ontological and 
epistemological perspectives that informed my choice of method for the major 
empirical study in this thesis. I provide an overview and evaluative review of 
empirical bioethics, and describe in detail my chosen methodology, grounded moral 
analysis (GMA). In Part 3 of this chapter, I describe my method. Each of the 
published or submitted papers also contains a short description of methods; in the case 
of my analysis of the Values in Medicine data, the only description of methods is 
provided in the published paper. The final two parts demonstrate my accountability 
for research ethics and follow up.  
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The findings of my empirical work are reported in Chapters Three to Seven. 
 
Chapter Three, Doctors on values and advocacy, is a study of how values shape the 
decisions doctors make about whether to engage in supraclinical advocacy, of which 
doctors’ engagement in policy is one form. This study analyses data that were 
collected by colleagues for the Values in Medicine research program. It was published 
in Health Care Analysis in 2017.  
 
Chapter Four, The values and ethical commitments of doctors engaging in 
macroallocation, focuses on the ethical commitments that underpin doctors’ 
performance in the expert role in macroallocation. It was published in July 2018 by 
BMC Medical Ethics. 
 
Chapter Five, A Qualitative and Evaluative Analysis of Doctors’ Skills in 
Macroallocation, was published in Health Care Analysis in March 2018. It reports on 
the skills doctors value and exercise in macroallocation, and their efforts in learning 
for the technical expert role. 
 
Chapter Six, Procedural justice and the individual participant in priority setting, 
is a study of doctors’ experiences of ethical issues as participants in macroallocation. 
This report is under consideration by Social Science & Medicine.    
 
Chapter Seven, Medical professionals as expert advisors in macroallocation: 
problems of dual agency and conflict of interest, was published as a chapter in the 
book Medical Professionals: Conflicts and Quandaries in Medical Practice, edited by 
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Kathleen Montgomery and Wendy Lipworth and published by Routledge in August 
2018. 
 
The published papers are presented as they appear in the publishing journal. The book 
chapter is presented in the format in which it was published. The paper that is under 
consideration replicates the version submitted for publication. The referencing style 
differs from publication to publication, in accordance with the requirements of the 
publishing journal.  
 
In Chapter Eight, Theoretical concepts relevant to the Discussion, I provide an 
overview of virtue ethics and a description of the ethics of Paul Ricoeur. I have 
chosen to present the theory after the empirical findings in order to reflect its origin in 
the data. This chapter sets the scene for the discussion, which appears in Chapter 
Nine, Discussion and Conclusion. This final chapter summarises how the research 
reported in Chapters Three to Seven answers my research questions, integrates the 
main findings of the publications in this thesis, and considers the implications of my 
findings for practice 
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Chapter One Part 2: Macroallocation in context 
 
 
 
1.2.1  Introduction 
In this Part I define and discuss policy making, situate macroallocation in health care 
policy, and discuss the expert role in macroallocation. I also describe and evaluate 
procedural justice frameworks for priority setting, which represent the organisational 
and ethical context in which macroallocation practice occurs.   
 
1.2.2 Health care policy making  
This section defines policy, and describes the policy process. It also relates healthcare 
resource allocation to policy, and identifies the aspects of policy with which the 
present research is concerned. 
 
Definition of policy 
There is no universally agreed definition of policy – at the most basic level it is 
understood to be a general statement of aims and intentions. To support this work I 
have followed I. Williams et al. (2012, p. 86), who in their book Rationing in health 
care: the theory and practice of priority setting, adopted Barker’s (1996, p. 32) 
definition of policy as a process that ‘may involve the ranking of decisions, the 
production of statements, the making of plans or the development of an approach’.  
 
Policy is an instrument of state power (Freidson, 1986, 2013; Hacker 2008; N. Kenny 
& Joffres, 2008; Majone, 1989; Rich, 2004, p. 2). In the health care setting, it 
embraces actions aimed at constraining or facilitating the institutions, organisations, 
services and funding arrangements that form the health system; public policy 
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concerns those parts of the system for which governments have primary responsibility 
(Palmer & Short, 2014, p. 25). In health care, policies can be made at and for each 
level of the system, from international, through national and organisational, to the 
clinical unit (Travaglia, 2015, p. 189). 
 
Types of policy  
A commonly applied typology of policy is that developed by Lowi (1972), which has 
been expressed by Hill (2009, pp. 139-141) as: distributive policy, which is concerned 
with the distribution of new resources, for example, the share of growth funding 
different services receive; redistributive policy, which is concerned with changing the 
distribution of existing resources between groups, for example, subsidy and insurance 
programs; regulatory, which is concerned with regulating activities; and constituent 
policy, which is concerned with establishing or reorganising institutions. The first two 
are the types of policy that are of interest in this research; they are sometimes referred 
to as material policies, shaping the distribution of resources across a country, system, 
or organisation (Travaglia, 2015, pp. 189-190). 
 
The policy development process  
Although a number of non-linear models have been developed to accommodate the 
messiness of the policy process – for example, Kingdon’s (2003, pp. 84-86) 
adaptation of the garbage can, or multiple streams, model – the most common 
depiction of policy-making is the ‘policy cycle’ in which stages follow each other 
sequentially. The cycle model will be employed here as its relative simplicity enables 
clear identification of the components of the policy-making process. Althaus, 
Bridgman, and Davis (2007, p. 37) offer a cycle, which, they claim, reflects common 
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practice in Australia. It comprises: issues identification, policy analysis, development 
of policy instruments, consultation, coordination, decision implementation, and 
evaluation. The present research is concerned with the first four of these stages, the 
main features of which are set out below:  
 
• During issue identification, problems uncovered by interest groups are 
brought to the attention of government.  
• Policy analysis, usually undertaken by the public service, follows for 
issues that are deemed worthy of attention. During this stage, information, 
including data and expert advice, are gathered and brought forward for the 
consideration of the decision-makers.  
• The identification of appropriate policy instruments involves selecting the 
correct policy response to the issue, taking into account feasibility and 
acceptability.  
• Consultation follows, demanding exposure of the issue and proposed 
solution to a wider range of stakeholders, with the aim of improving and 
gathering support for the proposals (Althaus et al., 2007, pp. 37-40).  
Doctors and other technical experts can engage at any time in the policy cycle, but 
most opportunities to be involved arise in these four stages (Rich, 2004, p. 139), 
which occur prior to a commitment being made to any particular policy response. The 
other elements of the cycle are conducted largely in the administrative domain.  
 
How policy making is pursued is also governed by the dominant political ideology of 
the day. In the present neoliberal environment, evidence based policy (EBP) enjoys 
the almost universal favour of academics and governments (Oliver et al., 2014). There 
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has been little research, however, on the process of EBP implementation in health 
care (Oliver et al., 2014; Sandberg, Persson, & Garpenby, 2018); in particular, study 
of the practices and needs of policy makers is neglected (Oliver et al., 2014). I return 
to this topic in Chapter Five. 
 
Opportunities for experts to engage with the policy cycle  
This research focuses on doctors’ inputs in the four stages I have described above. In 
the case of issue identification, or agenda setting, the doctor may be the one to raise 
an issue – for example, a lack of services aimed at meeting the needs of the patients 
served by their specialty – with decision-makers at the local, state or national level, in 
private, in available forums, or in the media. In this stage they can be viewed as 
sending warnings to decision-makers as well as guidance on how policy might be 
changed (Rich, 2004, p. 108). During the phases involving policy analysis and the 
creation of policy instruments, doctors may contribute information in the form of data 
or advice to policy-makers, or may act in the role of policy-drafter by working up 
proposals for submission to decision-makers. In this stage they can be seen as 
providing ammunition and support to one side or another of the policy debate (Rich, 
2004, p. 108). In the consultation phase the doctor may respond to proposals by 
attending meetings or writing submissions responding to policy proposals.  
 
Non-linear conceptualisations of the policy process, such as the garbage can model, 
draw attention to the need for a confluence of politics, public opinion, problem 
identification and the availability of a solution to occur before policy can be made 
(Haynes et al., 2011; Travaglia, 2015, pp. 190-191) and the rarity with which these 
confluences occur. This ‘messiness’ has an impact on those engaged in the policy 
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process. Kingdon (2002, pp. 97-116) conceptualises policy development as an 
asynchronous process in which the problem, proposal and politics phases all happen 
in parallel, and he points out that this requires protagonists of proposals to be 
perpetually ready to identify favourable conditions in the problem and political cycles 
and to be willing to invest time in their proposals and in the relationships that are 
needed to enable them to ride the wave of political or public interest (Kingdon, 2002, 
p. 115).  
 
Relationship of policy and resource allocation 
Healthcare resource allocation concerns the distribution of services amongst different 
groups and purposes. Most healthcare resources are allocated according to historical 
patterns and implicit, or undefined, priorities (N. Kenny & Joffres, 2008) or, 
alternatively, according to the patterns of use adopted, within broad policy 
parameters, by consumers and healthcare practitioners (Kilner, 2004, pp. 1098-1107). 
Decisions about the allocation of resources arise when material policies are up for 
review, when growth funding is identified for the health budget, or when there are 
additional demands on available funding, for example, when new medicines or 
technologies become available, or when the needs of underserviced patient groups are 
recognised. Each of these circumstances involves a policy decision that will direct or 
redirect funding. Policy resulting in the allocation of new funding necessarily entails 
some form of service growth or improvement, generally in the form of facilities or 
equipment, extensions to the range of investigations, medications or procedures 
offered free or at subsidised rates, or expanded staff and operating budgets. It is these 
resources that are at stake in the processes examined in this thesis. 
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1.2.3 Macroallocation  
It is common to classify healthcare resource allocation as either microallocation or 
macroallocation. Microallocation, often referred to as bedside priority setting or 
rationing, denotes the allocation of resources within programs to individual patients 
(Rudolf Klein, 2010; Rudolf Klein et al., 1996, p. 8). It focuses on decisions about 
individuals, including decisions between people who need the same scarce resource or 
about which of several potentially beneficial treatments to offer a patient (Kilner, 
2004, pp. 1098-1107; Scheunemann & White, 2011). It is the subject of extensive 
scholarship and is not the focus of the present research.  
 
Macroallocation is a governmental process used to control funding of health care 
interventions in order to contain spending or promote efficiency (Sandberg et al., 
2018; I. Williams et al., 2012, p. 6). It deals with decisions about the overall amount 
to be spent on health care relative to other goods, and its distribution across healthcare 
programs and organisations. Macroallocation decisions determine the amount of 
resources available for particular kinds of health services (Bærøe, 2008; Kilner, 2004, 
pp. 1098-1107; Scheunemann & White, 2011) and thereby the mix and volume of 
services provided to communities (Hoedemaekers & Dekkers, 2003b). It is 
distinguished from microallocation by its focus on the healthcare needs of populations 
at an aggregate level and its locus at the level of governments and institutions. 
Macroallocation decisions can result in investment, disinvestment, or reallocations 
(Sandberg et al., 2018). Since macroallocation generally entails normative 
assessments of the needs of groups of patients (Bærøe, 2008) and choices between 
competing policy goals (Daniels, 2016), it is often conceptualised as priority setting 
(Kilner, 2004, pp. 1098-1107; Rudolf Klein et al., 1996, p. 8).  
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Although some authors use ‘macroallocation’ to signify population level resource 
allocation decisions made at the level of central government and ‘mesoallocation’ to 
signify decisions taken at lower levels of government – typically by regional 
healthcare provider organisations (Barasa, Molyneux, English, & Cleary, 2015; N. 
Kenny & Joffres, 2008; N. Smith, Mitton, Davidson, & Williams, 2014, p. 6; I. 
Williams et al., 2012) – others use the term macroallocation to encompass all levels of 
decision making that occur at any level higher than the individual patient (Bærøe, 
2008; Tilburt & Sulmasy, 2017). For its simplicity and capacity to encompass my 
research’s concern with the allocations that arise from all distributive and 
redistributive policy, I take the latter approach in this thesis.  
 
Socialised health systems across the globe that have well-developed substantive and 
procedural principles for macroallocation generally institutionalise priority setting 
(Rumbold et al., 2017), using formal processes that determine the allocation of new 
resources to healthcare programs in accordance with their priority (Landwehr & 
Klinnert, 2015; Whitty & Littlejohns, 2015). Such processes may employ agreed 
criteria (Robinson, Williams, Dickinson, Freeman, et al., 2012), and generally engage 
networks, committees, panels, and other face-to-face interactions (I. Williams et al., 
2012, p. 93).  
 
1.2.4  The technical expert in policy making 
Macroallocation, like other policy processes, usually employs the knowledge of 
technical experts in the development of options and recommendations to decision-
makers, who are often politicians, but who may be local boards or executives, 
depending on the scale of the decision and the degree to which authority is delegated 
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in the system. The expert’s role is advise rather than to decide on resource 
distributions. In western democracies with health systems that are, at least in part, 
publicly funded, doctors dominate this advisory role (Belcher, 2014; Duckett, 1984; 
Homan, 2004; N. Kenny & Joffres, 2008; Martin, Abelson, & P., 2002). That doctors 
are essential as expert informants seems to be readily accepted (Landwehr, 2010; 
Whitty & Littlejohns, 2015). The role of the expert typically entails some or all of: 
membership of committees, attendance at meetings and workshops with decision-
makers, lobbying, construction of independent processes designed to advance policy 
debate, and preparation of submissions, options papers, applications, and 
correspondence; these products are proffered at the relevant phases of the policy cycle 
(Rich, 2004). 
 
The relationship of expertise and democracy is one of the classical issues in politics 
and sociology (Fischer, 2009, pp. 1-2; Majone, 1989). Defining ‘expert’ and 
‘expertise’ is epistemologically difficult, as the concept is prone to relativism and 
incommensurability across practices (Majdik & Keith, 2011b). For this work, I take 
the approach of Eliot Freidson (1970, p. 159), a groundbreaking sociologist of the 
professions, who claims that ‘there is no such thing as pure knowledge or expertise – 
there is only knowledge in the service of practice’, and recognises expertise as ‘the 
practice of knowledge, organised socially and serving as the focus for the 
practitioner’s commitment’. This idea conveys the nuance needed to contemplate 
expertise in macroallocation in its social context, and recognises the peculiar situation 
of the doctor who, being caught between the role of knowledge user and knowledge 
generator (Contandriopoulos, Lemire, Denis, & Tremblay, 2010), is often not a ‘true’ 
content expert. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the medical expert role in policy is 
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not clearly defined. In the medical ethics literature the expert role may be contained 
within the broader frame of public policy activities (Gruen et al., 2006; Jacobs et al., 
2013), or physician advocacy (Dobson, Voyer, Hubinette, & Regehr, 2014; Dobson et 
al., 2012) – or invoked without specifying in which area of expertise it is to be 
exerted, in what settings, and to what ends (Wright et al., 2005).  
 
A further problem arises when we try to pin down the nature of expertise, and to 
determine who is entitled to decide whether or not a person holds it. Whilst the 
empirical literature on technical experts in policy making is scarce, Haynes et al.’s 
(2011) Australian qualitative study of health care researchers’ engagement in policy 
showed that some of those who engage in policy-making are not acknowledged, and 
do not view themselves, as experts in the relevant field, and that others engage in 
policy areas, or with policy problems, that are not within the field of their clinical 
expertise. Indeed, an individual doctor’s role in policy may have a political, rather 
than knowledge-seeking purpose, reflecting their relevance as stakeholder rather than 
their value as an expert (Rich, 2004, p. 148).  
 
In the technical expert role the doctor is more tolerated than loved. Concerns that have 
been expressed about the medical expert role in matters of distributive justice include 
that doctors lack special expertise in determining the outcomes likely to promote 
social justice (Huddle, 2013, 2014; McKie et al., 2008), have limitations as 
barometers of public preferences (Brint, 1994, pp. 144-145; Thistlethwaite & Spencer, 
2008; Veatch, 1990), and are profoundly affected by conflicts of interest and role 
(Croft et al., 2012; Kerridge et al., 2013, p. 1041; N. Smith et al., 2014; Veatch, 1990; 
J. R. Williams, 2005, p. 71). Experts’ limitations in appreciating social context, 
 
 
26 
devotion to logical forms of decision making, and vulnerability to misinterpreting 
political support as approval of their ideas’ rationality rather than political 
expediency, have also been identified as problematical (Brint, 1994, pp. 129-149).  
 
Some of these problems arise from the fundamental ethical characteristics of the 
expert; it has been claimed that readings of the expert as neutral and aloof from the 
politics of policy making are naïve, and that the role of technical expert needs to be 
recognised as promoting certain values (Majone, 1989, p. 5; Rich, 2004, pp. 2-4; N. 
Smith et al., 2014). According to Dowie (2007, pp. 577-578) the social conventions of 
macroallocation militate against meaningful engagement amongst participants on the 
matter of values. Since the extent to which individual participants’ values – and the 
ethical perspectives they inform – accord with the principles underlying any given 
macroallocation exercise can shape the content and conduct of the deliberation (Clark 
& Weale, 2012; N. Smith et al., 2014), it is problematical that little is understood 
about the values that underlie medical participants’ performance of macroallocation.  
 
Despite these concerns, the doctor’s role as expert is unlikely to be dispensed with in 
the foreseeable future, in light of 1) the respect for professional specialisation that 
goes hand in hand with the structures of contemporary work and society (Fischer, 
2009, p. 22; Freidson, 2013; Majdik & Keith, 2011a), 2) the growing significance of 
evidence-based policy (EBP) and evidence-based medicine (EBM) (Campbell et al., 
2009; Fischer, 2009, p. 130; Greenhalgh & Russell, 2009; A. Kenny & Duckett, 2004; 
Oliver et al., 2014; Russell, Greenhalgh, Byrne, & McDonnell, 2008), which rely on 
doctors' unique experience and knowledge, and 3) the incorporation of a commitment 
to distributive justice into the ethos of medicine. This last might be seen as a strategic 
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effort to maintain medicine’s position of influence when it comes to resource 
allocation. In Australia, for example, the doctor’s expert role in health policy is 
included in the AMA’s code of ethics as an enjoinder to ‘use your knowledge and 
skills to assist those responsible for allocating healthcare resources, advocating for 
their transparent and equitable allocation’ (Australian Medical Association, 2017).  
 
Within and external to the medical profession there is vigorous debate on the degree 
to which experts should dominate access to policy makers and occupy seats around 
the policy table (Cassel, 1985; Dobson et al., 2012; Fischer, 2009; Hubinette, Ajjawi, 
et al., 2014; Huddle, 2011b, 2014; Jacobs et al., 2013; McKie et al., 2008; Sklar, 
2016; Tilburt, 2014; Veatch, 1990). Scholars have noted that experts’ dominance in 
policy making in the present ‘age of expertise’ is in conflict with the movement 
towards more democratic approaches to policy (Fischer, 2009; Landwehr, 2010). 
Fischer (2009) is amongst the growing number of advocates for deliberative policy 
models in health care that involve patients and the community and attempt to curtail 
medical professional influence. Whilst this is a welcome direction, this thesis does not 
evaluate the relative merits of systems that privilege doctors’ input and more 
democratic alternatives. The focus of this research is, rather, on the conditions under 
which the doctor’s role in macroallocation might be performed ethically. I return to 
expertise in Chapter Five 
 
It is significant that I elected to explore doctors’ social roles in macroallocation 
through the ‘technical expert’ construct rather than through other conceptualisations 
of the role I had explored in the early stages of this research project, which I discuss 
in the section below. Through my published papers I hope to encourage scholars 
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writing in medical ethics and medical education to use the terms ‘technical expert’ 
and ‘expert advice’ for doctors’ roles and activities in policy on the basis of their 
foundations in relevant literatures and their consequent advantages over the blurrier 
‘container’ provided by the term ‘physician advocacy’, which is the focus of much of 
the medical scholarship on doctors’ engagement in social justice.  
 
1.2.5  Other conceptions of the doctor’s role in macroallocation 
This section describes the evolution of my thinking on the nature of the phenomenon 
being studied in this research and the role doctors undertake in it. I take as my starting 
point here Sklar’s (2016) brief taxonomy of professionals’ roles in health care 
discussions – expert, health advocate, and stakeholder – although I explored a broader 
range of concepts before ultimately establishing the fit between the notion of 
‘technical expert’ and the phenomenon I wished to study. 
 
On the basis of my experience in the field and my preparatory reading for this 
research I had made an assumption that the idea of physician advocacy underlay the 
phenomenon I wished to study. It was on these grounds that I commenced my first 
study, which is reported in Chapter Three. When I examined the classification 
systems for physician advocacy offered in the international literature (Dobson et al., 
2014; Flynn & Verma, 2008; Hubinette, Ajjawi, et al., 2014; Oandasan, 2005; Wright 
et al., 2005), as well as the curricula of medical specialty colleges in Australia, I 
observed that engagement in policy concerned with the allocation of resources was a 
small part of the physician advocate role – even of the level that was conceived of as 
supra-clinical, that is, concerned with matters above the level of the individual patient 
(Dobson et al., 2014; Dobson et al., 2012). ‘Advocacy’, thus, seemed too diffuse a 
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term to relate meaningfully to doctors’ role in macroallocation. In addition, my 
reading in public policy, expertise, and medical ethics caused me to realise that it 
ought not to be taken for granted that ‘advocacy’ is either a motivating factor or a 
macroallocation practice. It was clear that I needed to seek a more specific and value 
neutral term for the phenomenon and that I ought to explore the matter of advocacy as 
a motivation in the course of the empirical research.  
 
The notion of ‘stakeholders’, ‘those groups or individuals who are affected by the 
organisation as well as those who can affect it’ (Ackermann & Eden, 2011), resonated 
in the broadest sense with doctors’ engagement in macroallocation – indeed, doctors 
are recognised as holding the most significant stakeholder interest in health care 
(Belcher, 2014; Duckett, 1984) – but seemed unsuitable for supporting my research 
on two grounds. First, the stakeholder construct implies that doctors engage in 
macroallocation because the decisions made stand to impact upon them personally or 
professionally, that is, it implies that they have ‘skin in the game’ – and I wanted to 
remain noncommittal on that until I had explored it empirically. Second, ‘stakeholder’ 
does not accommodate the bureaucratic motivation for the type of medical 
involvement in which I was interested: the collection of essential expert knowledge 
and perspectives. In summary, ‘stakeholder’ conveyed a sense of politics pre-
emptively, and I rejected it in favour of a more apt construct of the role.  
 
In the next section I will discuss the organisational and ethical setting – deliberative 
policy making – in which technical experts operate.  
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1.2.6 Procedural justice frameworks for priority setting  
Introduction 
The problem of fair allocation of health care resources is profoundly complex 
(Gutmann & Thompson, 2002, p. 78), in part due to difficulties in establishing both 
the goods of health care and the aims of justice (Biron et al., 2012; Hoedemaekers & 
Dekkers, 2003a; Landwehr, 2013). Whilst justice is almost invariably the key 
objective of priority setting (Daniels & Sabin, 2008, p. 2; Kapiriri, Norheim, & 
Martin, 2009), justice might be approached via any of a range of conflicting 
distributive justice principles. It is common to invoke one or a combination of liberal, 
egalitarian, utilitarian or communitarian models, each of which holds to a different 
idea of justice (Hoedemaekers & Dekkers, 2003a; Landwehr, 2013). Applying John 
Rawls’s communitarian ‘maximin principle’, for example, would direct resources to 
those with lowest health status, whereas utilitarianism would direct them to those who 
could benefit most (Biron et al., 2012). Other ethical ideas may also be taken into 
account, for example, the rule of rescue – which would prioritise those in immediate 
peril (Biron et al., 2012) – disease severity, and fair innings (I. Williams et al., 2012, 
p. 13).  
 
Content values that are typically associated with macroallocation in practice 
accommodate commitments to cost effectiveness, clinical effectiveness, justice, 
equity and solidarity (Clark & Weale, 2012). Nonetheless, the problems of conflicting 
conceptualisations of justice, and disagreement on substantive principles for 
prioritising (Daniels, 2000; W. R. Smith, 2018; I. Williams et al., 2012, p. 13) have 
led to a preference for procedural justice approaches in discourse and in practice (S. 
Holm, 1998; Landwehr, 2013; Martin, Giacomini, et al., 2002; W. R. Smith, 2018). 
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Whilst procedural justice approaches seek to overcome the difficulty of agreeing on 
distributive justice ethical principles, such processes may still take into account 
normative concerns (Carter, Gordon, & Watt, 2016; Hasman, McIntosh, & Hope, 
2008), as well as values and opinions (Sandberg et al., 2018; I. Williams et al., 2012, 
p. 97). 
 
Procedural justice-based normative frameworks for macroallocation are connected to 
Habermas’s discourse ethics, which is based in his notion of procedural rigour in 
deliberative communication (Habermas & Outhwaite, 1996, pp. 180-192), and are 
founded in valorisation of rationality and the idea that legitimacy is conferred by 
democratic participation and publicly shared reasons and critique (Bærøe, 2009; W. 
R. Smith, 2018). Procedural justice approaches respond to a belief that decisions will 
be accepted as legitimate if the institutional conditions for deliberation are fair, 
properly constituted (Daniels, 2016; R Klein & Williams, 2000, pp. 20-21; Sandberg 
et al., 2018), and subject to rigorous and fair due process (Ham, 2000; Sandberg et al., 
2018; I. Williams et al., 2012, p. 97). It is generally agreed, however, that all are in 
some way deficient in giving due weighting to values, evidence and legitimate 
process (Byskov et al., 2014; Danis, Clancy, & Churchill, 2002, p. xxi; N. Kenny & 
Joffres, 2008; Resnik, MacDougall, & Smith, 2018) and that they are incapable of 
protecting decision making from social, political, and economic pressures (Resnik et 
al., 2018; N. Smith et al., 2014). N. Smith et al. (2014) acknowledge that the 
rationality such approaches seek to promote and safeguard is ‘often juxtaposed 
against the messy, murky and possibly even malign influence of ‘politics’.  
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Accountability for reasonableness  
Daniels and Sabin’s (1997) ‘accountability for reasonableness’ framework (A4R) is 
the paradigmatic procedural justice model (Friedman, 2008), which embraces the 
dimension of reason as well as ‘notions of engagement, democracy and legitimacy’ (I. 
Williams et al., 2012, p. 22). Being accountable for reasonableness means making 
available to the public the rationales for allocative decisions (Daniels & Sabin, 2008, 
p. 44). In the A4R framework four conditions must be satisfied if a process is to be 
considered just: relevance; publicity; the possibility of appeals and revision; and 
regulative/enforcement mechanisms (Daniels, 2016). Daniels and Sabin (2008, p. 45) 
describe them in the following way:  
‘1. Publicity/transparency condition: Decisions regarding both direct and indirect 
limits to care and rationales must be publicly accessible. 
2. Relevance condition: The rationales for limit-setting decisions should aim to 
provide a reasonable explanation of how the organisation seeks to provide 
“value for money’ in meeting the varied health needs of a defined population 
under reasonable resource constraints. Specifically, a rationale will be 
reasonable if it appeals to evidence, reasons, and principles that are accepted 
as relevant by fair-minded people who are disposed to finding mutually 
justifiable terms of cooperation. 
3. Revision and appeals condition: There must be mechanisms for challenge and 
dispute resolution regarding limit-setting decisions, and, more broadly, 
opportunities for revision and improvement of policies in the light of new 
evidence or arguments. 
4. Regulative condition: There is either voluntary or public regulation of the 
process to ensure that conditions 1-3 are met.’ 
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The relevance condition, which illuminates the role of deliberation participants in 
generating just decisions, is the cornerstone of the framework. It takes fairness as 
foundational and focuses on the notion of ‘fair equality of opportunity’ in the tradition 
of Rawls (Hasman & Holm, 2005). The condition is aimed at confining disagreement 
to ‘reasonable’ disagreement (Friedman, 2008) and relies on construal of ‘fair-
mindedness’ as an in principle willingness to ‘cooperate with others on terms they can 
justify to each other’ (Daniels & Sabin, 2008, p. 44). Decisions are regarded as unfair 
if they are based on biased, irrational, or arbitrary reasons. 
The relevance criterion is the focus of most of the criticisms of A4R, which tend to 
centre on its lack of specificity (Resnik et al., 2018). Friedman (2008) mounts an 
argument that the relevance condition is unnecessary and both impractical and unjust, 
in part on the basis that ‘reasonableness’ is too freighted with value to be of any use in 
limiting what might be discussed. Hasman and Holm (2005) also claim that 
determining what are reasonable and unreasonable arguments is complicated, and 
draw attention to the possibility of agreement on reasons, but not on their 
implications. A related criticism is that just processes may result in unjust decisions 
and vice versa (Badano, 2018b). Badano (2018a) is also critical of the degree to which 
the relevance condition admits utilitarian reasons, generally via the centrality of cost-
effectiveness as an argument.  
 
W. R. Smith (2018) and Resnik et al. (2018) claim that decisions made according to 
procedural justice frameworks are vulnerable to being overruled – although such 
extra-procedural decisions may be, in fact, more just, or at least more in keeping with 
community standards, than the ones they replace. This phenomenon, known as the 
‘democracy problem’ (Resnik et al., 2018), is especially relevant where deliberation 
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that meets procedural justice standards founders on irresolvable ideological 
differences. This position is generally countered by an acknowledgement that such 
extra-procedural pathways may be necessary in setting up the preconditions for 
resource redistribution, but are relinquished once these are established (Badano, 
2018b). 
 
Another significant criticism is that the relevance condition is insufficiently sensitive 
to power dynamics, resulting in the voices of the less powerful being overwhelmed by 
those of more powerful interests, and of the voices of patients not being taken forward 
by those ostensibly representing their interests (Gibson et al., 2005; Resnik et al., 
2018). Indeed, Daniels (2018) himself concedes that research aimed at refinement of 
A4R is warranted in the areas of understanding the process of deliberation, 
particularly amongst deliberators with unequal power or charisma. The framework 
also receives criticism for failing to encourage broad democratic participation 
(Friedman, 2008) and, via its tendency to privilege majority representation and views, 
for its failure to accommodate pluralism (Tsu, 2018).   
 
Finally, A4R has been criticised for the way it deals with the nature of evidence in 
priority setting; in response, Daniels (2018) has established a research initiative 
linking the framework with multicriterial decision analysis in response to this 
problem. Although it has catalysed constructive criticisms and alternative models, this 
framework remains the dominant procedural justice model in healthcare scholarship 
and practice, and has underpinned priority setting exercises in a range of jurisdictions 
(Russell, 2017, p. 57; W. R. Smith, 2018), including Norway, the United Kingdom, 
and Canada (Byskov et al., 2014). 
 
 
35 
Other procedural justice frameworks 
In Table 1.1 below I summarise other procedural justice frameworks considered in the 
bioethics and health service research literatures. There is considerable variation in the 
domains considered, although transparency and accountability receive multiple 
mentions. With the exception of A4R and Gutmann and Thompson (2002), which I 
discuss below, these frameworks have had little impact.  
Table 1.1  Comparison of procedural ethical frameworks for macroallocation 
 Daniels and 
Sabin (2008): 
accountability 
for 
reasonable-
ness (A4R) 
Gutmann 
and 
Thompson 
(2002): 
standards 
for assessing 
the process 
of health 
policy 
decision 
making 
Clark and 
Weale 
(2012): 
process 
values for 
health care 
priority 
setting 
Gibson et 
al. (2005): 
conditions 
for priority 
setting 
Wasylenko 
(2013): 
process 
steps for 
priority 
setting 
Context  Theoretical 
exploration 
of just 
deliberation 
Theoretical 
exploration 
of values 
Empirical 
response 
to A4R 
Theoretical 
exploration 
of priority 
setting 
Condition      
Relevance X   X   
Publicity/transparency X  X X  
Possibility of appeals 
and revision 
X   X  
Regulative/enforcement 
mechanisms 
X   X  
Accountability    X X  
Citizen and patient 
participation 
  X  X 
Empowerment     X  
Accessible reasons  X    
Moral reasons  X    
Respectful reasons  X    
Revisable reasons  X    
Responsibility to 
participate 
    X 
Proposals targeted to 
goals 
    X 
Develop and practice 
required skills  
    X 
Recognise the moral 
burden of leaders 
    X 
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The principal feature of the Gibson et al. (2005) framework is the inclusion of a fifth 
condition, described as the ‘empowerment condition’, which aims to ‘minimise power 
differences in the decision-making context and to optimise effective opportunities for 
participation in priority setting’. I will return to this framework in later chapters. 
 
The hallmark of Clark and Weale’s (2012) framework is its recognition of the 
importance of stakeholder participation in generating legitimacy and trust in a 
process. Wasylenko (2013) approaches the problem from a medical leadership 
perspective. This framework does not cover the same ground as the other frameworks, 
providing, instead, an insider’s view on how the moral burden of resource allocation 
might be addressed.  
 
The framework proposed by Gutmann and Thompson (2002) intersects with A4R in 
its focus on reasons and its inclusion of revisability, but provides a different 
perspective on reasons. It is founded in the notion of reciprocity, or mutual advantage, 
and sets out 4 standards of justification for health care policy decisions: reasons 
should be accessible, that is, comprehensible to others; moral, that is possessing 
generality to all such persons in all such circumstances; respectful, that is, made with 
‘a favourable attitude towards’ those with whom we disagree; and revisable, which 
has the same import as the similar condition in A4R (Gutmann & Thompson, 2002, 
pp. 77-94).  
 
I will return to Gutmann and Thompson’s model in the Discussion section of the 
thesis because it is the only theoretically derived model that offers, via its standard of 
‘respectful reasons’, a dimension that touches on the quality of interpersonal relations 
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in macroallocation, a factor that is of key interest in this thesis. The notable feature of 
the comparison below is, otherwise, the absence of standards that reflect this 
dimension.   
 
1.2.7  Conclusion 
In this Part I defined policy, described policy making, situated macroallocation in 
policy making, described the role of the expert in macroallocation, surveyed some 
alternative conceptions of the role, and described and evaluated procedural justice 
ethical frameworks.     
 
Aspects of procedural justice are central to this thesis’s focus on the medical role in 
macroallocation. Procedural justice frameworks are a way of establishing and 
maintaining the legitimacy of priority setting processes. In order to implement a 
procedural justice framework, a macroallocation institution must actively establish 
procedures to enable satisfaction of the framework’s conditions (Hasman & Holm, 
2005).  Although they are not always adopted formally in this way, their 
characteristics are generally visible to some extent in deliberative policy making 
procedures as a consequence of the reach of their influence and their coherence with 
societal values around reason, participation and legitimacy. The purpose they serve in 
my research is twofold: first, to establish a basis on which an ‘ideal’ policy process – 
by current standards – might be conducted, against which to reflect on the actual 
world of macroallocation that is exposed in my empirical work; and second, to lay the 
foundation for the normative analysis and recommendations that emerge from my 
research.  
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In this Part I have surveyed important procedural justice frameworks and highlighted 
those to which I will return in later chapters of the thesis. 
In the following Part I address how macroallocation work challenges medical ethics 
and professionalism. 
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Chapter One Part 3: Challenges to medical ethics and professionalism in 
macroallocation work  
 
 
 
1.3.1 Introduction 
Macroallocation has been characterised as a setting in which there are ‘relentless 
pressures from political, social, cultural and economic forces, both internal and 
external’ (N. Smith et al., 2014). Doctors are ‘internal’ actors whose particular roles, 
characteristics, and perspectives are responsible for some of these pressures. This Part 
discusses how the ethical issues relevant to doctors’ participation in macroallocation 
and related socially focused actions are represented in the medical ethics literature; 
the qualitative literature is addressed in a separate Part.  
 
The most prominent normatively significant themes in the literature are conflict of 
interest, which arises from doctors’ potential to benefit materially and reputationally 
from gains they negotiate on behalf of patients (Croft et al., 2012; Kerridge et al., 
2013; Veatch, 1990; J. R. Williams, 2005), and dual agency, which occurs when the 
doctor is unable to resolve the conflicting commitments they have to the individual 
patient and society (Huddle, 2014; N. Kenny & Joffres, 2008; Riggs & DeCamp, 
2014; S. Ross et al., 2010; Tilburt, 2014). These role-related conflicts are increasingly 
viewed as important areas for medical ethics development (K. M. Ross & Bernabeo, 
2014; Sabin, 2000; Tilburt, 2014; Tilburt & Brody, 2016; Wasserman & Wertheimer, 
2014). Other areas that are canvassed in the literature are the apportionment of 
medical time, doctors’ authority in matters of justice, and the implications of 
mandating medical engagement in socially focused activities as a professional 
 
 
40 
commitment. Here I deal briefly with each of these areas, which are also represented 
in the empirical chapters of the thesis.  
 
1.3.2  Conflict of interest 
Conflict of interest is said to be present in circumstances where it is possible for 
secondary interests – including financial benefits and opportunities for professional 
progression, recognition, and influence – to influence actions and judgements 
concerning primary interests, such as patient care (Lo & Field, 2009). One of its 
properties is that those it affects underestimate both its potential to influence their 
choices (DuBois, 2017; Klugman, 2017) and the difficulties involved in managing it 
(Mayes, Lipworth, & Kerridge, 2016). Formal disclosure and monitoring policies are 
the most common means of dealing with the problem of conflict of interest; however 
this approach both overestimates doctors’ insight into potential conflicts and the 
degree to which they are troubled by them (DuBois, 2017; Klugman, 2017). The 
cultivation of medical virtue has been proposed as an alternative approach (DuBois, 
Kraus, Mikulec, Cruz-Flores, & Bakanas, 2013; Oakley, 2014, p. 669).  
 
It is interesting that conflict of interest is not often presented as a problem in 
connection with the allocation of resources in the bioethics reference literature2 or the 
medical codes of ethics. With the exception of the recent references to medical virtue 
in this context – there is little evidence in the literature that doctors are expected to be 
                                               
2 For example, conflict of interests in this context is unmentioned in the following 
influential texts: ‘The Foundations of Bioethics’ (Engelhardt, 1986), ‘A Companion to 
Bioethics’ (Kuhse & Singer, 2012), the Australian textbook, ‘Ethics and Law for the 
Health Professions’ (Kerridge et al., 2013), ‘Principles of Health Care Ethics’ 
(Ashcroft & Wiley, 2007), and ‘Medical Ethics Today: The BMA’s Handbook of 
Ethics and Law’ (British Medical Association, 2012). 
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conscious of, troubled by, or accountable to themselves for the management of their 
role-related conflicts. It seems that doctors are ill served by this circumstance: whilst 
they are held to be untrustworthy because of role-related conflict, there is little to 
guide them towards deep awareness and self-management of the problem; a 
consequence is that they are, to some degree, infantilised and left isolated in the face 
of the procedural approaches that are taken to the problem in practice. 
 
In healthcare policy making scholarship and practice, concern tends to be directed 
onto financial conflicts; non-financial conflicts are more often accepted, even though 
their potential to assume higher priority than primary interests ensures that they are 
also deeply problematical (Kesselheim & Maisel, 2010; Montgomery & Lipworth, 
2018a).  
 
Even where doctors do not stand to benefit financially from priority setting decisions, 
conflict of interest is a risk because healthcare resource investments and 
disinvestments affect both the volume and form of services – shaping the nature and 
scope of professional practice (N. Smith et al., 2014), and thereby the opportunities 
available to doctors to excel clinically, build reputations, perform research, and 
appoint and develop staff, amongst other things. In the macroallocation setting, the 
concern is that doctors’ contributions to policy deliberations could be motivated by 
such considerations, rather than by a desire to improve the circumstances of patients 
or the community (Croft et al., 2012). A service enhancement weighted towards 
research, for example, might benefit the doctor’s reputation and distant future patients 
more than it meets the needs of current patients or addresses contemporary health care 
access problems.    
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1.3.3 Dual agency 
Dual agency – sometimes known as divided loyalties – might be viewed as a special 
form of conflict of interest. Tilburt (2014) defines it as ‘an avowed requirement to act 
simultaneously on behalf of two different parties with competing interests’. It is a 
feature of a number of branches of medicine, for example military and occupational 
medicine, and of common medical tasks such as the certification of patients’ fitness to 
drive; in such cases, the traditional tenet of medical professionalism – that the patient 
comes first – is challenged by the doctor’s obligations to society, government, or a 
corporation.  
 
It is common for philosophers and economists to reject the notion that doctors have a 
legitimate role in resource allocation on the grounds of dual agency; they argue that 
doctors’ fiduciary duty to the patient is incompatible with representing community or 
national interests in the apportionment of resources (Cassel, 1985; Kerridge et al., 
2013; Wasserman & Wertheimer, 2014) and that the pressures it places on doctors to 
conform with distributive justice-based principles is incompatible with meeting 
individual patients’ needs and desires (Pugh, 2018). In macroallocation, dual agency 
might also play out when doctors have simultaneous commitments to assisting 
governments in the fair allocation of resources and to maximising the resources 
available to their own healthcare organisations or practices. 
 
Role morality – that is, the segmentation of roles in professional life over time or 
between individuals – is the most common approach proposed for the management of 
dual agency (Adams, 2014; Tilburt, 2014); however, no approach has been shown to 
be satisfactory in eliminating the problem of potentially irreconcilable commitments 
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(Tilburt, 2014). K. M. Ross and Bernabeo (2014) argue that even if professional codes 
were to offer guidance, ‘physicians must ultimately learn to become aware of and 
negotiate their values themselves’ if dual agency is to be managed. These authors are 
unusual in staking out for this issue territory in the personal ethics landscape of 
individuals, and in contemplating an active and self-reflexive approach on the part of 
doctors.  
 
Dual agency may manifest as doctors expressing partiality in favour of the patients of 
their area of specialisation. Where doctors are co-opted to a macroallocation process 
concerned with a patient group or health issue in which they specialise partiality is 
inevitable and – probably – desirable; however where they are engaged in more 
general priority setting exercises covering competing demands, such partiality may be 
unhelpful. Partiality towards one’s patients is a norm of medical ethics, but it may be 
problematical in the latter case.  
 
Søren Holm (2011) justifies partiality in macroallocation on the basis of its role in 
furthering the ends of a just health system; he claims that it supports patient 
representation – especially where patient groups cannot organise themselves, have 
‘unpopular’ conditions, or are receiving substandard care. Kopelman (1999) makes a 
similar argument, based on Hume’s position that partiality may be acceptable if it can 
be justified from a general moral vantage point, claiming that partiality is justified 
because of its potential to increase the overall good in the health system – which 
would be diminished if patients could not trust their doctors to represent their 
interests. Kopelman concludes that ‘some partiality may be necessary and reasonable 
to produce the kind of trust, empathy, and concern about human vulnerability that we 
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should want in a health care system’ (Kopelman, 1999). Other justifications scholars 
have offered for tolerating partiality in macroallocation deliberations include that 
partiality is a desirable element of the good life, a position taken by Nussbaum, 
drawing on Aristotle (Tholen, 2018), and its inevitability (Daniels, 2016). In practice, 
the institutional structures of macroallocation and the inherent limitations of medical 
influence may contain the effect of partiality, although they neglect the moral 
dissonance experienced by doctors as they navigate the conflict. 
 
1.3.4 Doctors’ authority in matters of justice 
Several scholars have claimed that doctors lack special expertise in determining the 
outcomes likely to promote social justice (Huddle, 2013, 2014; McKie et al., 2008) 
and may even be particularly unsuited to roles concerned with the allocation of public 
goods on account of discrepancies between their values, skills, life experiences, 
preferences, and views and those of the general public (Huddle, 2013; Thistlethwaite 
& Spencer, 2008; Veatch, 1990). Other aspects of the legitimacy of the technical 
expert in macroallocation have been discussed in Part 2 of this chapter.  
 
1.3.5 The apportionment of medical time 
The apportionment of medical professional time has been recognised as a moral issue 
(Coulehan, Williams, Van McCrary, & Belling, 2003; Huddle, 2011b; Tilburt & 
Brody, 2016). There is a notion that ‘real medical work’ is patient-facing and that to 
mandate less of that in favour of socially focused activities would be a perverse use of 
unique medical skills (Huddle, 2011b). This perspective coexists with historical 
rhetoric that, as Tilburt and Brody (2016) put it, conjures up ‘images of physicians 
who never sleep, take vacations, have families or learn hobbies….[and] put their life 
at risk with reckless abandon for the sake of patient protection’. Such positions are at 
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odds with the newly minted broader medical professional commitments. They are also 
at odds with reality, as Tilburt and Brody’s droll image illustrates. Historical concepts 
of the medical professional place medical hours at the disposal of the doctor; in 
contemporary managed health services, where doctors are employees, responsibility 
for medical time allocation may belong – at least in part – elsewhere. This is relevant 
background to consideration of doctors’ decisions about engaging in macroallocation.    
 
1.3.6  The implications of mandating socially focused activities as a professional 
commitment 
 
The inclusion of socially focused activities in prominent codes of medical ethics 
represents a change to the ideals of medical professionalism and has prompted 
examination of the ethics of such actions by a small group of academics, notably 
Croft et al. (2012), Huddle (2011b), Earnest et al. (2010), and Tilburt (2014). 
 
Huddle (2014) maintains that social justice activity is inherently a political rather than 
professional activity, the inclusion of which as a tenet of professionalism wrongly 
redirects resources from core medical roles, places unreasonable demands on doctors, 
usurps their rights to determine and act on their own priorities for government 
investment, takes no account of doctors’ skills and preferences, and fails to 
accommodate the plurality of ways in which doctors can contribute to society 
(Huddle, 2011b, 2013). Notwithstanding the limited impact of directions contained in 
medical codes of practice on doctors’ decisions about professional roles, the 
challenges experienced by those who engage in socially focused roles suggest that 
such directions may, themselves, be ethically problematical.   
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1.3.7 Conclusion 
I have provided a short outline of the ethical dimensions of the medical role in 
macroallocation as they are represented in the bioethics literature. I have made a case 
that the literature is deficient in recognising the needs of doctors for ethical guidance 
on choosing the role and conducting it ethically; and I have shown that it is insensitive 
to the matter of doctors’ ethical consciousness and their experiences of performing the 
role. In the next Part I will present a review of the qualitative literature that deals with 
doctors’ experiences of the macroallocation role. 
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Chapter One Part 4: The qualitative research literature on doctors’ 
experiences of participation in macroallocation  
 
 
 
1.4.1 Introduction 
This chapter draws together the qualitative empirical studies reported in the medical 
and bioethics literature on doctors’ experiences in macroallocation. In preparing this 
review I was guided by the approach to systematic reviews in empirical bioethics 
outlined by Strech, Synofzik, and Marckmann (2008). 
 
1.4.2 Rationale 
In the first part of this chapter I set out the scope and rationale for this research and 
claimed in broad terms that the areas of the ethical commitments of doctors who 
engage in macroallocation, their experiences of the process, the ethical issues they 
encounter, and the skills they employ have not been addressed to any substantial 
degree in the medical and bioethics literature. The aim of this search was to identify 
where these topics had been studied in empirical qualitative studies so as to provide a 
foundation for the present research.  
 
In the course of analysis of the Values in Medicine interview data for the report in 
Chapter Three of the thesis, and associated reading in the areas of medical 
professionalism and policy making, significant conceptual differences between the 
phenomena of physician advocacy – including at supraclinical levels – and 
participation in macroallocation became increasingly clear. In particular, it was 
apparent that macroallocation activities were but a part of physician advocacy, and 
that participation in macroallocation might be motivated by factors other than a desire 
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to advocate. Accordingly, the research cohered around the issue of physician roles in 
macroallocation, and the search strategy used here adopts that focus.  
 
1.4.3 Search strategy 
Search description 
Date range: 2000-present 
Literature: Medical and bioethics; empirical studies and literature published in peer 
reviewed journals 
Data bases: Medline, Psychinfo, Proquest, Embase, Pubmed, Google Scholar, 
EBSCOhost, CINAHL 
Search terms: key words ((health resources) OR (resource allocation)) AND ((policy 
making) OR (decision making) OR (priority setting)) AND ((values) OR (ethic*) OR 
(motivation*)) AND (physician*) and Qualitative filter  
 
Relevance criteria 
Study types: Interview, focus group, case study, surveys with open-ended questions, 
text analysis. 
Subject focus: Includes or concerns physicians  
Language: English  
Geographical location: Developed countries 
 
Screening process 
1st screen: manual screen of abstracts to select qualitative records 
2nd screen: manual screen of full text records to select those that complied with any 
of the following criteria:  
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1. Does it concern doctors’ experiences of priority setting processes (other than 
bedside)? 
2. Does it concern the values of doctors engaged in priority setting processes 
(other than bedside)? 
3. Does it concern the motivations of doctors engaged in priority setting 
processes (other than bedside)? 
4. Does it concern issues of ethics experienced by doctors in the process of 
resource allocation (not the ethical principles by which resource allocation 
decisions are made)? 
5. Does it concern the skills doctors use in resource allocation? 
 
I expanded my search by backwards and forwards citation searching, which involved, 
respectively, reviewing the reference lists and citations of salient publications, and 
added additional records from my database and from alerts established on the basis of 
my search.  
 
Figure 1.1 summarises this stage of the process. Appendices 1 and 2 contain 
respectively details of the qualitative records from the initial search that were 
reviewed in full text, and the qualitative records from forward and backwards search 
expansion, the researcher’s database, and alerts that were reviewed in full text and 
included. 
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Figure 1.1  PRISMA diagram showing records assessment  
 
 
1.4.4 Quality of identified papers  
Assessment of the quality of qualitative research, especially in the context of attempts 
at synthesis is a contentious area (Lipworth, Davey, Carter, Hooker, & Hu, 2010; 
Strech et al., 2008). Whilst I was guided by the 6 quality criteria – clarification and 
justification, procedural rigor, representativeness, interpretive rigor, reflexivity and 
evaluative rigor and transferability – applied to the assessment of qualitative research 
in the Medical Journal of Australia (Kitto, Chesters, & Grbich, 2008), I did not 
 
 
 
From:  Moher D, Liberati A, Tetzlaff J, Altman DG, The PRISMA Group (2009).  
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attempt to weigh the quality of one paper over another. Indeed, there were no 
meaningful conflicts between the findings of studies included in this synthesis that 
would have forced consideration of the relative quality of papers. I established that, 
while most scored low on reflexivity, none required exclusion and all were 
conceptually coherent.  
 
1.4.5 Extraction and analysis of data  
Using full text records, I extracted descriptive and interpretative information 
categories that were based on the themes covered by the criteria set out in section 
1.4.3 above, modified inductively in the course of reading the papers. I was interested 
in what each study could contribute towards understanding the social roles of doctors 
in policy: their roles and behaviours, their experiences, the values and motivations 
that propelled them into roles in priority setting, and matters of ethical significance, 
including skill levels and features of the allocation process. For this review, I was not 
interested in the nature of the ethical criteria guiding decision-making, but I was 
interested in how macroallocation participants perceived the use of criteria in the 
process.  
 
Most of the studies I reviewed had an indirect bearing on my topic. None focused 
solely on doctors’ experiences or on others’ experiences of working with doctors in 
this context. In most cases the material I sought was embedded in broader accounts of 
policy processes and participant perspectives. In my analysis I was careful to isolate 
and report only on material relating to doctors or to process elements in which they 
would inevitably be involved, and where this was not possible, to make it clear in 
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what way doctors were dealt with. Due to the unfocussed relationship between the 
records and my topic, authors’ conclusions were generally not relevant to the analysis. 
 
1.4.6  Results 
Overview  
Through the database search described above 172 records were identified. After 
adjusting for duplicates and including 7 records from my search expansion strategy, 1 
from my database, and 1 from my alerts there were 154 records, which were screened 
by review of abstracts for relevance. The number of full text articles screened for 
eligibility against the criteria described above was 27, of which 10 were ineligible 
following full text review for reasons set out in Figure 1.1 above. The remaining 17 
records were carried forward for qualitative synthesis.3 
 
In most records the term given to the process was ‘priority setting’. Common 
synonyms were resource allocation, macroallocation, and mesoallocation. Studies 
involving disinvestment decisions were included where the processes also included 
consideration of investment priorities. The commonest activity was providing advice 
on high cost medications (HCM) and on the introduction of expensive new 
technologies. The countries represented were: Australia, Canada, Sweden, the UK and 
the Netherlands. All levels of government – national, provincial/state, regional, local, 
and facility – were represented, with provincial/state and regional predominating.  
 
                                               
3 Jill Russell’s (2017) PhD dissertation, ‘The rationality of rationing: a rhetorical 
policy analysis of deliberations about resource allocation in the NHS’, to which I 
return later in the thesis, is represented here by published research from the project.  
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Whilst, in general, the literature discussed below is descriptive and eschews 
normative conclusions, some records, notably Hodgett et al.’s (2012) study of 
disinvestment, Gibson et al.’s (2005) report of power differentials in a Canadian 
setting, and Russell and Greenhalgh’s (2009) UK case study, offer conclusions that 
point towards structural problems in priority setting that make it an uncomfortable 
experience for participants, less rational than it aspires to be, and ultimately, 
vulnerable to the risk of unjust outcomes. 
 
The sections below deal with the major themes found in these studies: doctors’ values 
and ethical commitments; issues of ethical import experienced in the priority setting 
process; and skills and knowledge.  
 
Values and ethical commitments 
With the exception of the report by Sinclair et al. (2008), which set out to explore the 
internal frameworks of participants in macroallocation, the findings on values 
presented here were incidental to the main concerns of the papers in which they 
appeared. They expose participants’ valorisation of medical eminence in priority 
setting process, and their consciousness of the limitations of formalised priority 
setting procedures. 
 
Medical dominance: In most of the cases where the processes studied used 
formalised priority setting instruments incorporating clinical evidence and economic 
criteria, participants viewed these factors as secondary to more traditional 
mechanisms based on medical knowledge and prestige. Robinson, Williams, 
Dickinson, Freeman, et al. (2012), in their analysis of priority setting case studies, 
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reported that participants valued evidence and procedure ‘as much for their 
legitimising potential’ as for impact on the quality of decisions.  
 
The doctors in these studies tended to favour processes that relied on medical opinion. 
In McKie et al.’s (2008) Australian focus group study concerning the views of various 
interest groups on who should decide on health priorities, which I describe in greater 
detail below, eminence was highly valued by the doctors’ focus groups, who believed 
decisions should be made by panels of ‘eminent medical, allied health and community 
representatives’, who would consider representations made by interest groups. 
 
The same preference was reported in UK-based studies. In a narrative analysis of 
priority setting in an English primary care trust, Robinson, Williams, Dickinson, and 
Freeman (2012) reported that most clinicians favoured priority setting models that 
were founded on having the ‘right’ experts in the room, and conceptualised the 
process as one in which political fit and the ability to present a case well were 
significant.  
 
Committee functioning: Douglas Martin is first author on a range of qualitative 
studies of priority setting processes in the Canadian health system that give insights 
into participants’ experiences and values. One Ontario-based interview study, which 
evaluated the views on fairness and accountability for reasonableness of members of 
two committees charged with priority setting for new technologies in cardiac and 
cancer care, on which physicians formed the majority of the membership (Singer, 
Martin, Giacomini, & Purdy, 2000), found that they considered that collegiality and 
inclusivity derived from stable committee membership contributed to consistency in 
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decision-making (Martin, Giacomini, et al., 2002). The same study showed that 
participants believed the representation of multiple perspectives to be the single most 
important enabler of fair decision-making. This study also found a preference for 
consensus over voting because it gave decisions more ‘credence’ (Martin, Giacomini, 
et al., 2002).  
 
Subjective evaluative frameworks: Using a role-playing simulation of priority 
setting, Sinclair et al. (2008) studied the internal, subjective frameworks of influential 
oncologists, many of whom sat on a board recommending drugs for inclusion on the 
province’s cancer formulary in Alberta, Canada. The authors concluded that decision-
making was strongly influenced by committee members’ individual orientations 
towards their own internal frameworks and that these subjective frameworks – or 
values systems – need to be taken into account when attempting to implement 
objective systems, such as the accountability for reasonableness framework (A4R) of 
Daniels and Sabin (2008). Doctors’ contributions were particularly influenced by 
frameworks that accommodated their struggles with balancing fidelity to the patient 
with social stewardship, reconciling multiple perspectives, and coping with arduous 
procedure.  
 
Issues of ethical significance experienced in the priority setting process  
The categories of issues of ethical significance represented in the qualitative literature 
are: absent or inadequate criteria for decision making; role-related conflicts; 
argumentation practices; social bias and power differentials; structural bias; and 
insufficient support for processes and participants. 
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Absent or inadequate criteria for decision making: Although, as reported above, a 
number of records reported doctors’ satisfaction with processes in which they were 
given free rein to influence decisions, others highlighted engagement in processes that 
lacked explicit criteria for decision making as a cause of moral unease. In this 
summary I have represented participants’ perceptions of the absence or inadequacy of 
criteria for decision making as an ethical issue, taking cues from the data and the 
authors’ analyses – although it was not always seen as such by participants.  The 
matter of whether or not formal criteria were likely to have been in play has been 
comprehensively addressed by Brayan Seixas (2018) in a recent MSc thesis, in which 
he surveyed academics and decision makers in 14 industrialised countries to capture 
the details of current procedure. 
 
In Martin, Giacomini et al.’s (2002) in-depth, open-ended interviews with the 
members of priority setting committees in Ontario, participants claimed  that they did 
not know of criteria for determining fair outcomes, and judged fairness to be ‘relative’ 
(Martin, Giacomini, et al., 2002). The participants in this study held that the measure 
of fairness was the fairness of the process. There was a similar report from the UK: 
Bryan et al.’s (2007) qualitative case study aimed at understanding the use of cost 
effectiveness information in national level coverage for medical interventions 
reported that participants believed that equity considerations were not formally 
considered, and that some committee members were unaware of the principles to be 
applied or how they might be used. 
 
An Australian example is offered by Gallego, Taylor, and Brien (2007), who 
conducted an interview study involving participants in a committee deliberating about 
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the introduction of new technologies into a large metropolitan health service in New 
South Wales (NSW), aiming to describe the process and elicit participants’ 
perceptions of it. Amongst the 12 purposively selected participants were 4 medical 
clinicians and 5 medical managers. This committee lacked a formal ethical theory 
guiding decision-making, although some committee members reported that it decided 
on the basis of the principles of justice and beneficence (Gallego et al., 2007). For this 
committee, fairness was approached through making decisions explicit and 
transparent in order to demonstrate procedural justice (Gallego et al., 2007).  
 
Similar findings were made by Harris, Allen, Waller, and Brooke (2017), who 
conducted a qualitative case study involving interviews, workshops, and document 
analysis in a large multi-facility health service in Victoria, Australia in order to 
examine the decision making infrastructure and explore the knowledge and 
experience of participants in disinvestment. The participants in this study claimed that 
decision making took place in the absence of formal criteria. In this case, many 
participants reported that instead of relying on criteria they applied ‘mental checklists’ 
(Harris et al., 2017). The doctors in this study generally felt that decisions were made 
in the best possible way without explicit criteria and reported that attempts to 
introduce them had met with resistance (Harris et al., 2017). 
 
A case in which participants held the formalised priority setting tools with which they 
were expected to work to be inadequate for the task was reported in Russell and 
Greenhalgh’s (2009) analysis of the deliberative processes of an NHS PCT, which is 
described in greater detail below. The authors found that although there was a formal 
list of principles for decision-making, they were often found to be inadequate for the 
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purpose at hand, highlighting for the authors a tension between the aspirations of 
‘mechanising’ priority setting and ‘muddling through’ (Russell & Greenhalgh, 2009). 
 
Conflicts of interest and role: Given the extent of the concern in the theoretical 
literature about conflicts of interest and dual agency (Croft et al., 2012; de Kort et al., 
2007; Gallego, Fowler, & van Gool, 2008; Kerridge et al., 2013, p. 1041; N. Smith et 
al., 2014; Veatch, 1990; Wiersma, Kerridge, & Lipworth, 2017; J. R. Williams, 2005, 
p. 71) their exposure in the empirical literature was surprisingly slight. 
 
To answer the question ‘who should decide how health priorities are set in Australia?’ 
McKie et al. (2008) conducted a focus group study in which groups comprising the 
general public, health bureaucrats, allied health practitioners, and rural and 
metropolitan general practitioners met separately. In this study the citizen groups were 
found to value a dispassionate approach to decision-making. Their expectations of 
doctors were that they would contribute their knowledge of client needs and specialist 
perspectives on health conditions, but they considered that doctors’ vested interests 
could inappropriately influence priority setting outcomes (McKie et al., 2008).  
 
The group studied by Martin, Giacomini, et al. (2002) valued honesty and, to that end, 
participants viewed declaration of conflicts of interest as a must: clinicians with a 
great interest in a topic were suspected of being at risk of having a conflict of interest 
‘lurking in the background’.  
 
Dual agency is a special form of conflict of interest in which tension arises from the 
need to act simultaneously as gatekeeper to the service’s budget and patient advocate. 
 
 
59 
It was explored by de Kort et al. (2007) in their interview study, undertaken in the 
Netherlands, of how physicians view their responsibilities in relation to the cost of 
‘high cost’ treatments in cancer. The study found that, whilst participants did not take 
costs into account in bedside rationing, they did take them into account, perhaps 
unconsciously, at the level of hospital policy, in their resource allocation deliberations 
with management and colleagues, especially if a decision in favour of one expensive 
drug would wipe out their annual budget (de Kort et al., 2007). Doctors participating 
in policy development at the national level fell into two groups: those who believed 
that affordability was not their concern and those who believed that the committee 
would lose credibility if it did not include cost considerations in its deliberations. The 
authors attributed the differences in doctors’ attitudes and actions at each level of 
allocation to the inclusion in the concept of being a good doctor of a willingness to 
play different roles (de Kort et al., 2007).  
 
In Gallego et al.’s (2008) study  of a committee prioritising technology funding in a 
health service NSW, Australia, doctor members recognised and accepted the need to 
act as gatekeeper to the hospital’s budget as well as patient advocate.   
 
Argumentation practices: A synthetic discourse analysis of transcripts from a 
medical panel deliberating on disinvestment from a costly reproductive technology in 
Adelaide, Australia focusing on the argumentative and rhetorical strategies used by 
doctors to negotiate constructions of evidence (Hodgetts et al., 2012) found that 
doctors did not just append clinical information to objective outcomes data to arrive at 
a ‘more accurate’ version of the facts, but argued against the facts on a variety of 
bases and constructed an alternative version of legitimate evidence (Hodgetts et al., 
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2012). The authors highlighted the argumentative nature of doctors’ inputs and 
concluded that dispute over what is legitimate evidence has the potential to reframe or 
forestall deliberations (Hodgetts et al., 2012). This report is included in this synthesis 
because, although it focussed specifically on disinvestment, it was situated 
theoretically within the broader domain of health care priority setting and accords 
with my professional experience in policy making. It suggests that information and 
procedure alone cannot protect from threats to justice that arise from individual 
participant behaviours and failure to manage them.  
 
Participants’ valorisation of persuasive tactics was also reported by Russell and 
Greenhalgh (2009) in their case study analysis of the deliberative processes and 
decision making in a UK primary care trust (PCT). The authors used discourse 
analysis to analyse data gathered through observation, recordings, and transcripts of 
meetings comprising medical and non-medical participants in equal numbers, and 
observed that doctors used rhetorical contributions to reframe the policy problem 
away from numerical indices into areas where clinical experience carried weight. In 
their conclusion, they contrasted two conceptualisations of priority setting: decision-
science and rhetorical deliberation, favouring the latter and recommending that 
language, argument, and discourse in policy making should be given prominence in 
order to promote creative thinking (Russell & Greenhalgh, 2009). 
   
Social bias and power differentials: Unsurprisingly, as summarised earlier, doctors 
have been reported as readily accepting medical dominance in macroallocation 
decision making. Equally unsurprisingly, others do not share this view. 
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The allied health group studied in McKie et al.’s (2008) analysis of views about 
health care decision making in Australia felt that the voices of doctors and health 
economists were too powerful and should be weighted less than those of others 
around the table in order to reduce their capacity to influence outcomes; doctors were 
also judged by the citizen groups to have too much power. The authors pointed out 
that although redressing power imbalances and involving the public in deliberation 
might be a worthy goal, the ‘best’ process does not necessarily deliver the ‘best’ 
outcomes (McKie et al., 2008). The matter of doctors’ power also came up in Martin 
et al.’s (2002) case study, in which managerial participants reported being sensitive to 
the need to ensure that experts were not allowed to dominate the discussion. 
 
Reeleder, Goel, Singer, and Martin (2006) conducted a qualitative study involving 
semi-structured interviews with 46 hospital chief executives in Ontario, Canada, 
concerning the relationship of leadership to priority setting. They found that the CEOs 
were concerned about the potential of powerful doctors to secure disproportionate 
levels of funding by acting as ‘squeaky wheels’ in their engagement with boards of 
management. Similarly, participants in Harris et al.’s (2017) qualitative case study of 
resource allocation in a large health service in Australia reported that decisions were 
often undertaken outside the formal process or were influenced by extra-procedural 
lobbying. The power of clinicians to blow attempts at rigorous decision making off 
course was also reported by Robinson, Williams, Dickinson, Freeman, et al. (2012) in 
their analysis of 5 case study sites in the UK. 
 
The most comprehensive exploration of power differentials was provided by Gibson 
et al. (2005), who analysed a case study, involving interviews and focus groups, on a 
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priority setting process in an academic health service in Toronto, Canada for the 
impact of power differentials between participants. The process studied involved 40 
senior administrative and clinical directors and around 65 medical department heads. 
Included in the process was a vote. Participants reported the emergence of a ‘herd 
mentality’ and experienced being unduly swayed by the strongest speakers. They felt 
dissent was not welcome, were reluctant to oppose their line-managers, and were put 
on the defensive in a ‘game’ to ensure that their programs survived (Gibson et al., 
2005). Some participants felt they had been set up to ratify decisions that had already 
been made by those in power. The authors concluded that to the 4 conditions of A4R 
(Daniels & Sabin, 2008) should be added a fifth –  the empowerment condition –  
which states that there should be efforts to minimise power differences in the 
deliberative process in order to increase the likelihood of just decisions (Gibson et al., 
2005).  
 
In the Australian setting, whilst the participants in Gallego et al.’s (2007) interview 
study concerning priority setting for high cost medications at a tertiary-care hospital 
in NSW identified budgetary impact as the main factor taken into account in decisions 
on introducing new technologies, they also reported being influenced by political 
considerations – especially close to elections – pressure from individual clinicians, 
and the presence of community interest, especially if there was media attention 
(Gallego et al., 2008).  
 
Structural bias: The way discourse in resource allocation is prosecuted is an ethical 
issue, since it can admit exclusions and biases. In Russell & Greenhalgh’s (2009) case 
study of decision-making in a UK PCT, problems were constructed in terms of 
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quantitative information, leading to a tendency to marginalise other types of 
information, although committee members frequently expressed a desire to discuss 
the other dimensions of problems.  
 
The second instance is also from the UK. To explore how cost effectiveness analysis 
should be used in health technology coverage decisions I. Williams, Bryan, and 
McIver (2007) conducted a qualitative case study, involving non-participant 
observation and interview, of participants in the NICE Appraisals Committee 
responsible for national-level technology coverage decisions in the UK. Of the 
committee members, 12 out of 28 were doctors. This study found that one of the 
views held about economic analysis in priority setting was that it not only impacted 
the overall result, but that it influenced the structure and framing of the discussions 
towards areas where the health economists were the dominant experts and other 
members, feeling unskilled, remained silent (I. Williams et al., 2007). 
 
Insufficient support for processes and participants: Two Australian studies 
reported macroallocation participants’ perceptions that they received inadequate 
practical support. Harris et al.’s (2017) study of resource allocation processes in a 
large health care network in Australia found that, across a range of committee 
processes, insufficient resources were applied to supporting their function: staff time, 
access to expertise, education, and sources of data, although present in the 
organisation, were identified as deficient. 
 
On the basis of the assertions of participants in Gallego et al.’s (2008) study of 
technology funding in NSW that the paperwork associated with the process was 
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onerous for clinicians, the authors concluded that the process ought to be simplified, 
and that designated support staff ought to be provided in order to minimise the work 
of clinical staff. 
 
Skills and knowledge  
The records dealing with skills and knowledge focussed principally on participants’ 
limitations in areas relevant to contemporary priority setting practice, notably 
economic analysis. 
 
Skills and knowledge deficits: The three principal jurisdictions from which the 
empirical literature is drawn all reported on deficits in the required skills. 
 
In Bryan et al.’s (2007) qualitative case study of national level macroallocation 
concerning coverage for medical interventions in the UK, which involved semi-
structured interviews, observation, and analysis of documentation relating to policy-
making committees on which doctors made up 43% of the membership, participants 
were uncomfortable with their own and others’ lack of competence in understanding 
health economic analyses and recognised this as an ethical issue.  
 
Gibson et al.’s (2005) case study of a priority setting process in Toronto, Canada 
reported that people found making decisions difficult due to lack of preparedness, 
which in turn was related to insufficiency of preparation time, unavailability of data 
and limited skill sets; comparing the value of different courses of action was 
challenging for clinicians. As well as being concerned that their own skills were not 
adequate for the task, the participants in this study were critical of the acumen of 
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others. Gallego et al.’s (2008) study of technology funding decision making in NSW 
also found participants’ skills to be deficient, especially in economic evaluation.  
 
Eckard, Janzon, and Levin (2014) conducted an interview study with the medical and 
other members of the 21-person Priority Setting Group (PSG) for heart disease in 
Sweden in order to explore the use of cost effectiveness data in priority setting. The 
study found that participants rated their understanding of health economics as low, 
and that this made them prone to making easy ‘interpretations’ and falling under the 
influence of the health economist on the group.  
 
Harris et al. (2017) in their study of mesoallocation in an Australian health care region 
reported that their participants did not share understandings of the terms ‘evidence’, 
‘evidence-based processes’ or ‘critical appraisal’ that were congruent with current 
research definitions, and relied on members who ‘knew the evidence’ – often 
department heads – leading the authors to conclude that they could not be certain that 
the process used the best evidence in its decision-making. There is some evidence of 
the same phenomenon in Canada: participants in Martin et al.’s (2002) interview 
study of priority setting committees in Ontario tended to stick to the areas in which 
they felt competent, with medical specialists contributing to discussions of disease 
entities and the benefits of treatment, and medical generalists contributing to 
discussions on evidence and alternatives.   
 
1.4.7 Discussion 
The empirical scholarship in the area of the ethical dimensions of doctors’ 
engagement in macroallocation is scarce. Whilst some authors have made 
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observations related to my research topic, none have addressed it directly. Many of 
the insights yielded by this search were found in others’ perceptions of medical roles 
and behaviours, rather than in doctors’ own experiences. Notably absent were 
consideration of the values or motivations that propel doctors towards roles in 
macroallocation and influence their practice, attempts at ethical analysis of the expert 
role, and normatively relevant conclusions, which are the key concerns of my 
research.  
 
The reliance of the synthesis on my identification, informed by my prior reading, of 
ethical issues not voiced as such by study participants, or not identified as ethically 
important by the researchers, must be acknowledged as a limitation of this work. 
There are, however, some reasons to have confidence in the major themes. It is 
significant that the findings across all of the jurisdictions covered by the review 
exhibited strong congruence, and that they align with the available theoretical 
literature on professionals’ roles in macroallocation and policy making. Specifically, 
medical participants’ lack of knowledge about or dissatisfaction with principles for 
decision making has been acknowledged in the theoretical literature focusing on 
macroallocation participants generally (Rogowski, 2018; I. Williams et al., 2012, p. 
13), as has the damaging effect extra-procedural political intervention has on 
legitimacy (I. Williams et al., 2012, p. 88). Themes of unfairness are not unexpected; 
only 47% of the academics and decision makers in Seixas’ (2018) survey rated 
priority setting in their jurisdictions as fair. 
 
The matter of power differentials between bureaucratic and medical participants, and 
the limits of medical influence has been written about extensively – for example, by 
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Navarro (1976), Brint (1994), and El Enany (2013). The notions of collegiality, 
participant support, and skills represented in the empirical literature surveyed here 
resonate with Wasylenko’s (2013) ideas on the doctor’s view of the moral burdens of 
priority setting. Finally, the pull between evidence and eminence shown in the 
empirical literature is characteristic of the tensions between data and deliberation that 
are addressed comprehensively in contemporary literature on policy making, as well 
as in work addressing macroallocation, for example, by I. Williams et al. (2012), 
Russell (2017), and Seixas (2018).  
 
An important finding of this synthesis is that non-economist participants in 
macroallocation value skills and understanding in health economics over all other 
domains of knowledge, and attribute their feelings of being disadvantaged in 
deliberating priorities primarily to limited skills in economic analysis. This may 
signify either a sound grasp on the part of macroallocation participants of the realities 
of contemporary neoliberal policy making procedure, or a failure of insight into the 
full suite of skills and knowledge that are pertinent to policy deliberation.  
 
Another significant theme is that participants in macroallocation often report that they 
do not have an understanding of the principles of equity as they might affect health 
care resource allocation; they often do not discern in the processes in which they 
engage any formal set of principles or criteria for supporting just decision making – 
and when they are present, they are not always suited to the task at hand. In Hall et 
al.’s (2018) extensive survey of priority setting experts, by contrast, decision making 
frameworks were identified as an achievement; that the texts included here predate 
Hall et al.’s study may account for this difference.  
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The following features are also salient, in that they show considerable concordance 
with the elements of procedural justice approaches to legitimising decision making: 
the integrity of the process is the favoured measure of fairness; the power of doctors’ 
voices is a threat to just outcomes; and non-medical actors perceive doctors’ potential 
to have conflicts of interest as problematical. These themes coincide with the area 
identified as underdeveloped and in need of immediate research in the stocktaking 
survey undertaken by Hall et al. (2018). 
 
Taken as a whole, this literature suggests that there are structural problems in priority 
setting that may make it an uncomfortable experience for participants, less rational 
than it aspires to be, and ultimately, vulnerable to the risk of unjust outcomes. 
 
1.4.8  How the gaps in the literature support the relevance of this study  
Although this synthesis makes no significant contribution to delimiting the present 
study, it sheds some light on policy-active doctors’ ethical commitments and on the 
procedural issues they consider to have ethical import in the setting of 
macroallocation. This material has been of some use in supporting the background 
and discussion sections of the publications included in this thesis.  
 
It is, however, the shortage of empirical data on the area of concern to my research 
that is the most significant outcome of this of the literature, suggesting that my work 
has the potential to illuminate significantly the ethical landscape of macroallocation as 
it is experienced by the doctors who participate in it. 
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Chapter One Part 5:  Doctors’ roles in macroallocation – the NSW context 
 
 
 
1.5.1 Introduction  
This Part outlines the organisation of health care resource allocation in New South 
Wales (NSW) and describes the points at which doctors engage with it. 
Health funding is vulnerable to economic fluctuations, to changes of government and 
political and economic ideology (N. Smith et al., 2014), and to the consequences of 
the Australian multi-tiered system of government and mixed funding arrangements, 
that create opportunities for duplication, cost-shifting, and funding disputes (Biggs, 
2013). It is common for governments to attempt to depoliticise health care priority 
setting through defining it as a technical issue and allocating some of its 
responsibilities to independent expert advisory bodies, or through decentralising 
decision making to the regional level (Sandberg et al., 2018). In Australia, most 
significant priority setting occurs according to one or other of these models.  
 
1.5.2 Health care funding responsibilities in Australia 
The Commonwealth and the state and territory governments have separate 
responsibilities for funding and regulating the health system. Biggs (2013) outlines 
the responsibilities that are relevant to the large publicly funded and operated 
institutions with which this research is concerned as follows: 
  
Commonwealth Government: 
• Administering Medicare, which provides free or subsidised access to 
specified medical, diagnostic and allied health services  
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• Administering the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS), which 
provides a universal subsidy for prescription medicines 
• Allocating medical research grants, chiefly through the National Health 
and Medical Research Council 
• Administering capped dental benefits for children and teens  
• Funding community-controlled Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
healthcare organisations 
• Funding education of health professionals  
 
States and territories: 
• Managing and administering public hospitals 
• Delivering preventive services such as breast cancer screening and 
immunisation programs 
• Funding and managing community and mental health services 
• Operating public dental clinics  
 
Shared: 
• Managing and administering public hospitals 
• Funding public hospital services based on a national activity-based 
funding (ABF) formula  
• Funding and operating preventive services, such as free cancer screening 
programs  
• Funding palliative care services  
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The states and territories delegate some of their responsibilities to regional health 
authorities and institutions. How these arrangements operate in NSW is discussed in a 
later section. 
 
According to the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW), in 2015-16 
Australia’s total healthcare expenditure (recurrent and capital, combined) was $170.4 
billion, of which government healthcare expenditure represented about two-thirds 
(67.3%); in the same year, government expenditure on services provided by public 
hospitals was $46.9 billion, representing 40.9% of total government healthcare 
expenditure (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2017).  
 
Health care in Australia is also delivered by private sector institutions, which are not 
directly funded or managed by government. Around 47% (Palmer & Short, 2014, p. 
71) of Australians hold private health insurance, which gives them access to a range 
of hospital and health services, generally more promptly than the uninsured, and often 
in dedicated facilities. Private health care arrangements are not considered in this 
research. 
 
1.5.3 Organisation of healthcare funding in New South Wales 
This research was undertaken in the immediate aftermath of a significant change to 
the way healthcare policy, planning, and associated resource allocations are 
undertaken in NSW. The changed arrangements are specified in the ‘Corporate 
Governance and Accountability Compendium for NSW Health’, which was issued in 
2012 to support the introduction of a new, devolved corporate structure, involving 
small, locally-based hospital networks charged with planning and providing public 
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health services in local areas, as required under the National Health and Hospitals 
Network Agreement (NHHNA) of April 2010 (NSW Government, 2012).  
 
While the Ministry of Health (MOH) retained responsibility for planning system-
wide, undefined ‘key’, and undefined ‘national and state priority’ services, the 
majority of service and resource planning was devolved to the 15 Local Health 
Districts (LHD) and 2 Specialty Networks that report to and are funded by the NSW 
Ministry of Health (NSW Government, 2012; Saunders & Carter, 2016). The LHDs, 
which typically contain a range of hospital and community based services, are 
responsible for planning and delivering healthcare services to populations of between 
30,000 and 900,000 (Health Stats NSW, 2014) via individual annual agreements, 
under the provisions of the NSW Health Service Act 1997 (NSW Government, 2016).  
 
Under the new arrangements, LHDs receive their base budget, plus an allowance for 
population growth and ageing. The vast majority of decisions about investment in 
expansion and replacement of existing services, technologies, and equipment are fully 
devolved to the LHDs (NSW Government, 2012). The MOH retains a portion of the 
budget, however, to allocate directly to new technology, supra-regional services and 
services that are influenced by state-wide networking, i.e., services for which demand 
is generated that is outside the control of an individual LHD, for example, intensive 
care services (ICU). In most of these cases, the Ministry decides from which LHD to 
purchase additional services following consultation with the Agency for Clinical 
Innovation (ACI), which advises about the suitability of the locations selected for 
receipt of funding vis a vis their compliance with desirable models of care, as assessed 
by ACI’s clinician networks. Once the Ministry receives the advice and makes a 
 
 
73 
decision, its service-purchasing arm negotiates funding and provision with the 
relevant LHD(s). The Ministry retains a committee that has clinician members to 
advise the Secretary of the Ministry on new technology and supra-regional services 
(NSW Government, 2012). 
 
1.5.4 Opportunities for doctors to be involved in policy making and priority 
setting in NSW 
 
The devolution of the planning role saw a reduction in opportunities for doctors to 
participate in policy at the central level, except in the areas specified above, and an 
increase in the opportunities and obligations to do so at the regional and local levels. 
In addition to these avenues for policy engagement, the state-wide networks operated 
by ACI, whose brief is development of safe, effective patient-centred care for all 
aspects of the NSW healthcare system, largely through service redesign within 
existing resources, offered doctors a chance to engage in policy-making (Agency for 
Clinical Innovation, 2016).  
 
At the LHD level, the formal setting for doctors to engage with policy making is the 
clinical council, where doctors provide ‘professional (expert) clinical guidance’ on, 
amongst other things, priorities for service development and resource allocation 
(NSW Government, 2012) 
 
At all levels in the NSW system, policy resulting in macroallocation conforms 
broadly to the policy cycle outlined earlier in this chapter of the thesis. 
Macroallocation policy for a region is generally a recurrent process of assessing 
priorities and opportunities, and developing and resourcing strategies that respond to 
the most highly prioritised needs (Saunders & Carter, 2016). Doctors engaging in 
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policy will, thus, have many opportunities to present and re-present arguments or 
advice supporting courses of action they favour. The availability, each financial year, 
of resources for ‘key’ and priority service areas, growth funding, project funding, seed 
funding, as well as service growth opportunities that arise in the context of health 
capital works, creates frequent opportunities for doctors to be active in 
macroallocation at the central, regional, and local levels. As well as taking part in 
macroallocation under the new model, most of the doctors in my study had 
participated in the previous, more centralised, structures, which offered more doctors 
opportunities to participate at the statewide level. 
 
Doctors’ activities in priority setting typically include: membership of committees, 
attendance at meetings and workshops with decision-makers, lobbying, construction 
of independent processes designed to advance policy debate, and preparation of 
submissions, applications, and correspondence. Doctors who engage in these 
processes as experts contribute information that is unique to their clinical roles, and 
may argue in favour of certain courses of action; they do not, however, routinely 
make the ultimate decisions on what services or programs receive funding.  
 
The institutions for macroallocation in NSW offer opportunities for doctors to 
contribute their expertise in the role of petitioner, that is, as a proponent of a particular 
course of action, or as a judge, that is, an evaluator of the cases put forward by others. 
With growing subspecialisation in medicine shrinking the pool of experts capable of 
speaking authoritatively across their borders, it can be difficult to maintain a boundary 
between the two roles.  
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Doctors who are engaged in medical politics, including championing the rights of 
medical practitioners, and broad professional reform may also be involved in resource 
allocation as representatives of their organisations. It is not with these groups or issues 
that the present research is concerned. 
 
1.5.5 Participation of NSW doctors in macroallocation in other jurisdictions 
Some of the participants in this study engaged in policy-making activity in Australian 
and international jurisdictions other than, or as well as, in NSW. As these activities 
conformed to the general principles outlined in the section on policy and health care 
resource allocation, and have similarities with the opportunities described above, no 
attempt will be made to describe each of them individually.  
 
One role the participants in my study occupied at the national level was so common as 
to warrant a description in this introduction, however. It was the role of member of 
the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee (PBAC), a committee established in 
1954 to make recommendations to the Minister responsible for health care on new 
medicines for listing on the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS), determining 
community access to subsidised medicines (Whitty & Littlejohns, 2015). This 
committee is an independent expert body appointed by the Australian Government. 
Only medicines recommended by the committee can be listed. In arriving at a 
recommendation, the committee must consider ‘the medical conditions for which the 
medicine was registered for use in Australia, its clinical effectiveness, safety and cost-
effectiveness (‘value for money’) compared with other treatments’ (The 
Commonwealth of Australia, 2018). It was the first health technology assessment 
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process to use cost-effectiveness evidence in the formulation of its recommendations 
(Whitty & Littlejohns, 2015). 
 
The PBAC’s membership comprises medical practitioners, other health professionals, 
health economists, and consumer representatives. As at March 2018, 16 out of the 21 
members were doctors, covering a wide range of medical specialties, although none 
were surgeons or critical care specialists (The Commonwealth of Australia, 2018). 
 
Through the foregoing institutions, doctors gain access to decision making processes 
in relation to the funding of health care programs and initiatives, examples of which 
are: the establishment or expansion of specific health care programs, investment in 
facilities and technology, subsidisation of high cost medicines (HCM) and 
investigative technologies, and allocation of funding for pioneering treatments 
(Furnham & Ofstein, 1997).  
 
In the next and final Part of this Introduction I will set out the thesis aims and research 
questions. 
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Chapter One Part 6: Thesis aims and research questions 
 
 
 
1.6.1 Thesis aims 
In this Part I set out the thesis aims and research questions. 
 
Doctors are currently an integral part of priority setting at the macro level in health 
care, as providers of expert knowledge and perspectives. The ethical dimensions of 
the role are not yet well understood. I devised this research to advance understanding 
of the values, commitments, and ethical experiences of doctors who choose roles in 
macroallocation as a significant part of their professional lives. My study objectives 
were: 
1) to explore doctors’ reasons for taking on the role of technical expert in 
resource allocation policy work, 
2) to describe the values and ethical commitments of doctors who undertake 
the role, 
3) to understand how doctors experience the ethical dimensions of the role, 
and  
4) to identify an ethical framework with explanatory and normative power to 
assist in understanding practice and guiding moral analysis.  
 
This thesis aims to illuminate the social process of macroallocation through an 
examination of the reported experiences of its medical participants, and, by means of 
empirical bioethical analysis, to develop an empirically derived framework for moral 
evaluation of the practice.  By focusing on the ethical dimensions of the doctor’s role 
in policy making, the thesis seeks to describe the ethical challenges of participation in 
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macroallocation from the medical professional vantage point, explore whether and 
how the concerns documented in the literature are expressed in practice, arrive at 
normatively relevant conclusions – founded in doctors’ experiences – that can inform 
improvements to macroallocation procedure, and contribute to the academic discourse 
on participation in macroallocation as a medical professional commitment.  
 
A secondary objective of the study that forms the major part of this work is to test the 
applicability of the grounded moral analysis (GMA) empirical bioethics methodology 
to the non-clinical scenario presented by this topic.  
 
1.6.2 Research questions 
The overarching research questions are:  
1) What values influence doctors’ decisions about engaging in supraclinical 
(not related to individual patients) advocacy activities, including 
macroallocation?  
2) How do doctors experience the macroallocation process and the roles they 
play in it?  
 
The first question was addressed in the study reported in Chapter Three, which was 
based on data collected in 2009 as part of an investigation of values based medicine 
(VBM). 
 
The second research question was addressed in the interview study I designed and 
conducted for this thesis. Subsidiary questions relating to this question, and addressed 
in the studies reported in Chapters Four to Seven of this thesis are: 
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1) What are the ethical commitments of doctors who engage in policy 
concerned with resource allocation? 
2) How do doctors’ values and ethical commitments impinge on 
macroallocation?  
3) How do doctors experience and manage dual agency, conflict of interest, 
and other ethical challenges inherent in policy-making?  
4) How do doctors view the matter of skills in this role?  
 
1.6.3 Exclusions 
This thesis does not attempt to contest broader questions about healthcare resource 
allocation, such as 1) whether it is correct to construct rationing as inevitable, 2) 
whether and to what extent rationing should be and can be explicit, and 3) whether it 
is possible or desirable to devise and apply a single set of distributive justice 
principles to guide healthcare resource allocation. Nor does it engage with the matter 
of whether and to what extent the input of doctors ought to influence resource 
allocation policy. Finally, whilst recognising that organised professional interests 
have a stake in the allocation of societal resources – since their incomes and the 
nature of their work are affected by fluctuations in available resources (N. Smith et 
al., 2014) – this thesis excludes consideration of the perspectives and experiences of 
doctors who engage in macroallocation with the express aim of prosecuting maters of 
medical politics or professional status.  
In the following Chapter I discuss my choice of methodology and describe the 
methods used. 
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Chapter Two: Methodology and Methods 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Two Part 1: Introduction 
 
 
 
In the preceding chapters I have given an outline of the way policy relating to the 
allocation of resources is made in Australia, in particular in NSW, and the role doctors 
play in it. I have introduced the inherent ethical considerations, summarised the 
qualitative literature that relates to doctors’ experiences of macroallocation, and 
identified gaps in what is known. The remainder of the thesis concerns the process 
and results of my research. 
 
In this section I set out the ontological and epistemological basis of the research, the 
methodology, and the methods used for data collection and analysis.  
 
During 25 years spent working with doctors in the public sector in NSW on a range of 
policy issues I had the opportunity to develop an understanding of the policy process 
and to gain an appreciation of the social and ethical issues involved. While planning 
this research I recognised that I ought to build on these advantages, and on the 
strengths in qualitative enquiry of the research and supervisory network available to 
me at Sydney Health Ethics, and so I decided to apply empirical methods rather than 
to pursue the topic from a purely theoretical standpoint grounded in bioethics and 
moral philosophy. I hoped by this means to be able to draw normatively relevant 
conclusions that would be helpful to clinicians and policy makers.  
 
 
 
93 
Ethics is concerned with how we ought to live; it is often conceived as rules or 
principles that guide action (Singer, 1994, p. 3). It is divided into three classifications: 
meta-ethics, which is concerned with moral claims and the nature or basis of ethics 
(Singer, 1994, p. 11); normative ethics, which is concerned with moral frameworks 
capable of guiding action; and applied ethics, which is concerned with the 
implications of ethical questions in specific situations (Kerridge, Lowe, & Stewart, 
2013, p. 1). Bioethics is a branch of applied ethics (Kerridge et al., 2013, p. 1; Strong, 
Lipworth, & Kerridge, 2010). Whilst traditional bioethical enquiry employs normative 
theorising about what policy and practice ought to be (Ives & Draper, 2009), 
empirical bioethics, by accommodating the context in which ethical reasoning takes 
place (Ives & Draper, 2009), aims to overcome the distance between the traditional 
modalities of bioethical analysis and lived experience (Borry, Schotsmans, & 
Dierickx, 2004). Such social science-based empirical methods have the capacity to 
yield rich descriptions of social phenomena that support theory generation (Foley & 
Timonen, 2015), and to facilitate attempts at understanding every-day phenomena and 
how people experience their meaning (Carter, Ritchie, & Sainsbury, 2009). They 
seemed, thus, suited to answering my research questions. A later section of this 
chapter will address the properties of empirical bioethics specifically. 
 
The substantial literature gap I had identified signified that doctors’ performance of 
macroallocation is poorly understood and that, although some ethical issues are 
theorised, little or no empirical evidence exists on them. I established the research 
aims of: 
  
 
 
94 
• Exploring doctors’ reasons for taking on the role of technical expert in 
resource allocation policy work, 
• Describing the values and ethical commitments of doctors who undertake the 
role, 
• Understanding how doctors experience the ethical dimensions of the role, and  
• Identifying an ethical framework with explanatory and normative power to 
assist in understanding practice and guiding moral analysis.  
 
Wishing to approach it from within the discipline of bioethics, I determined that this 
might best be approached through the questions:  
 
• How do doctors experience the macroallocation process and the roles they 
play in it?  
• What are the ethical commitments of doctors who engage in policy concerned 
with resource allocation? 
• How do doctors’ values and ethical commitments impinge on 
macroallocation?  
• To address the question of how doctors experienced the ethical issues inherent 
in the process I decided to explore the questions: 
• How do doctors experience the policy process and the roles they play in it?   
• How do doctors experience and manage role-related conflict and other ethical 
challenges inherent in policy-making?  
 
From my experience in the industry, I had developed an intuition that the matter of the 
skills of macroallocation participants had ethical dimensions at the levels of the 
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individual, the procedure, and the results of deliberations. I had observed social and 
procedural aspects of macroallocation that caused me to question the extent to which 
participants were skilled to perform in that setting, and how skill might be defined. 
Thus I aimed to explore the question:  
 
• How do doctors view the matter of skills in this role?  
 
The rest of this section contains information on the rationale for my choice of 
methods and the manner in which I carried out the research. Some of this material is 
repeated in the methods sections of the published papers that form part of this thesis.  
 
This section relates only to the interview study I designed and conducted de novo for 
this thesis, and not to the paper ‘Doctors on values and advocacy: A qualitative and 
evaluative study’, which forms Chapter Three of the thesis. This paper contains its 
own justification and description of the methods used.   
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Chapter Two Part 2: Ontology, Epistemology and choice of method 
 
 
 
2.2.1 Introduction 
This study aimed to explore the experiences of doctors engaged in macroallocation as 
technical experts. A minority of doctors evince a sustained commitment to this role. I 
was interested in understanding the factors that influence doctors in their choices 
about becoming and remaining involved in resource allocation and their experiences 
of the process. That these questions concern practices and factors influencing 
behaviours (Braun & Clarke, 2013, pp. 45-46, 186), are focussed on a microcosm of 
interaction, refer to a field about which little is known, and appear to call for new 
theoretical explanations (Grbich, 2013, p. 70), suggested that a method based on 
grounded theory methodology (GT) would be suitable. I selected Charmaz’s (2014) 
constructivist approach as the basis for my investigation for its widespread use and 
acceptance, and for the clarity and comprehensiveness of Charmaz’s description of 
the method. I hoped that because it valued the role of abduction in theory generation, 
it would enable me to make best use of my experience of the field and my theoretical 
priming (Timmermans & Tavory, 2012). In grounded moral analysis (GMA) I found 
an adaptation of GT that would enable me to attempt empirically based ethical 
theorisation. 
 
2.2.2 Grounded Theory 
Grounded theory is a qualitative method characterised by ‘systematic and flexible 
guidelines for collecting and analysing qualitative data to construct theories from the 
data themselves’ (Charmaz, 2014, p. 1). As with other methods in the social sciences, 
data for GT may come from a variety of sources, but is most commonly derived from 
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interview studies (Braun & Clarke, 2013, p. 186; Foley & Timonen, 2015). For this 
research I opted to use data from semi-structured interviews with participants in the 
processes of concern to the research.  
 
GT is founded on symbolic interactionism, ‘a theoretical perspective derived from 
pragmatism that assumes that selves, society and reality are constructed through 
interaction’, itself reliant on language and communication (Charmaz, 2014, p. 9). It 
assumes that self-concept is constructed in social relationships and may, thus, change 
(Braun & Clarke, 2013, p. 185); that people think about their lives and actions; and 
that they create and mediate meaning through active processes (Charmaz, 2015, p. 9). 
GT grew out of a recognition of a need for mid-level theories relevant to people’s 
lives in specific contexts (Braun & Clarke, 2013, p. 184). Initially a positivist 
approach, a ‘constructivist turn’ championed by Charmaz, which occurred in the 
1990s, acknowledged subjectivity and the researcher’s involvement in the generation 
of theory whilst maintaining the inductive and open-ended features of Glaser and 
Strauss’s original model (Charmaz, 2014, p. 14). 
 
The key features of constructivist grounded theory, as described by Charmaz, are that 
1) data collection and analysis occur in parallel and iteratively, 2) actions and 
processes are analysed, 3) comparative methods are used, 4) data are drawn on to 
develop conceptual categories, 5) systematic analysis is used to develop inductive 
abstract categories, 6) theory construction (rather than description of the application 
of existing theory) is sought, 7) theoretical sampling is used, that is, sampling to test 
specific emerging theories, 8) variation is sought in the studied categories, and 9) it 
focuses on the development of categories, rather than on coverage of specific 
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empirical topics (Charmaz, 2014, p. 15). Silverman’s concise three-stage summary 
highlights effectively GT’s iterative and inductive character: 
 
• ‘an initial attempt to develop categories which illuminate the data 
• an attempt to ‘saturate’ these categories with many appropriate cases in order 
to demonstrate their relevance 
• the development of these categories into more general analytic frameworks 
with relevance outside the setting’ (Silverman, 2010, p. 235).  
 
In GT, theory, data gathering and analysis proceed dialectically, with the researcher 
‘moving back and forth’ between data and the process of explanation (Mason, 2002, 
p. 180), enabling application of both inductive and abductive reasoning in theory 
construction (Timmermans & Tavory, 2012). A key feature of grounded theory is the 
use of theoretical sampling, which involves collecting data to elaborate particular 
categories in emerging theories (Charmaz, 2014).  
 
Social constructivist epistemology recognises that the researcher interacts creatively 
with the data to construct an analysis that reflects the particularity of the social 
phenomenon, the participants, and the researcher’s role in creating meanings or, in the 
case of bioethical enquiry, identifying ethical issues (Charmaz, 2015; Dunn & Ives, 
2009). Having committed to constructivist grounded theory, I needed to explore and 
reflect on what I might bring to the construction by virtue of my background and 
biases, as a person with extensive experience in the area of the research. In qualitative 
research reflexivity is a technique used to explore and expose the researcher’s 
influence on the shaping and analysis of data (Braun & Clarke, 2013, p. 335). 
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Reflexivity enables researchers to acknowledge how their interests, positions and 
assumptions influence the construction of the knowledge found in the research 
(Charmaz, 2014, p. 334; Mason, 2002, p. 149), confront the effects of their prior 
socialisation, experience, and knowledge (Grbich, 2013; Hopkins, Regehr, & Pratt, 
2016, p. 10), examine iteratively their impact on the findings, enhance the quality of 
the research and the originality of its findings (Charmaz, 2014, p. 241), and set out 
these circumstances in communications about the research so that others can 
contemplate their role (Charmaz, 2014, p. 344). 
 
I discuss in the following paragraphs aspects of my background that are relevant to a 
reflexive approach. I qualified in medicine, and after several years in hospital-based 
clinical roles, began a training program in health services management and master’s 
degree in public health. I worked for several years in clinical services planning in the 
then NSW Health Department, where I interacted with panels of doctors who were 
sometimes advising, sometimes informing, sometimes influencing me and other 
policy officers on health care policy and related resource allocation decisions. Much 
of my work at that time was in the area of critical care, that is, the specialties of 
emergency medicine, intensive care, and medical retrieval services. In my next role I 
was the executive director responsible for service development and population health 
in a large publicly funded metropolitan health service that served three-quarters of a 
million people. Here, again, I observed doctors from the constituent hospitals and 
health services engaging with management in informing and advising capacities in the 
development of resource allocation policy. Because I was playing a tiebreaker role 
through my capacity to elevate certain priorities above others, the element of 
competition seemed overt, as the ‘tribes’ within the health service vied for expansion 
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opportunities. It was clear that only some doctors had an appetite for this role, but that 
those who did rarely relinquished it no matter how many setbacks they experienced. 
 
A later position saw me back amongst the critical care specialists, when I, as a 
representative of my organisation, became a member of the committees I had chaired 
earlier in my career. It struck me as significant that around the table were the same 
faces that had been there 20 years earlier. I wondered why people came to these roles, 
why they stayed in them despite limited returns, and how they reconciled their 
perseverance with the frustration they often showed. To me, then a practitioner of 
evidence based planning and supporter of evidence based medicine (EBM), the 
partisanship of the doctors on these committees towards their own specialties and 
local interests, even as they espoused EBM, seemed to signify an unreconciled 
tension. I also considered the possibility that doctors had deficits in skills or 
knowledge, which, if addressed, might make the doctors more effective, more 
efficient – or at least more resilient. I found it surprising that positivistic doctors had 
difficulties in seeing the merits of cases other than their own; in my eyes this showed 
a lack of rationality and, even, good citizenship. I became interested in understanding 
this apparent tension and its impact on the policy process.  
 
I was aware that doctors’ success in influencing resource allocation policy was not 
necessarily in society’s interests. During these years there was a growing movement 
to include patients and community in health policy making, and I embraced this on 
basis of my sympathies with the notion that doctors’ dominance of the process, at the 
expense of other voices, was problematic. In my roles I was responsible for 
relationships with community participants and for bringing them into the process. It 
 
 
101 
could be said that I often felt, behaved, and was observed to be more like bureaucrat – 
or even a ‘tax-payer’ – than a doctor. I was and remain an insider-outsider, sharing 
some group identity with the participants (Braun & Clarke, 2013, p. 10): by training a 
doctor, but in practice a bureaucrat. The concept for this research, and its execution – 
from creation of interview questions, through selection of and interaction with 
participants to analysis – are the products of my unique position. In light of this 
background, in this research I considered it essential to embrace reflexivity as matter 
of ethics (Charmaz, 2014, p. 27), as well as for its effect on research quality. I took 
note of Mauthner and Doucet’s (2003) advice on the possibilities and limits of 
operationalising reflexivity, and adopted Hopkins et al.’s (2016) framework, which I 
describe in a later section, for negotiating positionality to guide me in implementing 
it. I am grateful for the insights of my supervisors and mentor, who have helped me to 
navigate the impact of positionality on the project. 
 
2.2.3 Empirical Bioethics 
My desire to explore ethical issues that had not yet been identified by ethicists and 
generate, if possible, normatively relevant conclusions led my supervisor, early in my 
candidature, to recommend that I explore the potential of empirical bioethics methods, 
which I researched with the aim of identifying a normative approach compatible with 
grounded theory, which I had already identified as appropriate to the phenomenon I 
wished to study. 
 
Empirical bioethics is a relatively new form of bioethics that is characterised by its 
concern with particular ethical questions in their social contexts. Bioethics emerged in 
the 1960s in response to perceived physician paternalism and the challenges posed by 
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the availability of powerful medical technologies (Brody, 2009, p. 27; Salloch, 
Wäscher, Vollmann, & Schildmann, 2015). Although initially a widely 
interdisciplinary enterprise, it rapidly became the domain, chiefly, of philosophers and 
theologians (Borry et al., 2004; Borry, Schotsmans, & Dierickx, 2005; McKeown, 
2015). Empirical bioethics emerged in the early 1990s as a response to the resultant 
preoccupation with philosophical inquiry, whose focus on logical reasoning at the 
expense of contextual detail had led to it being criticised as distant from everyday life, 
abstract, speculative and dogmatic (Borry et al., 2005; Hunt & Carnevale, 2011; Ives 
& Draper, 2009; Molewijk & Widdershoven, 2012; Ten Have & Lelie, 1998).   
 
Empirical bioethics is a term given to types of research that combine empirical data 
and moral reasoning to enable normative claims about practical situations to be made 
(Dunn, Sheehan, Hope, & Parker, 2012). It was initially conceptualised as an adjunct 
to normative bioethics, providing a factual touchstone for the real work of bioethics: 
normative argument (Leget, Borry, & De Vries, 2009); however, a growing 
appreciation of the relevance of lived experience to bioethical enquiry and to the 
generation of normative conclusions relevant to particular contexts (Davies, Ives, & 
Dunn, 2015) led to growth and diversity in the forms and applications of empirical 
bioethical enquiry, including a prominent strand in which empirical data inform 
normative conclusions (De Vries & Gordijn, 2009; Molewijk, Stiggelbout, Otten, 
Dupuis, & Kievit, 2004; Salloch, Schildmann, & Vollmann, 2012), that is, 
prescriptive elements that say what should be done or decided, and why (Rehmann-
Sutter, Porz, & Scully, 2012). The 21st century has seen a growth in the intensity of 
efforts to overcome the separation of the empirical and the normative (Leget et al., 
2009) and to develop classification systems and methodologies (Davies et al., 2015). 
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The disciplines of sociology and philosophy underpin empirical bioethics, but it may 
also involve other disciplines, including anthropology, psychology, and epidemiology 
(Leget et al., 2009). It generally involves integrating philosophical reasoning with the 
quantitative and qualitative methods of the social sciences, including surveys, 
interviews, ethnography, case studies, experiments, and epidemiological and 
psychological studies (Borry et al., 2005; De Vries & Gordijn, 2009; Ten Have & 
Lelie, 1998). As in social science enquiry, in empirical bioethics empirical data serve 
as a means of conceptual innovation in the support of theory construction 
(Timmermans & Tavory, 2012). This type of reasoning requires the constructed 
nature of the ‘facts’ to be understood not as a picture of ‘how things are’, but rather as 
a product of the dialogue between the researcher and the data (Dunn & Ives, 2009; 
Rehmann-Sutter et al., 2012); indeed, the relationship between ethical theory and 
practice has been described as ‘symbiotic’ – that is, they mutually inform each other, 
enabling renewal of ethical theories through interaction with data from the practices to 
which they apply (Frith, 2012).  
 
In empirical bioethics, ethical judgement takes as a starting point people’s moral 
beliefs, intuitions, experiences, and behaviours (Ebbesen & Pedersen, 2007; Salloch, 
Vollmann, & Schildmann, 2014), strives for integration of empirical data and theory, 
and approaches flexibly the distinction between description and prescription (Borry et 
al., 2004). Its proponents claim that it overcomes deficiencies arising from the 
abstract nature of traditional philosophical enquiry, enabling deeper analyses based on 
the social and historical contexts of practices (Ives & Draper, 2009; Kon, 2009; 
Salloch et al., 2014), and more accurately reflecting the reality of the ‘muddling 
through’ that is a feature of most ethical decisions (Borry et al., 2005). They maintain 
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that incorporation of the moral intuitions and conceptual understandings of 
practitioners into moral analysis enables an understanding of the context of a practice 
and of the meanings those engaged in a practice give to concepts, thereby overcoming 
limitations caused by researchers’ necessarily limited experiences of the phenomena 
they are studying (Ives & Draper, 2009; Rehmann-Sutter et al., 2012).  
 
From a constructivist position it is possible to argue that empirical data and 
philosophical axioms are alike in their origins and endemicity to moral reasoning 
(Ives & Draper, 2009; Rehmann-Sutter et al., 2012; Scully, Banks, & Shakespeare, 
2006). Most practitioners advance the particularity of the resultant normative 
conclusions as part of the rationale for trying to integrate theory and data derived from 
practice; they claim that conclusions that are relevant to particular situations are more 
useful than general norms in the practical world of health care (Carter, 2009; Frith, 
2012; Molewijk, 2004).  
 
As a relatively new field of enquiry, empirical bioethics has attracted considerable 
criticism. I set out here the major criticisms, some counterarguments, and my 
conclusions. Some dismiss empirical bioethics out of hand on the basis of its 
relegation of philosophical reasoning (Borry et al., 2005); however, more nuanced 
objections are also offered. These centre around three principal concerns. First, the 
quality of the ethical conclusions may be limited by the quality of the constituent 
empirical research (Dunn & Ives, 2009; Ives, Dunn, & Cribb, 2016; Strong et al., 
2010). Second, the quality of analyses may be affected by inadequate or poorly 
specified approaches to the interaction between data and normative evaluation 
(Molewijk et al., 2004; Salloch et al., 2014), or by normative conclusions that are not 
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supported by the data (Salloch et al., 2012). Third, the drawing of normative 
conclusions from a set of facts arising from empirical investigation may not be well 
supported by logic.  
 
At the heart of these criticisms is uncertainty about whether and how social sciences-
derived data can have a role in determining normative outcomes (Frith, 2012), and 
about the conceptual and methodological challenges involved in connecting empirical 
data and normative analysis (Davies et al., 2015; Frith, 2012; Ives et al., 2016). These 
reservations are mediated by a concern about the effects on the validity of normative 
conclusions based on empirical research (Salloch et al., 2014; Salloch et al., 2015; 
Strong et al., 2010) of the fact-value distinction – which states that no statement or 
concept is irreducibly both evaluative and factual (De Vries & Gordijn, 2009) – and 
the is-ought problem – which states that a moral conclusion cannot be drawn from 
non-moral premises alone (De Vries & Gordijn, 2009) – because of the impossibility, 
and indeed the undesirability, of deriving how things ought to be from looking at how 
they are (Ives & Draper, 2009).  
 
Historically, critics argued that these were unbridgeable gaps that rendered empirical 
data peripheral to ethical judgment-making (Borry et al., 2005). More recently, 
however, a range of counterarguments has been made. The first is to challenge the 
claims from an epistemological perspective. For example, more recent empirical 
bioethics approaches, such as integrative empirical ethics (IEE), reject the distinction 
between fact and value, challenge the idea that principles or practices have universal 
meanings, and enable normative conclusions relevant to particular practices (Carter, 
2009; Molewijk et al., 2004). The distinctions held to affect the validity of empirical 
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bioethics, most notably fact and value, but also theory and practice, expert and lay 
knowledge, and descriptive and normative analyses, have been defended as inherent 
to any ethical analysis enterprise (Molewijk & Widdershoven, 2012). The second line 
of argument focuses on the nature and purpose of empirical bioethical enquiry: it has 
been claimed that much of the criticism of empirical bioethics is based on 
misunderstandings of its aim (Carter, 2009; Ives & Draper, 2009), and that the 
problems that affect it are common to any research endeavour. Some commentators 
claim that certain types of descriptive social scientific studies in bioethics do not 
qualify as empirical bioethical analyses (Ives & Draper, 2009), but that they are 
mistakenly received as such and draw unwarranted criticism to the genre; a response 
to this mistake has been to propose that in order to meet the definition of empirical 
bioethics a study must include both descriptive and prescriptive elements (McMillan 
& Hope, 2008; Molewijk & Widdershoven, 2012; Salloch et al., 2012). The third type 
of argument acknowledges the problem but claims that meta-ethical fallacies are 
relevant in only in a small subset of studies (De Vries & Gordijn, 2009). In the 
following paragraphs I will describe the final approach, which is to attempt to 
demonstrate the mechanism by means of which the empirical and theoretical interact 
to enable the drawing of normative conclusions.  
 
The ‘phenomenologically informed hermeneutic approach to ethics’ of Rehmann-
Sutter et al. (2012) is the example of this type of argument that I have chosen to 
present here, as it was the one that appeared to resolve my concern that I had yet to 
find a satisfactory resolution to the is-ought problem despite broad reading of the 
methodological literature in empirical bioethics. These authors offer a description of 
the process by which empirical data exert influence on normative conclusions, 
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effectively making visible the bridge between is and ought. I will set out, briefly, their 
argument.  
 
First they embrace McMillan & Hope’s (2008) criteria for empirical bioethics, which 
contain a requirement for cyclical interactions between data and analysis. The cycle 
suggests that the two parts are closely related and cannot usefully be seen as separate; 
Rehmann-Sutter et al. (2012) set out to fill a methodological gap they claim exists in 
McMillan & Hope’s work that leaves obscure the relationship between the empirical 
and normative within this cycle.  
 
The authors conceptualise the interview as a means to help the researcher to learn 
from the interviewee the meaning of a situation, providing them with first hand 
information to kick-start their ethical reflection. The researcher is then responsible for 
assessing the validity of the interviewee’s claim, arguing for it, and making it 
available to others. The researcher thus takes responsibility for the quality of the 
ethical argument. The authors draw an analogy between this type of data and any 
other text a philosopher might use in their analysis. They summarise:  
 
‘The normative force of the researchers’ ethical conclusions is based on the 
accuracy, sensitivity, and appropriateness of their reconstruction of the 
ethical argument they have assembled during the collection of data’ 
(Rehmann-Sutter et al., 2012).  
 
They draw on phenomenology to set up the next part of their argument: a 
phenomenological approach deals with the subjectivity of real, situated persons, who, 
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in empirical bioethics, include the reader of publications as well as the interviewer 
and interviewee. Together, all are connected in ‘hermeneutic circles’. This term 
reflects both that the researcher has a starting point, and that they change as a result of 
the interaction with the interviewee and the interviewee’s story. It acknowledges that 
interpretation is an emotional as well as intellectual endeavour and that moral truths 
are derived from within a situational complex, and not conjured out of thin air. They 
conclude that the job of researcher is to understand how participants in their research 
undertake their moral work, and to explain it, and make it accessible to others so that 
they may reflect on or use in their own practice. Ultimately, the authors claim, 
contemporary ethical expertise requires ‘engaging in critically reflective loops within 
social interactions and practices’ rather than deducing from moral axioms (Rehmann-
Sutter et al., 2012).   
 
I found this phenomenological approach, with its inclusion of the hermeneutic circle, 
to be a convincing riposte to the criticisms of empirical bioethics that focused on the 
is-ought problem, and was moved by the arguments the authors included about lived 
experience as a valid, if not essential, substrate for ethical analysis.     
 
There are many typologies of empirical bioethics. I describe here the one offered by 
the authors whose work on empirical bioethics methodologies informs this research, 
Dunn et al. (2012), according to whom there are two broad types, distinguished by 
their aims. The first is empirically driven broad-conception empirical ethics, which 
aims to describe the ethical issues that arise in a practice and to make sense of these 
from the perspective of a participant in the practice. The second is philosophically 
driven broad-conception bioethics, which aims to integrate theoretical argument 
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concerning what ‘ought to be’, with the context of its practical implementation (Dunn 
et al., 2012). The present research falls within the second category.  
 
2.2.4 Grounded Moral Analysis 
My review of the empirical bioethics literature was assisted by the systematic review 
of empirical bioethics methodologies undertaken by Davies et al. (2015), which 
brought to my attention grounded moral analysis (GMA), an emergent methodology 
that had recently been described by Dunn et al. (2012). The description of GMA 
offered by Dunn et al. is brief (see Appendix 3); I describe its characteristics below 
and return to it in the Discussion chapter.  
 
GMA is a constructivist approach like its parent methodology, grounded theory, 
where the term ‘grounded’ serves to indicate that any norms derived are grounded in 
the data. Its developers base its origins in the Socratic method and in sociology’s 
constant comparative method and active interviewing. It allows conceptual and 
normative analysis to proceed in parallel, which, according to Dunn et al. (2012), 
enables an interchange of the ethical and empirical, and a confluence of 
understanding, over the course of the research, towards normative conclusions that 
have been shaped by the participants’ attitudes, experiences, and intuitions. It falls 
into the category of ‘integrative’ methods, in which social scientifically derived data 
collection and analysis are integrated with normative theorising, and is also classed as 
a consultative methodology, where ‘consultative’ means participants’ views are 
sought, but analysis is undertaken and conclusions drawn by the researcher, and 
where the opposite pole is ‘dialogical’ enquiry, in which the researcher and 
participant reach consensus or a shared understanding about the normative 
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conclusions (Davies et al., 2015). As a consultative method, its relationship to the 
concept of hermeneutic circles, discussed above, is clear. 
 
In GMA, findings derive their moral authority, or coherence, from rationality and 
consistency (Davies et al., 2015). GMA dispenses, thus, with the reflective 
equilibrium that is a common feature of normative empirical bioethical enquiry 
(Davies et al., 2015) – where it is used in striking a balance between considered moral 
judgments, moral principles and ‘background theories’ in the analytic phase 
(McNamee & Schramme, 2011). Instead GMA integrates empirical and normative 
analysis in an iterative process that takes place throughout data collection and analysis 
and brings to bear, one on the other, empirical data and theory (Davies et al., 2015). It 
focuses on ‘real-world’ practical reasoning to arrive at coherence between data and 
theory, and aims for normative conclusions that that are practically useful (Dunn et 
al., 2012) and meet universal standards of justification (Davies et al., 2015). 
 
In terms of process, in GMA the researcher subjects emerging findings to ethical 
analysis, accommodates them within iterations of the interview schedule, and engages 
participants’ responses, aiming ultimately at ‘a particular normative claim, such that 
the argument underpinning this claim is valid and grounded in a persuasive 
explanatory account’ (Dunn et al., 2012). The mechanism by which this is achieved 
includes, where appropriate [my italics], drawing on ‘theories or principles within 
interviews in order to challenge or support participants’ accounts’ (Dunn et al., 2012).  
 
The brevity of the available description of GMA is problematical, however, and it 
contains certain ambiguities: the optional status of the procedure recounted in the 
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preceding paragraph, and the lack of clarity around whether ‘theories’ are the grand 
ethical theories, or the researcher’s emerging theories about the phenomenon, or both. 
I make clear the interpretive decisions I made in my description of methods, below, 
and reflect on my experience with the methodology in the Discussion in Chapter 
Nine.  
 
Initially I was sceptical about the power of normative-empirical interaction in this 
methodology to bridge effectively the is-ought gap. I conceptualised the two accounts 
as coalescing as a result of proximity and entertained myself with this notion from 
Flann O’Brien’s The Third Policeman:  
 
‘The gross and net result of it is that people who spend most of their natural 
lives riding iron bicycles over the rocky roadsteads of this parish get their 
personalities mixed up with the personalities of their bicycle as a result of the 
interchanging of the atoms of each of them, and you would be surprised at the 
number of people in these parts who nearly are half people and half bicycles.’ 
(O'Brien, 1967) 
 
It was only when I encountered the ‘phenomenologically informed hermeneutic 
approach to ethics’ of Rehmann-Sutter et al. (2012), which I have described above, 
that I became confident in my ability to account for the process by which my 
empirical data would exert influence on the normative conclusions I planned to make 
in this research, and in my potential to implement GMA effectively. 
To date, GMA has been used in few published studies. A search of the Medline, 
Embase, PsychInfo, and Proquest databases for the term ‘grounded moral analysis’ 
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yielded no publications, while only five qualitative reports containing the term were 
listed in a Google Scholar search. The detail with which the research process is 
described is limited in these studies, with most showing no evidence of the hallmarks 
of the methodology. The exception is Libby Dai’s (2013) Honours thesis, concerning 
the clinical ethics support needs of doctors, in which a description is provided of a 
GMA-based iterative inductive process involving participants in normative discussion 
based on analysis of the data and concurrent normative analysis.  
 
In conclusion, I elected to base my methods on GMA because it met several criteria: 
since it was founded on grounded theory, it was ontologically and epistemologically 
in harmony with the study purpose; it had the potential to facilitate normatively 
relevant conclusions; and it had not been often or intensively used, or used to explore 
an aspect of medical ethics, and thus offered an opportunity for me to contribute to 
knowledge on its potential applications.  
 
It is worth noting that most authors emphasise role differentiation and collaboration 
between the social scientist and the philosopher on empirical bioethics projects, 
(Molewijk et al., 2004; Rehmann-Sutter et al., 2012; Salloch et al., 2012). This was 
approximated in the present research through the involvement in the project of a 
philosopher as a mentor and co-author of most of the papers included in the thesis.   
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Chapter Two Part 3: Method 
 
 
 
2.3.1 Design  
As outlined above, I used a qualitative methodology with sampling, data-collection, 
and analysis strategies selected to answer my research questions. The study method 
was closely based on Charmaz’s (2014) GT, modified to accommodate GMA as 
described by Dunn et al. (2012). This approach required me to commit to an interview 
study involving participants in the phenomenon. 
 
In preparation for the project I read widely in qualitative research, particularly 
grounded theory and empirical bioethics, attended a 2 day master class on grounded 
theory run by Cathy Charmaz, and completed a unit of study at the University of 
Sydney’s School of Public Health: Advanced Qualitative Health Research. 
 
2.3.2 Participants  
Given the necessarily constrained scale of the research and the scarcity of literature on 
any aspect of it, I considered that to focus exclusively on Australian policy-active 
doctors, forgoing comparisons with those not engaged in policy and those engaged 
but in other jurisdictions, would offer me the best possible chance of making a 
meaningful contribution. I sought doctors who had engaged or were currently engaged 
in macroallocation at a variety of levels in the public health system in Australia. My 
interest was in doctors who elected to engage in policy as individuals, rather than as 
nominees of interest groups, and who were focused on the resourcing of services 
rather than on the rights of medical practitioners or broad professional reform.  
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2.3.3 Sampling 
I conducted semi-structured interviews with 20 doctors, purposively selected on the 
basis that they had participated in policy concerning the allocation of funding to 
health care programs at one or more levels of the health care system. In the first stage 
of recruitment, in order to access doctors active in macroallocation, we approached 
the Agency for Clinical Innovation (ACI), which operates clinical networks that 
advise the NSW Ministry of Health on the development, evaluation, and adoption of 
healthcare innovations (Agency for Clinical Innovation, 2016), and attracts doctors 
with an interest in priority setting. ACI issued an invitation on our behalf to which 
doctors responded if they felt they had information and perspectives relevant to the 
exploration of the ethical dimensions of priority setting. From this invitation 10 
doctors came forward, of whom 1 withdrew before an interview date could be set. The 
remaining 9, and an additional participant recruited by passive snowballing, were 
interviewed. Theoretical sampling was used to recruit a further cohort of participants 
from my networks in order to enable elaboration of the properties of categories 
emerging from the analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2013, p. 57; Charmaz, 2015). In this 
stage, 18 invitations were sent, from which 12 affirmative responses were received. 
Ten doctors were interviewed, while for 2 potential participants, interview 
arrangements proved too difficult to coordinate before the point at which theoretical 
saturation was reached and recruitment was terminated (Foley & Timonen, 2015).  
 
In the first phase, initial contact with participants was made by the ACI Research 
Director, who provided me with a list of those who had expressed an interest in 
participating, along with their contact details. The participant recruited through 
passive snowballing during this stage provided me with contact details. In the second 
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phase, I contacted participants using email addresses that were in the public domain. I 
kept all information relating to all participants confidential at all times.  
Between the first and second stages of recruitment I lodged a successful modification 
with the University of Sydney’s Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) seeking 
approval to recruit purposively from my network since the arm’s length recruitment 
strategy had ceased to yield participants, an event that coincided with the need to 
pursue theoretical sampling aimed at elaborating the categories being developed in the 
analysis through the inclusion of participants known to experienced the aspects of the 
phenomenon that were related to the categories (Charmaz, 2014, p. 220). After the 
tenth interview, purposive sampling commenced, and it continued until theoretical 
saturation had been reached. 
 
Each member of my sample had been involved as a technical expert in multiple 
macroallocation processes, acting concurrently or over the course of a career in policy 
at the institutional, local, state, national and, in some cases, international levels. All 
had advised or were currently advising policy makers in government macroallocation 
processes involving prioritisation of competing bids for health care funding. Each 
engaged in several or all of: membership of committees, attendance at meetings and 
workshops with decision-makers, lobbying, construction of independent processes 
designed to advance policy debate, and preparation of submissions, applications, draft 
policies, and correspondence. They contributed to decisions about the funding of 
public health programs, research and health professional education resourcing 
priorities, high-cost medications and technology, and state and institutional clinical 
specialty service growth and development. These activities were undertaken as 
individuals rather than as members of medical interest groups (Contandriopoulos, 
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2011). The characteristics of participants and their macroallocation activities are 
summarised in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1  Characteristics of participants and macroallocation activities 
Dimension Number of 
participants 
Age Range  
≤ 45  
46-55  
56-64  
65-80 
 
Average age: 58 
 
3 
4 
10 
3 
 
 
Sex  
Female 
Male 
 
5 
15 
Country of undergraduate training  
Australia  
Europe  
Asia  
  
16 
3 
1 
Clinical Specialty*§  
Paediatrics  
Endocrinology  
Plastic Surgery  
Rehabilitation  
General Practice Academic  
Rheumatology  
Clinical Pharmacology  
Gastroenterology  
Intensive Care Medicine  
Neurology  
Cardiology  
Radiation Oncology  
 
3 
1 
1 
3 
2 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
Focus of macroallocation engagement  
Multiple national governments or international bodies on public health programs  
Australian government policy on healthcare research priorities  
Australian government policy on the allocation of resources to high cost health 
care interventions  
Australian government policy on the allocation of resources for priority healthcare 
programs  
Australian government policy on the allocation of resources to participant’s 
specialty  
NSW government policy on the allocation of resources to the participant’s 
specialty  
Local health administration policy on the allocation of resources to the 
participant’s specialty  
University administration policy on the allocation of resources to health research 
and education programs  
 
2 
2 
3 
 
4 
 
2 
13 
11 
 
4 
* Some participants were qualified or practiced in more than one specialty; the one listed is the one 
on which the majority of their policy work was focussed. 
§ For the sake of maintaining anonymity, participants’ subspecialties, where they exist, are not 
provided. 
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The doctors in the sample were – or, in the case of the small number who had retired, 
had been – full-time or substantial part-time specialists or academics in salaried 
employment in clinical roles in hospitals and universities in NSW. The sample 
comprised 5 females and 15 males, ranging in age from 38 to 80 years, with an 
average of 58 years, and covering a wide range of medical specialties, including 
disciplines in critical care, medicine, surgery, and paediatrics. Three had trained in 
Europe, one in Asia, and the remainder in Australia. The age and sex distribution of 
the sample, and the representation of overseas-trained doctors, were similar to the 
medical specialist profile in Australia (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 
2016) 
 
2.3.4 Data-collection 
I conducted the interviews between July 2015 and July 2016. Each lasted from 30 
minutes to 90 minutes, with an average of 64 minutes. All were face-to-face and took 
place in the workplace of the participant, or if they preferred, in an office in Sydney 
Health Ethics.  
Each interview began with an overview of my background, an explanation of the 
project, and the consent process, which for the small number of participants who had 
not already provided me with a signed consent form, included signing of a copy of the 
form. The participant consent form and information statement are provided in 
Appendices 3 and 4. I used a semi-structured interview format, with questions 
designed to elicit participants’ values and encourage reflection on the ethical 
dimensions of the macroallocation process, while avoiding use of the terms values, 
ethics, or morals. I introduced the interview with broad questions, gradually moving 
to more focussed questions and using probing to follow up on key ideas offered by the 
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participants. I included in the initial interview schedule a single departure from the 
open-ended format comprising a direct questions on experiences and views on skills 
to enable collection of descriptive data relating on skills and learning. Participants 
were asked about competition for the health dollar; the roles they played in 
macroallocation; positive and negative experiences in the role; the characteristics, 
behaviours, and achievements of those of whom they approved and disapproved; and 
their views on how competition, power, and relationships were relevant to the policy 
process. If the information had not been otherwise elicited, they were probed to 
discuss aspects of the process that had caused them moral unease.  
 
The interview schedule was revised twice during the study, in response to the 
analysis, in keeping with GMA methodology (Dunn et al., 2012) and advice by 
Salloch et al. (2015) on the selection of ethical theories in empirical bioethics, to 
which I refer in more detail below. I used these iterations to probe the ethical concepts 
emerging from my analysis and explore my theoretical insights with participants. My 
supervisor provided feedback and suggestions on the design of each iteration.  
 
In order to honour my commitment to GT-guided open-ended interviewing, I elicited 
later participants’ responses to ethical perspectives emerging from the data indirectly, 
rather than engaging them in a formal reasoning process or in explicitly validating a 
particular account; for the same reason I elected not to make ethical theories explicitly 
visible to participants, although GMA may permit this (Dunn et al., 2012). I discuss 
this decision in my reflection on using GMA, which is contained in the Discussion 
section of this thesis. The final interview guide is provided in Appendix 6.  
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I discussed my progress as an interviewer with my supervisor, and my technique 
improved on the basis of her advice and as I became more experienced.  
 
2.3.5 Analysis  
To guide my analysis, I referred to the 3+1 framework of Hopkins et al. (2016), which 
encourages reflection on positionality in phenomenological research by offering three 
axes: the general to the particular; reduction to reflexivity; and description to 
interpretation. Each axis is founded in its separate philosophical basis, and all are 
underpinned by the process of writing. In this model, the researcher ‘dances’ between 
positions in order to recognise and harness the potential of all of the features, on all 
parts of the continua, of the researcher’s relationship with the data. My starting 
position tended towards particularity, reflexivity and description, this last because I 
was attracted to the potential of Latour’s ‘practical metaphysics’ – in which the claims 
of the actor are accepted as the real motivations for action (Latour, 2005, p. 50) – to 
modulate any potential bias arising from my insider-outsider perspective. 
 
I undertook inductive and abductive data analysis progressively from the 
commencement of the interviews. It involved detailed coding, comprehensive memo-
writing, exploration of the relationships between codes, and creation of analytic 
categories by combining codes (Charmaz, 2014), as well as integration of the data 
with ethical theory. I discussed my emerging findings with my supervisors and 
received feedback on my organisational schema initially and as it developed. 
Amongst other things, these discussions helped inform the sampling of participants in 
the second stage, the development of the second and third iterations of the interview 
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schedule, and the selection of an ethical theory to explore in the later interviews in 
line with GMA.  
 
I also drew reflexively upon my own experiences to understand their potential to 
inform or bias interpretation of the data (Braun & Clarke, 2013, p. 335; Charmaz, 
2015; Dunn & Ives, 2009; Hopkins et al., 2016; Mason, 2002, p. 149). Since 
participants’ reflections on ethical matters were frequently implicit I acknowledge my 
interpretative role in constructing the accounts presented in the empirical chapters of 
the thesis (Scully, Rippberger, & Rehmann-Sutter, 2004). 
 
Each interview was professionally transcribed within days of taking place, 
immediately de-identified, cleared of any material that might identify third parties, 
and corrected for errors and omissions. I read each transcript several times to gain a 
‘feel’ for the data and then coded it line-by-line. I wrote memos on each transcript, 
and further memos drawing together categories from the range of interviews available 
on a rolling basis. I organised emerging categories in spread sheets, which I revised 
regularly in light of new data, and wrote further memos related to the emerging 
categories and their relationships. For each of the research questions, I prepared 
diagrams and summary memos summarising the categories and exploring the 
relationships between them, and drew out relevant quotes from the transcripts. Since I 
was committed to GMA, my memos included speculations on the moral import of the 
emerging categories. This way of working was consistent with approaches I had seen 
described in the qualitative methods literature, adapted to suit my analytic purposes 
and my working style. Whilst I did not come to the project ignorant of the field, 
having worked and read widely in the area, in order to adhere as closely as possible to 
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Charmaz’s (2014) methodology, I did not formally bring to the analysis any 
preconceived codes, categories or theoretical preconceptions. My enculturation in 
medicine and theoretical priming created in me, however, a cultivated position which, 
by enabling the identification of unusual data, facilitated abduction (Timmermans & 
Tavory, 2012).  
 
In my initial inductive analysis, I found that my participants shared strong ethical 
insights that tapped into themes of virtue ethics, particularly distributive and 
procedural justice, practical reason, temperance/continence – characterised in my data 
as moderation – and the virtues of self-efficacy (Bandura, 1997), particularly patience 
and persistence, to which I responded by developing my interview schedule in the 
direction of virtue ethics, in accordance with GMA methodology (Dunn et al., 2012) 
and Salloch et al.’s (2015) criteria for the selection of ethical theories in empirical 
bioethics, in particular, the criteria of suitability to the issue at stake and congruity 
with participants’ actual moral deliberation. I used the steps set out in GMA to refine 
the interview guide and validate my emerging ethical insights with participants 
through targeted questioning aimed at exploring emerging perspectives (Dunn et al., 
2012). I focused closely on the themes of virtue that were emerging strongly from the 
data and also on the details of the social process of macroallocation as my participants 
experienced it in order to develop and connect emerging categories. The effect of this 
interplay between data and analysis was to recreate the ‘phenomenologically informed 
hermeneutic approach to ethics’ described by Rehmann-Sutter et al. (2012), in which 
the authority of normative claims comes from the researcher’s ‘reconstruction of the 
ethical argument they have assembled during the collection of data’ (Rehmann-Sutter 
et al., 2012). 
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After the interviewing phase had concluded, and towards the end of my analysis, 
whilst seeking a framing of virtue ethics that closely reflected the normative themes in 
my data, I observed a striking resonance between my categories and Paul Ricoeur’s 
‘little ethics’ – a variant of virtue ethics that incorporates the notion of the just 
institution – which I included from that point in my normative deliberations. 
Ricoeur’s ethics is described in Chapter 8, Theory supporting the Discussion.  
 
Five publications that respond to the research questions I describe in this chapter are 
provided in Chapters Three to Seven. 
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Chapter Two Part 4: Research ethics 
 
 
 
The study received approval from the University of Sydney Human Research Ethics 
Committee, reference number 2015/447. The committee approved my initial and 
revised recruitment emails, as well as the accompanying Participant Consent Form 
and Participant Information Statement. These are provided in Appendices 3 and 4, 
respectively. These documents contain an earlier version of the project title, which 
was subsequently changed in order to capture effectively the research findings. 
All participants gave individual consent in writing. With one or two exceptions, the 
participants had returned signed consent forms prior to the interview; the exceptions 
signed immediately prior to the interview. Participants were informed that they might 
withdraw from the study at any time, but none withdrew. They were assured of 
confidentiality.  
All data were de-identified, analysed under alphanumeric codes, and stored securely. 
To limit the possibility of participants being identifiable, I have not published the 
subspecialties or second specialty qualifications of participants, or linked 
demographic information with specialties. I have also given different aliases to 
participants in each published paper in order to prevent recognition of an individual 
on the basis of multiple quotes.    
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Chapter Two Part 5: Follow up  
 
 
 
Most participants requested information of the outcome of this research. I have 
provided them with a document summarising the findings and providing links to 
publications using the email addresses I used to make initial contact. 
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Abstract Doctors are increasingly enjoined by their professional organisations to
involve themselves in supraclinical advocacy, which embraces activities focused on
changing practice and the system in order to address the social determinants of
health. The moral basis for doctors’ decisions on whether or not to do so has been
the subject of little empirical research. This opportunistic qualitative study of the
values of medical graduates associated with the Sydney Medical School explores
the processes that contribute to doctors’ decisions about taking up the advocate role.
Our findings show that personal ideals were more important than professional
commitments in shaping doctors’ decisions on engagement in advocacy. Experi-
ences in early life and during training, including exposure to power and power-
lessness, significantly influenced their role choices. Doctors included supraclinical
advocacy in their mature practices if it satisfied their desire to achieve excellence.
These findings suggest that common approaches to promoting and facilitating
advocacy as an individual professional obligation are not fully congruent with the
experiences and values of doctors that are significant in creating the advocate. It
would seem important to understand better the moral commitments inherent in
advocacy to inform future developments in codes of medical ethics and medical
education programs.
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Background and Rationale
Commitment to advocacy, with a focus on the promotion of social justice, just
distribution of resources and fair access to care, features in a growing number of
codes of medical ethics across the globe [17, 29]. Although there is substantial
evidence that the codes are of little significance in shaping medical professionalism,
including doctors’ career and role decisions [1, 5, 21, 30, 35, 44, 51], and
notwithstanding wide acknowledgement that education and assessment in advocacy
are challenging [25, 30, 36] and are undermined by a lack of definitional clarity [6,
14], in medical education programs around the world competencies that support
social responsibility are being used to promote the operationalisation of the codes’
new role definitions [12, 13, 16, 26, 29, 30, 53].
Against this backdrop, discourse proceeds on the ethical challenges arising from
the codes’ extension of responsibility for advocacy from the profession as a whole
to the individual doctor [31, 48]. This paper explores the values and experiences of
advocate doctors in order to inform practical and philosophical analysis of the
promotion and enactment of supraclinical advocacy as an individual professional
commitment.
In the healthcare context the term ‘advocacy’ has historically denoted health
professionals seeking access to health and social care resources on behalf of
individual patients, conceptualised as ‘agency’ by Dobson et al. [13]. The language
and definitions in this field are evolving [11, 25, 27], however, and recently the term
has been doing double duty signifying actions, as described by Earnest et al. [17],
‘designed to promote those social, economic, educational and political changes’ that
improve the health outcomes of communities and populations. This definition aligns
with Hubinette et al.’s [25] concept of ‘supraclinical advocacy’, which embraces a
group of activities focused on changing practice and changing the system to address
the social determinants of health. The present report refers to this concept and uses
the terms supraclinical advocacy and advocacy interchangeably to denote it.
Agency—advocacy on behalf of individual patients—which is generally acknowl-
edged as a feature of clinical care, is outside the scope of this report [14, 22].
Of the codes promoting advocacy for social justice as an individual commitment,
the one with the most significant reach is ‘Medical Professionalism in the New
Millennium: A Physician Charter’ which has been promulgated globally by over
130 major medical journals and learned societies [2, 7]. The Australian Medical
Association’s Code of Ethics, in harmony with the Physician Charter, expects the
doctor to ‘endeavour to improve… access to medical services in the community’
and ‘accept a share’ of the profession’s responsibility in population health and
policy matters [4]. Where once these responsibilities were assigned to the profession
as a whole, they are now represented as commitments of its individual members and
entail action on their part. This is a profound change in emphasis that has the
potential to modify medical work and affect the balance of public discourse on
healthcare policy.
In practice, the vast majority of doctors do not consider advocacy as defined a
key professional commitment and do not engage in it [29, 30]. Empirical studies
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report that doctors lack awareness that the ethical codes express advocacy as a
doctor’s duty [52] or believe it should be mandated by the codes but do not engage
or plan to engage in it [23, 46]. No satisfactory empirical explanation has been
provided as to why this activity is not favoured by the majority of doctors [17],
although insight into those who do favour it is provided by Oandasan and Barker
[40], who studied the factors that shape community-responsive family physicians in
Canada and found the major factors influencing those who engage in it to be:
knowledge (of difference, the social determinants of health and physician power),
influences (role models and early exposure to marginalised groups) and motivations
(desire to do the right thing, give back, make a difference, and remain intellectually
challenged).
In seeking to understand the function of supraclinical advocacy in medical
professional life Arendt’s [3] conceptualisation of action is helpful. Action is
conducted in the public sphere and is a condition for the achievement of excellence.
It corresponds to the human condition of plurality and enables individuals to ‘show
who they are, reveal actively their unique personal identities and thus make their
appearance in the human world’ [3]. It is distinct from labour, which sustains life,
and work, which ensures a world fit for human use. All three are necessary
components of a complete life. In order to transcend the limitations of the labour
and work clinical practice entails, doctors will take up activities in the public sphere
that fill the third dimension of their humanity. Thus, supraclinical advocacy, as one
of a limited range of options available within the professional role, will inevitably
attract some doctors whose values and motivations need to be understood if they are
to be supported effectively in conducting the activity in a manner that will, indeed,
facilitate the attainment of excellence.
Codifying advocacy as an individual professional commitment brings into relief
the normative challenges it poses for doctors, including conflict of interest, which
arises from doctors’ potential to benefit materially and reputationally from gains
they negotiate on behalf of patient groups [11, 33, 49, 54], and dual agency, which
occurs when they are unable to resolve the conflicting commitments they have to
their patients and society [31, 32, 43, 45, 48]. Doctors’ lack of special expertise in
determining the outcomes likely to promote social justice makes privileging their
input problematical [30, 31, 37]. Doctors may even be particularly unsuited to roles
in advocacy due to discrepancies between their values, skills, life experiences and
views and those of the general public [47, 49]. Policy-making processes in which
doctors engage may be problematical, by unfairly privileging doctors’ input or by
falsely raising their expectations through failing to specify whether their role is one
of advocate or advisor [8, 37]. Advocacy also requires doctors to employ eristic
discourse, which poses problems for a profession educated to communicate honestly
and objectively. Huddle [31] maintains that social justice advocacy is inherently a
political rather than professional activity, the mandating of which wrongly redirects
resources from core medical professional roles, places unreasonable demands on
doctors, usurps their rights to determine and act on their own priorities for
government investment, and fails to accommodate the plurality of ways in which
doctors can contribute to society [29, 30].
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There is clearly a need for further empirical research to illuminate the many
unresolved issues about the desirability and feasibility of mandating supraclinical
advocacy as a professional commitment, as well as the implications of the
associated educational approaches. To date, few studies have addressed doctors’
reasons for engaging in community and system level advocacy. The availability of
data relating to doctors’ ethical and professional preoccupations that had been
collected by the authors for the purpose of exploring the role of values in medicine
presented an opportunity to explore the values and experiences of advocate doctors.
This study aimed to find out the extent to which the themes identified by Oandasan
and Barker [40] were found in our participants, who represented a different sub-
culture within the medical profession.
Methods
In this study, medical practitioners associated with the Sydney Medical School
(Australia) were invited to participate in interviews. Twenty-two people were
approached, of whom 20 were available to participate. Sampling was purposive
and was aimed at including both men and women and achieving maximum
variation in age and specialty in order to ensure that we were not missing any
major issues that might be obscured by interviewing only one ‘type’ of doctor.
There were 7 women and 13 men. Ages ranged from 28 to 76 (median 49), and
years since graduation from 3 to 52 (median 26). A wide range of inpatient and
community based specialties was represented. We continued sampling until
thematic saturation had been reached, that is, no new themes were emerging from
the interviews.
Our principal research question was: ‘‘What values matter to doctors in their
practices and in their educational experiences?’’ Interviews were semi-structured,
with participants encouraged to reflect on episodes in their careers that had stayed in
their minds because of their moral dimensions. They were also asked to talk about
specific issues such as the cost of health care, the availability of health services, the
appropriateness of the medical education program that they had received or were
teaching, and the impact of role models and mentors. Participants were not asked
specifically about ethics or professionalism as our interest was in how ethical and
professional values permeated clinical practice.
Interviews were conducted by a medical practitioner and a psychologist, either
together or separately. All interviews were anonymised with coded numbers used
for each participant. We have withheld detailed demographic information on each
practitioner to protect anonymity. Ethical clearances were obtained from the
University of Sydney for the interview study and this analysis.
For this analysis the principal research question was: ‘What values influence
doctors’ decisions in relation to engagement in supraclinical advocacy?’ Because
for this study we were interested in the processes within the data, and keen both to
view the data critically and manage researcher preconceptions, grounded theory
techniques were used in the analysis. The first author (SG) used line-by-line coding
by actions, focussed coding, category construction, and continuous creation of
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memos to enable the progressive construction of themes. The technique we used
was modified from that described by Charmaz [10], whose constructivist approach
lent itself to the study’s emphasis on views, values and beliefs.
Because advocacy was not explicitly defined for or by participants, for the
purpose of this analysis the subject was identified by applying Hubinette et al.’s [25]
concept of supraclinical advocacy: population-based activities aimed at practice and
system level changes that address the social determinants of health.
Results
Of the 20 participants, 12 described careers that included significant involvement in
supraclinical advocacy, including advocating for public health and patient groups,
improving service delivery in health care and medical education systems, lobbying
for service enhancements, and implementing population health programs. Almost
all saw themselves as clinicians primarily.
Our participants’ involvement in supraclinical advocacy revolved around two
themes: ‘It made me’, which describes how the participants’ experience of
medical training and enculturation formed them, and ‘Is that all there is?’ which
describes how participants’ mature perspectives on medicine shaped their role
choices.
Oandasan and Barker’s [40] themes of influences, motivations and knowledge
were replicated in this group and are embedded in the themes found in this study.
‘It made me’
Our participants described a journey from child to mature practitioner. They arrived
in university with a moral system already formed, but lost sight of their values
during medical school and early professional training, attributing this loss to the
rigours of the medical enculturation process. At or close to the end of their
formative phase as young clinicians they reconnected with their early values and
found again a desire to ‘do the right thing’ and give something back to society.
Becoming engaged in supraclinical advocacy signified a return to their ideals and
their assumption of adult roles in the profession.
P1: And although speaking of values, I think there was a period [during] which
I had to put that to one side during my career, but thankfully I’m now back
doing that.
One participant said of a brutalising experience during training: ‘It made me’,
providing a term that encompasses participants’ reflections on the features of their
training journey that opened them to taking on roles in advocacy. Early exposure
to marginalised groups and positive and negative role models influenced the
course of the journey. For some there were well-defined formative events.
Experiencing power and powerlessness contributed to participants’ formation as
advocates.
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Early Exposure to Marginalised Groups
Many advocate participants were exposed to marginalised groups in remote
domestic or overseas locations and observed socioeconomic disadvantage during
their university years or early in their postgraduate training. One participant, as a
young teenager, saw children’s special needs going unmet in the hospital where a
relative was receiving treatment, and went on to be an advocate for specialised
children’s health services. Another, an advocate for children’s services in
Indigenous communities, observed racism first hand whilst on an elective in the
Deep South of the USA.
P18: And most of the kids, the patients, were black. And I guess my social
consciousness was thoroughly informed by the level of racism.
Positive Role Models
Role models in early life and during medical training had an impact on participants’
decisions to include supraclinical advocacy in their careers. Influences included
family, school, church and senior colleagues who modelled population health
advocacy or commitment to health service leadership and development roles.
Negative Role Models
Participants viewed the major features of the Australian health system positively,
and although they experienced frustration at the practice level due to policy,
bureaucratic and interpersonal obstacles, they still felt like insiders and were critical
of those who did not. Some had seen their senior colleagues in a demoralised state
due to a failure to embrace the responsibilities of being part of the system.
Observing such clinicians pointed them towards a more involved way of practicing.
P14: I could hear the same old concerns and complaints, but none of them
would actually take any action to change it, so it became almost this
disempowered…and there was a broadening of my horizons in the sense that,
‘‘Yeah, there’s a whole different world outside that you could affect and
influence’’.
Formative Events
Witnessing or experiencing bullying or insensitivity, or discovering that a superior
had feet of clay, were common triggers for taking up a cause.
P6: The first was an early tutorial with… an eminent physician… who stood
us up and sort of said ‘now you can be a good doctor or a happy person, but
you can’t be both’, and just thinking ‘That’s daft, how can anyone possibly say
that?’ And my interest in doctors’ health and subsequent to that has shown that
that’s absolutely wrong anyway.
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Power and Powerlessness
Paradoxically, this study’s findings show that experiencing power and powerless-
ness were both related to decisions to engage in advocacy. On the one hand,
advocacy gave a sense of control to those who had experienced disempowerment;
on the other, working as part of a group on non-clinical issues gave relief from
constantly being the more powerful actor in doctor-patient and teacher-trainee
relationships.
Disempowerment, either due to the behaviour of those superior to them in the
hierarchy or to transitory feelings of professional inadequacy, was a strong feature
of most advocates’ accounts of their training and everyday work. A number of
participants became engaged in activities to improve the system in order to regain a
sense of control.
P 19: I’ve done a lot of work on handover and done a few reports for NSW
Health and consult with them on a couple of things. Which is a bit cathartic for
all the other crap that you have to deal with; at least you feel like something is
changing between times.
For some, the burden of the responsibility entailed in being a clinician weighed
heavily. They reflected on the power differential between doctor and patient,
expressing a preference for interactions in which this differential was less profound,
and enjoyed working with groups of others on shared projects. Such work offered
respite from day-to-day practice.
P4: But there are groups of people and in each where I come together and
where I get refreshed, rejuvenated, get your brain expanded, I think that’s a
really important part of it. And it is that you share a number of things in
common, and you have a similar language, or a similar vision for your
research or your clinical work or your public health work. It’s a safe
environment.
Doing the Right Thing and Giving Back to Society
Advocate participants held that doctors’ purpose was to do good through doctor-
patient transactions.
P14: I maintain my clinical practice. And that’s very grounding and positive in
a sense that that’s what you’re really there for [laughs].
At the same time, their view of the right thing for a mature practitioner
transcended this, to encompass caring for those who weren’t cared for, representing
the interests of disadvantaged people, and leading change in postgraduate
education—because ‘‘it’s only for the good of mankind that a lot of people give
their time for teaching’’ (P10).
P9: So if you have a good sense about yourself, you know where you stand,
you understand your own limitations and constraints, then I think you can add
value back to the profession of medicine.
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A number of participants were explicit about their indebtedness to society as a
result of receiving a free or subsidised education.
P11: Well I guess it’s about contributing to general practice. I do have a
genuine feeling of putting something back, and I think people are fortunate to
do medicine, and get the support that society gives it.
Is that all there is?
Supraclinical advocacy as a relief from boredom and a means of fulfilment,
especially for those who perceived themselves to have a range of talents, defines this
theme. Medicine could become tedious if not enlivened with additional activities.
For some participants, maturity as a professional came with a sense of disappoint-
ment. Medicine allowed them to peak early professionally, and caused them to ask:
‘is that all there is?’ They sought new challenges to fulfil their expectations of
having a varied and interesting career. With maturity, participants gave themselves
permission to seek within their working life opportunities for pleasure and delight.
Remaining Intellectually Engaged and Interested in Their Work
Participants regarded intelligence as of high importance in medicine and used it as
an explanation for doctors’ desire for a stimulating professional life. They viewed
their own intelligence as an important determinant of the course of their lives.
Engaging in a variety of activities enabled participants to combat boredom and
exercise their intellect.
P14: And I thought well I could spend another 25 years doing much more of
the same and publishing a lot more and travelling around the world, but I had
done all of that, I’d presented at major conferences around the world, and big
talk-fests. [I thought] there’s got to be more to life than this. So that’s why I
went down that particular path.
Achieving Potential
Participants perceived doctors to be multi-talented individuals, with potential to
contribute in many areas in the span of a single career, and considered that doctors
who felt bored or boxed in were at risk of professional dissatisfaction.
Some participants appeared to fall into the advocate role and stay engaged with it
because success signalled that they had an aptitude for it, but most articulated an
awareness of their own strengths, or what made them stand out in terms of attitudes
or preferences. For some, making choices that optimised the use of their talents was
a personal commitment.
P10: So probably one of my strengths is political, and getting groups of people
together, getting them to try to get things over the line, that’s my part in life.
Others believed that they had many talents and expressed a desire to exercise
them all.
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P14: I can sit back in 30-40 years time and say ‘well I did all that’, and I’ve
got the Phil Collins syndrome. The drummer of Genesis, they interviewed him
once and they said ‘Why did you become a singer?’ and he said ‘Well I could
have sat back and just been a drummer, but I wanted to explore all the talents
that I may have had’, so he became a producer, actor, singer. So that’s how I
see it. I think we don’t do enough of that in this, and a lot of people stick to
35 years in one thing, and then they get really good at it, and that’s it, that’s
the end of it. Is that going to be it?
For those who believed they had more to offer the health system than clinical
care, advocacy provided the reward and exhilaration of making a difference on a
larger scale.
Experiencing Pleasure
Finally, these data support the idea that advocacy at this level can be pleasurable,
and that one might excuse oneself from clinical activity to pursue this type of
pleasure. Aspects of the role are ‘fun’, surprisingly enjoyable, or a stimulating
puzzle. It is gratifying to use one’s talents and to exercise new skills. Pleasure may
also come from being recognised for one’s role or achievements as an advocate.
Being invited to participate in policy-making processes was viewed by a number of
participants as a form of recognition or reward. ‘Excitement’ is a term many
participants used in connection with their advocacy activities.
P1: Well it’s nice to get recognition from your peers for the work that you do,
so getting the job here at the University, and being asked to contribute to, you
know, policy or practice or committees, to be able to do that, shows that I
suppose people must value what you do in some way. So that kind of external
recognition is really, really nice, and when you publish things and people read
your work and ‘oh really, that’s great, how exciting’.
Pleasure encompassed feelings of pride and accomplishment.
P4: I actually feel proud of the fact that obesity in children is actually
something that’s far better recognised and resourced now than it was 10 years
ago, and I think I’ve been very involved at a number of levels in making it
(certainly in New South Wales) part of basic paediatric recognition.
Discussion
In this study, slightly more than half of the participants engaged in a wide variety of
advocacy activities aimed at changing society and the health and medical
educational systems in the pursuit of improved health outcomes. Two themes
explained doctors’ participation in these activities: ‘It made me’, signifying how
experiences in early life and medical training influenced doctors’ role choices, and
‘Is that all there is?’ relating the choices to participants’ mature perspectives. These
themes support Oandasan and Barker’s [40] findings that influences, motivations,
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and knowledge are important in the genesis of advocate patterns of practice in
doctors, although the present study’s application of Charmaz’s [10] grounded theory
techniques—in particular, rigorous coding by actions—allowed a more nuanced
picture of the linkages between the data, thus enabling insights into participants’
narratives of the experiences contributing to the formation of the mature doctor.
Significantly, our study presents a version of the doctor as a human being first
and a professional second. In the growth of doctors towards a form of mature
practice that includes advocacy, personal ideals and a desire to flourish were more
important than professional commitments. This finding is novel amongst the small
number of relevant qualitative studies reported in the literature, but is congruent
with theoretical positions on the role of personal ideals in career choice, specialty
choice and role emphasis [35], on the protection pre-existing moral beliefs and
commitments offer medical students when faced with moral issues related to role
choice [30], and on the role of extraprofessional ethical codes in shaping doctors’
professional behaviour and choices generally [50].
Our findings support existing evidence that neither the codes, nor their
operationalisation via education, play a significant part in doctors’ decisions on
advocacy. Our participants’ decisions were influenced most strongly by their
experience, in sequence, of the three modest foundational values—survival, security
and flourishing—that Little et al. [34] propose as the basis for values in medicine.
Their experiences of surviving a hostile enculturation process, striving for security
during postgraduate training, and eventually reconnecting with personal values were
consistent with other reports of recovery from the negative effects of enculturation
[28, 39] and with the process of unlearning—jettisoning false knowledge gained
from one’s masters—inherent in Foucault’s [18] practice of the self. For our
participants, flourishing entailed experiencing enjoyment, sustenance and recogni-
tion, and, in accordance with the Aristotelian principle, applying their talents to
create a practice that opened up the possibility of achieving excellence and
recognition [3].
Our participants built satisfying careers on a foundation of self-knowledge and
the application of talents and passions, as advocated from a theoretical perspective
by Fuster et al. [20]. Situating our participants’ experiences within Foucault’s [24]
conceptualisation of ethics as the self’s relationship to itself is helpful in
understanding the moral dimensions of our participants’ choices, and to a certain
extent, the temporal aspects of their emergence as advocates. To Foucault [18], the
techniques of the self are an adult practice. The eventual selection of a career
structure that includes particular supererogatory elements may reflect our partic-
ipants’ self-formation as ethical subjects, which Foucault expresses as ‘‘a process in
which the individual delimits that part of himself that will form the object of his
moral practice, defines his position relative to the precept he will follow, and
decides on a certain mode of being that will serve as his moral goal’’ [38]. By
exposing a journey that had its starting point in the doctor’s personal ideals and was
shaped by both negative and positive aspects of the fixed and discretionary
experiences of training, this study suggests that, once they have transcended the
survival and security phases of development as professionals, and are ready to
undertake the work of ethical self-formation, doctors will pursue supraclinical
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advocacy if that is where their passions and talents lie. Efforts to force a
commitment to advocacy in the early years of training, when young doctors are
seeking survival or security, may be futile.
This study’s theme ‘‘Is that all there is?’’ shines a more intense spotlight than
earlier studies on motivations that are not at base socially desirable, providing
additional insight that may assist those interested in promoting the advocate role to
doctors. It suggests that, for some doctors, advocacy meets their needs for an
interesting and varied professional life that accords with their personal ideals and
preferences. It may, thus, deliver benefits unrelated to direct health outcomes,
including bridging the gaps between the many players in the health system,
enhancing collegiality and reducing isolation. Whilst there is much debate about the
benefit to society of professionals’ participation in supraclinical advocacy, its
potential to limit loss of certain types of doctor from the profession should not be
overlooked. Perceiving oneself to be a member of an elite group was an attraction of
advocacy amongst our participants. With the rise of managerialism and stratification
of the medical profession in contemporary health systems [9], more opportunities
exist for doctors to experience elite roles, which may prove effective in keeping
some engaged in medicine, notwithstanding uncertainty about the ultimate effects of
stratification.
The singular finding of the present study is the relationship between doctors’
experience of power and their decisions to engage in advocacy, which on the one
hand, enables them to reclaim power in the face of a system over which they have
limited control, and on the other, provides a haven from the relational power that is
bound to the responsibilities and accountabilities of the clinical role. A hypothesis
that might explain this finding is that engaging in this activity allows doctors respite
from the pressures of clinical practice, including the frustrations of working in
health systems that constrain them and the uncertainty inherent in clinical practice.
Earnest et al. [17] hypothesised that doctors may be deterred from engaging in
advocacy processes by feelings of reduced competence and control. Our findings
suggest the opposite: that power can be burdensome and respite from it sustaining.
Advocacy may offer a release valve: an opportunity to relate to others as equals; to
be a collaborator or a conspirator; to act as if one is certain; to relax controls on
one’s emotions and behaviour; and to work actively for, or against, the system. In
this role the doctor can be another version of herself or, in Arendt’s [3] terms, she is
enabled to reveal her real identity.
The findings of this study also demonstrate doctors’ enjoyment of the collegiality
entailed in supraclinical advocacy, lending support to Hubinette et al.’s [26]
observation that the doctors they studied experienced advocacy work as a team
activity and derived sustenance from working with those who shared their values,
and amplifying these authors’ view that reconceptualisation by medical educators of
supraclinical advocacy as a group activity might encourage more graduates to
embrace the role. Arendt’s [3] conceptualisation of ‘action’ as a group activity
affording the opportunity for individuals both to manifest their plurality and engage
collectively may provide a theoretical basis for such a change in approach.
While many participants in this study spoke directly about ‘wanting to help
others’, it was in connection with choosing medicine as a career rather than with any
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subsequent choice they made. This was consistent with the ambiguity with which
they regarded supraclinical advocacy: as less important than clinical work, but more
suited to the repayment of debt to society. Future research should explore this
finding. The association we found between doctors’ feelings of indebtedness to
society and receipt of a free or subsidised education suggests a need to monitor the
impact of the rising personal costs of medical education on doctors’ participation in
supraclinical advocacy and other areas of supererogatory service related to their
profession.
The association of formative events—generally negative experiences—and of
negative role models with decisions to pursue supraclinical advocacy have not been
reported in other empirical studies, although Murinson et al. [39] found exposure to
positive and negative role models to be amongst the most powerful formative events
in the personal growth in medical students.
Support for a number of the findings of earlier empirical work on advocacy
emerges from this study, including for evidence that exposure to socioeconomically
disadvantaged groups impels doctors towards supraclinical advocacy [19, 40]. The
fact that such experiences are often discretionary, and were so in the case of our
participants, may indicate either a common antecedent or a causal relationship and
suggests a need for further research on the links between disposition, education and
exposure to marginalised groups, and between these factors and the later adoption of
roles in supraclinical advocacy. The findings encourage consideration of some
options for fine-tuning current educational endeavour, including greater use of well-
structured placements in marginalised communities as an alternative or supplement
to didactic and other forms of experiential teaching on advocacy. They also suggest
that personal and professional flourishing in mature practice might be enhanced by
taking a broader approach to education for supererogatory roles, replacing universal
advocacy training with student-selected educational modules consistent with their
interests and preferences.
This study’s finding that the values and preferences that doctors hold on reaching
maturity significantly influence their choices in respect of engagement in
supraclinical advocacy suggests that reserving education in this type of advocacy
for doctors with an interest in it, by whom it could be accessed on entry into the
flourishing phase of practice, might offer an alternative to existing educational
interventions. Such targeting should be considered if we are concerned about the
opportunity costs arising from the promotion of advocacy training in already-packed
medical programs ahead of education that would facilitate the development of
clinical skills or other, arguably equally worthy, supererogatory behaviours [29].
Such an approach might go some way towards managing the risk that, in applying a
small amount of advocacy education to a large number of students, medical
programs will be viewed as trivialising the subject and underestimating the need for
specialised skills [15, 41].
It is usual to consider doctors’ professional behaviours through the prism of
Kantian deontology and, in recent decades, virtue ethics as explicated by Pellegrino
and Thomasma [42]. These approaches are embedded in the dominant consensus
paradigm of professional ethics, which contains only the requirements imposed on
the members of the profession and excludes the personal ideals that motivate and
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sustain doctors [35]. This paradigm lacks sensitivity to the temporal and
maturational aspects of growth into the professional role that are relevant to the
development of educational and policy responses to medical advocacy. The present
study, by bringing into focus the growth trajectory leading to role choice and the
part personal ideals and ethical self-formation play in the selection of supereroga-
tory behaviours, highlights the limitations of continuing to privilege the consensus
paradigm. It suggests the need for and direction of a more comprehensive model
that embraces the self-interest and moral concern that work legitimately encom-
passes and acknowledges that the morality of medicine is not learnt, but grown into
[30]. We suggest that Little et al.’s [34] modest foundational values may provide a
useful framework for exploring why and when certain doctors engage in activities
directed at social justice, how and when to offer training for the role, and how
related activities might be organised to optimise their appeal and effectiveness.
Limitations and Further Research
Our recruitment process created a potential limitation to our study. The participants
were all associates of a single University who, because of our use of snowball
sampling, were often known to each other. As a result we may be over representing
a subset of the advocate doctor population. The distribution of age, sex and specialty
amongst our advocate participants was similar to that of the whole sample, which
was selected for maximum variation. Thus although our findings may not be widely
generalisable, we believe that they are likely to encompass a broad range of
advocate doctors. Whilst our sample contained advocates and non-advocates we did
not attempt formally to make comparisons between these subgroups. Nor did we
draw out fine distinctions between sub-groups of doctors based on gender, length of
time in practice, specialty or location of practice. Given that these could all impact
upon engagement with the advocate role, further research focusing on these
distinctions could be enlightening.
These data relate only to participants’ experiences of taking part in supraclinical
advocacy. They do not provide any insight into doctors’ assessment of the
serviceability of their moral frameworks in enabling their decisions to engage in
such activities, their awareness of and management of related issues such as dual
agency and conflict of interest, or their perception of the adequacy of their skills and
knowledge in this milieu, all of which represent areas for further research.
Elucidating the objective of codifying supraclinical advocacy as a professional
commitment, clarifying its definition and scope, and examining its feasibility is
required as a matter of priority in order to facilitate re-evaluation of its emerging
prominence in educational curricula. To the extent that it is likely to be both
inevitable and desirable if at least some doctors choose it as a form of service, it will
be important to know answers to questions such as: To what extent do doctors
perceive this to be a professional commitment? To what extent to they engage in it?
What characterises those who engage in it and what are their experiences and
educational needs? What do contemporary communities and governments want of
doctors’ engagement in supraclinical advocacy? What benefits arise from this
engagement?
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Conclusion
Our study aimed to identify the values that impelled a cohort of doctors towards
becoming supraclinical advocates. We found no evidence that either the medical
codes of ethics or their augmentation through the medical educational process were
significantly related to doctors’ decisions to become engaged in advocacy, rather
their personal ideals, formed as a result of their experiences in early life and during
training, were the most substantial influences on their role choices. We observed
role choice to emerge on maturity, in the flourishing phase of practice, suggesting
that both timing and participant selection are critical considerations when
developing educational interventions concerned with supraclinical advocacy. That
some doctors will include supraclinical advocacy in their mature practices is
inevitable, given its potential to enable the pursuit of excellence and recognition,
provide a setting for displaying ‘who’ they are, and function as an area for ethical
self-formation, but as several options serve similar purposes, it is equally
inevitable that other doctors will not. The variability that this entails suggests that
benefits might arise from consideration of alternatives to codification of the
advocacy role as an individual professional commitment and to its widespread
promulgation by medical education programs.
Whilst our participants reported being influenced to some extent by values
relating to social justice, there is little or no empirical evidence on the extent to
which social justice is served by doctors’ involvement in advocacy. Thus it would
seem important to take stock of and understand better the moral commitments
inherent in supraclinical advocacy to facilitate consideration of its future
representation in codes of medical ethics and medical curricula. To this end
empirical investigation needs to be undertaken into doctors’ experiences of the
advocacy role and the impact of supraclinical advocacy on social justice.
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Background
It is almost universal in contemporary western societies to
construct healthcare resources as scarce and in need of
rationing [1]. Most socialised health systems have formal
processes in place that manage scarcity and determine the
allocation of new resources to healthcare programs in ac-
cordance with their priority [2–4]. Because of its potential
to impact on persons and society, health policy-making
for resource allocation has been characterised as a moral
endeavour [5, 6]. In this analysis, part of a larger qualita-
tive study undertaken in NSW, Australia, we report on
the values and ethical commitments of doctors who
participate in health care resource allocation processes as
technical experts, and make an empirically derived contri-
bution towards the identification of an ethical framework
to guide doctors who occupy this role.
Macroallocation concerns decisions that determine the
amount of resources available for particular kinds of
health services and programs [7–9]. Its focus on the
healthcare needs of populations at an aggregate level and
its locus at the level of governments and institutions
distinguish it from microallocation, or bedside rationing,
which concerns decisions about individual patients’ access
to resources. Since it generally entails competing policy
goals that require choices to be made amongst many
defensible options [10] and normative assessments of the
needs of groups of patients who are seen as competing for
the same resources [9], it is often conceptualised as prior-
ity setting [8, 11].
In western democracies with socialised medicine,
macroallocation generally makes use of the input of tech-
nical experts when deliberating options and formulating
recommendations to the decision-maker, who is often a
politician, but may be a local board or executive, depend-
ing on the scale of the decision and the degree to which
authority is delegated in the system. In healthcare policy,
doctors are the dominant technical experts [12–16]. That
they are essential as expert informants seems to be readily
accepted [2, 17], notwithstanding concerns about their
lack of special expertise in determining the outcomes
likely to promote social justice [18–20], their limitations
as barometers of public preferences [21, 22], and the
ubiquity of conflicts of interest and role [21, 23–26].
Values and interests underlie macroallocation delibera-
tions [14, 25, 27] and the production and use of the medical
evidence that is the focus of policy deliberation [28–30].
Usually, priority setting is guided by rules or principles that
have been set by government or the relevant health author-
ity [31]; ideally, these are consistent with societal norms
and values [3]. In most systems, distributive justice is the
overarching principle guiding decisions, although one or a
combination of liberal, egalitarian, utilitarian or communi-
tarian models may be used to arrive at this aim, each hold-
ing to a different idea of justice [32].
The extent to which individual participants’ values –
and the ethical perspectives they inform – accord with the
principles underlying any given macroallocation exercise
can shape that process, determining the content of the de-
liberation and the potential for arrival at common ground
[26, 31]. Participants’ values can also influence how they
perform their roles in ways that are independent of
whether or not they subscribe to the values guiding the
resource allocation decisions. For example, the values they
hold about interpersonal engagement may influence how
they interact to arrive at decisions.
That the expert generally promotes certain values and
rarely functions in a purely technical role [26, 33, 34] brings
into relief the privileged position of doctors and their
limitations, and prompts our interest in understanding the
ethical ramifications of their engagement in macroalloca-
tion. Since values figure conceptually prior to ethics, in that
they help determine what is regarded as good or right [35],
a description of the values held by doctors who engage in
the normative evaluations inherent in distributive justice
might form a useful stepping stone towards an ethics for
this practice.
It has been claimed that the social conventions of policy
processes militate against explicit and detailed exploration
of values, and that unacknowledged differences in ethical
perspectives amongst participants can cause conflict and
failure to reach resolutions [14, 26, 36–38], a situation
echoed in the empirical and theoretical literatures on
priority setting where, although the plurality of values and
ethical perspectives in the macroallocation process is
acknowledged [9, 26, 37], little has been written on the
values of the different actors, including doctors. It is
common, instead, for assumptions to be made about the
values and ethical frameworks doctors bring to resource
allocation deliberations, notably that they have a deonto-
logical focus on addressing the needs of individual patients
that contrasts with the utilitarian perspectives of most
other categories of participant [26]. This divergence in
frameworks is then used to account for difficulties in
arriving at agreement on just allocations. The present
study aims to identify the values of one group of partici-
pants: the doctors who play the role of technical expert in
priority setting, so as to enable testing of some of the
assumptions about their ethical perspectives.
Globally, under the influence of the physician charter of
the ABIM Foundation [39], codes of medical ethics have
begun to include as a professional commitment engage-
ment in social and distributive justice activities [40–42].
The Australian Medical Association’s (AMA) encourage-
ment of doctors to ‘use [their] knowledge and skills to
assist those responsible for allocating healthcare resources,
advocating for their transparent and equitable allocation’
is a typical example [43]. This trend has prompted intense
debate about the ethics of doctors’ involvement in socially
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engaged actions [24, 40, 41, 44]; however, neither macroal-
location as a setting for this commitment nor the details
of its actualisation have been explored from an ethical
standpoint. A central problem in the codes of ethics is the
vagueness of the activities they embrace and of the
descriptions of ethically relevant concepts, especially at
the practical and social levels. For this reason, we believe
that identification of the values of participants in macroal-
location is a necessary foundation for normative work
towards bridging the gap between medical professional
ethics and the practice of socially engaged actions.
In order to obtain a rich picture of doctors’ understand-
ing of the social process of policy and to bring their intui-
tions to bear on our ethical analysis [45, 46] we undertook
a qualitative interview study of doctors who act as
technical experts in macroallocation. Our enquiry elicited
reflection on the roles doctors play in policy and their
practical experience of those roles. Using the empirical
bioethics methodology grounded moral analysis (GMA)
[47], we considered doctors’ conceptual understandings
alongside ethical theory in order to arrive at an under-
standing of ethics in macroallocation policy work. Our
focus was on doctors who elected to engage in policy as
individuals, rather than as representatives of interest
groups, and who were focused on the resourcing of
services rather than on the rights of medical practitioners
or broad professional reform.
Our principal goals for this part of the project were: first,
to develop an empirical account of macroallocation practice
focusing on the values and ethical commitments of doctors
who engage in it as technical experts; and second, by
exploring with participants the normative implications of
this information, to attempt to theorise an empirically
grounded ethics for doctors’ role in macroallocation.
Methods
Methodology
This analysis is part of a larger qualitative interview study
examining the ethical issues entailed in doctors’ participa-
tion as technical experts in government processes
concerned with the allocation of resources to health care.
To answer our research questions we selected sampling,
data-collection, and analysis strategies that were based on
Dunn et al.’s [47] GMA, an iterative empirical bioethics
methodology founded in grounded theory (GT) [48] that
employs contemporaneous interchange between the
ethical and empirical to support normative claims that are
grounded in practice.
Participants and sampling
We recruited 20 doctors, each of whom had participated
in macroallocation in the Australian health system. Ten
doctors responded to an invitation issued on our behalf
by the NSW Ministry of Health’s Agency for Clinical
Innovation, which coordinates clinician networks that
advise on aspects of health policy in NSW. Of these, one
withdrew before an interview had been scheduled. The
remaining 9 were interviewed, together with a doctor
recruited by means of passive snowballing. In order to
enable exploration of the categories emerging from the
analysis we then undertook theoretical sampling from
amongst members of our professional networks [49].
We issued 18 invitations in this stage, which yielded 12
affirmative responses. Out of these, 10 interviews even-
tuated, while for the remaining 2, theoretical saturation
had been reached and data collection had ceased before
interview arrangements could be finalised.
Each member of our sample had been involved as a
technical expert in multiple macroallocation processes,
acting concurrently or serially in policy at the institutional,
local, state, national and, in some instances, international
levels. All had advised or were currently advising policy
makers in government macroallocation processes involv-
ing prioritisation of competing bids for health care
funding. Their activities included: committee membership,
meetings with bureaucrats and political decision-makers,
lobbying, independent development of processes aimed at
advancing debate on healthcare priorities, and preparation
of submissions and correspondence. None were involved
in championing the rights of medical practitioners, or in
broad professional reform. Participants’ characteristics and
their policy activities are set out in Table 1.
All of our participants were or had been (in the case of
those who had retired) employed, mostly on a full-time
basis, in the public sector. Age, sex, and country of
training were distributed in the sample in accordance with
their representation in the Australian specialist medical
workforce [50, 51].
Data-collection
The first author, who has experience as a participant in
macroallocation, conducted the interviews, which lasted
an average of 64 min, with a range of 30 to 90 min. Our
semi-structured interview format was designed to draw
out participants’ experiences and prompt ethical reflec-
tion. Our interview schedule was structured to explore
broad topics initially, and became more focussed on par-
ticipants’ moral intuitions as the interview progressed.
We revised the interview schedule on two occasions, in
response to our early normative and conceptual analysis,
to enable the testing of emergent theories [47, 48]. In
order to honour our commitment to GT-guided
open-ended interviewing, we elicited later participants’
responses to ethical perspectives emerging from the data
indirectly, rather than engaging them in a formal reason-
ing process or in explicitly validating a particular ac-
count; we elected not to make ethical theories explicitly
visible to participants [47].
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Analysis
From the commencement of the interviews, we progres-
sively undertook inductive and abductive data analysis,
which involved preparing detailed codes, writing compre-
hensive memos, exploring relationships between codes,
and combining codes to create analytic categories [48].
The analysis was conducted by the first author, who
discussed emergent findings with the other authors, and
drew reflexively on her own experiences in order to
understand and take account of their role in informing the
interpretation of the data [49, 52–55]. Since participants’
reflections on ethical matters were frequently implicit we
acknowledge our interpretative role in constructing this
account [56].
In our initial inductive analysis, we found that our
participants shared strong ethical insights that tapped into
themes of virtue ethics, particularly justice, practical
wisdom, and moderation, to which we responded by
developing our interview schedule in the direction of
virtue ethics, in accordance with GMA methodology [47]
and Salloch et al.’s advice [57] that ethical theories in
empirical bioethics should be chosen on the basis of their
appropriateness to the issue at stake and congruity with
the moral deliberations of participants. We used the steps
set out in GMA to validate our emerging ethical insights
with participants [47]. The effect of this interplay between
data and analysis was to recreate the ‘phenomenologically
informed hermeneutic approach to ethics’ described by
Rehmann-Sutter et al. [58], in which the authority of nor-
mative claims comes from the researcher’s ‘reconstruction
of the ethical argument they have assembled during the
collection of data’ [58].
In the course of our analytic and normative deliberations,
we observed that the ethical themes in our data resonated
strongly with Paul Ricoeur’s ‘little ethics’—a variant of
virtue ethics that embraces self-esteem, solicitude, and
participative justice [59].
Ethics
The University of Sydney Human Research Ethics
Committee gave approval for this study. Each participant
gave consent in writing. All were assured that we would
maintain confidentiality, and that they were free to
withdraw from the study at any stage. We de-identified all
data, and assigned alphanumeric codes for analysis and
storage.
Results
Participants’ accounts of macroallocation practice were
rich in concepts of virtue, with justice, practical wisdom,
moderation, and the virtues of self-efficacy [60] strongly
represented. Participants also valued participation in the
institution of macroallocation and had confidence in its
power to effect just decisions. In addition, they gave their
views on the ethically desirable and undesirable practices
in which doctors might engage whilst performing the
expert role, and offered recommendations for changing
practice so that it more closely approached the ideal.
Participants’ ideas of virtue in macroallocation practice
were strongly aligned with the conception of virtue ethics
Table 1 Participant characteristics and policy activities
Sex (number of participants)
Female (5)
Male (15)
Age Range (number of participants)
≤ 45 (3)
46–55 (4)
56–64 (10)
65–80 (3)
Average age: 58
Country of undergraduate training (number of participants)
Australia (16)
Europe (3)
Asia (1)
Clinical Specialtya,b (number of participants)
Paediatrics (3)
Endocrinology (1)
Plastic Surgery (1)
Rehabilitation (3)
General Practice Academic (2)
Rheumatology (1)
Clinical Pharmacology (1)
Gastroenterology (2)
Intensive Care Medicine (2)
Neurology (2)
Cardiology (1)
Radiation Oncology (1)
Policy engagement level and issue (number of participants)
Multiple national governments or international bodies on public
health programs (2)
Australian government funding of healthcare research priorities (2)
Australian government funding of high cost health care interventions
(3)
Australian government funding for priority healthcare programs (4)
Australian government funding of participant’s specialty (2)
NSW government funding of participant’s specialty (13)
Local health administration funding of participant’s specialty (11)
University priorities for health research and education program
funding (4)
aFor participants with multiple specialist qualifications, the specialty listed is
the one on which the majority of their policy work was focussed
bParticipants’ subspecialties are withheld in order to preserve confidentiality
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set out by Paul Ricoeur in his ‘little ethics’. Ricoeur adds
to the Aristotelian concept of the virtuous life a recogni-
tion of the generative possibilities of institutions [61].
In this section we describe the ethical features of our
data; we relate them to the concepts in Ricoeur’s ethics
in the following section.
The doctors in our sample held values in common
across three domains –personal ethics, justice, and prac-
tices of argumentation. These values are set out in Fig. 1
below and described in the text that follows.
Personal ethics
Taking responsibility
Our participants believed that all doctors holding posi-
tions in public institutions had a duty to take up societally,
educationally, or professionally focused roles in addition
to their clinical work. It was a rare ‘brilliant clinician’ who
deserved to be excused from this obligation. Most partici-
pants considered the responsibility to undertake macroal-
location work to derive from their employment at the
taxpayer’s expense in the public sector. For some it was a
manifestation of gratitude for the privilege of working in a
prestigious institution.
P8: This institution has been pretty good in allowing
us to run around and do these things. I mean, that’s
important.
Many of our participants considered complaining with-
out attempting to address conditions in the health service
to be unconscionable and viewed colleagues who did this
as freeloaders, although some considered a structural fea-
ture of the Australian health system that makes it finan-
cially difficult for doctors in private practice to devote
time to macroallocation to be a mitigating factor.
P15: I guess, it’s also the sense of being able to shape
things and really having the bigger picture view of
wanting to make sure – I guess you can’t complain
about decisions and choices and policies if you’re not
in there shaping them. So if you see things you don’t
agree with, you’ve got to be in there doing it. So it’s
that feeling of that responsibility.
Disapprobation of those who pursued this route for
self-serving reasons, for example, as a means of building
an empire or developing a career, was strongly represented
in our data. Melioristic motives were offered by our partic-
ipants for their own participation, and expected of others:
for those whose focus was the local level, a desire to
provide ‘the best service possible’ and reduce stresses on
healthcare staff, and for those whose focus was state-wide,
national or international, a desire to ‘make a difference’
and to ‘be of service’.
A small number of participants, even as they upheld au-
thenticity and meliorism, admitted that they were unsure
of their own motives.
P16: And for me, it’s a very uneasy feeling obviously,
and I think it comes to the point where I then hope
that what I achieve to advocate is worth more than
what my ulterior motive was.
Persistence, patience, and loyalty to a cause
In our data the virtues of self-efficacy were highly valued:
persistence, patience, and resilience were the qualities
universally drawn on in macroallocation work. Persistence
was particularly prominent across our data: our participants
commonly evoked an image of themselves as ‘a dog with a
Fig. 1 The values of doctors who engage in macroallocation work, as defined by participants
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bone’. We found that our participants set long-term goals
and accepted deferred gratification. They endured failure
and partial success sanguinely, but as an interim step to-
wards achieving their objective, rather than the last word.
Many spoke of trying different avenues when the first
attempt failed, or repeatedly proffering the same opinion in
anticipation of it finally hitting the target.
P1: I think you need to be able to justify what you
need [in order] to be able to justify what you want,
but then there are ways to get what you need. And
maybe only half of what you need and that’s fine, or
just, you know, take another three years to get the
other half, that’s fine.
Our participants’ records bore out their claims: they
remained committed to the issues and processes that had
attracted their attention early in their careers, in some
instances engaging with a particular process for decades.
Although they had faced a wide range of negative experi-
ences, including betrayal, disrespect, sexism, the conse-
quences of being overcommitted, and high-profile public
repudiation of their advice, they found it hard to think of
circumstances in which they would give up.
Justice
Engaging in distributive justice
A significant number of the doctors in our sample charac-
terised themselves as protectors of the national purse.
They were concerned about transparency, accountability,
and waste in the health sector. For these doctors, engaging
with practical matters of distributive justice was a natural
response to those concerns. They considered that partici-
pation in policy making about resource allocation was a
legitimate role for them, and for doctors generally, to play.
P20: You’re making decisions about allocation of the
health care dollar in a cost effective and equitable way
- so that is, in a way, you’re advocating for patients
but you’re also advocating nationally for the country -
so it’s not so much advocacy, but being at the pointy
end of the way health care dollars are being allocated.
They believed in their own capacity to act in society’s in-
terests and were confident that, without doctors’ experience
and perspectives, decision-making would be impossible.
P6: So I guess the things – so I think that the system
needs societal good, all right? And we probably have
enough ego to believe that we can do – we can
prescribe what that looks like.
The doctors in our sample declared no difficulty in
separating this role from their obligations to individual
patients; they spoke often about the different ‘hats’ they
wore for different purposes.
P14: I think it has to be someone who’s interested
in societal health and being an advocate for society
because you’ve got to switch hats; if you’re a clinician
and you’re treating a patient then clearly your role
is to advocate for that patient and they would quite
reasonably not like it if you took a societal view
[laugh], [you] try and get the best you can for that
patient, but if you’re making decisions you’ve got
to put – take that hat off and put a different hat on.
Even as they engaged with the problem of apportioning
healthcare resources, some of our participants shared an
insight that decisions on resource distributions in health
care were essentially arbitrary and that investing in
non-health programs might be equally, if not more, justifi-
able in terms of benefit to society.
Equity
Of the 20 participants, 11 had entered an emerging
specialty or subspecialty, or had identified and developed
their practices to focus on a previously unrecognised issue;
almost all of the remainder occupied niches in evolving
areas of their specialties. Most participants expressed a
view that the disease entity in which they were interested
was considered unattractive, or that their patient groups
were neglected or stigmatised. Some were interested in
securing access to services for those who were socially
marginalised or geographically disadvantaged. A number
of our participants considered themselves to be the ‘cham-
pions’ of such groups and issues, while at the same time
regretting the need for champions. It was common for
participants to express wry resentment about how easy it
was for peers seeking resources on behalf of ‘sexier’ ill-
nesses or patient groups to gain advantage.
P14: Their catchcry for that was ‘this is an evidence
based decision making process, not an advocacy based
process’, because most health is about my disease is
bigger than your disease and if you do a cost of illness
study, everyone’s disease is the biggest and all of that,
but my prime motivation was actually for advocacy
for [the patients of my specialty] because they are the
poor cousin.
Confidence in institutions
In our participants’ accounts, macroallocation was experi-
enced as a rewarding practice. They enjoyed being valued
by bureaucratic and ministerial decision-makers, and con-
sidered that long-term commitment to macroallocation
eventually yielded benefits, built reputations, and created
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further opportunities. They were motivated by their confi-
dence in the policy and political processes available for
determining resource allocation and valued engaging with
them as a worthwhile activity from which they derived
both results and feelings of belonging and worth. Almost
all of our participants saw the bureaucrats with whom
they engaged on policy as well-meaning, dedicated people
trying to do the right thing. They believed bureaucrats
largely to be responsive to the evidence provided by doc-
tors, and willing, capable interpreters of doctors’ perspec-
tives to political decision-makers. They were optimistic
about their chances of success in the deliberative process.
P6: Lots of [doctors] I guess denigrate, in my view
quite unfairly, the hierarchy of the bureaucracy, and
what bureaucracy can do for them. I guess it's fair
that I don't see bureaucracy as intimidating or
frightening or - they're there to be - like everyone
they're there to do their job and they are open to
persuasion like everyone else is. And open to be
guided to make a better decision.
Some, however, characterised their interaction with bu-
reaucrats as ‘playing the game’. Whether cynical or sup-
portive, our participants all worked hard to assemble the
‘case’ that they believed would satisfy the bureaucrats’ need
for information to ‘take up the line’ to decision-makers. A
small minority claimed to distrust authority or dislike
bureaucrats of all stripes, although even these individuals
had forged successful relationships with bureaucrats who
supported them.
We found that the doctors in our sample understood
the constraints on their influence in the deliberative pro-
cesses to which they belonged, and believed their advice
was for others to adjudicate upon.
P5: Even if it’s not an outcome I agree with, if the
process is fair then I’m happy with that.
Practices of argumentation
Moderation
Our participants valued balance and moderation in their
formal transactions in macroallocation. A number said
they steered clear of melodrama or ‘overhyping’ in order
to avoid alienating bureaucrats or causing ‘the bullshit
meter to go up’ (P6). P20’s description of his approach
was typical:
P20: You have to persuade governments, not shout at
them or bully them.
Universally in our sample, doctors who flouted the rules
or gained advantage through being ‘squeaky-wheels’
attracted disapproval. A special level of condemnation was
reserved for those who went to the media, or who
leap-frogged the chain of command, especially if they
invoked the intervention of a politician. P8’s characterisa-
tion of such actors as ‘Visigoths’, who were looking after
their own agendas, exemplified our sample’s view. Some of
our participants described how groups self-policed to bring
colleagues into line or to weed out those who could not
operate in accordance with the group’s culture.
P4: [This committee is] here to advocate for society as
it were and people work that out pretty smartly and, if
they don't, they don't stay or they get booted off.
A small number of our participants, although endors-
ing moderate tactics, recounted incidents where they
had thumped tables, engaged in ‘stand-up rows’, impor-
tuned government ministers, and bypassed the chain of
command. Two claimed to understand the frustration of
actors who did not play by the rules, and had questioned
their own tactics, on the basis that they were ‘too nice’
to be successful.
Data and evidence
We found that our participants were committed to the
use of numerical data, evidence based medicine (EBM),
and cost effectiveness analysis in the policy process, and
were confident in the capacity of these techniques to
compel a response. Observations such as P1’s, that ‘any
doctor with a cause must master the data’, were common.
Most participants went to considerable lengths to gather
and present convincing data, including acquiring skills in
healthcare and financial data analysis, establishing purpose
built databases, and operating complex research programs
designed to allow quantification of patient and service
needs. They saw themselves as holding back the tide of ir-
rationality, disparaging colleagues who did not share their
regard for data as the foundation for argument, especially
if they dismissed available data or countered evidence with
anecdote. Paradoxically – since it did not disrupt their
commitment to using data – many participants reported
dismay at the frequency with which someone with no data
but a good story swayed opinion, and some noted that
deploying clinical vignettes assisted them in argumenta-
tion. A number reflected on the gap between the desire
for evidence-based decision-making and its execution.
Discussion
In addition to the solidaristic values that are commonly
held to underpin macroallocation, our participants shared
epistemological values and concepts of virtue that informed
the way they practiced macroallocation. We found that the
doctors in our sample held values in common across the
domains of personal ethics (‘taking responsibility’ and
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‘persistence, patience, and loyalty to a cause’); justice
(‘engaging in distributive justice’, ‘equity’, and ‘confidence in
institutions’); and practices of argumentation (‘moderation’
and ‘data and evidence’).
Through our use of GMA, which involved iterative
juxtaposition of data and theory, and engagement of
participants in exploring ethical insights emerging from
the data, we were able to establish that our participants’
conceptualisations of the good in macroallocation prac-
tice resided in a seam of virtue ethics that was congruent
with Paul Ricoeur’s ‘little ethics’. In this discussion we
reflect on the explanatory and normative implications of
this finding and integrate the empirical and theoretical
ideas we developed in our analysis.
Ricoeur’s ethics – encapsulated in the ethical aim of
‘the “good life”, with and for others, in just institutions’
– is based in his work on hermeneutics and narrative
identity. It was initially set out in his book Oneself as
Another [59] and elaborated in his later writings, includ-
ing Reflections on The Just [62]. It embraces a ‘social
ontology of solicitude, care, promising, and accountabil-
ity’, and recognises that the life of each ‘other’ is as sig-
nificant as one’s own [63]. A form of virtue ethics, it is
founded on the claim that human life has an ethical aim:
self-esteem, expressed as the need to approve one’s own
existence and be approved of by others and, as such, it
entails ‘personal pride about being oneself ’ [62].
Ricoeur’s idea of ‘the good life’ draws on the Aristotelian
concept of eudaimonia, or flourishing, and his notion of
‘living with and for others’ reflects the subject’s relation-
ship of reciprocity and mutuality with other people [59].
What distinguishes his ethics from other virtue ethics sys-
tems is its treatment of ‘just institutions’ as a fundamental
component of a good life [62]. For Ricoeur, the concept of
‘the just’, which is assigned the meaning ‘equitable’ [64],
pervades all human actions [62].
In Ricoeur’s ethics just institutions mediate equity, ex-
pand the ethical focus beyond single, identifiable others,
and cultivate acts of the human spirit [65]. Deliberation in
the just institution is founded on the exercise of practical
wisdom – the Aristotelian concept of phronesis [62] – and
supported by obligations to make the best possible argu-
ment [62] and engage respectfully with the convictions of
others [64]. Respect and mutuality in deliberation are
evoked by the act of translation from the language of one’s
own ‘culture’ into that of the other; Ricoeur calls this
phenomenon ‘linguistic hospitality’ [62]. Because we had
integrated virtue ethics into our data collection and pre-
liminary analysis we were able to apply Ricoeur’s version
of virtue ethics into our normative considerations in
response to the strength with which these features were
expressed in our data.
Neither Ricoeur’s ‘little ethics’ nor his work on medical
ethics has been widely referenced in the biomedical
literature [66, 67]. Although his detailed work on the med-
ical role is confined to clinical care and, to a lesser extent,
research [62], he identifies the ethical challenge of doctors’
involvement in matters of public health and public
expense [62]. On this basis, and because of the centrality
of distributive justice in his thinking, we believe his ethics
may illuminate the medical role in macroallocation.
The concordance between our empirical data and the
three levels of Ricoeur’s ethics lends weight to the idea
that it might serve better than either virtue ethics or de-
ontology as an ethical framework for doctors undertaking
macroallocation work, and as the foundation for actualis-
ing the medical ethics codes’ promotion of engagement in
resource allocation.
Personal ethics
Taking responsibility
Our participants valued performing the medical role in its
widest sense and took responsibility for addressing sys-
temic problems they encountered in their clinical roles;
they expressed a strong antipathy towards impure mo-
tives. Their rationales for taking part in macroallocation
were consistent with theoretical positions on the relative
importance of personal ideals and extraprofessional ethical
codes vis a vis the deontological medical codes in shaping
doctors’ professional behaviours and choices [68–70].
Their accounts of their motivations suggest that macroal-
location practice is located within concepts of virtue, and
within an idea of the good life that includes professional
flourishing and melioristic, socially responsive, and solida-
ristic actions.
It was these features of the data that evoked the first
level of Ricoeur’s ‘little ethics’. Ricoeur’s idea of ‘the good
life’ draws on the Aristotelian concept of eudaimonia, or
flourishing. The subject’s aim of a ‘good life’, which Ricoeur
also terms an ‘accomplished life’ [62], includes profes-
sional excellence [62] and virtuous actions, which, when
interpreted (favorably) by the subject, become self-esteem,
or ‘personal pride about being oneself ’, at the ethical level
[59, 62]. For Ricoeur, ethics has primacy over morality,
and solicitude primacy over duty [59].
Whilst there is much in this level of Ricoeur’s ethics
that applies equally to clinical practice and policy work
– responding to the suffering of others, being someone
others can count on, taking responsibility, mutuality and
caring – it is in joining this level with the notions of
‘working with and for others in just institutions’ that the
possibilities of wider projects dealing with the public’s
health and the public expense emerge. Ricoeur observes
that the term ‘responsibility’ entails the notion of
‘responding’, and means both ‘counting on’ and ‘being ac-
countable for’ [59]. Responding to perceived deficiencies
in health care on behalf of others in aggregate – both
groups of patients and society at large – thus fosters the
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testimony or attestation that is the culmination of
Ricoeur’s ethics [63], allowing recognition of oneself as
the one who is called to respond to the suffering of the
other [71] and enabling the modest self-esteem that the
ethical aim fosters.
The close fit between the first level of Ricoeur’s ethics
and our data on policy-active doctors’ aspirations and
perceptions suggests that this ethical system has value as
an explanatory and normative matrix for doctors’ ap-
proach to the expert role. Its normative relevance is con-
ferred by the standards of ethical reasoning it contains,
which have the potential to guide doctors towards right
action [23, 72] when evaluating the place of macroallo-
cation practice in the good life and reflecting on how it
might be conducted authentically.
Persistence, patience and loyalty to a cause
The intensity of our participants’ valuations of persistence,
patience, and loyalty to their chosen causes despite frequent
and severe setbacks suggests that macroallocation plays
essential anchoring and projecting roles in their lives, and
invokes Ricoeur’s notion of self-constancy, whose role in
Ricoeur’s account of human flourishing may enable us to
extend our theorisation of this phenomenon beyond the
bounds set by traditional virtue ethics approaches.
Ricoeur’s concept of ‘selfhood’ is the ipse – or narrative –
identity, which can change ‘within the cohesion of one life-
time’ [73]. The ipse identity, constituted as self-constancy,
is guaranteed by promising: keeping one’s word to others
offers ‘a faculty for mastering the future as if it were the
present’ [74]. Promising entails being ‘pushed into future
action by a projected self ’, who is a person who can be
counted on to keep their word [75], thus fostering the
self-esteem that inheres in the ethical life.
We hypothesise that, since future-building, except in
the most abstract sense, is not feature of clinical prac-
tice, especially under modern care models, macroalloca-
tion played a vital role in enabling the doctors in our
study to flourish by acting as a temporal projection of
their influence and intent, enabling them to deliver on
their promises to the ‘others’ that are the objects of their
interest and, ultimately, actualise self-constancy.
Justice
Engaging in distributive justice, and equity
Our participants made long-term commitments to pol-
icy work in macroallocation, a field occupied with dis-
tributive justice. They strongly expressed commitments
to cost effectiveness, clinical effectiveness, justice, equity
and solidarity, which align with the content values typic-
ally associated with macroallocation [31]. To our know-
ledge, this correspondence, although unsurprising, has
not been reported previously in the empirical literature
on substantive values in priority setting.
This finding resonated strongly with Ricoeur’s ethics, in
which apportioning society’s resources is the aim of acting
together in institutions and contributes to the actualisation
of the ethics of a good life [65]. The status of equity at the
heart of Ricoeur’s ethics, as the element that links the
subject to others and expresses the communitarian aim,
resonates with our participants’ strongly voiced solidaristic
values and appetite for engaging in distributive justice.
That justice is the objective of health policy delibera-
tions is widely understood [10, 76–79]. Although the
doctors in this study valued distributive justice, they were
unfamiliar with formal substantive principles for guiding
resource allocation, and lacked consciousness of the
irreconcilable conflicts that exist between them [80, 81].
Conflicting conceptualisations of justice and disagree-
ment on principles for prioritising have led to a focus in
macroallocation on procedural justice approaches [81–85].
Neither the specific process values proposed by Daniels,
Sabin [86] in their influential ‘accountability for reasonable-
ness’ framework– relevance, publicity or transparency, the
possibility of appeals and revision, and regulative/enforce-
ment mechanisms – nor those in Clark & Weale’s [31]
framework – transparency, accountability, and citizen and
patient participation – were present in our data.
A possible explanation for these two findings is that doc-
tors are insulated from reflecting and acting on substantive
and process criteria by virtue of occupying the role of
expert rather than process designer, and of the general
tendency for values to be glossed over in priority setting
[14, 26, 36–38]. We also found amongst our participants
little insight into the extent or consequences of the arguably
undesirable, and certainly inequitable [20–22, 87] privilege
the doctor’s voice is accorded in macroallocation.
Our finding of doctors’ distance, notwithstanding their
valuation of justice, from key normative features of contem-
porary macroallocation is concerning, and suggests a need
for macroallocation projects to develop shared understand-
ings amongst participants of distributive justice ideals and
ethical systems.
Confidence in institutions
Our participants experienced macroallocation as personally
and professionally rewarding, and were confident in its
potential to deliver just allocations. In this respect, they
embodied Ricoeur’s recognition of the generative power of
institutions. In their views on bureaucrats and politicians,
however, they departed from the standard of solidarity and
solicitude required by Ricoeur’s ethics. Bureaucrats were
conceptualised by the doctors in our sample as malleable
resources: nurtured within the bonds of shared interests
and given the right information, they would serve doctors’
ends. The notion of the just institution in Ricoeur’s ethics
demands moral and epistemological humility, and recogni-
tion of the equal worth, moral competency and convictions
Gallagher et al. BMC Medical Ethics  (2018) 19:75 Page 9 of 13
of the other [59, 88], to which the blurred sense of
bureaucrats as independent agents found in our data is
antithetical.
The ‘little ethics’ gives ethical shape to doctors’ valuation
of justice, but in doing so, exposes areas where their aspi-
rations are not met in practice. In Ricoeur’s ethics, ‘just in-
stitutions’ support both the ethical aim of the ‘self ’, who
exercises a ‘sense of justice’ within them, and the care of
the ‘other’ who receives a fair share as a result [89]. Whilst
the notion of distributive justice and the potential of insti-
tutions to dispense it appeal and give sustenance to doc-
tors who engage in macroallocation, our findings suggest
that structural factors in policy-making prohibit their
grasping at a deep level the aim of justice in this context;
these factors may skew the actualisation of the third level
of Ricoeur’s ethics towards those receiving justice as a
‘share in’, at the expense of those receiving justice as a
‘share of ’. Were it to be employed as a guide to ethical
action in macroallocation, Ricoeur’s ethics, which gives
due weight to each of these dimensions, would mitigate
this possibility by bringing into sharper focus the ultimate
ethical objective of justice.
Practices of argumentation
Our participants valued practices of argumentation that
mitigated the threats to justice arising from the structural
factors we have described. These values – moderation and
respect for data and evidence – demonstrated that our
participants shared a preference for respectful deliberation
and an intuitive grasp of phronesis, the Aristotelian
concept of practical wisdom that defines the third level of
Ricoeur’s ethics [59].
Moderation
Our participants strongly maintained that doctors partici-
pating in macroallocation should have the propensity for
moderation. Although aware of, and tempted by, more
aggressive ways of performing the expert role, our partici-
pants’ claims that they remained largely temperate sug-
gests that they recognised moderation as essential to
performing the role ethically. Their weighing of the merit
of each extreme may be a reflection of the place of virtue
in their ethical reasoning systems.
Moderation is in harmony with the Aristotelian con-
cepts of virtue contained in first level of Ricoeur’s ethics
and with the features that most strongly support arriving
at just allocations: deliberative justice as a project of mu-
tuality [90], recognition and respect for the convictions
of the other and, ultimately, willingness to compromise
rather than attempt to win by force [88].
The theme of compromise was also strongly represented
in our data. Ricoeur’s ethics, in focusing on the interaction
between individuals rather than on personal integrity as a
response to plurality in values and voices, recognises
compromise as a moral duty [88] and supports assertions
in the theoretical literature on policy-making that respect-
ful deliberation culminating in agreement on what are
‘good’ or ‘right’ actions are the normative foundation for
dealing with plurality [91, 92]. To Ricoeur, determination
to act on principle in this context is unethical because it
fails to recognise and respect the worth of the other [88].
In our data, it is what distinguishes the ‘Visigoth’ from the
ethical practitioner.
According to Yeager & Herman’s [88] reading of Ricoeur,
moderate deliberation, by exposing convictions to proper
evaluation, not only encourages equitable distributions but
also offers to the subject the chance to understand herself
as one amongst others and to experience a new dimension
of personhood through the act of modifying her convic-
tions. We hypothesise that macroallocation has a valuable
function for doctors whose professional lives do not other-
wise offer many opportunities for self-scrutiny and ethical
development.
Ricoeur’s ethics has been criticised for being unreason-
ably optimistic about the extent to which mutuality pre-
vails in deliberation, participants’ willingness to engage in
‘linguistic hospitality’, and the self-scrutiny that is required
to adjust convictions and allow compromise [90]. Indeed,
Ricoeur recognises the courageousness of his vision [62].
Our data showing that individuals are capable, despite
inherent and external obstacles, of selecting and following
an ethical course, suggest that these objections do not
diminish the value of Ricoeur’s ethics – with its sensitivity
to practices of mutuality and respectful debate – as a nor-
mative guide for those engaging in macroallocation.
Data and evidence
Performing the expert role typically involves repackaging
clinical experience into data that is expressed in the lan-
guage of the bureaucrat [26, 93] and directed towards
satisfying the requirements of the neopositivistic
policy-making models currently favoured in health
policy-making [91, 94–96]. This was the experience of our
participants, who held profound epistemic commitments to
data and evidence based medicine (EBM), and strong eth-
ical commitments to obtaining the skills required to deploy
them effectively in argumentation.
Ricoeur recognises that deliberators in distributive just-
ice often assign different meanings to language, concepts
and customs, necessitating translation between parties
[90]. In the literature on health care policy making, it is
commonly claimed that the direction of translation is
from expert to bureaucrat [26, 93]. Ricoeur refers to the
act of translation as ‘linguistic hospitality’ and considers it
to be an ethical act of caring and mutual welcome [62].
Although our participants’ willing cooperation in this en-
deavour exemplifies linguistic hospitality, by virtue of the
unilaterality they describe, it lacks the mutual generosity,
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charity and respect for the others’ convictions that Ricoeur
considers essential if debate is to foster the social cooper-
ation and flourishing that is called for by the ethical
intention [90]. In the context of macroallocation, doctors’
preoccupation with adopting bureaucrats’ language could
further distance the already under-represented patient
from deliberations, and efface representations of suffering
from them. Ricoeur’s focus on mutuality would offset this
risk were linguistic hospitality employed in an ethical
guide for doctors’ macroallocation work, by bringing into
relief the reciprocal responsibilities of other actors. This
feature of Ricoeur’s ethics suggests its potential as an eth-
ical guide to deliberative interactions for macroallocation
participants more broadly.
The relevance of Ricoeur’s accounts of phronesis and eth-
ics in deliberation emerged from our data on practices of
argumentation in priority setting, suggesting that Ricoeur’s
ethics might have roles to play in the development of
norms for doctors’ deliberative practice in macroallocation
and in the rectification of discrepancies between what is
valued and what is performed. The mutuality, linguistic
hospitality, and respect for the convictions of others
demanded by Ricoeur’s ethics suggests that it might also
have relevance as a guide to practice for the other actors in
health care priority setting, especially in a future in which
patient and community involvement in priority setting is
routine [97–100].
Limitations
We included doctors from a wide range of specialties, and
our sample matched the profile of the specialist workforce
in Australia [50, 51] for age, sex, and country of training.
In addition, some participants had international experi-
ence in the role. We believe, therefore, that our partici-
pants’ experiences are are likely to be consistent with
those of doctors who engage in macroallocation in formal
processes in other socialised health systems. We do not
report on distinctions between sub-groups, and so cannot
say whether such distinctions might be significant. Our
findings represent a single social perspective due to our
focus on data only from doctors. Further empirical re-
search into the ethical dimensions of doctors’ participation
in macroallocation and into the experiences of other ac-
tors in priority setting would be needed in order to obtain
a more comprehensive picture of the phenomenon.
Conclusions
In this analysis, we explored priority setting as an ethical
practice and investigated the social and moral meaning
of doctors’ engagement in it. We described and explored
the theorisation of values in macroallocation work, and
brought together practical and theoretical domains not
previously united for the purpose of moving towards an
ethical framework for doctors’ role in macroallocation.
We found that the values of macroallocation practitioners
covered domains of personal ethics (‘taking responsibility’
and ‘persistence, patience, and loyalty to a cause’); justice
(‘engaging in distributive justice’, ‘equity’, and ‘confidence in
institutions’); and practices of argumentation (‘moderation’
and ‘data and evidence’). To our knowledge, this informa-
tion has not been previously derived empirically. The find-
ings challenge the assumption that doctors in the priority
setting milieu are motivated primarily by deontological
considerations. The broad span of ethical commitments we
have described offers novel insights into the social and
ethical processes at play in this setting and opens up oppor-
tunities for understanding how doctors’ values might have
procedural and substantive impacts on macroallocation.
Our use of the principles of GMA enabled Ricoeur’s ‘lit-
tle ethics’ to emerge from our data as an ethical frame-
work for medical work in priority setting that reflected
doctors’ ideas of the good in macroallocation and their
normative insights into how it might be performed ethic-
ally. The close fit between our data and the three levels of
Ricoeur’s ethics suggests that this ethics system is a valid
explanatory and normative model for doctors’ expert role
in macroallocation. Practitioners of the role might find
value in Ricoeur’s ethics as an aid to ethical reflection
about their performance of the role, as a guide to ethical
action, and as a foundation for resolving discrepancies
between values and practice. Its embrace of mutuality and
respect for the convictions of others suggests that the ‘lit-
tle ethics’ might also have a role in harmonising delibera-
tive practices amongst macroallocation actors generally.
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Abstract In this analysis of the ethical dimensions of doctors’ participation in 
macroallocation we set out to understand the skills they use, how they are acquired, 
and how they influence performance of the role. Using the principles of grounded 
moral analysis, we conducted a semi-structured interview study with Australian doc-
tors engaged in macroallocation. We found that they performed expertise as argu-
ment, bringing together phronetic and rhetorical skills founded on communication, 
strategic thinking, finance, and health data. They had made significant, purposeful 
efforts to gain skills for the role. Our findings challenge common assumptions about 
doctors’ preferences in argumentation, and reveal an unexpected commitment to 
practical reason. Using the ethics of Paul Ricoeur in our analysis enabled us to iden-
tify the moral meaning of doctors’ skills and learning. We concluded that Ricoeur’s 
ethics offers an empirically grounded matrix for ethical analysis of the doctor’s role 
in macroallocation that may help to establish norms for procedure.
Keywords Macroallocation · Priority setting · Ethics · Paul Ricoeur · Grounded 
moral analysis · Physicians · Skills
Background and Rationale
The just allocation of healthcare resources is an area of expanding study in the bio-
ethics literature [6, 22, 39, 44, 68]. Whilst a range of views has been expressed on 
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the ethics of doctors’ involvement in socially engaged actions [10, 18, 34, 66], the 
doctor’s role in resource distribution policy processes has not been comprehensively 
explored from an ethical standpoint. In this analysis, part of a larger empirical study 
undertaken in NSW, Australia, of the ethical dimensions of doctors’ participation as 
technical experts in macroallocation, we consider the question of the skills doctors 
apply in the role.
Macroallocation decisions determine the amount of resources available for par-
ticular kinds of healthcare services and, hence, the mix and volume of services pro-
vided to communities [32, 40, 60]. Macroallocation generally entails competing pol-
icy goals, requiring choices to be made amongst many defensible options [11] and 
is, consequently, often conceptualised as priority setting [40, 43]. Where we use the 
term macroallocation in this report it signifies priority setting between programs by 
governments and delegated health authorities.
For its potential to impact on persons and society, policy-making for resource 
allocation has been characterised as a moral endeavour [28, 39, 41]. Satisfactory 
substantive and procedural approaches to establishing and defending priorities that 
give due weighting to values, evidence and legitimate process in macroallocation 
have proven elusive due to the complexity of the economic, political and ethical 
challenges involved [12, 39]. Given the need for resource distribution policy to meet 
standards of justice and accountability it is reasonable to pursue an examination of 
the ethical aspects of doctors’ involvement in them.
The specialised knowledge of experts has a privileged role in policy-making, 
reflecting the respect for professional specialisation that goes hand in hand with the 
structure of contemporary society and the current organisation of work [26, 27, 45]. 
In healthcare policy, doctors are the dominant experts [4, 16, 33, 39, 47]. In Aus-
tralia, the doctor’s expert role in health policy is included in the Australian Med-
ical Association’s (AMA) code of ethics as an enjoinder to ‘use your knowledge 
and skills to assist those responsible for allocating healthcare resources, advocating 
for their transparent and equitable allocation’ [3]. That the technical expert gener-
ally promotes certain values and rarely functions in a purely technical role [46, 53, 
61] contributes to our interest in understanding the ethical ramifications of doctors’ 
engagement in policy.
Little has been written about the skills exercised by technical experts when par-
ticipating in policy-making. It is not known whether skills other than those inherent 
in professionals’ core roles are called upon and if so, what they are, and how they 
affect the process and its outcomes. In the case of macroallocation, although empiri-
cal data concerning doctors’ skills in the promotion of ‘transparency’ and ‘equity’, 
as stipulated by the AMA, are absent, several commentators have recorded doctors’ 
lack of special expertise in determining policy outcomes likely to promote social 
justice [35, 36, 48, 63, 67]. As contributors to the policy process, doctors’ individual 
competences and values are material to the success of the enterprise and the trust in 
which the community holds it. The skills they exercise in the policy role and their 
commitment to acquiring them are, thus, matters of ethical significance [15].
We situate this analysis in the ‘little ethics’ of Paul Ricoeur. Ricoeur is unusual 
amongst the philosophers of the twentieth century in valuing the generative pos-
sibilities of institutions [62], for whom the apportioning role of institutions answers 
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the ethical subject’s need for justice and completes the communitarian level of the 
ethical intention of ‘aiming at the “good life” lived with and for others in just institu-
tions’ [54]. Thus, we characterise the process of macroallocation as an institution, 
or ‘structure of living together’, that has the right of distribution of society’s goods 
equitably [62], according to ‘a sense’ of justice [54]. In this analysis, we explore the 
extent to which the skills valued by doctors enabled their engagement in phronesis, 
the Aristotelian concept of practical reason that, in Ricoeur’s ethics, is mediated by 
the institution as it addresses matters of justice [62], and test how Ricoeur’s ethics 
might be used to enhance understanding of the moral significance of doctors’ prac-
tices in mobilising skills and knowledge in the macroallocation setting.
Taking the position that theorising about priority setting as a practice should be 
based on practitioners’ experience, we determined to undertake a qualitative inter-
view study of doctors who engage in it. We wished to obtain a rich picture of their 
understanding of the social process of policy and to bring their intuitions to bear on 
our ethical analysis [19, 37]. Thus our enquiry elicited reflection on the skills used 
in macroallocation policy work, on the importance of being skilled, and on efforts to 
acquire skills, in order to illuminate participants’ self-understanding of their skills 
and the effectiveness of those skills. In this report we consider doctors’ conceptual 
understandings alongside some of Ricoeur’s ethical concepts in order to arrive at a 
better appreciation of ethics in macroallocation policy work.
Methods
Methodology
We used a qualitative methodology with sampling, data-collection, and analysis 
strategies selected to answer our research questions. The study method was closely 
based on grounded theory as described by Charmaz [9], modified to accommodate 
the principles of the empirical bioethics methodology grounded moral analysis 
(GMA) as devised by Dunn et al. [17], in which conceptual and normative analysis 
proceed in parallel with data collection and analysis in order to inform normative 
claims that are grounded in the practice setting. To enable this descriptive compo-
nent we modified our open-ended questioning format, including in the interview 
schedule direct questions on their perspectives on the skills they used and valued.
Participants and Sampling
We conducted semi-structured interviews with 20 doctors, all of whom had partici-
pated in priority setting at one or more levels of the Australian health care system. 
Initially, participants were recruited through an invitation issued by the Agency for 
Clinical Innovation, which hosts clinician networks that work on aspects of health 
policy in NSW. From this invitation 10 doctors came forward, of whom 1 withdrew 
before an interview date could be set. The remaining 9, and an additional participant 
recruited by passive snowballing, were interviewed. In order to enable elaboration 
 Health Care Anal
1 3
of categories emerging from the analysis theoretical sampling was used to recruit a 
further 10 participants from the researchers’ networks [5]. In this stage, 18 invita-
tions were sent out, from which 12 affirmative responses were received. Ten doctors 
were interviewed, while for 2 potential participants, interview arrangements had not 
been concluded before the point at which theoretical saturation was reached and data 
collection was terminated.
Most participants had engaged as technical experts in multiple policy-making 
processes, contributing concurrently or over the course of a career to macroalloca-
tion policy decisions at the local, state, national, and in some cases, international 
levels. Their activities centred on: participation as members of committees, attend-
ance at meetings with bureaucrats and decision-makers, lobbying, construction of 
independent processes designed to advance policy debate, and preparation of sub-
missions, applications and correspondence, all in the context of processes such as 
technology assessment, service development, and determination of high cost care 
access.
The sample was similar in its distribution of age, sex, and country of training to 
the general cohort of specialist doctors in Australia [1, 2]. All of our participants 
were employed by, or in a small number of cases, retired from, public sector institu-
tions. The characteristics of participants and their policy activities are presented in 
Table 1.
Data‑Collection
We used a semi-structured interview format, with questions and prompts designed 
to elicit participants’ experiences and encourage reflection on the ethical dimensions 
of the role. The first author, who has experience in the field under investigation, con-
ducted the interviews, which lasted from 30 to 90 min, with an average of 64 min. 
The interviewer used probing to follow up on key ideas offered by the participants. 
For this component of the study participants were asked about their skills and skills 
deficits in the area of policy work, and the training they had undertaken for the role. 
In addition, relevant codes were extracted from participants’ responses to questions 
touching on the skills of colleagues and on medical training. The interview sched-
ule was revised twice during the study, in response to the analysis, in keeping with 
the principles of GMA [17]. We used these iterations to probe the ethical concepts 
emerging from our analysis and explore our theoretical insights with participants.
Analysis
Inductive and abductive data analysis was undertaken progressively from the com-
mencement of interviewing, involving detailed coding, comprehensive memo-writ-
ing, exploration of the relationships between codes, and creation of analytic cate-
gories by combining codes [9]. The first author conducted the analysis, discussing 
emergent findings with the second and third authors, and reflexively drawing upon 
her own experiences to understand their potential to inform or bias interpretation of 
the data.
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Salloch et al.’s [58] criteria for the selection of ethical theories in empirical bio-
ethics, in particular, the criteria of suitability to the issue at stake and alignment with 
participants’ actual moral deliberation, guided us in our choice of ethical framework. 
We developed the later iterations of our interview guide in the direction of virtue 
Table 1  Characteristics of participants and policy activities
a Some participants were qualified or practiced in more than one specialty; the one listed is the one on 
which the majority of their policy work was focussed
b For the sake of maintaining anonymity, participants’ subspecialties, where they exist, are not provided
Clinical  specialtya,b (number) Paediatrics (3)
Endocrinology (1)
Plastic Surgery (1)
Rehabilitation (3)
General Practice Academic (2)
Rheumatology (1)
Clinical Pharmacology (1)
Gastroenterology (2)
Intensive Care Medicine (2)
Neurology (2)
Cardiology (1)
Radiation Oncology (1)
Age range (number) ≤ 45 (3)
46–55 (4)
56–64 (10)
65–80 (3)
Average age: 58
Sex (number) Female (5)
Male (15)
Country of initial training Australia (16)
Europe (3)
Asia (1)
Policy activity (number) Policy with multiple national governments or international bodies on 
public health programs (2)
Australian government policy on healthcare research priorities (2)
Australian government policy on the allocation of resources to high cost 
health care interventions (3)
Australian government policy on the allocation of resources for priority 
healthcare programs (4)
Australian government policy on the allocation of resources to partici-
pant’s specialty (2)
NSW government policy on the allocation of resources to the partici-
pant’s specialty (13)
Local health administration policy on the allocation of resources to the 
participant’s specialty (11)
University administration policy on the allocation of resources to health 
research and education programs (4)
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ethics on the basis of its long association with the study of medical professionalism 
[51], and in response to our early inductive analysis, which showed that participants 
were strongly concerned about practical reason, distributive and procedural justice, 
the golden mean—characterised in our data as moderation—and the virtues of self-
efficacy, particularly patience and persistence. After the interviewing phase had 
concluded, and towards the end of our analysis, whilst seeking a framing of virtue 
ethics that would be helpful in drawing together the normative themes in our data, 
we observed a striking resonance between our categories and Paul Ricoeur’s ‘little 
ethics’—a variant of virtue ethics that incorporates the notion of the just institu-
tion—which we included from that point in our normative deliberations.
Ethics
The study received approval from the University of Sydney Human Research Eth-
ics Committee. Each participant gave written consent, was assured of confidentiality 
and was free to withdraw from the study at any stage. All data were de-identified, 
and stored and analysed under alphanumeric codes.
Results
The doctors in our sample shared a notion that their capacity to be effective in pol-
icy was linked to their skills in areas outside those covered by their medical train-
ing, and they expressed a strong commitment to acquiring the skills they held to 
be essential for the role. They identified communication skills, strategic thinking, 
finance and data skills, and the ability to combine these to make a good case as the 
skills they possessed and applied in the policy-making process.
Valued Skills
Communication Skills: ‘The Capacity to Bring People Together’
Most participants considered themselves to have superior communication skills, 
both as listeners and speakers. The response of P5, active at multiple health system 
levels, to a question about her abilities encompassed the communication skills that 
were commonly identified by participants.
What are my skills? I’m a good communicator I think. I’m quite a good facili-
tator. I can pick up on a vibe if I’m chairing a meeting and I’m very inclusive, 
like I listen to everyone that’s got a voice because you get some incredibly 
good ideas from little voices if you listen to them and so I like that. And then I 
also make sure I recognise everyone as best I can. I know I upset people some-
times but try to give acknowledgement where it’s due and make sure people 
know that they’ve been appreciated and recognised.
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Strategic Thinking: ‘Looking at the Big Picture’
Many participants said their ability to be strategic, see the big picture, and under-
stand how the elements of the system interact was a significant enabler of their 
policy work. A number focused on the human side and valued their ability to 
understand the way the system impacts on managers and policy makers, or as 
P10, active at the local and state levels, put it, ‘what they’ve got to deal with’. 
These doctors were sensitive to the location of power and how to influence its 
holders.
Skills in Health Data and Health System Finance: ‘No Data, No Disease’
Skills in health system finance and data were held to be critical to success in the 
policy role. For P13, active at the state and national levels, advanced financial 
knowledge enabled engagement with complex policy issues.
I think what is important is that I have a reasonable understanding of financial 
literacy and an understanding of how budgets work and how the - both the 
bureaucracy works but also how the finance flows within the bureaucracy and 
what generates money and what doesn’t and what - how patient care is funded 
and lots of clinicians don’t have the vaguest idea of any of that, don’t know 
how. They don’t have an idea of how their own bank account works, let alone 
how a state level bank account works. So I think that’s been advantage.
Whilst most participants considered their capacity to identify, derive, work with, 
and present pertinent health data to decision-makers as a strength, many reported 
having had to overcome data system deficiencies and lack of administrative sup-
port in order to exercise this strength.
Some doctors in our sample felt that having to rely on experts diminished their 
own effectiveness and some felt guilty that they had not mastered finance and health 
economics adequately, but others did not show an appreciation of the gap between 
their skills in finance and data and those of professionals in those disciplines:
P10 So you’ve got to make up – not make up, but try and work out demo-
graphics, look at population growth, look at the incidence of different con-
ditions and how that might have an impact and if we did have this service 
how could it shorten your length of stay.
Making a Good Case: ‘We had All the Arguments Lined Up’
For the doctors in our sample, the ability to pitch a case was the most valued skill. 
As a foundation for this skill, early in their policy work doctors came to realise that 
health administrators and health bureaucrats were not the enemy, or as P12, a sea-
soned participant in priority setting, put it, they ‘really just want enough evidence 
to argue with Treasury’. It was the doctor’s role to craft a case that captured the 
bureaucrat’s attention and enabled them in turn to convince the decision-maker.
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Many participants spoke of learning the right language to speak. P12 gave an 
historical perspective:
So there was a big move in the 90s to communicate with patients and learn to 
speak clearly and express complex ideas but people, I think, didn’t realise you 
also needed to learn to speak clearly to administrators and health executives in 
a language that they could – that they thought was valid, in a way they thought 
was valid. So I did a distance learning course in health economics which gave 
me a lot of the – I don’t want to say jargon – a lot of the intellectual tools that 
people [use].
P6 was conscious of needing to learn the skill:
So you need to kind of speak a different language when you’re speaking to 
these various groups. So trying to get the nuances and then understanding 
what changes you need to make, you know, how you pitch your information, 
that’s something that I’m trying to learn. I wouldn’t say that I’m an expert or 
anything with this.
Participants considered that decorum in delivery was as important as the message. 
Decorum involved anticipation of the hearer’s needs and a subtle style that avoided 
arrogance and aggression. Over-egging the pudding, emotivism, and deficiencies in 
logic were frowned upon. P13, a doctor with 3 decades of experience in macroallo-
cation policy work, attributed his success to:
Common sense. Trying to be objective and you’re not only pushing whatever 
it is my view is. Being prepared to listen to other people and being prepared to 
articulate a case that’s not aggressive or harsh or over hyping and doesn’t have 
the bullshit metre going up.
While making a case was underpinned by reason and logic, the ability to deploy 
clinical narratives in support of a position was highly prized. For P7, an academic, 
this skill was critical:
Look if I sit at a table, to be honest, the main thing I bring actually is my stand-
ing and credibility as a clinician…I know that when I sit at a table whether it’s 
at the faculty or in various committees, the moment I say, “Oh, the patient I 
saw last week” changes the whole conversation. So I know that makes a differ-
ence and that’s part of it.
Skills Acquisition
Almost all participants had acquired most of their skills on the job, by watching and 
listening to others, and by absorbing how systems and hierarchies functioned.
P3 Most of…my ability in that area, whether it’s good or bad, came from expe-
rience, I think. Seeing how things are done. Seeing how other people work and 
so forth.
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In the case of numerical skills, however, formal learning was common. In seeking 
mastery of the business language of decision-makers so that they could craft well-
targeted messages, the doctors in this study undertook programs that featured health 
economics, health data, and epidemiology, such as master’s degrees in public health, 
health management, clinical epidemiology, and health policy. One participant under-
took formal learning in fundraising, and one in health economics. Two participants 
had undergone orientation and training related to specific policy processes. Some 
of the participants who relied on their acumen in financial and health data analysis 
and presentation were self-taught, sometimes enlisting the assistance of friends and 
acquaintances. Those who had elected to pursue formal qualifications had done so in 
response to the challenges they encountered once they had begun to be involved in 
policy-making, rather than as a stepping-stone to entry into the role. All participants 
reported that the educational programs they had chosen had been helpful to them in 
their engagement with policy-making. Only 2 participants stated that they had never 
done any training related to the role.
Whilst the majority of participants were uncritical of the processes by which they 
had acquired the skills and knowledge necessary for policy work, a small minority 
reported a lack of support from administration, whose active input into their devel-
opment would have accelerated their progress, reduced the personal cost of learning 
the necessary skills, especially in terms of time, and limited the stress they felt when 
performing in roles for which they felt inadequately prepared. P18, a younger doc-
tor, active in policy at the local level, regretted not having had mentoring and formal 
training in people management:
[It] would have been very helpful in terms of managing, you know, your per-
sonal wellbeing, which unfortunately often gets ignored as well.
The younger participants, and some others with special responsibilities in medi-
cal education, said that the changing face of medicine necessitated a more formal 
approach to imparting the skills needed in the policy role. They believed that skills 
development programs in the areas of people management, health system structure, 
function and financing, advocacy skills (especially understanding how to approach 
decision-makers), and strategic thinking should be offered to the increasing number 
of doctors whose roles expand beyond the clinical. P18 believed that such training 
‘would make better department heads, better hospital leaders and ultimately better 
outcomes for the patients’.
Some older participants reported implementing graded experiential learning for 
younger colleagues who showed an interest in policy, while one participant sug-
gested succession planning for policy roles had been neglected, especially in spe-
cialties that enjoyed a thriving network of engaged doctors.
P13 One of the system’s failings is that we haven’t grown a whole heap of peo-
ple who are interested in this. So there are a whole heap of - there are lots of 
senior people who have dabbled in the space, but we haven’t nurtured another 
rung, I don’t think. So look in [my specialty] and maybe it’s because we’ve 
been too successful and anyone that’s interested just gets put off because it’s all 
taken care of already, I don’t know. But there aren’t - I think there’s a potential 
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problem within the system that there’s a whole heap of people that could be 
doing this stuff as the leaders in 10 years’ time aren’t.
Discussion
We found that the doctors in our study took for granted the special status of their 
medical knowledge and training. They linked their effectiveness in macroalloca-
tion, however, to their skills in the areas of communication, strategic thinking, and 
numerical data, and to their ability to integrate these in order to make a cogent argu-
ment directed towards persuading bureaucrats to represent their interests to politi-
cal decision-makers. They were assiduous in acquiring the skills they considered 
to be necessary for the role. Their formal learning efforts were directed in the main 
towards skills in the use of numerical data, in some instances in order to compensate 
for lack of access to the relevant experts. The younger doctors in our sample, and 
those concerned with education, perceived an unmet need for formal education in 
interpersonal and strategic skills, and considered that employers should provide edu-
cational support.
Valued Skills
Whilst the account of skills in our data is consistent with those of the small number 
of prior qualitative studies concerned with the policy skills of healthcare experts 
[14, 31], this is the first study, to our knowledge, to focus on macroallocation and to 
explore doctors’ accounts of learning in this context. Thus it provides an opportunity 
for doctors and policy-makers to review the relationship between extant skills and 
the requirements of the policy process.
The valued skills suggest that the doctors in our sample shared a holistic concep-
tualisation of argumentation that accorded with the Aristotelian concept of rhetoric 
as the capacity to see and communicate the ‘possibly persuasive’, aiming at, but not 
necessarily achieving, persuasion [29, 45]. Each of the three components of clas-
sical rhetoric—logos—logic and coherence; pathos—the feeling or emotion con-
veyed; and ethos—the personal credibility or trustworthiness of the speaker [13]—
was strongly represented in our data. This finding was surprising, since healthcare 
policy-making strongly favours neopositivist, technocratic approaches that focus on 
scientific data and rational arguments [23, 29, 50, 57] for reasons that include the 
positivistic commitments of the doctors who dominate advice-giving in this sector 
[8, 26, 30, 38, 41, 42, 61, 65] and the valorisation by neoliberal governments of 
evidence and priority setting tools for their putative rationality and usefulness as 
correctives to provider power [23, 61]. The form of argumentation shown in our data 
is suited to postpositivist deliberative models of policy-making, which have a focus 
on language, encompass context and practitioner experience [23, 24, 59], integrate 
the empirical and normative [25], and acknowledge the constructed nature of claims, 
norms, and arguments [25, 39].
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The unexpectedly textured model of argumentation suggested by our participants’ 
appreciation of their skills led us to hypothesise that doctors who are committed 
to roles in macroallocation embrace a rhetorical position akin to that of the ‘client 
advocate’, as theorised by Throgmorton [65], a role integrating both scientistic and 
political interpretive values, that cultivates sensitivity to the perspectives of political 
decision-makers, and translates technical jargon into language they can understand, 
in an attempt to overcome the rhetorical impasse that scientists historically face in 
policy. Doctors’ willingness to elaborate arguments integrating the financial and 
economic business language of bureaucrats [61, 64] with their own technical knowl-
edge dominated our data. Thus, at the heart of our theoretical model explaining doc-
tors’ approach to skills for macroallocation work is the notion that they perform the 
role of expert as an argumentative practice [45], thus claiming a full, rather than 
auxiliary, place in the valued phronetic process of determining just allocations. In 
the account of expertise as argument, expertise entails arguing as an active partici-
pant in phronetic deliberation, presenting justifications of judgments that respond to 
problems in their contexts, rather than less influential statements of technical reason 
derived from subject knowledge [45].
Even though postpositive conceptualisations of policy-making recognise that 
argumentation is at its core [13, 29, 46], most scholars have treated it as synony-
mous with logos [29]. That our participants, although members of the scientific 
interpretative community and operating in a largely technocratic policy environ-
ment, displayed subtle and holistic rhetorical sensibilities, encompassing ethos and 
pathos along with logos in their argumentation, provides support for Gottweis’s [29] 
assertion that accounts of argumentation in policy that tie it to logos alone miss the 
reality of the nuanced practice of persuasion in policy-making and the performative 
function of ethos and pathos in exposing the situational and personal consequences 
of different courses of action.
Our participants intuitively constructed policy-making as practical reason, engag-
ing a combination of technical and persuasive skills, practiced with the pragmatic 
positioning, judgment, and decorum cultivated in these fora. The Aristotelian con-
cept of practical reason—phronesis—is a form of prudence exercised in ‘the art of 
a fair decision in situations of uncertainty or conflict’ [56] that emphasises respond-
ing to problems in their particular contexts [23]. Our participants’ construction of 
phronesis resonates with Ehninger’s [21] influential description of argumentation, 
in which the wise arguer implements ‘restrained partisanship’, voluntarily limiting 
persuasive tactics to those that will withstand examination and criticism.
The moderate persuasive practices valued by the doctors in our sample also align 
with the centrality Ricoeur gives to respect for others’ convictions in the context of 
deliberation about just distributions [55]. It is by no means certain, however, that 
through sincere engagement in phronesis—as evinced by our participants—in the 
role of ‘restrained partisan’, or of Throgmorton’s [65] ‘client advocate’, doctors 
obtain justice for themselves or the interests they represent. There are no gauges with 
which to measure the success of any sort of rhetorical practice individual doctors 
use in priority setting deliberations; the efforts of ‘restrained partisans’ exist along-
side those of ‘naked persuaders’ [21], who use less moderate tactics and are often 
rewarded for it [15]. We suggest that our participants have constructed a ‘best-case’ 
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for doctors’ participation in macroallocation, and we consider it significant that their 
ideal is not in alignment with the technocratic models prevalent in health care, nor 
with the political focus often observed in medical professional activism.
Skills Acquisition
This study challenges the commonly made claim that doctors overestimate their 
abilities in domains for which they have had no training [7], relying on their experi-
ence rather than embracing new skills [15]. The doctors in our study took the matter 
of skills acquisition seriously, purposefully learning from experience and pursuing 
costly qualifications. Only in the matter of underestimating the proficiency inherent 
in the roles of other professional groups did the doctors in our study evince the ste-
reotype. Our participants aimed for skill in types of numerical data that are normally 
the responsibility of other professionals, such as accountants, economists and health 
data experts, often in response to difficulties in accessing practical support or col-
laboration within their employing organisations. When preparing their arguments or 
assessing those of others, the doctors in our study tended to rely on their own emerg-
ing skills in areas requiring numerical competence. Doctors’ willingness to arrogate 
the roles of other professionals may expose them to exploitation and, even though 
well intentioned, may propagate imperfect analysis capable of affecting the quality 
of decisions [20].
Our data suggest that reliance on doctors’ estimation of the skills needed, and on 
their self-development according to these assessments, may be insufficient. Despite 
their reliance on these skills, we found no evidence that the doctors in our study had 
contemplated either logic or argumentation in any formal way, nor of guidance by 
policy-makers in their skills development choices. It is also surprising that our par-
ticipants did not report learning or using skills in ethics, given the place of justice at 
the heart of health policy deliberations [11, 42, 49, 68].
These gaps, along with the pressure doctors in our sample experienced to develop 
a wide portfolio of skills in which numerical skills were prioritised for development 
ahead of other valued skills, may be a response to inadequately specified deliberative 
processes and ill-defined concepts of the technical expert role, themselves reflective 
of uncertainty arising from ongoing debates about effective health policy-making 
models and what counts as evidence in policy [13, 25, 29, 30, 50, 59]. Our find-
ings suggest the presence of a gulf of misunderstanding between policy-makers and 
participants on the objectives of the expert role in macroallocation, and the skills 
required to perform it, which leaves expert participants to guess at the skills they 
might need and to fend for themselves in acquiring them. Elucidating what doctors’ 
expertise consists in in the macroallocation milieu would be a prerequisite to the 
development of pedagogical guidance for doctors or organisations wishing to offer 
training for the role.
Our work suggests that common assumptions about doctors’ abilities and interests 
in macroallocation, and policy-making generally—notably that they are staunchly 
committed to positivistic reasoning—may misinterpret their values, motivations and 
epistemological stance, and underestimate their acumen and diligence. Our findings 
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illuminating experts’ objectives, preferences, and capabilities have implications for 
those who design policy processes, promoting consideration of the need for well-
specified and clearly communicated processes, irrespective of the prevalent policy-
making model.
Ricoeur’s ‘Little Ethics’ as a Framework for Doctors’ Learning 
for Macroallocation Work
Our exploration of virtue ethics with participants, which was centred on the norma-
tive themes of justice, moderation and the virtues of self-efficacy, established that 
this ethics system offered a persuasive account of the moral significance of the doc-
tor’s role in macroallocation, and of doctors’ intuitions about the skills needed to 
be effective in the role. In order to finalise our analysis, we sought a framing of 
virtue ethics that would be helpful in drawing together the particular constellation 
of virtues our participants considered to be important in macroallocation work. We 
found this in Ricoeur’s ‘little ethics’, which is encapsulated in ‘aiming at the “good 
life”, with and for others, in just institutions’. Ricoeur’s treatment of just institutions 
as fundamental to the constitution of the ethical subject [56] and comprehensive 
exposition of practical reason resonated strongly with our data’s prominent theme 
of confidence in macroallocation as an institution, which was shown in participants’ 
commitment to developing skills for policy work and purposeful adoption of mac-
roallocation’s rhetorical conventions.
To ‘just’ Ricoeur assigns the meaning ‘equitable’ [55]. The just possibilities of 
the institution—its strivings for justice—are mediated by the concerted efforts of 
its members [62], invoking a communitarian ideal. Deliberation in the just institu-
tion on matters of distributive justice is an ethical act of cooperation founded on the 
exercise of practical wisdom [54] and supported by obligations to make the best pos-
sible argument [56] and to engage respectfully with the convictions of others [54], 
commitments that were prominent in our data. Ricoeur’s concept of ‘linguistic hos-
pitality’ in argumentation [56]—respect and mutuality, fostered by the generous act 
of translation from one’s own language into that of the other—figured strongly in 
our data through the centrality in our participants’ rhetoric of sensitivity to audience 
[52] and efforts to bridge the communication gap. Our findings thus support the 
claim that participants perceive that the institutions they participate in ought to be 
virtuous, and act so as to maintain, reinforce or achieve virtue in those institutions.
We found amongst participants in macroallocation a thinking system that is con-
sistent with Ricoeur’s ethics. By virtue of the purposeful and comprehensive efforts 
the doctors in our study made to engage with practical wisdom for the benefit of 
others, their commitment to sustaining the virtues of the institutions with which they 
were involved, and the ethical satisfaction they derived from acting in the expert 
role, they might be understood as paragons of its enactment. This finding provides 
an empirically derived basis for suggesting that Ricoeur’s ethics might illuminate 
the gap between medical professional ethics and the performance of the technical 
expert role in macroallocation, where its foundation in practice might make it bet-
ter suited to enabling moral reflection than other ethical systems commonly used in 
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bioethics. At the individual practitioner level, it might aid doctors confronted with 
opportunities to participate in macroallocation in determining whether they meet the 
conditions that support the ethical intention and the virtuous functions of health care 
institutions, since it prompts questions concerning the adequacy of the process as a 
vehicle for bringing about just distributions of resources, the sufficiency and aptness 
of their skills, and the availability of support to do the task well.
Limitations
That our sample contained only doctors who self-selected or were selected on the 
basis of their commitment to priority setting activities and their interest in partici-
pating is a limitation of our study. The distribution of age, sex, and place of train-
ing in our sample mirrored the profile of the general cohort of specialist doctors in 
Australia [1, 2]. Thus, although our findings might not be widely generalisable, we 
believe that they are likely to reflect the experiences of a broad range of doctors 
involved in priority setting in publicly funded health systems. We did not draw out 
fine distinctions between sub-groups of our participants, and so cannot say to what 
extent such distinctions impact upon the priority setting role. That we sought data 
only from doctor participants in priority setting causes a limitation due to the repre-
sentation of a single social perspective.
Conclusions
As part of our empirical work on the ethical issues entailed in doctors’ participation 
in priority setting, we set out to understand what skills doctors used in macroallo-
cation, how they were acquired, and how they influenced performance of the role. 
We found that doctors who were committed to roles in macroallocation performed 
expertise as argument, bringing together rhetorical skills and profession-specific 
expert knowledge in a way that was sensitive to social and political context. In this 
way they enhanced their influence in the phronetic process of priority setting. Our 
findings were unexpected since they challenged common assumptions about doc-
tors’ preferences in argumentation, and suggested a commitment to practical reason 
that is out of step with the technocratic policy models that predominate in health 
care.
We found applying the principles of GMA to be useful in allowing us to develop 
normative insights grounded in accounts of our participants’ experiences. Using 
Ricoeur’s ethics in our analysis enabled us to explore macroallocation as an ethical 
practice, and to identify the social and moral meaning of doctors’ learning for prior-
ity setting work.
Our contribution in this work has been to identify in Ricoeur’s ethics an empir-
ically grounded matrix for moral analysis of the doctor’s technical expert role in 
macroallocation that may help to establish norms for procedure in that setting and 
contribute to the development of criteria for evaluating both the substance and the 
process of doctors’ engagement in the role.
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Ricoeur’s ‘little ethics’ and his work on medical ethics have yet to be widely con-
sidered in the bioethics literature. The communitarian ideal encompassed in working 
‘with and for others’ to achieve the just possibilities of institutions suggests that it 
might have broader application in medicine and health care as a yardstick by which 
to evaluate processes and outcomes.
Our contribution is also relevant to the debate regarding the serviceability of 
stereotypical technocratic models of policy-making in health care since it provides 
insights into the performance and preferences of key participants. At the very least, 
the existence of untested assumptions about the doctors’ role in macroallocation 
should be acknowledged openly.
Compliance with Ethical Standards 
Conflict of interest The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.
Ethical Approval All procedures performed in studies involving human participants were in accord-
ance with the ethical standards of the institutional and/or national research committee and with the 1964 
Helsinki declaration and its later amendments or comparable ethical standards.
References
 1. Australian Institute of Health and Welfare. (2014). Medical Workforce 2012. National health work-
force series. Canberra: AIHW.
 2. Australian Institute of Health and Welfare. (2016). Australia’s Medical Workforce 2015. Canberra.
 3. Australian Medical Association. (2017). AMA code of ethics 2004. Editorially Revised 2006. 
Revised 2016. https ://ama.com.au/sites /defau lt/files /docum ents/AMA. Accessed April 22, 2017.
 4. Belcher, H. (2014). Power, politics and health care. In J. Germov (Ed.), Second opinion: An intro-
duction to health sociology (5th ed., pp. 356–379). Melbourne: Oxford University Press.
 5. Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2013). Successful qualitative research: A practical guide for beginnners. 
London: SAGE.
 6. Brody, H. (2009). The future of bioethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 7. Bujak, J. (2008). Inside the physician mind: Finding common ground with doctors. Chicago, IL: 
Health Administration Press.
 8. Campbell, D. M., Redman, S., Jorm, L., Cooke, M., Zwi, A. B., & Rychetnik, L. (2009). Increasing 
the use of evidence in health policy: Practice and views of policy makers and researchers. Australia 
and New Zealand Health Policy, 6(1), 21.
 9. Charmaz, K. (2014). Constructing grounded theory. London: Sage.
 10. Croft, D., Jay, S. J., Meslin, E. M., Gaffney, M. M., & Odell, J. D. (2012). Perspective: Is it time 
for advocacy training in medical education? Academic Medicine, 87(9), 1165–1170. https ://doi.
org/10.1097/ACM.0b013 e3182 6232b c.
 11. Daniels, N. (2016). Resource allocation and priority setting. In D. H. Barrett, L. H. Ortmann, A. 
Dawson, C. Saenz, A. Reis, & G. Bolan (Eds.), Public health ethics (1st ed.). New York: Springer.
 12. Danis, M., Clancy, C. M., & Churchill, L. R. (2002). Introduction. In M. Danis, C. M. Clancy, & L. 
R. Churchill (Eds.), Ethical dimensions of health policy. New York: Oxford University Press.
 13. Danziger, M. (1995). Policy analysis postmodernized. Policy Studies Journal, 23(3), 435–450.
 14. Dobson, S., Voyer, S., Hubinette, M., & Regehr, G. (2014). From the clinic to the community: The 
activities and abilities of effective health advocates. Academic Medicine. https ://doi.org/10.1097/
ACM.00000 00000 00058 8.
 15. Dowie, J. (2007). Decision analysis: The ethical approach to most health decision making. In R. E. 
Ashcroft & I. Wiley (Eds.), Principles of health care ethics (pp. 577–583). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
 Health Care Anal
1 3
 16. Duckett, S. J. (1984). Special issue: Health and health care in Australasia structural interests and Aus-
tralian health policy. Social Science and Medicine, 18(11), 959–966. https ://doi.org/10.1016/0277-
9536(84)90266 -1.
 17. Dunn, M., Sheehan, M., Hope, T., & Parker, M. (2012). Toward methodological innovation in empiri-
cal ethics research. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 21(4), 466–480. https ://doi.org/10.1017/
S0963 18011 20002 42.
 18. Earnest, M. A., Wong, S. L., & Federico, S. G. (2010). Perspective: Physician advocacy: What is it and 
how do we do it? Academic Medicine, 85(1), 63–67. https ://doi.org/10.1097/ACM.0b013 e3181 c40d4 0.
 19. Ebbesen, M., & Pedersen, B. D. (2007). Using empirical research to formulate normative ethical prin-
ciples in biomedicine. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, 10(1), 33–48. https ://doi.org/10.1007/
s1101 9-006-9011-9.
 20. Eckard, N., Janzon, M., & Levin, L. A. (2014). Use of cost-effectiveness data in priority setting deci-
sions: Experiences from the national guidelines for heart diseases in Sweden. International Journal of 
Health Policy and Management, 3(6), 323–332. https ://doi.org/10.15171 /ijhpm .2014.105.
 21. Ehninger, D. (1970). Argument as method: Its nature, its limitations and its uses. Speech Monographs, 
37(2), 101–110. https ://doi.org/10.1080/03637 75700 93756 54.
 22. Emanuel, E. J. (2002). Foreword. In M. Danis, C. M. Clancy, & L. R. Churchill (Eds.), Ethical dimen-
sions of health policy (pp. vii–xi). New York: Oxford University Press.
 23. Fischer, F. (1998). Beyond empiricism: Policy inquiry in post positivist perspective. Policy Studies 
Journal, 26(1), 129–146.
 24. Fischer, F. (2004). Professional expertise in a deliberative democracy. The Good Society, 13(1), 21–27. 
https ://doi.org/10.1353/gso.2004.0027.
 25. Fischer, F. (2007). Deliberative policy analysis as practical reason: Integrating empirical and norma-
tive arguments. In F. Fischer, G. J. Miller, & M. S. Sidney (Eds.), Handbook of public policy analysis: 
Theory, politics & methods. Boca Raton: Taylor & Francis.
 26. Fischer, F. (2009). Democracy and expertise: Reorienting policy inquiry. New York, NY: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
 27. Freidson, E. (2013). Professionalism: The third logic. Hoboken: Wiley.
 28. Furnham, A., & Ofstein, A. (1997). Ethical ideology and the allocation of scarce medical resources. 
The British Journal of Medical Psychology, 70(1), 51–63.
 29. Gottweis, H. (2007). Rhetoric in policy making: Between logos, ethos, and pathos. In F. Fischer, G. J. 
Miller, & M. S. Sidney (Eds.), Handbook of public policy analysis: Theory, politics & methods. Boca 
Raton: Taylor & Francis.
 30. Greenhalgh, T., & Russell, J. (2009). Evidence-based policymaking: A critique. Perspectives in Biology 
and Medicine, 52(2), 304–318.
 31. Haynes, A. S., Derrick, G. E., Redman, S., Hall, W. D., Gillespie, J. A., Chapman, S., et al. (2012). 
Identifying trustworthy experts: How do policymakers find and assess public health researchers worth 
consulting or collaborating with. PLoS ONE, 7(3), e32665.
 32. Hoedemaekers, R., & Dekkers, W. (2003). Key concepts in health care priority setting. Health Care 
Analysis, 11(4), 309–323. https ://doi.org/10.1023/b:hcan.00000 10060 .43046 .05.
 33. Homan, M. S. (2004). Promoting community change: Making it happen in the real world (Vol. 3). Bel-
mont, CA: Thomson/Brooks/Cole.
 34. Huddle, T. S. (2011). Perspective: Medical professionalism and medical education should not involve 
commitments to political advocacy. Academic Medicine, 86(3), 378–383. https ://doi.org/10.1097/
ACM.0b013 e3182 086ef e.
 35. Huddle, T. S. (2013). The limits of social justice as an aspect of medical professionalism. Journal of 
Medicine and Philosophy, 38(4), 369–387. https ://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jht02 4.
 36. Huddle, T. S. (2014). Political activism is not mandated by medical professionalism. American Journal 
of Bioethics, 14(9), 51–53. https ://doi.org/10.1080/15265 161.2014.93588 4.
 37. Ives, J., & Draper, H. (2009). Appropriate methodologies for empirical bioethics: It’s all relative. Bio-
ethics, 23(4), 249–258.
 38. Kenny, A., & Duckett, S. (2004). A question of place: Medical power in rural Australia. Social Science 
and Medicine, 58(6), 1059–1073. https ://doi.org/10.1016/S0277 -9536(03)00278 -8.
 39. Kenny, N., & Joffres, C. (2008). An ethical analysis of international health priority-setting. Health Care 
Analysis, 16(2), 145–160.
 40. Kilner, J. F. (2004). Healthcare resources, allocation of: I. Macroallocation. In S. G. Post (Ed.), Ency-
clopedia of bioethics (3rd ed., Vol. 2, pp. 1098–1107). New York: Macmillan Reference USA.
 41. Kirby, J., & Simpson, C. (2007). An innovative, inclusive process for meso-level health policy develop-
ment. HEC Forum, 19(2), 161–176. https ://doi.org/10.1007/s1073 0-007-9040-7.
1 3
Health Care Anal 
 42. Kirch, D. G., & Ast, C. (2017). What should guide health policy? A perspective beyond politics. Aca-
demic Medicine, 92, 1222–1224.
 43. Klein, R., Day, P., & Redmayne, S. (1996). Managing scarcity: Priority setting and rationing in the 
National Health Service. Buckingham: Open University Press.
 44. Light, D. W., & Hughes, D. (2001). Introduction: A sociological perspective on rationing: Power, rheto-
ric and situated practices. Sociology of Health & Illness, 23(5), 551–569. https ://doi.org/10.1111/1467-
9566.00265 .
 45. Majdik, Z. P., & Keith, W. M. (2011). Expertise as argument: Authority, democracy, and problem-solv-
ing. Argumentation, 25(3), 371.
 46. Majone, G. (1989). Evidence, argument, and persuasion in the policy process. New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press.
 47. Martin, D., Abelson, J., & Singer, P. (2002). Participation in health care priority-setting through the 
eyes of the participants. Journal of Health Services Research & Policy, 7(4), 222–229. https ://doi.
org/10.1258/13558 19023 20432 750.
 48. McKie, J., Shrimpton, B., Hurworth, R., Bell, C., & Richardson, J. (2008). Who should be involved in 
health care decision making? A qualitative study. Health Care Analysis, 16(2), 114–126.
 49. Mooney, G., & Houston, S. (2004). An alternative approach to resource allocation. Applied Health Eco-
nomics and Health Policy, 3(1), 29–33. https ://doi.org/10.2165/00148 365-20040 3010-00006 .
 50. Oliver, K., Lorenc, T., & Innvær, S. (2014). New directions in evidence-based policy research: A criti-
cal analysis of the literature. Health Research Policy and Systems, 12(1), 34.
 51. Pellegrino, E. D., & Thomasma, D. C. (1993). The virtues in medical practice. New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
 52. Perelman, C., & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1971). The new rhetoric: A treatise on argumentation (P. Weaver 
& J. Wilkinson, Trans.). Notre Dame, London: University of Notre Dame Press.
 53. Rich, A. (2004). Think tanks, public policy, and the politics of expertise (pp. 1–6). Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
 54. Ricœur, P. (1992). Oneself as another. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
 55. Ricœur, P. (2000). The just. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
 56. Ricœur, P. (2007). Reflections on the just. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
 57. Russell, J., Greenhalgh, T., Byrne, E., & McDonnell, J. (2008). Recognizing rhetoric in health care 
policy analysis. [Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov’t]. Journal of Health Services & Research Policy, 
13(1), 40–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1258/jhsrp .2007.00602 9.
 58. Salloch, S., Wäscher, S., Vollmann, J., & Schildmann, J. (2015). The normative background of empiri-
cal-ethical research: First steps towards a transparent and reasoned approach in the selection of an ethi-
cal theory. BMC Medical Ethics, 16(1), 20.
 59. Sanderson, I. (2009). Intelligent policy making for a complex world: Pragmatism, evidence and learn-
ing. Political Studies, 57(4), 699–719.
 60. Scheunemann, L. P., & White, D. B. (2011). The ethics and reality of rationing in medicine. Chest, 
140(6), 1625–1632. https ://doi.org/10.1378/chest .11-0622.
 61. Smith, N., Mitton, C., Davidson, A., & Williams, I. (2014). A politics of priority setting: Ideas, interests 
and institutions in healthcare resource allocation. Public Policy and Administration, 29(4), 331–347.
 62. Taylor, G. H. (2014). Ricœur and just institutions. Philosophy Today, 58(4), 571–589. https ://doi.
org/10.5840/philt oday2 01481 136.
 63. Thistlethwaite, J., & Spencer, J. (2008). Professionalism in medicine. Oxford: Radcliffe Publishing.
 64. Thorne, M. L. (2002). Colonizing the new world of NHS management: The shifting power of pro-
fessionals. Health Services Management Research, 15(1), 14–26. https ://doi.org/10.1258/09514 84021 
91279 8.
 65. Throgmorton, J. A. (1991). The rhetorics of policy analysis. Policy Sciences, 24(2), 153–179.
 66. Tilburt, J. C., & Brody, B. (2016). Doubly distributing special obligations: What professional practice 
can learn from parenting. Journal of Medical Ethics. https ://doi.org/10.1136/medet hics-2015-10307 1.
 67. Veatch, R. M. (1990). Physicians and cost containment: The ethical conflict. Jurimetrics, 30(4), 
461–482.
 68. Wild, C. (2005). Ethics of resource allocation: Instruments for rational decision making in sup-
port of a sustainable health care. Poiesis & Praxis, 3(4), 296–309. https ://doi.org/10.1007/s1020 
2-005-0008-x.
 
 
177 
Chapter Six: Procedural justice and the individual 
participant in priority setting 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Six part 1: Chapter introduction  
 
 
 
6.1.1  Publication details 
This chapter consists of the report ‘Procedural justice and the individual participant in 
priority setting: Doctors' experiences’, which is under consideration by the journal 
Social Science & Medicine. 
6.1.2  Authors’ contributions  
SG designed the study, collected and analysed the data, and drafted the manuscript. 
ML provided input and feedback into the preparation of the manuscript for journal 
submission. Both authors considered the reviewers’ comments, to which SG drafted 
the responses.  
6.1.3  Manuscript  
The current version of the paper follows. 
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Procedural justice and the individual participant in priority setting: 
Doctors' experiences  
 
Abstract 
In this study we describe, synthesise, and discuss the experiences and views of doctors who 
participate as technical experts in health care priority setting, reflect on the ethical 
significance of the challenges to procedural and distributive justice they encounter, and 
propose an empirically derived practical approach to improving the fairness of the process.   
 
Between August 2015 and July 2016 we conducted semi-structured face-to-face interviews 
with 20 doctors in NSW, Australia, purposively selected on the basis of their participation in 
macroallocation. Participant selection, data collection, and analysis were carried out 
according to the principles of grounded moral analysis, an empirical bioethics methodology 
closely based on grounded theory. 
 
The doctors we interviewed attached ethical significance to a broad range of procedural 
concerns that militated both against the prospect of distributive justice and against their own 
wellbeing: unfair access to opportunities to participate in macroallocation, sexist behaviours 
and structures, rewards for rule-breakers, cynical and insincere practices, waste, duplication, 
and inefficiency, and being taken for granted.  
 
On the basis of our data, we hypothesise that the institutional conditions for macroallocation 
do not support the care of medical participants in deliberations. Evaluating our findings 
against the ‘accountability for reasonableness’ framework of Daniels and Sabin, we expose as 
incompatible with the conditions for procedural justice processes that treat participants in 
macroallocation unfairly or cause them to have moral unease about the justice of the 
enterprise. We suggest a supplementary procedure that positions commitment to the care and 
just treatment of participants as a foundation of any macroallocation procedure. 
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Background and Rationale 
Most health systems that are, at least in part, regulated and funded by government have 
formal processes in place for managing resource scarcity and distributing funds to health care 
programs in accordance with their priority [1-3], which have been characterised as moral 
endeavours because of their potential to impact on persons and society, [4, 5]. In this analysis, 
part of a larger qualitative study undertaken in NSW, Australia, we report on the ethical 
challenges experienced by doctors who participate in these processes, explore the impact of 
these challenges on procedural and distributive justice, and propose an empirically derived 
approach to mitigating the threats to fair allocations that we identified.   
 
Macroallocation – the term generally used to describe these processes – is concerned with 
decisions about the amount of resources to be made available to particular kinds of health 
services and programs [6-8]. Its focus is on the healthcare needs of populations at an 
aggregate level and its locus is at the level of governments and institutions. Its broad objective 
is justice [9, 10] and, since it generally entails normative assessments of the needs of groups 
of patients [8] and choices between competing policy goals [11], it is often conceptualised as 
priority setting [12, 7]. We use the term ‘macroallocation’ to encompass all institutional 
decision making [8, 13], although some authors differentiate between the ‘macro-’ and ‘meso-
’ levels, which occur, respectively, at central and peripheral levels of government [14-17].  
 
Macroallocation generally makes use of the input of technical experts, that is, individuals with 
special knowledge and skill in the area under consideration [18], when devising options and 
formulating recommendations to decision-makers. In healthcare policy, doctors dominate the  
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field [19, 20, 16, 21, 22]. That they are essential as expert informants seems to be readily 
accepted [1, 23]. 
The ethical dimensions of doctors’ performance of the expert role in macroallocation are 
identified in the theoretical literature chiefly as 1) their lack of special expertise in 
determining the outcomes likely to enhance social justice [24-26], 2) their limitations as 
barometers of public preferences [27, 28], and 3) their vulnerability to role-related conflicts 
[29, 27, 30, 31, 14]. In the empirical literature, however, there is little that deals directly or 
exclusively with these or any other ethical challenges encountered by doctors as actors in 
macroallocation. Furthermore, despite the wide adoption of procedural justice ethical models 
for macroallocation [32, 33], the literature is scarce on the practices required to implement 
formal priority setting techniques [34], on the institutional conditions in which they are 
performed [35], or the detail and implications of the medical role.  
 
The medical role in macroallocation is an area of rising importance due to the current pattern 
amongst medical professional organisations, such as the ABIM Foundation [36] and the 
Australian Medical Association [37], of promoting participation in socially engaged actions, 
including resource allocation, as a professional commitment at the level of the individual 
doctor. The present analysis – which is part of a broader study aimed at establishing an 
empirically derived ethical framework for moral analysis of doctors’ roles in macroallocation, 
on which we have previously reported [Anonymous 2018a, 2018b] – aims to describe, 
synthesise, and discuss the experiences and views of doctors who engage in macroallocation. 
We reflect on the ethical significance of our findings – especially for distributive justice – and 
consider their practical implications.  
 
Methods 
Methodology 
Between August 2015 and July 2016 we conducted semi-structured face-to-face interviews 
with 20 doctors, purposively selected on the basis of their participation in macroallocation at 
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one or more levels of the health care system. We sought to obtain a rich picture of doctors’ 
understandings and experiences of the social process of macroallocation and bring their 
intuitions to bear on our ethical analysis [38, 39]. 
 
Since we were interested in making normatively significant conclusions, we chose to base our 
study method closely on Charmaz’s [40] constructivist model of grounded theory (GT), 
modified to accommodate grounded moral analysis (GMA), an iterative empirical bioethics 
methodology that employs contemporaneous interchange between the ethical and empirical 
over the course of the research, aiming ultimately at a confluence of understanding leading to 
‘a particular normative claim, such that the argument underpinning this claim is valid and 
grounded in a persuasive explanatory account’ [41].  
 
Participants and sampling 
Our interest was in doctors who elected to engage in policy as individuals, rather than as 
nominees of interest groups, and who were focused on the resourcing of services rather than 
on the rights of medical practitioners or broad professional reform. In the first stage of 
recruitment, in order to access doctors active in macroallocation, we approached the Agency 
for Clinical Innovation (ACI), which operates clinical networks that advise the NSW Ministry 
of Health on the development, evaluation, and adoption of healthcare innovations [42], and 
attracts doctors with an interest in priority setting. ACI issued an invitation on our behalf to 
which doctors responded if they felt they had information and perspectives relevant to the 
exploration of the ethical dimensions of priority setting. Ten potential participants came 
forward, of whom 1 withdrew before a date for an interview could be set. The remaining 9 
respondents met the criteria and were interviewed, along with an additional participant who 
was recruited by passive snowballing. The exhaustion of this recruitment avenue coincided 
with the emergence of tentative theories from the data, prompting a transition to theoretical 
sampling in accordance with GT methodology [43, 44]. This involved accessing the 
researchers’ professional networks for individuals with deep experiences of the phenomenon 
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and a perceived capacity to enable development of the categories emerging from the data 
[40]. In this stage, from 18 invitations issued, 12 doctors agreed to participate, of whom 10 
were interviewed while, for 2 potential participants, interview arrangements had not been 
finalised by the point at which theoretical saturation was reached and recruitment was 
terminated [45].  
 
The sample comprised 5 females and 15 males, ranging in age from 38 to 80 years, with an 
average of 58 years, and covering a wide range of medical specialties and sub-specialities, 
including disciplines in critical care, medicine, surgery, and paediatrics. Three participants 
had trained in Europe, one in Asia, and the remainder in Australia. The age and sex 
distribution of our sample, and the representation of overseas-trained doctors, were closely 
similar to the medical specialist profile in Australia [46].  
 
The doctors in our sample were – or, in the case of the two who had retired, had been – full-
time or substantial part-time specialists or academics in salaried employment in clinical roles 
in hospitals and universities in NSW. They each participated in macroallocation at the 
institutional, regional, state, national, or international level – with most engaging in multiple 
macroallocation processes in several jurisdictions, in parallel or over the course of a career. 
Each engaged in several or all of the activities entailed in the medical expert role in Australia: 
membership of committees, attendance at meetings and workshops with decision-makers, 
lobbying, construction of independent processes designed to advance policy debate, and 
preparation of submissions, applications, policy drafts, and correspondence. They contributed 
to decisions about the resourcing of public health programs, research and health professional 
education funding priorities, high-cost medications and technology, and state and institutional 
clinical specialty service growth and development. They undertook these activities as 
individuals rather than as members of medical interest groups [47].  
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Data collection 
We used a semi-structured interview format, with questions and prompts designed to elicit 
participants’ experiences and encourage reflection on the ethical dimensions of the role. Our 
interview schedule explored broad topics initially, and became more focussed on participants’ 
moral intuitions as the interview progressed. Participants were asked about competition for 
the health dollar; the roles they played in macroallocation; positive and negative experiences 
in the role; the characteristics, behaviours, and achievements of those of whom they approved 
and disapproved; and their views on how competition, power, and relationships were relevant 
to the policy process. If the information had not been otherwise elicited, they were probed to 
discuss aspects of the process that had caused them moral unease. The interviews, which were 
conducted face-to-face by the first author, who is medically qualified and has macroallocation 
experience as a health executive, lasted from 35 minutes to 125 minutes, with an average of 
65 minutes. The interview schedule was revised twice during the study, to enable us to probe 
the ethical concepts emerging from our analysis and explore our theoretical insights with 
participants, in keeping with GMA methodology [41].  
 
Analysis 
The interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. The first author undertook 
inductive and abductive data analysis progressively from the commencement of the 
interviews, and iteratively discussed and refined the coding structure with the second author, 
who is a philosopher, researcher in sociology, and retired clinician. This involved detailed 
line-by-line coding, comprehensive memo-writing, exploration of the relationships between 
codes, and creation of analytic categories by combining codes [40]. In the course of the 
analytic process the researchers drew reflexively upon their own experiences in order to 
understand and respond to their potential to inform or bias interpretation of the data [48, 44, 
43, 49, 50]. As participants’ statements on ethical matters were often implicit we 
acknowledge our interpretative role in constructing this account [51].   
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The analysis was guided by the constructivist empirical bioethics methodology Grounded 
Moral Analysis (GMA) [41], enabling us to consider doctors’ conceptual understandings 
alongside ethical theory as we strove to arrive at an understanding of ethics in 
macroallocation work. 
 
As the analysis progressed, it became obvious that justice and self-efficacy were of deep 
concern to the participants, suggesting virtue ethics as an appropriate ethical lens through 
which to examine the phenomenon. In keeping with the GMA methodology described by 
Dunn et al. [41], and Salloch, Wäscher, Vollmann, and Schildmann’s [52] criteria for the 
selection of ethical theories in empirical bioethics – in particular, the criteria of suitability to 
the issue at stake and alignment with participants’ actual moral deliberation – the interview 
schedule was modified in two iterations to draw out experiences that responded to the ethical 
themes emerging from our analysis.  
 
Results 
The doctors in our study were of one voice in identifying deficiencies in the design and 
management of the macroallocation process as the issue of greatest ethical significance; a 
number stated that they had agreed to participate in the study expressly for the purpose of 
recording this issue. Conflicts of interest and role were also present in our data to a modest 
degree; however, because participant experiences of and reflections on procedural justice 
dominate our data and offer a novel area for ethical inquiry, we concern ourselves only with 
these categories in the present analysis, reserving role-related conflicts for a separate report 
[Anonymous, 2018c).  
 
Participants’ ideas of procedural injustice in macroallocation fell into 6 categories. Three – 
‘unfair access to opportunities to participate in macroallocation’, ‘sexist behaviours and 
structures’, and ‘rewards for rule-breakers’ – they strongly associated with the potential to 
affect distributive justice. Three – ‘cynical and insincere practices’, ‘waste, duplication, and 
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inefficiency’ and ‘being taken for granted’ – they associated with feelings of annoyance, 
affront, and personal injustice rather than with societal disadvantage. The themes that support 
these categories are set out in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Participants’ ideas of procedural injustice in macroallocation: categories and 
theme descriptions  
Unfair access to opportunities to participate in macroallocation 
• Opportunities to participate in priority setting are not offered equitably or transparently. 
• There is a bias towards high-cost, high-visibility capital and technology projects and against 
marginalised groups, emerging health issues, and patient groups or conditions considered 
unattractive. 
• Doctors or craft groups with strong track records for achievement and compliant behaviour 
get more opportunities to participate in macroallocation. 
Sexist behaviours and structures 
• Women’s voices are ignored or discounted, contributing to neglect of women’s interests in 
policy making.  
Rewards for rule-breakers 
• ‘Squeaky wheels’ are often rewarded. 
• Some doctors manipulate third parties or public opinion to influence the decision.  
• The system tolerates and rewards poor collaborators and those who seek to benefit from or 
undermine the work of others. 
Cynical and insincere practices 
• Governments use funding allocation processes to divide and conquer interest groups.  
• Ministers make decisions independent of, and sometimes in opposition to, the 
recommendations agreed by experts and bureaucrats. 
• Once enmeshed in macroallocation, participants lose their freedom to speak out about issues 
that cause them concern. 
Waste, duplication, and inefficiency 
• Bureaucratic inefficiency is a major source of duplication and rework.  
Being taken for granted  
• Doctors who engage in macroallocation are overcommitted; they do much of the work in their 
own time, on top of their other workload, and without care or oversight from management.  
• Project support is inadequate, resulting in doctors gathering and repackaging information for 
which other members should take responsibility. 
• There is inadequate training, mentoring, and psychological support for doctors entering the 
role. 
• No allowances are made by their superiors for early-career doctors who take on these roles, in 
terms of reductions in teaching, clinical, and research burdens.  
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Unfair access to opportunities to participate in macroallocation 
In our participants’ accounts, the biggest threat to distributive justice arose from decisions 
made prior to their involvement, in the construction of the policy agenda. It had its origins, 
commonly, at the level of politicians, who were biased towards certain health issues – for 
example, high technology medical equipment and facilities, and life threatening childhood 
illnesses – on the basis of their political attractiveness.  
 
P8: Politicians are very keen to build the building because you can look at it, you can 
show it on TV and you can touch it and it’s an achievement. 
 
Participants claimed that these biases reduced the chance of emerging or stigmatised health 
issues, and services demanding recurrent rather than capital funding, entering the 
prioritisation system.  
 
P17: There's a hierarchy of health problems and it doesn’t relate to what you might 
think of as burden of disease or anything, it’s a whole lot of other things.   
 
Selectivity also occurred at the level of managers and bureaucrats, who filtered out certain 
opportunities to engage in policy making in accordance with their own views on priorities.  
 
P20: Invariably whoever has got the money doesn’t, in my view and my experience, 
doesn’t actually let the clinicians know until just before applications close. So it 
makes it difficult to get things together. Unless you’re in the know, unless you’re 
right up in the echelons, it’s hard to actually find out that there’s money out there for 
various projects until you stumble across it.   
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Participants recognised that factors independent of real or claimed priority influenced whether 
or not an issue would advance onto the policy agenda. One important factor was the acumen 
and reputation of the medical specialty network involved with an issue. Association with past 
successful decisions also enhanced individual doctors’ access to decision makers. 
 
P5: Craft groups get reputations. So for instance, the bureaucracy is very unlikely to 
listen to an orthopaedic surgeon, that's a silly example, versus a cardiologist. Why? 
Because the cardiologists have been seen to help improve the system and have not 
been belligerent or antagonistic –  which orthopaedic surgeons have been – and the 
level of self-interest is different. 
 
Even though some acknowledged that it could work in their favour, participants disapproved 
of Ministers making decisions independent of or in opposition to the recommendations agreed 
by experts and bureaucrats through formal procedures.  
 
P20: And “yak, yak, yak, yak”, and [the Minister] puts the phone down and says, 
“You’re funded,” and that was it. And, so, all these applications and forms and letters, 
it all came down to Jim knew Bill knew Fred. It was a good enterprise, but was it 
fair? No. 
 
Sexist behaviours and structures 
Underrepresentation of women in the technical expert role constituted a second major threat 
to distributive justice. The women in our sample reported that the time demands of 
macroallocation made it difficult for younger female doctors with family commitments to 
take part, allowing the field to be dominated by males. Women engaging in the technical 
expert role reported that their voices were routinely resented or disregarded, and their input 
and achievements belittled by their male counterparts.  
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P10: I’ve had pretty major pushback and big, big male egos do not like anyone telling 
them that they’re wrong or that it should be done differently. They particularly don’t 
like a female telling them that. So I’ve had sort of very major pushback, very major 
putdown, belittling and I suppose by people who are supposedly my colleagues and 
peers. That’s happened quite a lot. Still happens even now.   
 
One male participant, who spoke throughout his interview about the superior leadership skills 
of several of his female colleagues, reported on sexism in macroallocation:   
 
P13: I witnessed significant offensive behaviour, particularly a masked misogyny. 
There is certainly misogyny amongst some of our relatively esteemed colleagues. 
 
The female participants considered that, since women are more likely than men to push for 
consideration of the needs of the disadvantaged, the combination of structural and social bias 
had the potential to impact upon distributive justice, not only in matters concerning the health 
needs and perspectives of women, but also in those concerning vulnerable groups generally.  
 
Rewards for rule-breakers 
Participants were highly critical of the tolerance of institutions towards disruptive actors – 
who were ubiquitous in formal and informal macroallocation networks – who flouted priority 
setting’s deliberative conventions. They considered that the input of ‘squeaky wheels’ was 
unfairly privileged and that they received disproportionately high rewards at the expense of 
good decision-making.  
 
P18: The louder the voice is the more likelihood you’ll be heard, whether it’s justified 
or not. I find that hard. 
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Some participants attributed the problem to their colleagues’ behaviours rather than to any 
systemic failing. They were especially critical of doctors who manipulate third parties or 
public opinion to influence decisions, for example, by taking issues to the media or to directly 
to the Minister.  
 
P5: There's manipulating public opinion to manipulate politicians to manipulate the 
bureaucracy and that takes it to a different level – so the system is riddled with that 
idea, that stuff. So personally I think that's pretty unethical and never did any of that, 
even though there were times that I could have used the newspapers to crucify 
someone's decision that didn't go the way I wanted it.   
 
Those who use such tactics in order to benefit from or undermine the work of others also 
drew the disapprobation of several participants:  
 
P8: They find somebody who will go and run with their interests and they are just 
sitting in the train that somebody else is pushing and not contributing anything. 
 
Cynical and insincere practices 
A number of participants considered that macroallocation processes were often used in a 
cynical way to distract clinicians or engender competition amongst them in order to inhibit 
effective activism.  
 
P16: You just give a bunch of money to one lot of people and just watch them all 
fighting for it. So there you go, classic. 
 
Some participants found that taking on the ‘insider’ technical expert role in macroallocation 
had the effect of constraining their willingness to influence policy using other means.  
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P7: I’ve got to think of ways where I’m almost doing that – raising alert, concerns 
and so on – without sending too much mud on the hospital. 
 
Waste, duplication and inefficiency 
Many of the doctors in our study gave accounts of bureaucratic processes –constructed as 
bureaucratic inefficiency – that demanded additional or duplicated effort on the part of 
macroallocation participants. Some attributed these frustrations to the consequences of 
shortages and turnover of leading bureaucrats and managers. P18 recounted the difficulties he 
had in preserving his reputation as a successful innovator in the face of each new wave of 
bureaucrats offering resources for programs that had failed in the past:  
 
P18: They come up with these great ideas that you’ve already tried. So I’m often in 
this position where I think, well, if I go, ‘nah, that won’t work, we tried that’, I’ll be 
seen as a curmudgeon and a stick in the mud.   
 
Others attributed these difficulties to the scale and transparency requirements of complex 
macroallocation processes. P10 gave a wry account of an occasion on which, for the sake of 
due process, she had been formally asked to comment on a draft policy of which she had been 
the author. 
 
P10: What really, really bugs me at that sort of government policy level is that you do 
the due process with that group. By the time you get back to them, they’re gone and 
you do it again with someone else and we did that run around quite a few times 
related to this [particular] issue and I realise that we were really wasting our time at 
that level. 
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Other participants felt unjustly treated when management adjusted processes in favour of less 
well-organised groups at the expense of engaged, diligent actors. P20 described his chagrin 
when a deadline he had met was extended to accommodate others:  
 
P20: There was an email that came out that said you’ve got another month to get it in.  
Okay. Thanks, very much. Well, could you have told us a couple of weeks ago rather 
than – my first thought was we’ve got it in, well, why the hell do we have to wait for 
someone else to put their late application in? 
 
Being taken for granted  
A strong theme in our data was doctors’ perceptions that they were taken for granted by 
institutions that, despite reliance on doctors’ input, put obstacles in the way of their 
effectiveness. Participants emphasised that macroallocation requires doctors to do much of 
the work in their own time, on top of their other workload, and for no additional financial 
reward.  
 
P13: I think that both university and hospital bureaucracy are totally unaware of the 
amount of pro bono work that’s done – universities run on goodwill and they are on a 
very thin line between alienating people because they don’t respect them, and people 
who want to teach and want to put something back, and are prepared to do it for 
nothing.  But they are not prepared to do it for being disrespected.   
 
Participants almost universally reported that they received inadequate technical support, 
especially in the areas of economic, financial, and health data analysis. 
 
P19: People liked the outcome but, for example, in terms of statistics and data 
analysis and even data collection there was zero support.  
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Some younger participants complained of insufficient training and preparation for operating 
competently in high level forums with more experienced actors:  
 
P16: You're really kind of forced into the deep end of the water, so to speak, so you 
do have a very fast learning curve…It does make us, I guess, better doctors and better 
people at what we are and what we do, but along the way all of us have had to find 
our own support mechanisms because it's just non-existent. 
 
They recognised a lack of mentoring and psychological support, and its consequences:  
 
P19: You know, your personal wellbeing, unfortunately, often gets ignored as well. 
 
This group also reported that managers and clinical superiors were reluctant to adjust clinical, 
teaching, and research performance targets to accommodate macroallocation effort and 
achievement. 
 
P15: What’s interesting is that you don’t get any more hours in the day for doing that, 
your main employers aren't overly thrilled…At the same time, you know that your 
publication rate is going to go down, because in actual fact, a lot of this stuff doesn’t 
lend itself to publications. 
 
The theme that dominated this category, however, was structural tolerance of over-
commitment amongst participants, who spread themselves across a variety of professional 
activities and routinely worked extended hours on macroallocation projects.  
 
P14: So I think everybody who you’ll talk to [in this study] will be over committed. 
I’m definitely over committed. I have no hours in my day that I am awake not 
thinking about or writing about or talking about or reading about my work…Even my 
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cups of coffee are over committed. It is what it is. I don’t – how else can it be? I can’t 
imagine it any other way. 
 
Whilst a number of participants claimed to thrive on it, an equal number questioned the 
sustainability of this pattern of work.  
 
P15: You can't sustain this, going forwards, this business of answering emails at 4 
o’clock in the morning.  It’s silly… It’s a concern, it’s a real concern, how are you 
going to get the next generation in? 
 
Many attributed their need to take on excessive extra-clinical burdens to failure of their 
colleagues to pull their weight.  
 
When it came to mitigating strategies, a number of participants praised processes in which the 
goals and rules of engagement were explicitly expressed at the outset. Some suggested that 
fairer resource distribution might follow from improvements to the participant experience 
through adequate technical, educational, and psychological support. For matters of structural 
bias and immoderate behaviour no solutions were offered. 
 
Discussion 
This analysis concerns our participants’ evaluations of the ethical challenges of the expert 
role in macroallocation and the ways in which it might be improved. We report elsewhere on 
their evaluation of macroallocation overall as a pleasurable and sustaining long-term 
professional project, and an essential constituent of an ethical life [Anonymous, 2018].  
 
The salient finding of the present analysis is that participants emphatically identified 
deficiencies in procedure as their main ethical concerns. They had strong intuitions that the 
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fairness of a process has a direct bearing on the justice of the resulting distributions, and were 
troubled by the potential of the procedural injustice they experienced to affect both 
distributive justice and their own wellbeing. This finding was unexpected since procedural 
injustice has not previously, to our knowledge, been conceptualised as a moral challenge at 
the level of the person in the theoretical literature – which tends to focus on role-related 
conflict and on doctors’ dominance of the field at the expense of others –  or categorised as 
such in studies of policy participants’ experiences. Although empirical studies have reported 
that participants in priority setting experience the process as intimidating [35], arduous [53], 
and inadequately supported [54, 55], they have not assigned ethical significance to these 
features. Our findings show that doctors attach ethical significance not only to these concerns, 
but also to a much broader range of procedural deficiencies. This research is, thus, unique in 
providing a rich description of doctors’ experiences and perceptions of the ethical aspects of 
priority setting in its social context.  
 
Our participants’ intuitions about justice 
The doctors in our sample did not relate their ideas of fairness in macroallocation decisions to 
any personally held principles, or to formal ethical approaches based on principles of 
procedural or distributive justice – a finding that has also been reported in earlier empirical 
studies in this field [56, 33, 57, 54, 58, 18]. The absence of such a foundation for reasoning 
may account for their conceptualisation of their experiences, not as ordinary and benign 
features of a typical pluralistic policy model – in which the fairness of the policy agenda is 
conferred by its status as a product of societal forces [59, 60] – but as egregious systemic 
injustices. That those of our participants who had experienced macroallocation processes in 
which objectives, participant roles, essential knowledge, and operating principles had been 
made explicit at the outset were enthusiastic in their praise for them suggests that information 
may be a corrective [61]. 
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In terms of societal impact, our participants were concerned that bias in the selection of issues 
for the macroallocation policy agenda and extra-procedural decision-making mechanisms 
operating outside of formal macroallocation structures had the potential to deprive some 
health issues or patient groups of fair access to processes that distribute resources.  
 
The women in our sample described powerfully their experiences of testimonial injustice, the 
bias that occurs when ‘a speaker receives an unfair deficit of credibility from a hearer owing 
to prejudice on the hearer’s part’ [62]. Little et al. [63] reported the same phenomenon 
amongst lay participants in health care policy, labelling it dysempowerment. Testimonial 
injustice in this setting has procedural and substantive consequences; for example, our 
participants felt it deprived some health issues of a voice. This finding of structural and social 
biases against women’s contributions offers an insight into an area of the macroallocation 
system that has not been previously reported upon, to our knowledge, or theorised in the 
context of macroallocation. 
 
In terms of personal impact, our participants constructed as ethical issues inadequate support 
from organisational managers and professional colleagues, being taken for granted, and time-
wasting, incompetent, or cynical bureaucratic processes. Their accounts of over-commitment 
expose an absence of management oversight of the distribution of macroallocation work 
between doctors, and a failure to monitor the burden assumed by the largely self-selected 
group who take on the role. This, in turn, suggests a failure to nurture medical participants in 
macroallocation to an extent commensurate with either management’s expectation of 
receiving doctors’ expert input, or the medical profession’s desire to influence resource 
distributions [36, 64, 37].  
 
Hypothesis arising from our data 
We hypothesise that deficiencies in the social world of policy making in Australia, and 
perhaps in jurisdictions with similar health care systems – expressed as failures of knowledge-
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sharing, communication, transparency, and mutuality – account for participants’ experiences 
and perceptions injustice in macroallocation procedure. Three particular features of our data 
support this hypothesis. Firstly, participants’ longstanding unresolved grievances and 
misconceptions around the nature and conduct of the policy process suggest the absence of 
endeavours to arrive at shared knowledge and understandings about the fundamentals of the 
process. Secondly, the structural and social biases affecting women’s representation and 
comfort suggest both a critical undervaluation of diversity and deficiencies in the 
management of the social processes of deliberation. Thirdly, the profound and enduring 
resentment arising from the various procedural deficiencies that our participants construed as 
disrespecting their time and effort, along with tensions over unorthodox influences on 
decision makers, suggest a social world lacking in the conventions, structures, and procedures 
for meeting participants’ needs for information, support, and fellowship. 
 
Our hypothesis is supported by theoretical perspectives on priority setting which claim that 
the social conventions of priority setting tend not to expose and reconcile the different 
perspectives, values, and constituency beliefs of policy participants [65, 16, 56, 14, 66, 53], 
and by empirical studies showing that participants consider themselves and others to be 
underprepared for roles in macroallocation, and lacking in key knowledge [35, 18, 55]. On 
this basis, we claim that our participants’ experiences of procedural injustice at the level of 
the person, and the notion that these may be related to failure to attend to participant welfare, 
appear to be valid foundations on which to build further analysis that may have relevance to 
macroallocation broadly.  
 
Ethical evaluation of our participants’ experiences  
Although the limitations of procedural approaches to priority setting ethics are acknowledged 
[67-69, 32, 66], they are widely relied upon as a framework for the ethical analysis of 
macroallocation in the absence, and likely impossibility, of agreement on principles of 
distribution [70]. In order to move towards an examination of the practical implications of our 
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findings, we evaluate their ethical implications against the paradigmatic procedural justice 
model: the 'accountability for reasonableness' (A4R) ethical framework that Daniels and 
Sabin [71] devised to operationalise the concept of fairness in priority setting. The A4R 
framework appears to go some way toward addressing the procedural issues raised in our 
data, and may provide a foundation for answering the question: Is participant welfare an 
integral component of procedural justice in macroallocation?  
 
In the A4R framework four conditions must be satisfied if a process is to be considered just: 
relevance; publicity or transparency; the possibility of appeals and revision; and 
regulative/enforcement mechanisms [11]. The relevance condition is the cornerstone of the 
framework since it illuminates the role of participants in macroallocation deliberations in 
generating just decisions. It states that ‘a rationale will be relevant if it appeals to evidence, 
reasons, and principles that are accepted as relevant by fair-minded people who are disposed 
to finding mutually justifiable terms of cooperation’ [70]. The relevance and transparency 
conditions are the ones that apply to the phase of macroallocation with which this research is 
concerned.  
 
The unchecked moral discomfort we report suggests deficiencies in the social process of 
deliberating that are incompatible with notions of fairness. Such unresolved misgivings about 
a procedure’s potential to deliver just results for patient groups or society are inconsistent 
with the mutuality entailed in the relevance condition’s requirement for rationales that are 
acceptable to ‘fair-minded people who are disposed to finding mutually justifiable terms of 
cooperation’ [70]. The quality of evidence and reasoning has the potential to be compromised 
by participant over-commitment – through its impact on the time available to doctors for 
preparation – and by inadequate support, through its effect on the technical accuracy of their 
inputs. Perhaps most significant, for its impact on the A4R relevance condition, is the toll 
taken on good will and mutuality by doctors’ feelings of being personally treated unjustly.  
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Underrepresentation of women and discriminatory treatment of their contributions represent a 
failure to satisfy A4R’s requirement for fair consideration of stakeholder perspectives [11]. At 
a substantive level, such a significant procedural flaw reduced the likelihood of arrival at just 
distributions. The possibility of distributive injustice is heightened by the general 
underrepresentation and credibility deficit of community members in macroallocation.  
 
The constructive interplay between participant and process that is inherent in the relevance 
condition is particularly challenged by the extra-procedural decisions we report, since they 
negate the mutual problem-solving efforts of relevant fair-minded people and undercut the 
influence over decisions of – arguably – legitimate interests. Informal decision-making is a 
violation of the A4R transparency condition, and can be especially problematical in otherwise 
formally structured approaches that present to participants and communities the appearance of 
compliance with procedural justice standards. 
 
The problem we found with succession planning, which was attributed to younger doctors’ 
perceptions of involvement in macroallocation as onerous and lonely, was also significant, 
since deterrence of potential participants impacts upon the range of experts contributing to the 
generation and exploration of options. This dampening effect, which has lasting implications 
for the structures of power in macroallocation, represents a threat to the relevance condition 
of the A4R framework. 
 
The analysis above suggests that participant welfare is an integral component of procedural 
justice in priority setting and that, consequently, our participants’ intuitions about the impact 
of macroallocation participant treatment on the potential to realise just distributions are valid. 
The analysis also allows the conclusion that, where the conditions under which participants 
perform macroallocation are deficient or not tested, it cannot be claimed that a procedure 
meets the standard of procedural justice set by A4R. It is significant that even though, as we 
have shown, A4R seems to accommodate taking the participant experience into account it is 
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not customary to do so – probably because this dimension is implicit, rather than clearly 
stated. We consider that a more nuanced evaluation of priority setting is desirable and would 
be possible were this potential of A4R to be harnessed. We suggest below how this might be 
achieved. 
 
Implications for practice 
Our analysis exposes dimensions of justice related to participant welfare that have not 
previously been incorporated in procedural justice frameworks for priority setting and 
encourages us to consider how our findings might contribute useful texture to such systems.  
 
Our observations suggest two recommendations for improving conditions for doctors 
participating in macroallocation – not to improve the efficacy of their inputs, which would be, 
arguably, undesirable [72], but to redress obstacles to the satisfaction of the conditions for 
procedural justice. The first is that medical professional organisations, for example, medical 
boards, associations, and training institutions, attend to any discrepancies they find between 
their cultures and practices and their goals in relation to medical participation in socially 
engaged activities. The second is that institutions responsible for conducting priority setting, 
put in place a framework for promoting the welfare of macroallocation participants, 
supporting them practically, educationally, and psychologically, and monitoring their 
workloads and wellbeing. Institutions seeking to operationalise our recommendations might 
find it helpful to adopt the participant welfare checklist derived from our data, which is 
presented in Table 2.  
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Table 2 Macroallocation Participant Welfare Checklist 
Knowledge  
1.  Has there been an orientation to this priority setting process that sets out objectives, 
operating principles, participant roles, and required knowledge? 
2.  Have participants’ needs for role-related training been addressed? 
Participant support 
3.  Is adequate specialised technical support provided to participants? 
4.  Are mentoring and psychological support available to participants? 
5.  Is there a system for monitoring and, if necessary, modifying the workload of 
participants, taking into account other calls on their skills and knowledge? 
Inclusiveness 
6.  Have efforts been made to mitigate structural bias and promote diversity?    
7.  Are those leading the process capable of conducting it in a way that models and 
manages inclusiveness and respect for all perspectives? 
Accountability 
8.  Is there a mechanism for feeding back to participants the reasons and contexts for 
the decisions made by the final decision maker? 
9.  Are those responsible for the welfare of participants and the quality of the processes 
held to account?  
 
Because we position commitment to the welfare of participants as an essential ethical 
foundation for any macroallocation procedure, whether or not it is guided by a formal 
procedural justice framework, we refrain from proposing an additional A4R condition, 
although this approach has been used before by scholars of priority setting [35]. Instead, this 
checklist augments A4R and other normative frameworks by prompting the interpretations of 
relevance and transparency that include participant welfare. 
 
We offer the checklist without comment on deliberative or democratic forms of priority 
setting, which are beyond the scope of this report, but suggest that it might apply equally well 
to them. At the level of the individual doctor contemplating engagement in macroallocation, 
this checklist might serve as a basis for evaluating the institution’s level of commitment to the 
welfare of its participants, for setting expectations, and for negotiating conditions. 
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Limitations 
The distribution of age, sex, and place of training in our sample mirrored the profile of the 
general cohort of specialist doctors in Australia [46, 73]. In addition, some participants had 
international experience in the role. The processes in which our participants engaged and the 
actions they carried out in the exercise of the expert role were similar in nature and intent to 
those described in other jurisdictions. Thus, although our findings might not be widely 
generalisable, we believe that they are likely to reflect the experiences of a broad range of 
salaried medial clinicians who engage in formal macroallocation processes in publicly funded 
health systems that are structured along the lines of those in Australia. Further scholarship is 
required in order to establish whether our findings are replicated in other samples, or whether 
they apply to other categories of macroallocation participant.  
 
We do not report generally on differences between subgroups, but we made an exception for 
the matter of women’s reports of sexism because of the intensity of its presence in our data; 
however, since our sampling and data collection were not designed expressly to explore either 
women’s experiences or manifestations of sexism in macroallocation, this important area 
remains for future researchers to investigate more thoroughly than was possible in this study. 
Finally, as is the case with other interview studies, social desirability bias may have 
influenced participants’ accounts of their views and practices.  
 
Conclusions 
To our knowledge, this is the first published study to describe the ethical challenges 
encountered by doctors when engaging in macroallocation as technical experts. We found that 
the doctors in our sample attached ethical significance to a broad range of procedural 
concerns affecting macroallocation and considered it to be procedurally unfair in ways that 
militated against the prospect of distributive justice. Our findings bring to light a dimension of 
procedural justice in priority setting not explored in conventional procedural justice models. 
We hypothesised that the institutional conditions for macroallocation lack social conventions, 
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structures, and procedures for meeting medical participants needs for knowledge, support, and 
fellowship. 
 
By evaluating our findings against the A4R framework of Daniels and Sabin, we were able to 
expose as incompatible with the conditions for procedural justice processes that treated 
participants in macroallocation unfairly or caused them to have moral unease about the justice 
of the enterprise. We suggested a supplementary procedure for promoting participant welfare 
and assessing the commitment of macroallocation institutions to it. We hope that our findings 
will prompt all actors in macroallocation to take account of the importance of just treatment 
of participants to the satisfaction of procedural justice conditions.  
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Chapter Seven: Medical professionals as expert 
advisors in macroallocation: problems of dual agency 
and conflict of interest 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Seven Part 1: Chapter introduction  
 
 
 
7.1.1  Publication details  
This chapter consists of the following book chapter:  
 
Gallagher, S. (2018). Medical Professionals as Expert Advisors in Macro-
allocation: Problems of Dual Agency and Conflict of Interest. In K. 
Montgomery & W. Lipworth (Eds.), Medical Professionals: Conflicts and 
Quandaries in Medical Practice. Oxfordshire: Routledge. 
 
Montgomery & Lipworth’s book aims to shed light on the role-related conflict that 
pervades contemporary healthcare by exploring the experiences of doctors in a range 
of common scenarios. My chapter is one of 5 empirical chapters examining the ethical 
quandaries faced by doctors as they deal with competing and conflicting roles. The 
book concludes with two conceptual chapters – the second of which reflects on the 
serviceability of value pluralism as a framework for working through role-related 
conflicts and quandaries – and a final chapter offering suggestions for reframing 
thinking about medical roles, responsibilities, and decision-making in the shifting 
field of modern medicine. 
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7.1.2 Authors’ contributions  
SG designed the study, collected and analysed the data, and drafted the manuscript. 
Emeritus Professor Miles Little reviewed a draft. The editors (WL and KM) provided 
editorial feedback into the preparation of the manuscript for publication.  
7.1.3  Manuscript  
The published version of the book chapter follows.  
  
 Background 
 In health systems that are, at least in part, regulated and funded by govern-
ment, it is almost universal to conceptualize healthcare resources as scarce 
and in need of rationing ( Light and Hughes 2001 ) and to have in place 
formal processes for distributing funds to healthcare programmes in accor-
dance with their priority ( Whitty and Littlejohns 2015 ;  Landwehr and Klin-
nert 2015 ;  Rumbold et al. 2017 ). In this analysis (part of a larger qualitative 
study of the ethical dimensions of doctors’ involvement with policy con-
cerning the allocation of healthcare resources), I report on the role-related 
conflicts of doctors who participate as technical experts in such macroal-
location processes. 
 Macroallocation concerns decisions about the amount of resources avail-
able for particular kinds of health services and programmes ( Scheunemann 
and White 2011 ;  Kilner 2004 ;  Bærøe 2008 ). It is distinguished from micro-
allocation, or bedside rationing, by its focus on the healthcare needs of pop-
ulations at an aggregate level and its locus at the level of governments and 
institutions. Because macroallocation generally entails normative assess-
ments of the needs of groups of patients ( Bærøe 2008 ) and choices between 
competing policy goals ( Daniels 2016 ), it is often conceptualized as priority 
setting ( Klein, Day, and Redmayne 1996 ;  Kilner 2004 ). 
 Macroallocation processes usually employ the advice and knowledge of 
technical experts. These experts participate in devising options and formu-
lating recommendations to decision-makers, who are often politicians but 
who may be local boards or executives, depending on the scale of the deci-
sion and the degree to which authority is delegated in the system. In western 
democracies, doctors dominate this advisory role ( Belcher 2014 ;  Duckett 
1984 ;  Kenny and Joffres 2008 ;  Homan 2004 ;  Martin, Abelson, and Singer 
2002 ). That they are essential as expert informants seems to be generally 
accepted in practice ( Whitty and Littlejohns 2015 ;  Landwehr 2010 ). 
 The impartial expert assisting government has long been a recognized pro-
fessional role available to doctors ( Gillon 1986 ), although it is only recently 
that participation in the allocation of resources has come to be considered 
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Medical Professionals’ Roles in Macroallocation 89
part of the doctor’s job ( Tilburt 2014 ). Encouraged by the influential “Med-
ical Professionalism in the New Millennium: A Physician Charter” ( ABIM 
Foundation 2004 ), in recent decades a growing number of codes of medical 
ethics across the globe have moved to represent advocacy for social justice, 
access to care, and the fair distribution of resources as a commitment of 
each individual doctor ( Huddle 2011 ;  Earnest, Wong, and Federico 2010 ; 
 Tilburt 2014 ). The Australian Medical Association’s urging of doctors to 
“use [their] knowledge and skills to assist those responsible for allocating 
healthcare resources, advocating for their transparent and equitable alloca-
tion” is a typical example of this move towards entrenching social respon-
sibility and, along with it, medical influence over resource allocation, in 
the ethos of medicine ( Australian Medical Association 2017 , ¶4.4.3). How 
these obligations can be made to fit together with traditional professional 
commitments, most notably responsibilities to individual patients, has yet to 
be resolved ( Tilburt 2014 ). 
 This change to the ideals of medical professionalism has prompted exami-
nation of the ethics of doctors’ involvement in socially engaged actions by a 
small group of academics, notably  Croft et al. (2012 ),  Huddle (2011 ),  Ear-
nest, Wong, and Federico (2010 ), and  Tilburt (2014 ). This literature char-
acterizes the  ethical challenges of doctors’ performance of socially engaged 
roles such as priority setting, as: (1) their lack of special expertise in deter-
mining the outcomes likely to promote social justice ( Huddle 2013a ,  2014 ; 
 McKie et al. 2008 ), (2) their limitations as barometers of public preferences 
( Thistlethwaite and Spencer 2008 ;  Huddle 2013b ), and (3) the role-related 
issues of conflict of interest and dual agency ( Kerridge, Lowe, and Stewart 
2013 ;  Croft et al. 2012 ;  Williams 2005 ;  Smith et al. 2014 ;  Huddle 2014 ). 
 Huddle (2011 ), who is a major critic of the promotion of medical involve-
ment in resource allocation as a professional commitment, claims that its 
purpose of consolidating medical influence over healthcare resourcing is 
highly morally problematic and rightly invokes society’s scepticism.  Tilburt 
(2014 ) is more concerned with how to reconcile the new professional com-
mitment to participation in distributive justice at macro and micro levels 
with the traditional medical ethical tenets that reflect the primacy of the 
doctor–patient contract. 
 The small available body of empirical literature on participants’ experi-
ences in macroallocation confirms that conflict of interest ( McKie et al. 2008 ; 
 Martin, Giacomini, and Singer 2002 ) and dual agency ( Gallego, Fowler, and 
van Gool 2008 ;  de Kort et al. 2007 ) are ethical issues that arise in this setting. 
 Conflict of interest is said to exist in circumstances where there is a pos-
sibility that secondary interests—including financial benefits and opportuni-
ties for professional progression, recognition, and influence—will influence 
actions and judgements concerning primary interests—such as patient care 
( Lo and Field 2009 ). In healthcare policymaking scholarship and practice, 
concern tends to be focused on financial conflicts; non-financial conflicts 
are more often accepted, even though their potential to assume higher priority 
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90 Siun Gallagher
than primary interests ensures that they are also deeply problematical ( Kes-
selheim and Maisel 2010 ) (see also observations in  Chapter 5 of this vol-
ume). Formal disclosure and monitoring policies are the most common 
means of dealing with the problem of conflict of interest. The cultivation 
of medical virtue has been proposed as an alternative remedy ( DuBois et al. 
2013 ;  Oakley 2014 , 669). 
 For salaried medical practitioners, who make up the majority of doctors 
providing public healthcare in Australia, remuneration is largely unrelated 
to the dimensions or complexity of the service. As a consequence, financial 
conflicts may be less important than non-financial conflicts. Because health-
care resource investments and disinvestments affect both the volume and 
form of services, they shape the nature and scope of professional practice 
( Smith et al. 2014 ), and thereby the opportunities available to doctors to 
excel clinically, build reputations, perform research, and appoint and develop 
staff, amongst other things. In the macroallocation setting, the concern is 
that such considerations, rather than results for patients or the community, 
could motivate doctors’ contributions to policy deliberations ( Croft et al. 
2012 ). Doctors and others might consider such tensions to be innocent—for 
might not the needs of the patient, doctor, and staff all coalesce around 
the “better” service that results from new resources?—when in reality not 
all decisions benefit all parties equally. A service enhancement weighted 
towards research, for example, might benefit the doctor’s reputation and 
distant future patients more than it meets the needs of current patients or 
helps society to address contemporary problems. 
 Dual agency might be viewed as a special form of conflict of interest. It 
is defined by  Tilburt (2014 ) as an “avowed requirement to act simultane-
ously on behalf of two different parties with competing interests” (30). It 
is a feature of a number of branches of medicine, for example, military and 
occupational medicine, and of common medical tasks such as the certifi-
cation of patients’ fitness to drive; in such cases, the traditional tenet of 
medical professionalism—that the patient comes first—is challenged by the 
doctor’s obligations to society, government, or a corporation. Priority set-
ting of necessity entails dual agency, because it requires doctors whose pri-
mary professional interests are in patient care to provide neutral technical 
advice as an agent of government and in the interest of society and to con-
form to distributive justice-based principles, which are often incompatible 
with meeting individual patients’ needs and desires ( Pugh 2018 ). Indeed, it 
has been common for philosophers and economists to reject the notion that 
doctors have a legitimate role in resource allocation, arguing that their fidu-
ciary duty to the patient is incompatible with representing community or 
national interests in the apportionment of resources ( Cassel 1985 ;  Kerridge, 
Lowe, and Stewart 2013 ;  Wasserman and Wertheimer 2014 ). Dual agency 
might also play out when doctors have simultaneous commitments to assist-
ing governments in the fair allocation of resources and to maximizing the 
resources available to their own healthcare organizations or practices. 
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 Notwithstanding reservations about conflicts of interest and dual agency, 
doctors look set to remain embedded in the role of expert advisor in 
macroallocation—both because of the need for policy deliberation to be 
informed by doctors’ unique experience and knowledge and because of the 
incorporation of a commitment to distributive justice into the ethos of medi-
cine. Thus, exploring how doctors can navigate competing commitments 
is increasingly seen as an important area for medical ethics ( Tilburt 2014 ; 
 Tilburt and Brody 2016 ;  Sabin 2000 ;  Wasserman and Wertheimer 2014 ; 
 Ross and Bernabeo 2014 ). 
 In such work, conflict of interest and dual agency are usually problema-
tized more as ethical quandaries facing doctors than as threats to distribu-
tive justice. Consequently, suggested ethical frameworks for addressing the 
problem tend to be physician-focused—prescribing attitudes and actions 
for doctors to take. This approach overestimates both doctors’ insight into 
potential conflicts and the degree to which they are troubled by them ( Klug-
man 2017 ;  DuBois 2017 ). More significantly, it overlooks the social context 
of macroallocation. Priority setting at this level occurs typically in a delib-
erative process that brings together a plurality of voices and skills to argue 
the merits of a range of claims and norms ( Danziger 1995 ;  Gottweis 2007 ; 
 Majone 1989 ). 
 The privileged access doctors gain, whilst engaged in macroallocation, to 
opportunities to advance their careers and pursue patient-related interests 
prompted my interest in understanding whether and, if so, in what form 
doctors appreciate role-related conflict as an ethical issue. This component 
of the study aimed to expand the empirical knowledge base on doctors’ 
experiences of ethical challenges in the role of the technical expert in prior-
ity setting, test some of the theoretical claims concerning conflict of interest 
and dual agency, and explore ethical frameworks that might guide doctors 
in this setting. 
 Empirical Observations 
 Study Setting 
 In order to obtain a rich picture of doctors’ ethical intuitions and of their 
understanding of the social process of priority setting ( Ives and Draper 
2009 ;  Ebbesen and Pedersen 2007 ), I designed a qualitative interview study 
of doctors who act as technical experts in macroallocation. The enquiry elic-
ited reflection on the roles doctors play in policy and their practical expe-
rience of those roles. Using the principles of the constructivist empirical 
bioethics methodology known as grounded moral analysis (GMA) ( Dunn 
et al. 2012 ), doctors’ conceptual understandings were considered alongside 
ethical theory in order to arrive at an understanding of ethics in macroal-
location work. The focus was on doctors who elected to engage in policy as 
individuals, rather than as nominees of interest groups ( Contandriopoulos 
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92 Siun Gallagher
2011 ) and whose interests were focused on the resourcing of services rather 
than on the rights of medical practitioners or broad professional reform. 
 Method 
 Interviews were conducted with twenty doctors, purposively selected on the 
basis that they had participated in policy concerning the allocation of fund-
ing to healthcare programmes at one or more levels of the healthcare system. 
 The study method was based on  Charmaz’s (2014 ) constructivist model 
of grounded theory, modified to accommodate the principles of grounded 
moral analysis (GMA), an iterative empirical bioethics methodology 
employing contemporaneous interchange between the ethical and empirical 
to support normative claims grounded in practice ( Dunn et al. 2012 ). 
 The doctors in the sample were or had been (in the case of the small num-
ber who had retired) full-time or substantial part-time specialists or clini-
cal academics employed in hospitals and universities in New South Wales, 
Australia. The distribution of age (average 58; range 38–80), sex (5 female, 
15 male), and place of training in our sample mirrored the profile of the gen-
eral cohort of specialist doctors in Australia ( Australian Institute of Health 
and Welfare 2016 ,  2014 ). 
 A semi-structured interview format was used, with questions and prompts 
designed to elicit participants’ experiences and encourage reflection on the 
ethical dimensions of the role. Participants were asked about competition 
for the health dollar; the roles they played in macroallocation; positive and 
negative experiences in the role; the characteristics, behaviours, and achieve-
ments of those of whom they approved and disapproved; and their views 
on how power and relationships were relevant to the policy process. If the 
information had not been otherwise elicited, they were probed to discuss 
aspects of the process that had caused them moral unease. Interviews aver-
aged sixty-five minutes. 
 The interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. Inductive 
and abductive data analysis was undertaken progressively from the com-
mencement of the interviews. As the analysis progressed, it became obvious 
that justice and self-efficacy were of deep concern to the participants, sug-
gesting virtue ethics as an appropriate ethical lens through which to exam-
ine the phenomenon. In keeping with the GMA methodology described by 
 Dunn and colleagues (2012 ), the interview schedule was modified in two 
iterations to draw out experiences that responded to this theory. 
 Results 
 Participants in the study gave accounts of acting in the expert role in mac-
roallocation at one or more levels, from institution based to international, 
with most engaging in multiple macroallocation processes and jurisdictions, 
either in parallel or over the course of a career. Participants’ actions in priority 
6?!C=E7K+#?LLC+*EL,0+*#EC=ML*!81*!KC?LC*6?!C=E7K=MC=??!CM?!Q4M%E??*6+*MA+)?KQ*!:?*!Q5CIP+KM%
9+1ME?!A?7K+81?LM2++D0?*MKE%MMI,?++D=?*MKEIK+-1?LM=+)ECK*!?CL ?++DL!?MCE=MC+*.!+=1-


0K?M?!#K+)K*!?CL ?++DL+*  	,,	
0
+I
QK
CA
%M
R



9
+1
ME?
!A
?
/
EE
KCA
%M
L
K?
L?
K2
?!

Medical Professionals’ Roles in Macroallocation 93
setting included membership of committees, attendance at meetings with 
decision-makers, lobbying, construction of independent processes designed 
to advance policy debate, and preparation of submissions, applications, and 
correspondence. They contributed expert advice to decisions about whether 
specific health service programmes would receive funding or, if already 
funded, enhanced funding. These activities were undertaken as individual 
health service employees rather than as members of medical interest groups. 
 Participants did not immediately recognize role-related conflict in mac-
roallocation as an ethical issue or find it troubling; in fact, they were more 
concerned about the ethical ramifications of procedural deficiencies, such as 
bureaucratic inefficiency and behaviours and structures that disadvantage 
certain types of participant. Nevertheless, their accounts showed that the 
expert role entailed both conflict of interest and dual agency, as described 
ahead, followed by participants’ views on strategies to manage these conflicts. 
 Conflicts of Interest 
 While participants spoke in detail about their engagement in processes for 
managing conflict of interest, they largely denied being influenced by either 
the desire for personal financial gain, or the desire to progress their careers; 
rather, it was common for them to claim to be the “champions” of their 
services, engaging in macroallocation to enhance their quality, reputation, 
and resourcing: 
 Most health is about “my disease is bigger than your disease” and if you 
do a cost-of-illness study, everyone’s disease is the biggest and all of that, 
but my prime motivation was actually for advocacy for [my specialty] 
because they are the poor cousin. 
 Participants thus offered melioristic motives for their own involvement with 
macroallocation, such as a desire to provide “the best service possible.” 
 Yet that these motives may coexist with more self-seeking motives was 
suggested by their accounts of their career trajectories. Of the twenty par-
ticipants, eleven had entered an emerging specialty or subspecialty or had 
identified and developed their practices to focus on a previously unrecog-
nized issue; almost all of the remainder occupied niches in evolving areas of 
their specialties. Universally, they expressed considerable personal pride and 
satisfaction about their success in amassing resources and developing their 
services in terms of size, reputation, and status. One participant acknowl-
edged, and rationalized, this dual purpose: 
 I think people who say they have never had an ethical dilemma lie or they 
don’t reflect. I’m a little bit in the non-reflecting [group] now because 
I am 100 per cent sure that I would’ve advocated, hopefully for the 
right thing but with somewhere an ulterior motive, and that’s really an 
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94 Siun Gallagher
ethical dilemma, I’m pretty sure. And for me, it’s a very uneasy feeling 
obviously, and I think it comes to the point where I then hope that what 
I achieve to advocate is worth more than what my ulterior motive was, 
to tell yourself, oh, I’ll be OK. 
 While denying that they themselves had confl icts of interest, participants 
argued that it was inevitable that  other doctors who engage in macroalloca-
tion might have some degree of confl ict of interest: 
 Clearly you have to be careful that you’re not self-serving, all right? 
And I guess in medicine like everywhere else, there are a whole heap of 
individuals, some of whom will be out to benefit number one, them-
selves, rather than the system. But apart from being aware of that and 
avoiding that in my own behaviour and trying to be objective and fair, 
I’ve seen that in other people sometimes, and that’s been of concern, but 
that’s how humans are. 
 This sentiment was echoed strongly by other participants, who showed 
disapproval of colleagues who engaged in macroallocation activities for self-
serving reasons—for example, as a means of building an empire or develop-
ing a career: 
 That whole idea that those roles are simply one more step in your career 
I find deeply offensive. Deeply offensive. 
 Although participants thought badly of colleagues who used their macroal-
location roles for personal, career, or other benefi ts, they were less critical 
of people with intellectual biases (i.e. biases stemming from a commitment 
to a particular line of reasoning). In fact, several objected to the practice of 
excluding the views of individuals because of their prior work on a drug, 
device, or service that was under consideration. They considered that intel-
lectual confl ict of interest, even though problematic, was the price that had 
to be paid for expertise: a person ignorant of the detail of the policy area 
would be neither interested in participating nor useful. They believed that 
having a number of different expert voices in the room mitigated the risk of 
a decision being swayed by someone with a confl ict of interest: 
 Conflict of interest. I think where it’s known, I think it’s better to use 
people with—and recognize their conflicts of interest [rather] than just 
to exclude them and have a whole bunch of people that don’t know 
anything about it. 
 Dual Agency 
 A substantial number of the doctors in the sample characterized themselves 
as protectors of the national purse. They were concerned about transparency, 
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accountability, and waste in the health sector. For these doctors, engaging 
with practical matters of distributive justice was a natural response to those 
concerns and a legitimate role for them and for doctors generally, to play. 
 You’re making decisions about allocation of the healthcare dollar in a 
cost-effective and equitable way—so that is, in a way, you’re advocating 
for patients but you’re also advocating nationally for the country—so 
it’s not so much advocacy, but being at the pointy end of the way health 
care dollars are being allocated. 
 They believed in their own capacity to act in society’s interests and were con-
fi dent that, without doctors’ experience and perspectives, decision-making 
would be impossible: 
 So I think that the system needs societal good, all right? And we prob-
ably have enough ego to believe that we can do—we can prescribe what 
that looks like. 
 Dual agency was represented in participants’ experiences of a confl ict 
between their fi duciary duty to individual patients and the macroallocation 
roles they undertook as agents of the state. Some participants described the 
problem at a conceptual level: 
 It’s the classic tension between the public good and the individual good 
and in that setting you can see it. 
 Many more gave accounts of their propensity to advocate for the patients 
under their care, even in situations where they were conscious that their role 
was to provide dispassionate expert advice: 
 Presenting the data, I always had to say I have to declare [that] my con-
flict here is that I really want this drug for my patients, it could make a 
big difference, but obviously they’re costly. 
 Participants fell into two groups in the way they experienced and dealt with 
dual agency. The fi rst declared no diffi culty in separating their roles in mac-
roallocation from their obligations to individual patients. They often spoke 
about the different “hats” they wore for different purposes, or about “com-
partmentalizing” themselves: 
 I think it has to be someone who’s interested in societal health and being 
an advocate for society because you’ve got to switch hats; if you’re a cli-
nician and you’re treating a patient then clearly your role is to advocate 
for that patient and they would quite reasonably not like it if you took 
a societal view, [you] try and get the best you can for that patient, but if 
you’re making decisions you’ve got to put—take that hat off and put a 
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96 Siun Gallagher
different hat on, and most clinicians don’t like doing that; they stay in 
the clinical mould. 
 Well at a personal level, I never found it that—I didn’t feel conflicted 
about it. Because when you’ve got a patient in front of you, what you’re 
doing is, whatever is appropriate for that patient and that’s regardless of 
whether there are resources there or not. You’d go and get the resources 
if you can, or use everything that’s available to you. At a policy level, 
you’re looking at more generic broader issues and I don’t think—again 
I don’t think that’s in conflict with doing everything you can for the 
patient or everything appropriate for the patient in front of you. 
 The second group actively sought to serve the interests of their specialty’s 
patients whilst engaged with macroallocation tasks on behalf of the state: 
 But each person would make different contributions in different fields. 
The oncologist would be very much advocating for oncology patients 
and tending to push the idea that that would get through. I would be 
tending to push the idea that [drugs relevant to my specialty] should get 
up, although sometimes I didn’t think they should. 
 Participants in this group believed favouring one’s own specialty was a nec-
essary evil, reasoning that a totally disinterested person would not engage in 
deliberations about policy or contribute meaningfully: 
 Supposedly at that time I was working for the government, but yeah, I 
was making sure that we got a good deal for the people I was kind of 
advocating for because why else would I be on it? So I had dual purpose 
but trying to work in with their regulations. So I don’t know. I didn’t 
feel badly about it. 
 Some participants were critical of colleagues with medico-political role con-
fl icts, which were evident when doctors advanced medical professional 
concerns—for example, enhancing doctors’ remuneration levels and pro-
tecting professional “turf”—in parallel with or instead of the societal inter-
ests to which they were expected to restrict their contributions. 
 Managing Role-Related Conflict 
 Participants understood the constraints on their influence in the deliberative 
processes in which they engaged and were confident that the bureaucratic 
and political procedures surrounding decision-making could correctly man-
age conflicts of interest and dual agency. One participant, an advisor to a 
wide range of local and national policy processes, expressed succinctly a 
theme that was strongly present throughout the data—“Even if it’s not an 
outcome I agree with, if the process is fair then I’m happy with that.” 
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 The plurality of views taken into account in macroallocation was held 
by some to be a safeguard against opinions motivated by conflicts holding 
sway: 
 And probably you deal with it by having a few experts, because even if 
they have conflicts they’re undoubtedly going to be different conflicts, 
and they’ll have different perspectives, and you can’t get two experts to 
agree on very much anyway. 
 Participants indicated satisfaction with the common strategies used for 
managing confl icts—declarations of confl icts of interest, transparency, and 
self-monitoring—although most considered that such strategies were not 
implemented with suffi cient rigour. Participants also reported that doctors 
engaged in self-policing strategies, such as weeding out peers who pursued 
medico-political or ideological goals and calling out colleagues who bla-
tantly or consistently offered partisan arguments: 
 I think, probably for everyone to be open to that idea about themselves 
and others and to call it more and say, “hang on, mate, that seems a bit 
sectoral.” So, I think honesty in our exchanges—like most of us have 
got a pretty good antenna for this sort of stuff and you can hear the 
corporate speak and the—it’s all over the place. 
 Discussion 
 The data in this study showed that both conflicts of interest and dual agency 
were features of macroallocation practice: in the technical expert role, 
agency on behalf of society had the potential to conflict with doctors’ per-
sonal goals for career and financial advancement and with their duties to the 
patients and patient groups for which they were responsible as clinicians, 
lending support to the claims made in the theoretical and empirical litera-
tures about the phenomenon of role-related conflicts in priority setting. 
 However, doctors did not view these phenomena as ethically relevant at 
a personal level. Few of the doctors recognized their own conflicts of inter-
est or appreciated the claims such conflicts make on medical virtue and 
procedural justice. This was predictable, because it is a property of conflict 
of interest that those it affects underestimate both its potential to influence 
their choices ( Klugman 2017 ;  DuBois 2017 ) and the difficulties involved in 
managing it ( Mayes, Lipworth, and Kerridge 2016 ). 
 It was surprising, however, that respondents also were insensitive to the 
risk associated with dual agency, even though the phenomenon was highly 
visible to them: those who claimed facility in giving primacy to societal 
interests and those who knowingly tried to achieve benefits for both patients 
and society were equally confident in the defensibility and success of their 
chosen approach. 
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 Importantly, neither of these conflicts weighed on participants as ethical 
issues or caused them moral unease. Although these doctors were concerned 
about the justice of the decisions in which they were involved—and disap-
proved of the impact of others’ conflicts on the conduct and outcomes of 
priority setting processes—they had few intimations that their own behav-
iours might be transgressive or that their behaviours might be viewed as 
such by others. This finding suggests that if we are to continue to conceptu-
alize role-related conflicts in resource allocation as a problem, we need to be 
more specific about how and by whom the problem is experienced and its 
consequences felt. That is, the data do not support the idea that role-related 
conflict troubles doctors at the level of their internal professional ethical 
landscapes. This finding runs counter to the ethics frameworks that have 
been advanced to address the perceived problem. 
 It is common for codes of medical ethics and scholars writing in this area 
to assume that the technical expert role entails, at least to some extent, acting 
on behalf of patients or causes, and, thereby to conceptualize expert advice-
giving as a form of physician advocacy ( Bagshaw and Barnett 2017 ;  Gruen, 
Campbell, and Blumenthal 2006 ). A prominent thread in this study showed 
that many doctors strongly identified with being an agent of society, rather 
than a patient advocate, when engaging in macroallocation. The plurality 
of motivations and values shown by participants suggests that the expert 
advisor role does not fit neatly under the “physician advocacy” umbrella. 
Continuing to conflate the two may risk perpetuating misunderstandings 
about the function of the technical expert in policymaking. Further disam-
biguation of the concepts of “expert” and “advocate” in this setting would 
be helpful to those seeking to define medical professionalism and offer ethi-
cal guidance to doctors. 
 This study’s other salient finding was participants’ confidence that the 
social processes of macroallocation would effectively manage role-related 
conflicts. The doctors in this study were willing participants in and keen sup-
porters of the standard mitigation strategies for conflict of interest, which are 
largely focused on financial conflicts ( Lo and Field 2009 ); they were critical 
when these strategies were imperfectly implemented and took action to curtail 
the partisanship of others. Conflicts were not suffered internally, or hidden; 
rather, they were displayed openly so that they could be viewed, evaluated, 
and responded to by the other participants in the process. This pattern sug-
gests that participants had a sophisticated understanding of the social role of 
“expert” within the practical world of policymaking. Their recognition of the 
communitarian aims of macroallocation and conceptualization of role-related 
conflicts at the collective, rather than the individual, level enabled them to 
cede to the group the responsibility for managing the impact of conflicts on 
the fairness of resource distributions. This legitimization of the power of the 
group opens up opportunities for defining the problem of role-related conflict 
and exploring its implications and management in a social context. 
 On the basis of these findings, it can be hypothesized that doctors who 
engage in macroallocation experience role-related conflict not as a problem 
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of professional ethics but as a normal part of the social process of priority set-
ting. Thus, in health systems that are, at least in part, regulated and funded by 
government, doctors’ professional positioning as parts of institutions may set 
the scene for their recognition of macroallocation as a cooperative endeav-
our and its problems as social phenomena that require a collective response. 
 Mitigation strategies for dual agency usually take as their starting point the 
doctor as an individual, who must navigate an internal landscape in which 
duty to the patient is pitted against duty to the community and those who 
have commissioned the doctor’s advice. The most compelling approach that 
has yet been offered to the problem of dual agency relies on role ethics, in 
which duty to society is assigned to specific medical roles. Doctors may 
occupy these roles from time to time, as needed ( Tilburt 2014 ), or the roles 
may be assigned to selected doctors, who will occupy them continuously 
on behalf of others ( Tilburt and Brody 2016 ). Its critics claim, broadly, that 
“that’s not how things work” and that, for a doctor in this position, accept-
ing the “complex algorithm” that is professionalism may be the only way 
to reconcile competing commitments ( Ubel 2014 ;  Ross and Bernabeo 2014 ; 
 Wasserman and Wertheimer 2014 ). 
 This demonstration of doctors’ deficiency in the reflexivity necessary for 
discerning and responding at a personal level to role-related conflict lends 
weight to the arguments of those who are sceptical about the potential of 
role ethics to offer a solution to dual agency. In addition, the findings dem-
onstrating the value doctors place on the social processes of macroallocation 
that safeguard procedural fairness lend support to traditional oversight-
based approaches to conflict of interest. Together, these findings suggest that 
the preoccupation in the medical ethics literature with the doctor’s interior 
ethical landscape may be ill founded and that the problem and its solutions 
lie in the social world. 
 Medical ethical frameworks founded on communitarian principles might, 
thus, better illuminate the problem than physician-centred frameworks 
such as role ethics and virtue ethics that rely on doctors’ self-awareness and 
reflexivity. Practical solutions to the ethical challenges inherent in the tech-
nical expert role might be found in institutional approaches that focus on 
safeguarding procedural justice through transparency and external checks 
and balances and encompass all professional disciplines. An example of 
a system that would lend itself to this purpose is the “accountability for 
reasonableness” (A4R) ethical framework ( Daniels and Sabin 1997 ). The 
framework’s four conditions—relevance, publicity or transparency, the pos-
sibility of appeals and revision, and regulative/enforcement mechanisms—
support the operationalization of fairness in macroallocation. 
 Implications for Practice 
 If the problems of dual agency and conflict of interest do not trouble doc-
tors who engage in macroallocation, ethical approaches that are premised 
on resolution of physician ethical unease are unnecessary. They also can be a 
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distraction from the true ethical problem of how the collective of individuals 
involved in macroallocation processes might best discharge its responsibili-
ties for procedural justice. Medical ethics scholars might, therefore, consider 
broadening the scope of their enquiry to acknowledge the social nature of 
macroallocation. 
 Codes of medical ethics that enjoin doctors to take up opportunities to 
engage in resource allocation are often criticized for failing to provide the 
action guide that will enable doctors who do so to reconcile the competing 
commitments it entails. An approach to filling this gap that would be con-
sistent with these findings would be for the codes to (1) promote sensitivity 
to context ( Ross and Bernabeo 2014 ), (2) encourage doctors to become 
familiar with and recognize the qualities of pluralistic policy development 
models and their participants ( Cassel 1985 ), and (3) emphasize the need to 
approach the task with humility and collegiality. 
 At a practical level, macroallocation institutions might draw comfort from 
these data showing doctors’ appetite for procedural approaches to the man-
agement of role-related conflict and redouble their efforts in implementing 
frameworks designed to safeguard procedural justice at a holistic level. 
 Conclusion 
 As perhaps the first study to describe the role-related conflicts encountered 
by doctors when engaging in macroallocation as technical experts, these 
findings confirm the long theorized problems of conflict of interest and dual 
agency. Interestingly, doctors in this sample constructed role-related conflict 
not as a challenge to medical professional ethics but as part of the social 
process of priority setting. Although participants showed an underdevel-
oped appreciation of the threats these conflicts pose to medical virtue and 
procedural justice, they were confident that the institution of macroalloca-
tion would protect them and the community from significant harm. 
 The common tendency to construct role-related conflict as a professional 
ethics matter and to seek solutions in medical virtue and role ethics is not 
supported by this analysis. That doctors conceptualize the problem as exist-
ing in the social, rather than internal, world suggests that procedural justice 
ethics frameworks may offer both a more fertile setting for the explora-
tion of the ethical implications of role-related conflicts and a more viable 
approach to safeguarding distributive justice in priority setting from its 
consequences. 
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Chapter Eight: Theory supporting the discussion 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Eight Part 1: Introduction 
 
 
 
In order to provide theoretical background that is relevant to the Discussion chapter of 
this thesis, in this chapter I describe virtue ethics and the ethics of Paul Ricoeur. 
Virtue ethics guided my view as the interaction between data and theory proceeded 
during data collection, and Ricoeur’s ‘little ethics’ emerged in the final stages of my 
analysis for Chapters Four and Five (Skills and Values) as the framing of virtue ethics 
that had best fit with my data.  
  
In Chapter Two, Methodology and Methods, I described how I used GMA first to 
identify ethical insights in the data and form tentative theories and, second, to explore 
these tentative theories with participants with the intention of arriving at empirically 
derived, normatively relevant conclusions. The process and its outcomes are 
summarised in the following paragraph.  
 
Analysis of the data from my early participants revealed strong, shared ethical 
insights that tapped into themes of virtue ethics, particularly practical wisdom, justice, 
moderation, and the virtues of self-efficacy. Following the principles of GMA, I 
developed the later iterations of my interview schedule to explore these tentative 
theoretical categories, and ultimately established that notions of virtue offered a 
persuasive account of the moral significance of the doctor’s role in macroallocation, 
and of doctors’ intuitions about the skills needed to be effective in the role. 
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Throughout the research, I read widely to broaden my knowledge of virtue ethics and 
ideas of medical virtue. In order to finalise my analysis, I sought a framing of virtue 
ethics that would be helpful in drawing together the particular constellation of virtues 
my participants considered to be important in macroallocation work. I found this in 
Ricoeur’s ‘little ethics’, an ethics system in the virtue ethics tradition, which is 
encapsulated in ‘aiming at the “good life” lived with and for others, in just 
institutions’. Ricoeur’s treatment of just institutions as fundamental to the constitution 
of the ethical subject (Ricœur, 2007, p. 234) and his comprehensive exposition of 
practical reason resonated strongly with the prominence in my data of the notion of 
the institution as an enabler of human flourishing and suggested that Ricoeur’s ‘little 
ethics’ might serve as an ethical framework that had both explanatory and normative 
power for medical involvement in macroallocation.  
 
In this chapter I first briefly describe and evaluate virtue ethics in order to provide a 
foundation for my description of Ricoeur’s 20th century virtue ethics variant. I then 
provide an overview of Ricoeur’s ‘little ethics’ and his work on medical ethics. I also 
mention the work of scholars who have applied Ricoeur’s ethics to nonclinical 
problems in medicine and health care.
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Chapter Eight Part 2: Virtue ethics 
 
 
 
8.2.1 Introduction 
In this section, I outline the major ethical theories that hold sway in the fields of 
medicine and health care, the Aristotelian concept of virtue, the main features of 20th 
century conceptualisations of virtue ethics, and some of the arguments concerning its 
validity as a system of ethics that supports medicine and health care. I focus on 
aspects that are relevant to my data and to the discussion that will follow in Chapter 9.  
 
Ethics is ‘the study of what should be done’ (Kerridge, Lowe, & Stewart, 2013, p. 1).  
Ethical theories assist us in understanding the moral basis of our decisions and guide 
us in selecting ethical courses of action (Kerridge et al., 2013, p. 8). The three major 
ethical theories in moral philosophy are deontology, consequentialism, and virtue 
ethics. According to consequentialist theory, the moral worth of an action is 
determined by its consequences, or intended consequences (Hare, 2012, p. 85); the 
premise of deontology is that actions are right or wrong ‘in and of themselves’ and 
confer upon the actor a ‘binding duty’ (Kerridge et al., 2013, p. 8); virtue ethics, I 
shall discuss below. There are, in addition, several other significant frameworks, of 
which principlism and care ethics are the ones that are most frequently employed to 
support ethical reasoning in the health care setting.  
 
All ethical theories are imperfect, especially in their applicability to real-life 
situations, and they are often in conflict; nonetheless, they may usefully be drawn on 
individually or in combination to guide ethical reasoning, or at the very least make it 
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transparent (Kerridge et al., 2013, p. 30). Bioethicists tend to reject the notion of 
‘applying’ ethical theory, and prefer to consider it in parallel with other non-rational 
dimensions of decision-making (Rachels, 2012, p. 15).  
 
Virtue ethics, which concerns the advocacy of the virtues (Crisp, 1996, p. 5), has its 
origins in the ‘Nicomachean Ethics’ of Aristotle (384-322 BCE). It fell from 
prominence following the Enlightenment, in the face of the primacy of deontological 
(largely Kantian) and consequentialist ethical models, but was reintroduced as a 
framework for moral analysis in the late 20th century (Hursthouse & Pettigrove, 
2016). Virtue ethics garnered particular attention in bioethics, where rules-based 
systems had been found by some scholars and practitioners to be insufficiently 
flexible to accommodate the contingencies of medicine and health care (Kerridge et 
al., 2013, p. 14).  
 
Virtue ethics is concerned with the question of character, rather than rules, and with 
the question of what to be, rather than what to do. Practical summaries of virtue ethics 
that are intended to guide action generally follow this type of formulation: ‘An action 
is right if and only if it is what an agent with a virtuous character would, acting in 
character, do in the circumstances’ (Hursthouse, 1999, p. 28), and it is generally taken 
that both the action and the disposition need to be in play for an act to be ‘what a 
virtuous agent would do’ (Oakley, 2012, p. 93). In practice, virtue ethics aids ethical 
decision making by promoting reflection on what a virtuous person would do in a 
given circumstance (British Medical Association, 2012). 
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8.2.2 Aristotle’s ‘Nicomachean Ethics’  
The ‘Nicomachean Ethics’ is Aristotle’s attempt at answering the question: How 
should we live? It is founded on his assumptions that humans have a distinctive 
function, or ergon, and that human life has a foundational purpose (Gellera & 
Thompson, 2017). The function Aristotle assigns to man is rational activity, and the 
purpose, eudaimonia. Eudaimonia is often translated as ‘flourishing’, well-being, or 
‘excellence’ (Hursthouse & Pettigrove, 2016). It signifies living an objectively 
desirable life and actualising one’s potential as a human being. Treating others well is 
a by-product of our desire to be a good example of a human being. The achievement 
of the state of eudaimonia demands virtuous action, ‘excellence of character’, and the 
capacity to engage in phronesis. Phronesis, generally translated as practical wisdom, 
means the ability to discern the meaning of situations and respond appropriately.  
 
Aristotle was concerned with understanding the type of person who would achieve 
eudaimonia and the kind of society that might nurture it. On the basis of study of 
earlier thinkers and observation of life, Aristotle claimed that good and successful 
people possess in common distinct moral and intellectual virtues, and that the degree 
to which we possess the moral virtues affects our capacity to achieve eudaimonia 
(Hursthouse & Pettigrove, 2016). He also acknowledged that our material and other 
life circumstances play a part in enabling us to pursue virtuous actions (Gellera & 
Thompson, 2017).  
 
Aristotle believed that the intellectual virtues could be learned. He held that the moral 
virtues were developed during early training and cultivated throughout life through 
habituation to virtuous action, in the manner of learning a craft. Through habituation 
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we learn how to enjoy acting virtuously, for its own sake, rather than for the end of 
flourishing, and we internalise the doing of virtuous actions so that they become part 
of who we are (Rozier, 2016). Aristotle counselled that we should develop the 
capacity to identify the virtues in order to be able to nurture them in ourselves and 
honour those who possess them.  
 
Aristotle’s definition of a virtue is ‘the disposition that makes one a good man and 
causes him to perform his function well’ (2004, 1106a-b20). Dispositions are 
beneficial features of character that determine our action in particular circumstances. 
In virtue ethics, the morality of actions flows from their origin in the virtue of the 
actor rather than from the result of the action. 
 
The Aristotelian virtues represent the ‘golden mean’ – or middle way – between pairs 
of vices, or extremes of character, of which a surfeit is undesirable. The virtues of 
justice, temperance, and courage are prominent in Aristotle’s list of virtues, which 
also includes liberality, magnificence (meaning holding wealth and possessions), 
magnanimity, pride, patience, truthfulness, wittiness, friendliness, and modesty 
(Hursthouse & Pettigrove, 2016; Warburton, 2014, pp. 67-70).  
 
For Aristotle, ethics is a practical subject that involves tailoring actions to 
circumstances rather than applying general rules. The virtue that facilitates this is 
phronesis, or practical wisdom. Aristotle sets out his idea of phronesis as an 
intellectual virtue in Book 6 of the ‘Nicomachean Ethics’. It signifies the capacity of 
being able to discern, in any situation, the most beneficial course of action (Pellegrino 
& Thomasma, 1993, p. 84). Aristotle justifies the place of phronesis amongst the 
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virtues on the basis that we need this capability in order to be sensitive to the 
requirements of particular situations, locate the golden mean, and select virtuous 
actions (Hursthouse, 2006, p. 103). Phronesis has a special relevance to the 
professional context and has been widely studied in relation to the profession of 
medicine, most notably by Pellegrino and Thomasma (1993), and, recently, by 
Russell, Greenhalgh, Byrne, and McDonnell (2008) and Kotzee, Paton, and Conroy 
(2016). 
 
Aristotle and thinkers who follow in his tradition regard participation in political life 
as essential to the good life, not for its potential to bring about good ends, but as an 
end in itself (Tholen, 2018).  
 
8.2.3 Modern conceptions of virtue ethics 
Reinvigoration of virtue ethics was first advocated by Elizabeth Anscombe, in her 
1958 article ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, which challenged the validity of pseudo-
legalistic moralities drawn from Christianity in the modern, secular era (Crisp, 1996, 
p. 2). Anscombe was also reacting to other deficiencies in deontological and 
teleological ethical theories: their focus on what one ought to do, rather than on what 
sort of life one should live, their abstractness, and their inability to guide action in 
concrete situations; in bioethics the shortcomings of principle-based ethics was also a 
factor driving interest in this approach (Oakley, 2012, p. 99). Anscombe’s arguments 
in favour of a revival of virtue in ethics were taken up in the 1980s and 1990s by other 
scholars, notably Philippa Foot, Rosalind Hursthouse, and Alasdair MacIntyre 
(Blamey & Thompson, 2017, p. 49). During the same period, Paul Ricoeur developed 
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his ‘little ethics’ on a conception of virtue ethics that was firmly tethered to its 
Aristotelian origins. 
 
The Scottish philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre was the most influential of the post-
Anscombe proponents of Aristotelian virtue. He claimed that, by not recognising a 
telos for human life, post-Enlightenment moral frameworks failed to support people in 
identifying the good, and thereby stymied the chances of reaching agreement in 
private and political life; recognition that human life had a purpose and reinstatement 
of the virtues were needed for restoration of moral meaning (Thompson, 2017). 
MacIntyre recognised the important role institutions play in enabling realisation of the 
internal and external goods of practices (Tholen, 2018). The significance of action in 
the polis to the achievement of the good life was also prominent in the work of 
Hannah Arendt’s ‘The Human Condition’ (1958).   
 
Martha Nussbaum is contemporary philosopher whose work in virtue ethics has had 
far-reaching impact. Her capabilities approach to welfare, rooted in the notion of 
flourishing, represents an original formulation of virtue ethics, which has been applied 
in many practical contexts, including in the United Nations’ Human Development 
Index (Blamey & Thompson, 2017, p. 68; Robeyns, 2016).  
 
It is a defining feature of modern conceptualisations of virtue ethics that motive and 
rightness are connected (Oakley, 2012, p. 94): an action motivated by altruism is more 
‘right’ than the same action motivated by duty alone. Another feature of virtue ethics 
is its amenability to plurality: more than one virtue may be pertinent to any given 
situation, and virtuous actors might choose one of a number of equally virtuous 
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courses of action (Oakley, 2012, p. 95). Many virtue ethics scholars, especially those 
in bioethics, link the Aristotelian virtues and the notion of a flourishing life, although 
a number use different conceptualisations of virtue – such as common sense morality 
(Crisp, 1996, pp. 14-16) – which may or may not be connected to their potential to 
engender eudaimonia (Oakley, 2012, p. 96). 
 
Formulations of virtue specific to the field of medicine have been plentiful (Kotzee et 
al., 2016). Most notable is that of Pellegrino and Thomasma (1993), who advance an 
extensive and demanding compilation of physician virtues: fidelity to trust, 
compassion, phronesis – which they consider to be of central importance – justice, 
fortitude, temperance, integrity, and self-effacement. In the values based medicine 
movement (VBM), Little, Lipworth, Gordon, Markham, and Kerridge (2012) have 
claimed for ‘flourishing’ the status of foundational value for medicine. Virtue ethics 
has been rarely explored, however, in the field of public health and health care fields 
that address people in aggregate (Rozier, 2016), or in the field of justice in health 
care, such as resource allocation (Oakley, 2013, pp. 237-241). 
 
8.2.4 Criticisms of virtue ethics approaches in health and medicine 
In the context of examining the relevance of Aristotle’s virtue ethics to contemporary 
life, scholars have taken issue with several of its aspects, including: 1) Aristotle’s 
foundational assumptions about the existence or character of ‘human nature’ and the 
existence or nature of the human function, 2) the hierarchy of values he proposes, 3) 
the difficulty in identifying the apposite virtue for a given situation, 4) the 
arbitrariness of the virtues, which seem to be rooted in their time, 5) the unimportance 
of virtue relative to situational variation and 6) its focus on the individual, rather than 
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on society, a claim that is countered by recognising the effect of virtues on promoting 
the good of other individuals and, hence, society (Oakley, 2012, pp. 99-102; 
Warburton, 2014, pp. 67-70).  
 
Virtue ethics approaches have also been criticised for their inadequacy in 
circumstances where individuals have interests that need greater protection than 
reliance on the virtue of others can guarantee, and for the dangerous consequences 
that might arise from prioritisation of one set of virtues over another (Kerridge et al., 
2013, p. 15). The association of ‘rightness’ with virtue has also come under question 
on the basis that thoroughly virtuous people may, arguably, make mistakes; for this 
reason, some theorists claim that virtue ethics needs to be supported in its application 
by rule based criteria (Oakley, 2012, p. 101).  
 
The most significant and widely discussed criticisms are that the exhortation to act 
and decide as one who is wise and virtuous would do is circular and exposes the 
vagueness of the framework when it comes to prescribing right action (Kerridge et al., 
2013, p. 15; Oakley, 2012, p. 99; Pellegrino & Thomasma, 1993, p. 18), and that 
virtue ethics is incapable of codifying principles to guide action, an objection that has 
been documented, and contested, by Hursthouse and Pettigrove (2016) and Oakley 
(2013, p. 198), amongst others. Oakley (2013, p. 198), for his part, instances the 
success of virtue ethics in addressing several practical problems in the field of 
bioethics, and claims that each virtue incorporates a ‘regulative ideal’ or standard, 
which the subject endeavours to attain via motivations and acts (Oakley, 2013, p. 
206). New Zealand philosopher Rosalind Hursthouse (1999) offers a comprehensive 
rebuttal, which includes a rule-of-thumb formulation of virtuous actions, which she 
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terms ‘v-rules’, for use in any circumstance requiring an ethical determination. They 
are generated by the virtues and vices, and are secondary to acceptance of the notion 
of a virtuous person; an example of a v-rule is ‘do what is honest, not what is 
dishonest’ (Hursthouse, 1999, p. 80). Hursthouse claims that this confers on virtue 
ethics the normative relevance required for it to take its place beside, or even exceed, 
deontological and utilitarian approaches in terms of utility to practice.  
 
A final criticism – one that is particularly relevant to this thesis – is that it neglects the 
importance of social and political factors, to which the standard rebuttal is that the 
virtues are invoked most frequently in situations that require us to focus on what 
should be done for other people. Lawrence Blum (1996, pp. 232-233), drawing on the 
essential communitarian features of both Aristotle’s and MacIntyre’s ideas of virtue, 
amplifies this rebuttal. He sets out six links between virtue and community, drawn 
from MacIntyre and other virtue scholars:  
 
• Learning: Virtues need to be learned in communities 
• Sustaining: We require a community in which to exercise and sustain our 
morality 
• Agency-constituting: Our moral identity is partly constituted by the 
communities to which we belong 
• Content-providing: We require communities to stimulate us to respond to our 
principles 
• Worth-conferring: Our ideas of what is virtuous are determined by the 
community in which we live 
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• Virtues sustaining community: some virtues support community life in 
general. 
 
 His purpose in presenting the list is to demonstrate the degree to which virtue and the 
social sphere interact and, ultimately, to form a perspective on the communal 
generation of moralities that are shared by members of a community.  
A more recent theorisation of the potential of virtue ethics in the social context is 
Michael Rozier’s (2016) ‘structures of virtue’, a virtue ethics approach to population 
level structural problems that relates the virtues to public health objectives, desirable 
social norms, and structural interventions.  
 
8.2.5 Conclusion 
Virtue ethics’ historical and contemporary formulations have potential as alternative 
or adjunctive approaches to Kantian and utilitarian models of ethical reasoning in the 
field of medicine and health care. Whilst virtue ethics has been criticised for 
vagueness and circularity, contemporary scholarship, especially that of Rosalind 
Hursthouse, suggests that its limiting features are similar in nature and degree to those 
of the other ethics frameworks medicine commonly relies on, and that its application 
can be made practical through rules-of-thumb that confer on the virtues a normative 
character. Recent insights into the links between the virtues and the social world and 
into their relevance to non-clinical aspects of medicine are promising, but further 
theoretical and empirical work is needed to explore their potential in these settings. 
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The ‘little ethics’ of Paul Ricoeur, to which I turn in the next section, has its 
foundation in Aristotelian concepts of virtue and connects with modern conceptions 
of virtue ethics.  
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Chapter Eight Part 3: The ethics of Paul Ricoeur 
 
 
 
8.3.1 Introduction 
In this section I present a general overview of Ricoeur’s ‘little ethics’ and his work on 
medical ethics. I then outline the ideas that have particular relevance to my data, 
analysis, and conclusions.  
 
8.3.2 Brief biography of Paul Ricoeur 
Paul Ricoeur was born in Valance, France in 1913. Following the death of his mother 
shortly after his birth, and his father 2 years later, he and his sister were brought up by 
their paternal grandparents and, later, an aunt in Rennes (Pellauer & Dauenhauer, 
2016). His family’s protestant religion played a strong role in his upbringing and 
influenced his life and work (Pellauer & Dauenhauer, 2016, p. 4; Reagan, 1996).  
 
He studied philosophy, initially at the University of Rennes, and then at the Sorbonne 
in Paris, where he encountered his ‘intellectual hero’ philosopher Gabriel Marcel 
(Simms, 2003, p. 3), who would have a strong influence on his life and work (Reagan, 
1996, p. 6). During these years, he became a pacifist and a socialist (Reagan, 1996, p. 
6), and developed his interest in the relationship between philosophy and Christian 
faith (Simms, 2003, p. 3), both themes he explored throughout his life.  
 
On the basis of his performance in competitive examinations, in 1935 he qualified for 
postings to provincial universities, which he occupied between that year and 1940, 
when he was called up for military service in the second world war (Simms, 2003, p. 
3). He was decorated for valour (Clark, 2010), before serving 5 years as a prisoner of 
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war in the company of other intellectuals and academics, during which time he 
translated Husserl’s book ‘Ideas’ into French and studied the work of Karl Jaspers 
(Pellauer & Dauenhauer, 2016).  
 
After the war, he spent several years in provincial academic posts in France, before 
being appointed lecturer, then professor, of the history of philosophy at the University 
of Strasbourg. He was awarded a PhD in 1950 on the basis of the first part of his own 
work ‘Philosophy of the Will’ and his translation of Husserl. In 1956, he was 
appointed to the chair of general philosophy at the Sorbonne (Simms, 2003, p. 3).  
 
Having been a vocal critic of the French university system, in 1965 he joined the new 
University of Paris at Nanterre, occupying the role of Dean of the Faculty of Letters 
during the student uprising of 1968 (Reagan, 1996, pp. 31-41). On one occasion, he 
called on the police to restore order on campus, provoking a riot that resulted in costly 
property damage and harm to Ricoeur’s reputation (Simms, 2003, p. 4).  
 
He resigned from Nanterre in despair (Reagan, n.d.) and spent the years 1970 to 1982 
in academic posts in the US and Canada, in what amounted to voluntary exile (Clark, 
2010), resuming a connection with Nanterre in 1973 (Simms, 2003, p. 4). During this 
time he worked on hermeneutics and on his influential trilogy, ‘Time and Narrative’, 
published during the years 1983 to1985. This work re-established him as an important 
figure in French intellectual life (Reagan, 1996, p. 48).  
 
Although he retired from the French university system in 1980, and from his US 
appointments in 1991, he continued to write on a range of topics in philosophy, 
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theology, and politics. During this time and throughout his career, he worked to 
enforce a separation between his work in philosophy and his faith (Reagan, n.d.) In 
1990, he published ‘Oneself as Another’, an investigation of identity, which contains 
his ‘little ethics’ and, in 1995 and 2002 respectively, his works on theories of justice: 
‘The Just” and ‘Reflections on the Just’ (Simms, 2003, p. 4). During these years he 
was outspoken in favour of social tolerance in France (Reagan, n.d.).  
  
Paul Ricoeur spent the late portion of his life back at the heart of French and 
European intellectual life (Clark, 2010) and was the recipient of many formal honours 
(Pellauer & Dauenhauer, 2016). He died in France, on May 20, 2005. 
 
Ricoeur’s work follows in the hermeneutical tradition established by Martin 
Heidegger and Wilhelm Dilthey. He was also formatively influenced by the 
existentialist approach of Gabriel Marcel and Karl Jaspers, and by Jurgen Habermas’s 
critique of ideology (Blundell, 2010).  
 
8.3.3 Ricoeur’s ‘little ethics’ 
Overview  
Ricoeur’s ethics – encapsulated in the ethical intention of ‘the “good life” lived with 
and for others in just institutions’ – is grounded in his work on hermeneutics and 
narrative identity. Based on his 1986 Gifford Lectures, in which he explored the 
notion of the ‘capable person’, the ‘little ethics’ was published initially in his book 
‘Oneself as Another’ (1992) and elaborated in his later writings, including 
‘Reflections on The Just’ (2007). At the heart of Ricoeur’s work in ethics is an 
acknowledgement of the inevitability of conflict between humans and of our failure to 
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‘realise genuine human community’ (O’Dwyer, 2009). Ricoeur is optimistic, 
however, about the possibility of reconciling the tension between the ‘self’ and the 
‘other’ through acceptance of difference and plurality, and engagement in practical 
communitarian projects. Disposition and solicitude – reflecting one’s regard for the 
‘other’ as another ‘self’ – rather than duty, motivate the subject’s actions (Ricœur, 
2007, p. 68).  
 
A form of virtue ethics, Ricoeur’s ethics seeks to describe what constitutes a good life 
– which he also terms an ‘accomplished life’ (Ricœur, 1992, p. 170) – and what it 
means to be a good person (Simms, 2003, p. 101). Thus, for Ricoeur, ethics has 
primacy over morality (Ricœur, 1992, p. 170), and solicitude primacy over duty. 
Ricoeur’s idea of ‘the good life’ draws on the Aristotelian concept of eudaimonia, or 
flourishing, and his notion of the just institution is founded on Aristotle’s concept of 
phronesis, or practical wisdom. His notion of ‘living with and for others’ reflects the 
subject’s relationship of reciprocity and mutuality with other people (Ricœur, 1992, p. 
194), recognises that the life of each ‘other’ is as significant as one’s own, and 
embraces a ‘social ontology of solicitude, care, promising, and accountability’ (de 
Leeuw, 2016, p. 35).  
 
Ricoeur’s ethics is teleological: the aim of human life is self-esteem. Self-esteem is 
expressed as the need to approve one’s own existence and be approved of by others, 
and entails ‘personal pride about being oneself’ (Ricœur, 2007, p. 203). In Ricoeur’s 
ethics the subject’s aim of a ‘good life’ includes virtuous actions, which, when 
interpreted (favorably) by the subject, become self-esteem at the ethical level 
(Ricœur, 1992, p. 177). As with virtue ethics, living well includes meeting the 
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standards of excellence of one’s profession (Ricœur, 2007, p. 176). Ricoeur’s ethics 
culminates in testimony or attestation (de Leeuw, 2016), that is, being able to identify 
oneself with right actions undertaken in the service of others (Flaming, 2006; Simms, 
2003, p. 107) 
 
What distinguishes Ricoeur’s ethics from other virtue ethics systems is its treatment 
of ‘just institutions’ as a fundamental component of a good life (Ricœur, 2007, p. 
234). For Ricoeur, the concept of ‘the just’, which is assigned the meaning ‘equitable’ 
(Ricœur, 2000, p. xxiv), pervades all human actions (Ricœur, 2007, p. 234).  
Neither Ricoeur’s ‘little ethics’ nor his work on medical ethics has been widely 
referenced in the biomedical literature (Fiasse, 2012; Potvin, 2010). 
 
The self and the other in ‘Oneself as Another’ 
‘Oneself as Another’ is concerned with both identity and ethics, being impelled 
towards the latter by the implications of the former. The title of the book reflects the 
progression therein of Ricoeur’s thought from considerations of the nature of the self, 
through the relation between the self and others, to the ethical import of these 
considerations in the social world. In brief, it is founded on the notion that the 
consequence of the existence of any self that is worthy of self-esteem is that other 
selves must be equally valuable, and on that basis, solicitude and right actions must be 
extended to each other, individually and in the social context (Hohler, 2000), via 
shared projects of distributive justice, in just institutions. Plurality is, thus, intrinsic to 
the actions for and with others – such as phronetic deliberation – that form the 
foundation of the self-esteem that Ricoeur claims is the telos of the good life. 
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The three levels of the ethical intention of ‘the “good life”, lived with and for others, 
in just institutions’ might be summarised as self-esteem, solicitude, and participative 
justice. To understand the relationship between the self and the other that supports this 
aim, it is helpful to refer to the writings of Belgian-Australian philosopher Marc de 
Leeuw. According to de Leeuw (2016) the basis of Ricoeur’s ethics is ‘a social 
ontology of solicitude, care, promising, and accountability, anchored in the 
acknowledgment of one’s own and others’ otherness’. It is the otherness of others that 
stimulates our capabilities and enables an active response on our part. De Leeuw 
identifies ‘the ontological dissymmetry between self and others’, that is, our 
individuality in the face of our common humanity, as the foundation for social 
recognition, which, in turn, stimulates the need for solicitude and just institutions (De 
Leeuw, 2017).  
 
Nietzsche, Hegel, Levinas, and Lacan had each offered approaches to defining the self 
through the other. Ricoeur’s work is closest to Nietzsche’s, drawing on the latter’s 
insight into the importance to us of others’ opinions of us in order to explore the 
relationship between identity and recognition, and the implications of this relationship 
for how we must perceive the other (O’Dwyer, 2009). Recognition is central to 
Ricoeur’s concept of the self’s relation with the other: ‘I actively recognise things, 
persons, myself; I ask, even demand, to be recognised by others’ (Ricœur, 2007, p. x). 
Recognising one’s self through one’s capabilities – to speak, act, promise, for 
example – entails, of necessity, entanglement with others, whom we must recognise 
and esteem if we are to esteem ourselves. We maintain our self-identity through 
making promises to others and accounting for our actions (De Leeuw, 2017).  
According to de Leeuw (2017), in Ricœur’s ethics, solicitude, reciprocity and 
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friendship constitute the relation between the self and the other and, together, invoke 
mutuality. It is in mutuality that the essence of recognition resides: each ‘other’ is 
‘another me’ and their value is, therefore, equal to mine. Out of this realisation both 
self-esteem and care for the other spring. Ricoeur sees in the mutuality of self-esteem 
‘the primordial reflexive moment of the aim of the good life’ (Ricœur, 1992, p. 188), 
and he traces through mutual self-esteem both equality and the social institutions 
where just care of ‘general’ others is mediated.    
 
Narrative identity 
Ricoeur offers as a foundation for his ethics a concept of selfhood that is ‘a lived 
conviction, rather than a logical or scientific certainty’ (Pellauer & Dauenhauer, 
2016). In ‘Time and Narrative’, Ricoeur contemplates the work of Hannah Arendt and 
arrives at the conclusion that ‘Who?, rather than ‘What?’ is the critical question in 
defining the self:  
 
‘To answer the question ‘Who?’ as Hannah Arendt has so forcefully put it, is 
to tell the story of a life. The story told tells about the action of the ‘who’. And 
the identity of this “who” therefore itself must be narrative identity’(Ricoeur, 
1985, p. 246). 
 
Ricoeur initially elaborates the concept of the narrative identity as the ipse identity, 
which acknowledges the effect of life’s narrative on identity: it is the self that can 
change ‘within the cohesion of one lifetime’, and function as both author and reader 
of his or her own life (Ricoeur, 1985, p. 246). Ipse-ity is constituted as self-constancy 
(Ricoeur, 1985, p. 246), placing promising and keeping one’s word to others at the 
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centre of Ricoeur’s ethics (Simms, 2003, p. 104). Ricoeur distinguishes the ipse 
identity from the idem identity, which reflects ‘sameness across and through change’ 
(Pellauer & Dauenhauer, 2016). In ‘Oneself as Another’, he clarifies that idem-
identity signifies ‘sameness’, and ipse-ity ‘selfhood’ (Ricœur, 1992, p. 3) and 
integrates both idem and ipse into the concept of narrative identity.  
 
Promising 
Because of its reliance on mutual receptiveness, promising occupies a place at the 
heart of the social bond, alongside shared mores and values (De Leeuw, 2017). For 
Ricoeur, promising guarantees the self-constancy that constitutes the ipse identity. 
Keeping one’s word to others cements the indispensability of human plurality to the 
achievement of the ethical aim (Ricoeur, 2006, p. 487), and offers ‘a faculty for 
mastering the future as if it were the present’ (Ricoeur, 2006, pp. 487-488).  
 
Promising entails being ‘pushed into future action by a projected self’ (Flaming, 
2006), who is a person who can be counted on to keep their word. One keeps one’s 
word to others because being a person who keeps one’s word is part of who one is (De 
Leeuw, 2017), and because it is a manifestation of character (Flaming, 2006). 
Promising establishes the subject as one who is able to account for their actions and 
have them testified to by others. It is this attestation that engenders the self-esteem 
that is the aim of the ethical life. Actions that project future benefits or rectify past 
injustices, such as apologies, are as important as present actions in the constitution of 
a good life.  
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The idea of self-constancy embraces an entwining of the self with others and forms 
the basis on which attestation performs its role in Ricoeur’s ethics:  
‘Self-constancy is for each person that matter of conducting himself or herself 
so that others can count on that person. Because someone is counting on me, I 
am accountable for my actions before another. The term ‘responsibility’ unites 
both meanings: ‘counting on’ and ‘being accountable for’. It unites them, 
adding to them an idea of a response to the question ‘Where are you?’ asked 
by another who needs me. This response is the following: ‘Here I am!’, a 
response that is a statement of self-constancy.’ (Ricœur, 1992, p. 165) 
 
It is in declaring “Here I am!’ that we impute right actions to ourselves and 
demonstrate self-esteem and esteem for the other (Simms, 2003, pp. 107-108).   
 
Attestation 
The notion of attestation does phenomenological, epistemological, and ontological 
work in Ricoeur’s philosophy (Perez, 2001, p. 4), and plays a particularly crucial role 
in his hermeneutics of the self. As comprehensive treatment of each of these 
dimensions of attestation is beyond the scope of this thesis, in the description below I 
confine myself to the features of the concept that are essential to understanding 
Ricoeur’s ethics and the applications I propose for it in Chapters Four and Nine.  
 
Ricoeur offers several definitions of attestation. It is most expansively set out in the 
introduction to ‘Oneself as Another’. This rendering most clearly illustrates the link 
between attestation and the other – with whom we are entangled due to their suffering 
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and our obligation to respond – and so is most suited to my purpose here, which is to 
draw out the relationships that tie together the strands of the ‘little ethics’: 
 
‘Attestation is fundamentally attestation of self. This trust will, in turn, be a 
trust in the power to say, in the power to do, in the power to recognise oneself 
as a character in a narrative, in the power, finally, to respond to accusation in 
the form of the accusative: “It’s me here” (me voici!), to borrow an 
expression dear to Levinas’ (Ricœur, 1992, p. 22). 
 
Ricoeur’s concept of attestation is thought to have its origins in Heidegger’s ‘Being 
and Time’, in which conscience serves as the attestation of Dasein’s ‘ownmost 
potentiality for being’ (Ford, 2012, p. 91; Perez, 2001, p. 3). It is included in 
Ricoeur’s early writings, but his unique formulation is not fleshed out until ‘Oneself 
as Another’ (Ford, 2012, p. 91). In ‘Oneself as Another’ attestation forms the essential 
bridge between Ricoeur’s hermeneutics and his ethics: it is the ‘password for this 
entire book’ (Ricœur, 1992, p. 289, note 82).   
 
In Ricoeur’s ethics, attestation has a meaning beyond simply bearing witness – it 
represents the means by which our desire to live a good life, in which regard for the 
other takes a central place, is judged. Indeed, Ricoeur asserts that the only way of 
judging our actions, when making decisions that reflect living the good life, is to 
attest to their rightness (Flaming, 2006). Attestation announces the self’s ability to 
witness its own selfness and integrity (Ford, 2012, p. 133) and is underpinned by 
imputability: the capability of being able to affirm that ‘I can take myself to be the 
true author of the acts assigned to my account’ (Ricœur, 2007, p. 17). As such, it is 
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tied to the notion of capability and, thence, to the self-esteem that is the apex of the 
ethical aim. For Ricoeur, the subject’s capability – or ‘I-can’ – to speak, act, recount, 
‘recognise myself accountable for the effects of acts for which I acknowledge myself 
to be the author’ is ‘the self-affirmation of the capable human being’ (Ricœur, 2007, 
p. 65). 
 
By attesting to our own actions and powers and having our actions and powers 
attested to by others –‘those who approve of my existence and those whose existence 
I approve of in the reciprocity and equality of self-esteem’ (Ricoeur, 2006, p. 81) –  
we must conclude that we are but one self amongst other selves, each of us equally 
valuable (Pellauer & Dauenhauer, 2016) and realise that aiming for the good life is 
done in community with others (Blundell, 2010, p. 169). Exercising practical wisdom 
in deliberation in the shared project of just institutions, we create the opportunity for 
attestation and completion of the communitarian level of the ethical aim.  
 
Just institutions in Ricoeur’s ethics  
Ricoeur treats just institutions as fundamental to the constitution of the ethical subject 
(Ricœur, 2000, p. xxiv) and justice as a fundamental component of the wish for a 
good life, rather than merely a duty (Ricœur, 2007, p. 234). To ‘just’ Ricoeur assigns 
the meaning ‘equitable’ (Ricœur, 1992, p. 172). Justice can only be approached 
through our relations with others (Hohler, 2000). Just institutions answer the subject’s 
need for justice and complete the communitarian level of the ethical intention of 
‘aiming at the “good life” lived with and for others in just institutions’ (Ricœur, 1992, 
p. 172). Ricoeur justifies his decision to include this third level in his ethics of living 
well on the basis that it enables a response to ‘tragic aspects of action’ and lesser 
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conflicts of competing moral laws that render resolution in accordance with principles 
and rules impossible, that is, situations where the choice is not between black and 
white but, as Ricoeur expresses it, between ‘grey and grey’ or between bad and worse; 
Ricoeur gives, as an example of a ‘grey and grey’ situation amenable to nothing other 
than practical wisdom, establishing the age at which adolescents should receive the 
same punishment as adults under penal law (Ricœur, 2007, pp. 241-248).  
 
Institutions are ‘structures of living together’ (Ricœur, 1992, p. 194) that stretch our 
involvement in justice to those beyond our intimate circle. The term ‘institution’ 
applies to any ‘community’ that has responsibilities for the apportionment of 
prerogatives and burdens amongst its members; thus, both government and smaller 
associations, such as religions and businesses are in scope (Taylor, 2014). Ricoeur’s 
idea of an institution is characterised by common mores rather than constraining rules 
(Ricœur, 1992, pp. 194-195).  
 
In valuing the generative possibilities of institutions, Ricoeur is unusual amongst the 
philosophers of the 20th century, who were almost universally chary of them in light 
of institutions’ implication in the terrible global events of their era (Taylor, 2014). In 
his recognition of institutions, Ricoeur draws legitimacy from Arendt’s notion of 
power-in-common, an acknowledgement that life is lived, in all its aspects, with 
general, as well as intimate others, and that it is through institutions that the 
relationships that flow from this are mediated and nourished (Ricœur, 1992, pp. 194-
195). Institutions enable the action in concert that Arendt recognises, and offer the 
best chance for the individual to make an enduring impact on the world (Ricœur, 
1992, p. 196). Hegel’s concept of the actualisation of the interior self through 
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externalisation is also represented in the thinking that leads to Ricoeur’s identification 
of the positive potential for human flourishing offered by the ordering function of the 
institution (Taylor, 2014).  
In Ricoeur’s ethics, an essential function of institutions is their apportioning role in 
mediating access to shared goods, that is, in structuring sharing (Ricœur, 1992, p. 
199). Institutions are valued for their roles in expanding the ethical focus beyond 
single, identifiable others, and cultivating acts of the human spirit (De Leeuw, 2017; 
Taylor, 2014). The just possibilities of the institution – its strivings for justice – are 
enabled by the concerted efforts of its members, invoking a communitarian ideal (De 
Leeuw, 2017; Pellauer, 2012). The just institution demands moral and epistemological 
humility, and recognition of the equal worth, moral competency and convictions of 
the other (Ricœur, 1992, pp. 262-273; Yeager & Herman, 2017). It is in institutions 
that we recognise others as ‘an individual each’, rather than merely as a member of 
the horde (Flaming, 2006), and it is in the impartiality they demand that institutions 
allow us to affirm ‘that every life is worth as much as our own’ (Ricœur, 2007, p. 88).  
 
Deliberation in Ricoeur’s ethics  
According to Ricoeur, by deliberating we show our care for the other (Mei, 2014). In 
the just institution the ethical act of cooperation on matters of distributive justice is 
effected by the act of deliberation (Ricœur, 1992, pp. 290-291). Adopting the concept 
of intellectual virtue that is central to book 6 of Aristotle’s Nicomachean ethics, in 
‘Reflections on the Just’ Ricoeur opts to define the third level of his ethics as practical 
wisdom, enhancing the visibility of the links between the institution, justice, and 
phronesis, (Ricœur, 2007, pp. 211, 241). Ricoeur’s conceptualisation of just 
institutions as founded on practical wisdom addresses the limitations of 
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conceptualisations – common amongst political theorists – that rely solely on 
considerations of institutional structure and composition (Taylor, 2014).  
 
The exercise of practical wisdom requires respectful engagement with the convictions 
of others (Ricœur, 2000, p. 66) and reflection on the influence of one’s tradition on 
one’s receptiveness to those of others (Mei, 2015, pp. 99-122). It relies on the ‘sense’ 
of justice, rather than on norms or rules of justice (Taylor, 2014). Deliberation, for 
Ricoeur, has room for argumentation, which he associates with logic, and 
interpretation, which, he claims, accommodates invention, originality, and creativity 
(Ricœur, 2007, p. 2019).  
 
Ricoeur co-opts Habermas’s discourse ethics on the basis that its focus on translating 
conflict to the domain of language makes it ideal for application in deliberations on 
distributive justice (Marcelo, 2014). Ricoeur paraphrases Habermas as follows:  
 
‘Everyone has an equal right to speak; everyone has the duty to give his best 
argument to anyone who asks for it; he must be heard with the presumption 
that he could be correct; finally, and perhaps above all else, the antagonists of 
a rule-governed argument must share a common horizon which is one of 
agreement, of consensus’ (Ricœur, 2007, p. 240). 
 
He notes that Habermas assumes, on the part of antagonists, ‘an equal will to seek 
agreement, a desire to coordinate their plans of action on some reasonable basis’, and 
a preference for cooperation over conflict (Ricœur, 1992, p. 241; 2007, p. 241). 
Although he positions Habermas’s discourse ethics as a universal rule, he accepts that 
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resolution of aporias also requires the accommodation of contextualism in order to 
take account of plurality and, ultimately, open the possibility for enhancement of the 
validity of universal claims through exposing them to the challenge of the particular 
(Ricœur, 2007, pp. 232-248).  
 
According to Yeager & Herman’s (2017) reading of Ricoeur, moderate deliberation, 
by exposing convictions to proper evaluation, not only encourages equitable 
distributions but also offers to the subject the chance to understand him- or herself as 
one amongst others and, through modifying his or her position, experience a new 
dimension of personhood. 
 
Mutuality, convictions, and compromise 
For my understanding of the role of ethical convictions (hereafter convictions) in 
distributive justice I am indebted to Todd Mei’s (2014) essay ‘Are Reasons Enough? 
Sen and Ricoeur on the Idea of Impartiality’. According to Mei (2014), convictions 
are ‘substantive ethical beliefs which we inherit by virtue of the historical and cultural 
transmission of knowledge’. For Ricoeur, convictions represent historically-grounded 
commitments to values and norms that are seeking recognition – awaiting the 
possibility of validation – in a substantive conflict (Ricœur, 2007, p. 247). It is the 
ethical order forming the normative basis for an individual’s convictions that is 
challenged in deliberations on distributive justice. 
 
Ricoeur is unconventional in his conceptualisation of convictions not as in opposition 
to reason, but as essential components of the sort of rationalising we engage in when 
we exercise mutuality in processes of distributive justice (Mei, 2014). As convictions 
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are ontologically prior to justified beliefs, Ricoeur considers that impartiality in 
distributive justice can only be approached through their inclusion in ethical 
reasoning. In this process we attempt to recognise others’ convictions and to develop 
a ‘shared understanding’ (Ricœur, 2007, p. 89). Because Ricoeur denies the 
possibility of third-person objectivity, he takes the position that decisions on 
distributive justice are beyond shared reasoning, unamenable to agreement, and based, 
instead, on mutuality (Mei, 2015, pp. 99-122). For Ricoeur, compromising is a 
virtuous act that arises out of the ethical duty to recognise the worth of the other – and 
determination to act on principle, an ethical violation (Yeager & Herman, 2017). 
 
Engaging with the convictions of others is a generous act that shows our willingness 
to approach charitably unfamiliar and perhaps competing traditions and to expose our 
own convictions to challenge (Mei, 2014). Genuine argumentation opens up 
convictions to challenge and, ultimately, may result in refiguration of beliefs and 
values and enhancement of the coherency of putative universal claims. Such 
argument, according to Ricoeur, demands self-scrutiny, mutuality, and ‘willingness to 
receive each other’ (Mei, 2014).  
 
The virtuous behaviour required of us in deliberations is made possible by our 
acknowledgement of the uncertainty of our convictions, by the value we set on being 
able to impute to ourselves the capacity to engage with another impartially, and by the 
esteem in which we hold the impartiality of the others involved in deliberating with 
us: we are conscious that we are attempting to choose well under the gaze of others 
(Mei, 2014) and we expect to arrive at impartiality through mutuality. Our efforts at 
impartiality and ‘shared understanding’ are mediated by ‘linguistic hospitality’.   
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Linguistic hospitality 
Ricoeur recognises that parties in distributive justice deliberations often assign 
different meanings to language, concepts and customs, necessitating translation 
between parties (Mei, 2014). The generous and respectful act of translation (Ricœur, 
1992, p. 246; 2007, p. 116) is essential if we are to take into	account	the	convictions	of	the	other	and	treat	them	as	if	their	view	were	rational	and	coherent	(Ricœur,	2007,	p.	246).	Ricoeur refers to the act of translating from the language of one’s own 
‘culture’ into that of the other as ‘linguistic hospitality’, reflecting his 
conceptualisation of it as an ethical act of caring and mutual welcome (Ricœur, 2007, 
p. 246). Ricoeur likens to linguistic hospitality other acts of understanding that call for 
mutuality, transference, and welcome (Mei, 2014). Indeed, in ‘Reflections on The 
Just’, he makes high claims for translation, stating it ‘is from end to end the remedy 
for plurality in a world of dispersion and confusion’ (Ricœur, 2007, p. 28), thereby 
cementing it in his ethics as a model for intersubjective relations (Foran, 2018). 
 
8.3.4  Ricoeur’s treatment of medical ethics in ‘Reflections on The Just’ 
In ‘Reflections on The Just’ Ricoeur brings together and expands ideas he articulated 
in ‘Oneself as Another’ and ‘The Just’, establishing a dialectic between teleological 
and deontological ethics, leavened by his ‘little ethics’ (Clark, 2010). The latter part 
of the book is primarily an exploration of his ethics system in the practical world of 
the institutions of justice, but it contains two essays in which Ricoeur extends his 
reasoning to medicine in an attempt to illuminate medicine’s dialectic of 
argumentation and interpretation through comparison with the (more highly codified) 
law (Ricœur, 2007, p. 37).  
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Although Ricoeur’s conceptualisation of the medical role is confined to clinical care 
and, to a lesser extent, research (Ricœur, 2007, pp. 198-212), he identifies, albeit only 
in passing, the conflict that arises from the duality of the doctor’s responsibility to 
society as well as the individual (Ricœur, 2007, pp. 207-209). He claims that 
traditional medical deontology is particularly challenged in ambiguous situations and 
in those in which there are obligations arising from ‘concern for public health as it 
affects institutional organisation and public expense’ (Ricœur, 2007, p. 34).  Public 
health – in the sense of managing individuals’ health for the good of the community – 
and research are the two contexts in which he evokes this duality. 
 
In ‘The Three Levels of Medical Judgment’, his principal study of bioethics, Ricoeur 
focuses on the matter of ‘judgment’, setting out, in order of importance and proximity 
to the individual clinical circumstance, three levels of judgment: prudential (situation 
based), deontological (based on Kantian thought), and reflexive or teleological (which 
stands for Aristotelian approaches to defining the good life). He argues that the ethical 
significance of bioethics resides primarily in judgments made at the prudential level – 
in practical wisdom. Judgments made at the deontological level are derived from 
generalisation of the precepts that arise out of the prudential level, and are encoded in 
medical norms. Reflecting on ethical traditions – primarily notions of the good life 
arising in the Aristotelian tradition – enables us to contemplate the meaning of 
decisions for health, happiness, and life and death (Ricœur, 2007, pp. 198-212). 
Ricoeur claims that contemporary approaches to medical ethics overemphasise the 
deontological at the expense of attention to moral sources (Ricœur, 2007, p. 210). 
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Ricoeur observes that the order of ethical levels in bioethics is the reverse of the 
architecture of ‘the little ethics’, where teleological, deontological and prudential 
levels stand for the three levels of the ethical aim: ‘the “good life”, with and for 
others, in just institutions’. That the three elements appear at all is no accident, he 
claims, for medical ethics fits well into ‘the general ethics of living well together’ 
(Ricœur, 2007, p. 210). He accounts for the reversed structure of the levels by 
acknowledging the unique context of medicine, in which suffering and its relief 
confer immediacy and primacy on practical wisdom (Ricœur, 2007, pp. 33, 211). At 
the base of prudential judgment is the relation between the doctor and patient and the 
trust that underpins the covenant arising from the doctor’s promise to relieve suffering 
(Ricœur, 2007, pp. 200-203). Within this covenant, the doctor exercises practical 
wisdom – born, Ricoeur claims, of training and practice. The precepts concerning the 
individuality of the patient that arise from practical wisdom form the foundation for 
the medical norms that constitute the deontological level of judgment. Ricoeur places 
‘self-esteem’ (Ricœur, 2007, p. 203), the telos of a life, at this level on the basis of the 
role phronesis plays in generating opportunities for approval by others and by the self. 
Practically, in the clinical setting, iteratively invoking judgments at these levels 
accommodates the situation as a whole and takes account of the perspectives and 
convictions of each participant (Potvin, 2010).  
 
Although he acknowledges the duality of medicine’s obligations – to the individual 
and to society – and refers in passing to domains of medicine in which the doctor has 
specific and separate responsibilities to society, Ricoeur does not attempt to broaden 
his conceptualisation of medical ethics into the realm of priority setting.  
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8.3.5 Applications of Ricoeur’s ethics to health care and medicine 
Neither Ricoeur’s ‘little ethics’ nor his work on medical ethics has been widely 
referenced in the biomedical literature (Fiasse, 2012; Potvin, 2010), and such 
references as there are tend to focus on problems in the clinical setting. It is 
noteworthy that health care is not a major focus of the authors who are most active in 
contemporary Ricoeur scholarship. I summarise in this section the significant recent 
papers that apply Ricoeur’s ethics to areas of health care that touch on public health 
and policy concerns.  
 
Marie-Josee Potvin (2010) proposes Ricoeur’s ‘little ethics’ as an ‘inspiration’ for the 
development of ethical competencies for the clinician-turned-bioethicist on the basis 
of its capacity to illuminate and support the shifting epistemological perspective of 
one undergoing such a profound change in professional orientation. She claims that 
key concepts in Ricoeur’s ethics, specifically solicitude, practical wisdom, 
argumentation ethics, and imagination, could facilitate understanding of the tensions 
involved in this shift and greater sensitivity to the contextual features of complex 
ethical situations.  
 
Health information management is the setting for Corine Mouton Dorey’s (2016) 
exploration of the applicability of Ricoeur’s ‘little ethics’. Mouton Dorey argues that 
Ricoeur’s ethics, by focusing on the selfness of the other, prevents the health 
professional from seeing patients as ‘mere data’ and provides a foundation for 
resolving the problem of conflicts between patient privacy and the public good and, 
more broadly, for justice in public health. 
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Puschel, Furlan, and Dekkers (2017) see in Ricoeur’s medical ethics a basis on which 
to build an approach to fairness that resolves the tension between the ethics of justice 
and the ethics of care in the context of caring for the socioeconomically 
disadvantaged.  
 
In conclusion, these studies show how scholars might go about analysing the potential 
of Ricoeur’s ethics to be of use to problems in health care ethics. They do not, 
however, make or substantiate broad claims for the applicability of Ricoeur’s ethics to 
complex issues in clinical care, or in bioethics, medical professionalism, or health 
care policy.  
 
8.3.6  Conclusion 
Ricoeur’s ‘little ethics’, encapsulated in the ethical intention of ‘the “good life”, lived 
with and for others, in just institutions’ is a framing of virtue ethics that recognises 
participative justice as essential to the ethical subject. Its foundation on mutuality and 
the detail with which it engages with the ethical aspects of deliberation give it 
relevance in the context of macroallocation. Ricoeur’s medical ethics offers a 
sequence for practical ethical reasoning that is in harmony with the ‘little ethics’. 
Ricoeur’s conceptualisation of medicine is narrow, however, and he leaves many of 
the profession’s dimensions unexplored. Although the institutional contexts of 
medical professionalism and health care resource allocation suggest that they would 
be amenable to examination in the light of Ricoeur’s ethics, it has not been 
substantially referenced in the literature on either of these topics.   
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Chapter Eight Part 4: Chapter conclusion 
 
 
 
Virtue ethics is concerned with the question of character, rather than rules, and with 
the question of what to be, rather than what to do. Its focus is on living an objectively 
desirable life and actualising one’s potential as a human being. Virtue ethics aids 
ethical decision making by promoting reflection on what a virtuous person would do 
in a given circumstance. Virtue ethics has been used widely in medicine, but rarely in 
connection with non-clinical aspects of health care. Contemporary insights into links 
between the virtues and the social world and ways of implementing them in practice 
open the possibility for broader application of this ethics framework in health care. 
 
Ricoeur’s ‘little ethics’ is a framing of virtue ethics that recognises procedural justice 
as essential to the ethical subject. It responds more completely to my data, and offers 
greater explanatory and normative potential, than other historical and contemporary 
formulations of virtue ethics. In keeping with Ricoeur’s thin picture of medicine, 
subsequent scholars have not attended significantly to the potential for the ‘little 
ethics’ to be of use in guiding ethical analysis in the broader realm of medicine and 
health care. 
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Chapter Nine: Discussion and Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Nine Part 1: Introduction to this chapter 
 
 
 
In this chapter I summarise how the research reported in Chapters Three to Seven 
answers my research questions, integrate the main findings of the publications in this 
thesis, and consider the implications of my findings for practice. This chapter does not 
reproduce the detailed discussion provided in the individual chapters, but offers an 
analysis of the thesis findings as a whole. It focuses on the implications of the 
discrepancy between macroallocation’s ethical aim of justice and its realisation, and 
considers how an ethics for macroallocation practice might address this problem. The 
key objective of this chapter is to make an empirically supported case for the 
relevance of Ricoeur’s ethics as a framework for understanding and guiding doctors’ 
practice in macroallocation and for supporting moral analysis of macroallocation 
generally. In the published and submitted papers I drew on different theoretical 
approaches that were relevant to the problem and data at hand. I will bring these 
together in this chapter. A secondary objective of this chapter is to reflect on the 
experience of using the GMA methodology and draw attention to points that might be 
useful to others using it in the future.  
 
The chapter has 9 parts. In Section 9.2 I review the objectives of my study. In section 
9.3 I summarise the main findings of my research. In Section 9.4 I relate the key 
themes in my research to the empirical literature, and in Section 9.5 I discuss its 
implications for policy and practice. I reflect on my experience with GMA in section 
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9.6. Sections 9.7 and 9.8 are devoted respectively to a discussion of the limitations of 
this enquiry and recommendations for further research. Finally, in section 9.9 I set out 
the conclusion.  
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Chapter Nine Part 2: Study objectives and research questions 
 
 
 
For its potential to impact on persons and society, policy-making for resource 
allocation has been characterised as a moral endeavour (Furnham & Ofstein, 1997; 
Kenny & Joffres, 2008; Kirby & Simpson, 2007). It is an area of expanding study in 
the bioethics literature (Brody, 2009; Emanuel, 2002, pp. vii-x; Kenny & Joffres, 
2008; Light & Hughes, 2001; Wild, 2005), but there has, to date, been little 
theoretical or empirical work on the values, ethical experiences, and ethical practices 
of the doctors who participate in it as subject matter experts, or into the practices of 
implementing priority setting systems (Robinson, Dickinson, Williams, et al., 2011).  
 
The gap in knowledge is acquiring increasing salience on account of the promotion by 
medical professional organisations of doctors’ participation in socially engaged 
actions, including resource allocation – for example by the Australian Medical 
Association (2017) and the ABIM Foundation (2004) – and its consequent inclusion 
in medical education programs in many jurisdictions across the globe (Bhate & Loh, 
2015; Dharamsi, Ho, Spadafora, & Woollard, 2011; Earnest, Wong, & Federico, 
2009; Hubinette, Dobson, Voyer, & Regehr, 2014; Whitehead, Austin, & Hodges, 
2011). The pace and extent of these changes draws attention to the absence of clarity 
about the role, and of agreement about the ethics of doctors’ involvement in socially 
engaged actions (Cassel, 1985; Croft, Jay, Meslin, Gaffney, & Odell, 2012; Dobson, 
Voyer, & Regehr, 2012; Earnest, Wong, & Federico, 2010; Fischer, 2009; Hubinette, 
Ajjawi, & Dharamsi, 2014; Huddle, 2011, 2014; Jacobs, Greene, & Bindman, 2013; 
McKie, Shrimpton, Hurworth, Bell, & Richardson, 2008; Sklar, 2016; Tilburt & 
Brody, 2016; Veatch, 1990). 
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Although the technical expert, or advisor, role in policy-making is elucidated in the 
political science literature, there is little acknowledgment in the bioethics literature of 
the role or the ethical demands it places on the doctors who carry it out. Given the 
need for resource distribution policy to meet standards of justice and accountability 
examination of the ethical aspects of doctors’ involvement in it is essential.  
 
This empirical bioethics research aimed to contribute to the knowledge base on 
resource distribution by examining the ethical dimensions of doctors’ involvement in 
such processes. My study objectives were: 
  
• To explore doctors’ reasons for taking on the role of technical expert in 
macroallocation,  
• To describe the values and ethical commitments of doctors who undertake this 
role, 
• To understand how doctors experienced the ethical dimensions of the role, and  
• To identify an ethical framework with explanatory and normative power to 
assist in understanding practice and guiding moral analysis.  
 
The work comprised two studies. For the first, the research question was:  
 
• What values influence doctors’ decisions about engaging in supraclinical (not 
related to individual patients) advocacy activities, including macroallocation?  
 
This question was addressed using data from a study concerning Values in Medicine. 
This research is reported in Chapter Three.  
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The second research question was addressed in the publications in Chapters Four to 
Seven, which were based on the set of interview data I collected in 2015-16 from a 
purposively selected sample of doctors known to have an interest in and experience of 
macroallocation in Australia. I gathered and analysed these data in accordance with 
the principles of the grounded moral analysis (GMA) methodology of Dunn, Sheehan, 
Hope, and Parker (2012). The overarching research question for this study was:  
 
• How do doctors experience the macroallocation process and the roles they 
play in it? 
 
Additional questions were addressed to segments of the topic:  
 
• What are the ethical commitments of doctors who engage in policy concerned 
with resource allocation?  
• How do doctors’ values and ethical commitments impinge on 
macroallocation?  
• How do doctors experience and manage dual agency, conflict of interest, and 
other ethical challenges inherent in policy-making?  
• How do doctors view the matter of skills in this role?  
 
A secondary objective of the research was to test the applicability of GMA to the non-
clinical domain of practice presented by this topic.  
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Chapter Nine Part 3: Summary of main findings 
 
 
 
I recap in this section the findings of each of the empirical chapters (Chapters Three 
to Seven). 
 
9.3.1 Motivating values 
In the analysis presented in Chapter Three (Advocacy) I set out to understand why 
doctors might choose to include socially focused activities, such as macroallocation, 
in their career plans. Accepting macroallocation as a form of supraclinical advocacy 
(see Chapters One and Nine for a discussion of this linkage), I undertook an analysis, 
using the principles of grounded theory, of interview data collected in 2009 from 20 
doctors associated with the University of Sydney for purpose of exploring the 
question: What values influence doctors’ decisions to engage in supraclinical (not 
related to individual patients) advocacy activities?  
 
I found that personal ideals were more important than professional commitments in 
shaping doctors’ decisions on engagement in advocacy. I showed that doctors’ 
decisions to engage in macroallocation were influenced by two significant factors: 
firstly, experiences in early life and during medical training and enculturation – 
including positive and negative role models, marginalised groups, power and 
powerlessness, formative events, and the medical virtues of doing the right thing and 
giving something back – and secondly, the desire to finesse their medical careers and 
make them more pleasurable through taking on intellectual challenges and exercising 
a broader range of skills than is possible in clinical practice. Doctors included socially 
directed activities in their mature practices if they coincided with their concepts of 
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excellence. I found that Aristotelian ethical concepts, mediated by Hannah Arendt’s 
idea of action in the public sphere and Foucault’s notion of ‘care of the self’, had 
explanatory power for my data.  
 
9.3.2 The ethical commitments of doctors who engage in macroallocation 
In the analysis in Chapter Four, I described the values and ethical commitments of 
doctors who engage in macroallocation work, explored with participants the 
normative implications of their values in this context, and theorised an empirically 
grounded ethics for macroallocation practice.  
 
I found that doctors who engaged in macroallocation held values in 3 broad domains: 
personal ethics (‘taking responsibility’ and ‘persistence, patience, and loyalty to a 
cause’); justice (‘engaging in distributive justice’, ‘equity’, and ‘confidence in 
institutions’); and practices of argumentation (‘moderation’ and ‘data and evidence’). 
I reported that the impacts of these commitments on macroallocation were 1) that 
doctors’ personal ethics contributed to their long-term engagement with 
macroallocation and identified consequences of that, both positive and negative; 2) 
that their commitment to justice was not equalled by their grasp of the practicalities of 
implementing it; and 3) that their moderate practices of argumentation promoted 
compromise, but potentially privileged the bureaucratic over the patient perspective. I 
hypothesised that, since future-building, except in the most abstract sense, is not a 
feature of clinical practice, especially under modern care models, macroallocation 
enables doctors to flourish by acting as a temporal projection of their influence and 
intent. 
 
 
 
270 
In this chapter I explored the theorisation of values in macroallocation work, and 
brought together practical and theoretical domains not previously united, for the 
purpose of moving towards a theory of macroallocation ethics. I showed the close 
alignment of the values of doctors engaged in macroallocation with the three levels of 
Ricoeur’s ethics and suggested that this ethics system has merit as the foundation for 
an ethical framework for macroallocation. My analysis exposed a tension between the 
‘share in’ and ‘share of’ aspects of the just institution as conceived by Ricoeur.  
 
9.3.3 Doctors’ skills in macroallocation 
The publication in Chapter Five covers the skills doctors use in macroallocation, how 
doctors acquire them, and how they influence performance of the role. I showed that 
doctors linked their effectiveness in macroallocation to their skills in the areas of 
communication, strategic thinking, and numerical data, and to their ability to integrate 
these in order to make a cogent argument directed towards persuading bureaucrats to 
represent their interests to political decision-makers. They performed expertise as 
argument, bringing together rhetorical skills and profession-specific expert knowledge 
in a way that was sensitive to social and political context. In this way they enhanced 
their influence in the phronetic process of priority setting. My findings challenged 
common assumptions about doctors’ preferences in argumentation, and suggested a 
commitment to practical reason that is out of step with the technocratic policy models 
that predominate in health care.  
 
I also found that doctors made considerable efforts to acquire the skills they believed 
to be necessary for effective performance in the role, challenging stereotypes and 
throwing into relief untested assumptions about the doctors’ roles and performance in 
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macroallocation. I suggested that the mismatch between doctors’ priorities for skills 
development and the exigencies of policy making arose from misunderstandings 
about their role.    
 
The skills valued by doctors, their performance of the role as argumentation, and their 
confidence in the institution of macroallocation resonated closely with Ricoeur’s 
‘little ethics’, which emerged from my data as an empirically grounded matrix for 
moral analysis of the doctor’s performance of the role of technical expert. In this 
paper I suggested that Ricoeur’s ethics might help to establish norms for procedure in 
macroallocation and contribute to the development of criteria for evaluating both the 
substance and the process of doctors’ engagement in that setting and that it might 
have broader application in medicine and health care as a yardstick by which to 
evaluate processes and outcomes. 
 
9.3.4 Ethical issues doctors experience in macroallocation  
I found that doctors’ experiences of ethical issues in macroallocation were grouped 
clearly into two domains: procedural injustice and role-related conflicts, and elected 
to deal with each of these domains in a separate paper. Concerns about procedural 
justice featured significantly more strongly in participants’ accounts than issues of 
role-related conflict.  
 
The paper presented in Chapter Six deals largely with procedural injustice. I found 
that doctors attached ethical significance to a broad range of procedural concerns that 
militated against the prospect of distributive justice and negatively affected their own 
wellbeing. Doctors’ ideas of procedural injustice in macroallocation fell into 6 
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categories: ‘unfair access to opportunities to participate in macroallocation’, ‘sexist 
behaviours and structures’, ‘rewards for immoderate behaviour’, ‘cynical and 
insincere practices’, ‘waste, duplication, and inefficiency’, and ‘being taken for 
granted’.   
 
My data suggested that experiences and perceptions of injustice impact upon 
participants’ welfare and moral comfort, and upon institutions’ ability to achieve 
procedural justice and realise just decisions. I hypothesised that the current 
institutional conditions of macroallocation leave unmet a critical need for the 
information, fellowship, and support essential to enabling participants to attest to the 
justice of the process. Using Daniels & Sabin’s accountability for reasonableness 
(A4R) framework as the basis for ethical evaluation of my findings, I showed that it is 
not possible, in macroallocation procedures where there is a failure to care for the 
welfare of participants, to meet the conditions necessary for vouchsafing procedural 
justice. 
 
In response to my analysis, I proposed an empirically derived practical intervention, 
in the form of a checklist, that positions commitment to the care and just treatment of 
participants as a foundation of any macroallocation procedure. 
 
I reported on role-related conflict in the book chapter presented in Chapter Seven of 
this thesis. In that analysis I showed that, while both conflicts of interest and dual 
agency were features of macroallocation practice, the data did not support the notion 
that role-related conflict troubles doctors at the level of their internal professional 
ethical landscapes. Doctors recognised the communitarian aims of macroallocation 
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and conceptualised role-related conflicts at the collective, rather than the individual, 
level. They were confident that the social processes of macroallocation would 
effectively manage role-related conflicts and protect doctors and the community from 
significant harm. On the basis of my findings, I suggested that, relative to role ethics 
and appeals to physician virtue, procedural justice ethics frameworks might offer both 
a fertile setting for the exploration of the ethical implications of role-related conflicts 
and a viable approach to safeguarding distributive justice in priority setting from their 
consequences.  
 
9.3.5 Conclusion 
This thesis has been concerned with illuminating the social process of 
macroallocation through a phenomenological examination of the reported experiences 
of its medical participants. It has sought to represent not the broader normative 
question of distributive justice, but how it is interpreted and negotiated in practice, 
and it has sought an explanatory and normative ethical framework for doctors’ 
performance of the expert role.  
 
Taken together, the descriptive findings in my empirical chapters present doctors’ 
motivations for engaging in policy work and their ideas of the good in 
macroallocation. Their motivations are founded in concepts of virtue and their ideas 
of the good are linked to faith in the social processes of macroallocation. Their ideas 
of virtuous practice in macroallocation are defined in both positive terms: what 
characterises an ethical practitioner of macroallocation and what constitutes an ethical 
process; and negative terms: what characterises an unethical practitioner of 
macroallocation, and what constitutes an unethical process. Whilst doctors generally 
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find macroallocation work to be ethically sustaining, and are confident in its 
contribution to justice, deficiencies of caring in the social process of macroallocation 
pose threats to their wellbeing and to the possibility of justice.  
 
In this thesis I have found that the key tensions in macroallocation practice are 
between doctors’ confidence in the institution of macroallocation as both an 
ingredient in a good life and a deliverer of distributive justice and their experience of 
it as procedurally unjust; and between their valorisation of justice and their 
underdeveloped sense of the threats to justice inherent in the technical expert role and 
their way of performing it. Ultimately, the positive effect on doctors’ ethical 
fulfilment of their engagement in the role may not be matched by their impact on the 
justice of the distributions that result. 
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Chapter Nine Part 4: Discussion of the descriptive empirical aspect of my 
findings and comparison with the empirical literature 
	
	
	
9.4.1 Introduction 
This section relates my findings to the empirical literature on doctors’ experiences of 
ethical issues in macroallocation. It focuses on the descriptive components of my 
research and draws attention to areas where my findings have added new information, 
supported prior findings, or exposed the need for further research. In general, it avoids 
reiterating connections between the findings and the literature that have already been 
made in the individual papers that constitute the empirical chapters. Specifically, it 
omits consideration of Chapter Three (Advocacy), in which there is a self-contained 
consideration of the literature and findings, and of the topic of rhetoric in 
macroallocation – discussed in Chapter Five (Skills) – for the same reason. 
 
In Chapter One, Part 4, I described the dearth of relevant literature and the steps I 
needed to take to isolate relevant findings from studies that were only loosely focused 
on my topic. This gap in the literature limits the scope and significance of this section 
of the discussion. 
 
I present this part of the discussion under the following headings: procedural justice, 
criteria for decision making, role-related conflict, medical power, and skills and 
knowledge. I also provide a conclusion. 
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9.3.2 Procedural justice  
As I reported in Chapters Six and Seven, (Procedural Justice and Role-related 
Conflict), when given the opportunity to explore ethical issues the participants in my 
study privileged deficiencies in procedural justice over matters of personal ethics. 
This finding exposes a discrepancy between subjective and objective perspectives on 
the ethics of macroallocation practice: while the theoretical literature in bioethics 
focuses on the impact of role-related conflict on the prospect of just distributions, 
macroallocation practitioners are preoccupied with the impact of procedural injustice. 
In finding this imbalance, I have replicated the patterns in the published empirical 
literature. 
 
In Chapter Six I reported that the doctors in my study considered inequitable access to 
the policy table, sexist behaviours and structures, and the undercutting of formal 
process by medical political actors to be threats to distributive justice. They also 
reported experiencing injustice at a personal level, which they related to unjustifiable 
calls on their time and effort brought about by bureaucratic inefficiency, political 
insincerity, and bureaucrats’ tendency to take the work and commitment of doctors 
for granted. These findings are consistent with earlier evidence that doctors 
experience the macroallocation process as intimidating (Gibson, Martin, & Singer, 
2005), arduous (Sinclair et al., 2008), and inadequately supported (Gallego, Fowler, & 
van Gool, 2008; Harris, Allen, Waller, & Brooke, 2017), as well as with the 
perspectives of  patients who engage in health policy (Dukhanin, Topazian, & 
DeCamp, 2018). They also support the findings of two Australian studies. Harris et 
al.’s (2017) qualitative case study of resource allocation in a large health service in 
Australia reported that participants perceived that decisions were often undertaken 
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outside the formal process or were influenced by lobbying, while Gallego et al. (2008) 
highlighted the power of the coalescence of political and medical interests to derail 
procedure. Reeleder, Goel, Singer, and Martin (2006), in the Canadian setting, and 
Robinson, Williams, Dickinson, Freeman, and Rumbold (2012) in the UK also 
documented macroallocation participants’ disapprobation of powerful clinicians who 
act as ‘squeaky wheels’. Finally, my findings concerning doctors’ perceptions of 
being used cynically by bureaucrats and politicians corroborated Gibson et al.’s 
(2005) Canadian case study, which found that macroallocation participants resented 
being ‘set up’ to ratify decisions that had already been made by those in power. My 
findings extend beyond those of these studies, however, in establishing that doctors 
conceptualised these issues as ethical challenges, in expanding the range of practices 
macroallocation participants considered to be unjust, and in supporting theorisation 
about the ethical dimensions of doctors’ role in macroallocation.  
 
Gender bias was the most unexpected of my findings in the area of procedural 
injustice, manifesting as structural bias against women’s participation and as 
testimonial injustice. At a substantive level, such procedural flaws risk the potential 
for arrival at just distributions. Neither of these signs of gender bias has been reported 
in the empirical literature on macroallocation, although testimonial injustice against 
lay participants in policy has been reported (Little et al., 2002), and bias against 
women in medicine has been in the public eye in recent years (Walton, 2015). Further 
research into bias in macroallocation and strategies for its mitigation is essential, 
particularly if we wish the conditions of policy making to be hospitable to all 
members of contemporary pluralistic societies. The growing movement towards 
deliberative policy making models that include consumer and citizen input (Danis, 
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Clancy, & Churchill, 2002; Dukhanin et al., 2018; Fischer, 2009; G. H. Mooney & 
Blackwell, 2004; Palmer & Short, 2014, pp. 357-360; Wiseman, Mooney, Berry, & 
Tang, 2003) makes this research more pressing. The #MeToo movement provides 
impetus in this direction and, by shining a spotlight on unfair treatment of women in 
the workplace, may signal a favourable climate for such research (Choo, van Dis, & 
Kass, 2018; Jagsi, 2018). 
 
This is the first published research, to my knowledge, whose focus is on 
understanding procedural justice in macroallocation from the perspective of its 
participants; as such, the insights it offers must be viewed as provisional and in need 
of validation through further research. It would seem particularly important to gather 
information on the ethical perspectives and experiences of all categories of 
macroallocation actor in order to gain an understanding of the practice as a whole, and 
of its micro-procedural and person-focussed aspects. 
 
My approach in Chapter Six and in the present chapter is consistent with that 
advocated by Hall et al. (2018), who, on the basis of their international survey of 
experts in priority setting, concluded that the structural aspect of priority setting had 
matured to a degree that the focus should shift away from the development of new 
systems and decision making frameworks and onto understanding organisational 
context and outcomes and overcoming difficulties with the implementation of existing 
approaches (Hall et al., 2018).  
 
Beyond description, research needs to be undertaken into the effect of deficiencies in 
macroallocation procedure on its outcomes. Evaluation of the impact of the 
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institutional conditions of macroallocation on distributive justice is limited, however, 
by the same factors that confound the establishment of an approach to 
macroallocation based on distributive justice principles (Daniels, 2018; Landwehr, 
2013). One approach to overcoming this difficulty may be to include person-focussed 
criteria in research studies that are aimed at understanding the characteristics and 
quality of macroallocation decision processes. This might be an additional application 
for the participant welfare checklist I developed in Chapter Six.  
 
9.3.3 Criteria for decision making 
The doctors in my sample did not give any indications of how they would go about 
making decisions, that is, of what values and ethical frameworks guided their ideas of 
fairness, a feature they have in common with most policy actors (Kluge & Tomasson, 
2002). 
 
The absence of decision support for priority setting – in the form of principles or 
criteria for determining fair outcomes – has been reported in a number of studies 
(Gallego, Taylor, & Brien, 2007; Harris et al., 2017; Martin, Giacomini, & Singer, 
2002). Although satisfaction with unstructured decision making was reported by 
Harris et al. (2017) in an Australian study, the remainder of the qualitative literature 
touching on this issue has reported that doctors experience unease when they perceive 
macroallocation processes to lack explicit criteria for decision making (Bryan, 
Williams, & McIver, 2007; Singer, Martin, Giacomini, & Purdy, 2000), or when they 
consider the criteria to be inadequate for the purpose at hand (Russell & Greenhalgh, 
2009).  
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The doctors in my study did not report using formal principles for macroallocation, 
but unlike those in prior studies, they did not view this as a gap or deficiency, and 
hence did not experience moral unease about it. Whilst they valued procedural justice 
– or, at least, found signs of its absence ethically problematical – they did not find in 
any of the procedural deficiencies they experienced reason to doubt the validity of 
their attempts at distributive justice. That justice is the objective of health policy 
deliberations is widely understood (Daniels, 2016; Hall et al., 2018; Kirch & Ast, 
2017; G. Mooney & Houston, 2004; Wild, 2005); I showed in Chapters Three and 
Four (Advocacy and Values) that doctors were motivated to engage in 
macroallocation, at least in part, by the value they place on justice, although their 
valuation of justice was not met by their grasp of the practicalities of implementing it. 
It is troubling that, despite the consistency between societal goals for justice and their 
personal values and goals, the participants in my study were not aware of the formal 
aspects of deliberating justly, had not been exposed to or sought out knowledge about 
ethical approaches based on principles of procedural or distributive justice, and lacked 
insight into their potential utility.  
 
By contrast, other studies have shown that doctors make the connection between 
formal process and fair distributions (Gallego et al., 2007; Martin, Giacomini, et al., 
2002). The high profile of procedural approaches to justice amongst macroallocation 
participants was shown by Hall et al. (2018) in their international open-ended survey 
of priority setting participants, which found that progress in decision making 
frameworks was held to be the most notable achievement in recent decades in 
macroallocation, as well as a significant ongoing challenge. It would be difficult to 
draw any firm conclusions from these dissimilarities. They may be explained by 
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differences in research questions, methods, or settings. Alternatively, the explanation 
may be found in the general naivety, misperceptions, and unrealistic expectations 
around procedural justice shown by the doctors in my study, as I reported in Chapter 
Six (Procedural Justice). In that chapter, I theorised that this arose from the absence of 
sufficient of care, communication, and shared objectives about the policy process. In 
other jurisdictions, the institutional conditions for macroallocation may differ from 
those in Australia, and research in these settings may be needed in order to establish 
whether my findings reflect common themes in resource allocation practice, and if so, 
what their impact is.  
 
9.3.4 Role-related conflicts 
As doctors’ engagement in containing health care expenditure grows, exploring how 
doctors navigate competing commitments is increasingly seen as an important area for 
medical ethics (Ross & Bernabeo, 2014; Sabin, 2000; Tilburt, 2014; Tilburt & Brody, 
2016; Wasserman & Wertheimer, 2014).  
 
Given the extent of the concern in the theoretical literature about conflicts of interest 
and dual agency (Croft et al., 2012; de Kort et al., 2007; Gallego et al., 2008; 
Kerridge, Lowe, & Stewart, 2013, p. 1041; N. Smith, Mitton, Davidson, & Williams, 
2014; Veatch, 1990; Wiersma, Kerridge, & Lipworth, 2017; J. R. Williams, 2005, p. 
71), it is remarkable how little role-related conflict has been investigated empirically, 
and how slight the findings on this subject are.  
 
Thick descriptions of conflict of interest and dual agency proved elusive in this 
research. Although I had planned and implemented my study with role-related conflict 
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front and centre, I found it difficult to get my participants to engage with the issue and 
was surprised by the superficiality with which they addressed the problem. 
Participants did not see it as a personal responsibility; rather they placed the locus of 
responsibility for managing it at the level of the social process of macroallocation.  
 
Where my research adds value is in its exposition of the confidence doctors have in 
the capacity of the institution to regulate the issue. In my report in Chapter Seven 
(Role-related Conflict), I recognised in this insight a prompt to consolidate the role of 
social approaches to the management of role-related conflict. Nonetheless, I was 
concerned about the apparent absence of role-related conflict from participants’ 
personal ethical landscapes. While it is possible that my findings represent the limits 
of doctors’ insight into role-related conflict, it is also possible that my interview 
process was inadequate for the task of eliciting this type of sensitive, confronting 
information, or encouraged a focus on the systemic level. Further empirical work is 
required in order to gain an understanding of doctors’ conceptualisations of role-
related conflict within a personal ethics framework.    
 
My research is not alone, however, amongst empirical reports, in failing to provide 
rich insights into role-related conflict. Only one empirical study showed doctors 
engaging with the issue (Martin, Giacomini, et al., 2002); like my participants, theirs 
took a superficial approach and externalised the problem and its resolution. Doctors’ 
experience of dual agency featured in only three empirical studies, by Sinclair et al. 
(2008), and by de Kort et al. (2007) and Gallego et al. (2008), who both reported that 
doctor participants in priority setting considered a willingness to play different roles 
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and a capacity to balance the gatekeeper and advocate roles to be part of being a good 
doctor. Unlike my study, neither of these set out specifically to explore the issue.   
 
In light of this, I am left with two opposing explanatory propositions: either doctors 
do not engage deeply with role-related conflict in macroallocation practice, or they 
do, but researchers find it difficult to elicit useful information in this sensitive area. 
Indeed, the dearth of empirical literature may even indicate a deeper reluctance on the 
part of investigators to engage with the issue. Role-related conflict in macroallocation 
is, thus, clearly an area that calls for further research – in the first instance into 
methods for eliciting meaningful qualitative data about this delicate and confronting 
issue. Given the unchallenged ubiquity of the theoretical claims that conflicts of 
interest and dual agency render doctors untrustworthy in macroallocation, research 
ethics and procedural justice call for doctors’ understanding of role-related conflict to 
be comprehensively investigated.  
 
9.3.5 Medical power 
In western democracies, doctors dominate the expert advisory role in health care 
policy (Belcher, 2014; Duckett, 1984; Hall et al., 2018; Homan, 2004; Kenny & 
Joffres, 2008; Martin, Abelson, & P., 2002). Unsurprisingly, doctors have been 
reported in the empirical literature as readily accepting medical dominance (McKie et 
al., 2008; Robinson et al., 2012). Equally unsurprisingly, the literature also shows that 
non-medical actors do not share this view (Harris et al., 2017; Martin, Abelson, et al., 
2002; McKie et al., 2008; Reeleder et al., 2006; Robinson et al., 2012).  
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My research, by showing that the doctors in my study took for granted their right and 
obligation to be involved in priority setting, confirms others’ reports of medical 
privilege. It adds to knowledge in this area by providing a perspective on doctors’ 
separation from concerns about this privilege: my participants offered melioristic and 
altruistic rationales for engaging in macroallocation, only rarely – and mildly – 
tempered by insights into role-related conflict and the possibility that doctors’ input 
might be deficient or ineffective. That the former might be expected due to 
participants’ data not being pure subjective presentations of self – instead reflecting 
societal values about ‘the good’ in the practice – makes the absence of a more socially 
‘expected’ response to the matter of role-related conflict surprising, and renders 
significant the strength of participants’ favourable self-image. 
 
Whilst the necessity for medical expert input to macroallocation is generally not 
disputed (Landwehr, 2010; Whitty & Littlejohns, 2015), the limits of the role have not 
been firmly set, nor has a satisfactory way of balancing medical and other stakeholder 
interests been established. The insights I have described may be of use to those who 
are responsible for designing and managing macroallocation processes, and to those 
who are engaged in scholarship and practice concerned with new policy making 
models, for their exposure of ‘blind-spots’ in doctors’ ethical reasoning in relation to 
their privilege.  
 
9.3.6 Skills and knowledge  
My research is the first to report on doctors’ skills in macroallocation in any depth. In 
the small body of previous literature, skills have been mentioned in passing. What 
literature there is suggests that lack of capability in economic analysis is the deficit 
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that most commonly causes doctors concern about their efficacy in macroallocation 
(Bryan et al., 2007; Eckard, Janzon, & Levin, 2014; Gallego et al., 2008; Gibson et 
al., 2005). Limitations in understanding what constitutes evidence have also been 
reported (Harris et al., 2017; Martin, Abelson, et al., 2002). My participants reported 
being out of their depth with economic analysis, but the younger participants also 
wished they were more knowledgeable about health system structure and function, 
and more skilled in people management, advocacy, and strategic thinking.  
 
In Chapter Five (Skills), I reported on the skills doctors value in the macroallocation 
role, and on doctors’ priorities for skills acquisition and efforts to acquire the skills 
they value. Finance, health data, and economic skills were valued by participants in 
my study for their instrumental role in rhetorical performance. Despite their reliance 
on rhetorical skills, however, there was no evidence that the doctors in my study had 
contemplated either logic or argumentation in any formal way. I hypothesised that 
these gaps might result from inadequately specified deliberative processes and ill-
defined concepts of the technical expert role, themselves reflective of uncertainty 
arising from ongoing debates about effective health policy-making models and what 
counts as evidence in policy (Danziger, 1995; Fischer, 2007, p. 229; Gottweis, 2007; 
Greenhalgh & Russell, 2009; Oliver, Lorenc, & Innvær, 2014; Sanderson, 2009). 
These findings reinforce the theme represented in the other strands of this research – 
of communication deficiencies and misunderstandings between policy-makers and 
participants on the objectives of the expert role. Defining the scope and limitations of 
the expert role in macroallocation, and establishing the skills and knowledge 
necessary for its conduct require further empirical and theoretical examination, so that 
expectations can be set and the needs and means for skills development established. It 
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will be important to consider generational issues in light of my findings concerning 
both younger doctors’ more holistic view of the skills needed and the challenges of 
succession planning. 
 
My findings lend weight to other authors’ observations that constructing problems in 
terms of quantitative information, such as financial and health economic data, leads to 
marginalisation of other types of information in macroallocation (Russell & 
Greenhalgh, 2009; I. Williams, Bryan, & McIver, 2007), and to these authors’ 
concerns about the ethical implications of a discourse in resource allocation that is 
biased towards economic considerations.  
 
9.3.7 Conclusion 
The literature on doctors’ experiences in macroallocation is scarce, and little of it 
focuses on ethical concerns. My research is unique in its attempt to describe in depth 
how doctors practice macroallocation. While it generally reinforces the findings of 
earlier work that addresses the same issues, it provides a greater depth of focus, and 
captures a wider set of issues.  
 
No prior research has described the ethical commitments of macroallocation 
practitioners, or their views and practices in connection with skills, and whilst 
procedural justice and role-related conflict have been documented in broadly focussed 
descriptive research, no attempt has been made to evaluate macroallocation 
participants’ consciousness of their ethical dimensions. It must be acknowledged, 
however, that the literature provides no basis on which to claim that there is an unmet 
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demand amongst its practitioners for an ethical framework to guide their 
macroallocation reflection and endeavours. 
 
Most importantly, unlike the present thesis, none of the prior research has attempted 
ethical theorisation of the phenomenon. Taken together, the findings of my empirical 
chapters support a theorisation of doctors’ practice in priority setting as being guided 
by concepts of virtue and confidence in the institution of macroallocation; doctors fall 
short of achieving the ethical aim due to deficiencies in the social processes of 
macroallocation, which render them underprepared and inadequately supported for the 
role. Of particular concern is the apparent absence, in the setting I studied, of levels of 
care, collegiality, and communication about the objectives and procedures of 
macroallocation sufficient to support its goal of equity. I will explore this theorisation 
further in the following section.  
 
These insights into the experiences and perceptions of doctors may be of use to those 
responsible for the design of policy processes; they may also be of interest to 
employers and senior clinicians responsible for the management and care of medical 
staff engaging in macroallocation and other supererogatory activities.  
 
Finally, I offer a reflection on the research process. In my chapters on procedural 
justice and role-related conflict (Chapters Six and Seven), finding the ethical issues 
problematised at the social level by participants, I offered socially focused theories 
and recommendations. It may be that the social focus of my data and my analysis was 
a consequence of my choice of a GT-based methodology, and of my own 
positionality, rather than an integral feature of the phenomenon. Whilst individuals’ 
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moral development is shaped by social and systemic factors, it is possible to examine 
individuals’ ethical stances in isolation from those factors, and to hold them to 
account. It is interesting, therefore, to reflect on my findings in light of the results of 
the international studies I cited above – which suggest that doctors in some 
jurisdictions have a higher level of ethical awareness than the participants in my study 
– and to contemplate an alternative perspective: one that situates the locus of 
responsibility for having the requisite knowledge at the level of the individual 
macroallocation expert participant, rather than at the level of the system. After all, 
doctors take personal responsibility for ensuring they have the knowledge and 
conditions needed to undertake the clinical components of their jobs, so why should 
they not do the same in the case of macroallocation? Such a reading would shift the 
focus of analysis to defects in doctors’ reflexiveness, thoughtfulness, and knowledge-
seeking practices. Future theoretical analysis and empirical research should be 
undertaken in order to develop an understanding of the respective responsibilities of 
the institution of macroallocation and its individual participants for ensuring that 
participants have the right knowledge and skills to undertake the task.  
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Chapter Nine Part 5: An ethics for macroallocation practice 
 
 
 
9.5.1 Introduction 
In this section I will reflect on the findings and analysis presented in the empirical 
chapters of the thesis and propose for Ricoeur’s ‘little ethics’ a role in guiding 
macroallocation practice at several levels.  
 
I established the need for an ethical framework to guide moral analysis of the doctor’s 
role as technical expert in macroallocation in Chapter One (Introduction). In Chapter 
Three, I reported that my data situated doctors’ motivations for engaging in socially 
focussed activities, including macroallocation, in an Aristotelian framework of 
personal and professional flourishing, in which action in concert with others played an 
important energising role. In Chapter Four, I described how Ricoeur’s ‘little ethics’ 
emerged from my data as the ethical framework that had best fit with doctors’ 
experiences and perceptions of the medical role in macroallocation. I also suggested 
that it had promise as an ethics for the deliberative interactions of other actors in 
macroallocation. In Chapter Five I gave an account of doctors’ skills in 
macroallocation that exposed their deliberative priorities and strategies as well as the 
value they placed on the opportunity priority setting afforded them for exercising 
phronesis. In that report I also drew connections between my data and Ricoeur’s 
ethics.  
 
Chapter Six, in its treatment of procedural injustice, described valued practices and 
brought into relief areas of weakness in the social process of macroallocation that 
challenged the achievement of both doctors’ ethical aim and just resource 
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distributions. I argued that, where such deficiencies exist, the conditions for 
accountability for reasonableness (A4R) cannot be met and I proposed an empirically 
derived set of norms focusing on macroallocation participants’ welfare. Chapter 
Seven demonstrated doctors’ lack of sensitivity to role-related conflict, and their 
location of the problem and its solutions in the social world of macroallocation. 
 
I justified my claims about the explanatory and normative power of Ricoeur’s ethics 
in relation to my data in Chapter Two and in Chapters Four and Five (Values and 
Skills). With that justification as the foundation, in this section – building on all of my 
empirical chapters and on my exposition of Ricoeur’s ideas in Chapter Eight – I 
conclude my claim for the relevance of Ricoeur’s ‘little ethics’ to doctors’ 
macroallocation work, argue that Ricoeur’s ethics might be applicable to 
macroallocation practice generally – especially to guiding further development of 
procedural justice frameworks – and draw out the practical implications of my 
research.  
 
In this context it is necessary to acknowledge that the objective of this research was 
not to derive an ethics for selecting priorities for funding, but to focus on the doctor as 
a participant in the social process of macroallocation and identify a framework to aid 
doctors in carrying out the medical role in priority setting ethically; however, that my 
findings highlighted structural impediments to the achievement of distributive justice 
that are outside the control of individual doctors also demands a response. In this 
discussion I will, therefore, draw out areas where Ricoeur’s ethics is relevant to 
macroallocation more broadly. Figure 9.1 below shows the hierarchy of the domains 
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in which my recommendations will fall, and expresses their relationship to Ricoeur’s 
ethics.  
Figure 9.1 Hierarchy of domains of recommendations, and their relationship 
with Ricoeur’s ‘little ethics’ 
 
 
 
Within these domains I will suggest how Ricoeur’s ethics might help to answer key 
questions about the ethical dimensions of macroallocation practice, including:  
 
• How should doctors decide about starting or stopping the macroallocation 
role? 
• How should they perform the role? 
• How should they interact with others? 
• How should they manage dual agency and conflict of interest? 
• How should they evaluate a macroallocation procedure? 
• How should they learn for the role? 
Ricoeur's 'little ethics'
Medical professional ethics
Role and activity 
choice
Norms for 
performing 
macroallocation 
ethically
Procedural 
justice ethical 
frameworks
Norms for 
macroallocation
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• How should they evaluate and respond to other actors’ performance? 
 
Ricoeur’s ethics, based in ‘a social ontology of solicitude, care, promising, and 
accountability, anchored in the acknowledgment of one’s own and others’ otherness’ 
(de Leeuw, 2016), joins an account of human flourishing with the notion of 
distributive justice. It is expressed as the ethical aim of ‘the “good life” lived with and 
for others in just institutions’. I will organise this section according to these three 
levels: self-esteem, solicitude and participative justice, and conclude with a section 
that considers Ricoeur’s ethics in the context of procedural justice frameworks. 
 
9.5.2 Self-esteem 
My empirical data suggested that macroallocation practice is located within concepts 
of virtue, and within an idea of the good life that includes professional flourishing and 
melioristic, socially responsive, and solidaristic actions. I observed connections 
between the significance of the macroallocation role in the lives of participants and 
Aristotelian concepts of the good life, particularly Ricoeur’s ethics, Hannah Arendt’s 
(1958) notion of action in concert with others, and Foucault’s (1988) concept of care 
of the self, themes that are united in Ricoeur’s ‘little ethics’ (Tholen, 2018). Such 
motivations are commonly recorded in the theoretical and empirical literatures on 
doctors’ engagement in supererogatory activities and are consistent with 
psychological conceptualisations of the value of work (Lips-Wiersma & Wright, 
2012; Ward & King, 2017), notions of professional motivation (Larson, 1977, pp. 61-
63), and MacIntyre’s notion of the internal goods associated with a practice, which 
Ricoeur uses to support his ideas of a ‘life plan’ (Ricœur, 1992, pp. 176-178).  
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On the basis of my data, which resonated with Ricoeur’s idea that human flourishing 
encompasses accomplishment (Ricœur, 2007, p. 170), professional excellence 
(Ricœur, 2007, p. 176), virtuous actions, self-understanding through externalisation of 
the interior self (Mei, 2014; Yeager & Herman, 2017), and – through engagement in 
deliberation on matters of justice – the development of self-esteem (Ricœur, 1992, p. 
177; 2007, p. 203), I hypothesised that macroallocation meets an ethical need of 
doctors for action in concert with others, self-scrutiny, and ethical development.  
 
I also identified a connection between the meaning in doctors’ lives of enduring 
engagement with particular health care issues and the role keeping one’s word to 
others plays in guaranteeing self-constancy in Ricoeur’s ethics (Ricoeur, 2006, p. 
487). I hypothesised that, since future-building, except in the most abstract sense, is 
not a feature of clinical practice, macroallocation acted as an essential temporal 
projection of doctors’ influence and intent (Ward & King, 2017), offering them a 
chance to make an enduring impact on the world (Ricœur, 1992, p. 196). 
 
The apportionment of medical professional time has been recognised as a moral issue 
(Coulehan, Williams, Van McCrary, & Belling, 2003; Huddle, 2011; Tilburt & 
Brody, 2016). Ricoeur’s ethics considers – through the notion that promising offers ‘a 
faculty for mastering the future as if it were the present’ (Ricoeur, 2006, pp. 487-488) 
– that actions that benefit future others are equal in value to those whose benefits are 
felt in the present. This feature addresses the ethical problem of doctors’ rationales for 
prioritising macroallocation over other activities, in particular, over patient care in 
overstretched health systems, which was illuminated in my research by participants’ 
unquestioning commitment to the role, despite the pressure of other professional and 
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personal demands. My participants acknowledged that macroallocation exacted costs 
that were borne in their personal and home lives. They were sensitive also to the 
financial cost their non-salaried peers bear if engaging in macroallocation. They had 
no concept, however, of opportunity cost relating to their work lives, that is, of patient 
care forgone to enable their engagement in macroallocation. In Ricoeur’s ethics we 
find a basis on which the ‘cost’ to patients in hand of activities that generate a legacy 
(Ward & King, 2017) might be justified, both for their potential to improve individual 
doctors’ flourishing and for their value to (temporally distant) others.  
 
In Chapter Four (Values), I claimed that the normative relevance of Ricoeur’s ethics 
in this context is conferred by the standards of ethical reasoning it contains, which 
have the potential to guide doctors towards right action when evaluating the place of 
macroallocation practice in the good life and when reflecting on how it might be 
conducted authentically (Kerridge et al., 2013, p. 30; Rachels, 2012, p. 15). My 
claims about this level of Ricoeur’s ethics are centred on the value Ricoeur’s 
understanding of the ethical characteristics of such activities, and of their role in 
human flourishing might hold for doctors who are reflecting on the role 
macroallocation plays in a good life, evaluating it as a career choice, assessing the 
merit of becoming engaged in or continuing to engage in individual priority setting 
opportunities, and seeking to perform macroallocation ethically. Specifically, my data 
and their relationship to Ricoeur’s ethics suggest that involvement in macroallocation 
meets a human need for flourishing and should therefore be evaluated on the basis of 
its contribution to a life rather than to a career; that it demands long-term commitment 
if promises are to be met and accountability achieved; that, if engaging in 
macroallocation is to qualify as a virtuous action, solidaristic motivations ought to be 
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at its foundation; and that legacy-generating, even if it comes at a cost to immediate 
concerns, may be justifiable in a flourishing life. The insights Ricoeur’s idea of the 
good life provides into the ethical meaning of performing roles in macroallocation 
might also serve as guidance to those involved in designing and recruiting to priority 
setting processes. 
 
These ideas may find practical application in Australia through their intersection with 
the AMA’s guide for doctors: ‘The role of doctors in stewardship of healthcare 
financing and funding arrangements’ (Australian Medical Association, 2016), which 
complements its code of conduct. This document recommends ethical reflection on 
whether the good is served by a doctor’s engagement in any macroallocation process; 
my analysis here and in later parts of this discussion goes some way towards setting 
out criteria against which that assessment could take place. 
 
9.5.3 Solicitude 
In Ricoeur’s ethics, solicitude, based in recognition that the worth of the other is equal 
to one’s own, underpins actions taken in community for the benefit of others, 
individually and in the social context (Hohler, 2000).  
 
In Chapters Three and Four (Advocacy and Values), my findings included doctors’ 
ideas on what should motivate performance of the macroallocation role, and how it 
should be performed ethically. I described doctors’ solidaristic motivations for 
engaging in macroallocation, their reconceptualisation of the ‘patient’ to mean the 
community or society at large, and their enjoyment of the mutuality of the 
macroallocation process. I showed that these themes were consistent with Ricoeur’s 
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conception of living ‘with and for others’. In this section I will draw out some features 
of Ricoeur’s thinking that have particular pertinence to the medical ethical problems 
with which this research is concerned and summarise those of my normatively 
relevant findings that relate to this level of Ricoeur’ ethics.  
 
For Ricoeur, ‘responsibility’ entails the notion of ‘responding’, and means both 
‘counting on’ and ‘being accountable for’ (Ricœur, 1992, p. 165). Medicine is 
founded on willingness to be responsible for recognising and responding to the 
suffering of others (Clark, 2010). That medicine provides plentiful opportunities to 
respond to the suffering of others and to be recognised as a person who can be 
counted on prompts the question: does not clinical practice already encompass the 
ethical aim of solicitude?  
 
According to Ricoeur the answer is ‘yes’. Ricoeur explored clinical medicine in 
‘Reflections on The Just’ (2007) and found it to be a good fit with the ‘little ethics’, 
although it required a reversal of the sequence of the ethical aim in order to 
accommodate the phronesis required to respond to immediate patient needs. His 
conceptualisation of medicine, however, is narrow. My data led me to conclude that it 
is not to his specific treatment of medicine that we should look for the connection to 
macroallocation; rather it is to the ‘little ethics’ in its original form, whose order better 
reflects both the complex role of macroallocation in the accomplished medical life 
and the difference in character between acting publicly in the polis and acting 
privately in the doctor-patient encounter. I hypothesise, therefore, that for doctors who 
elect to be involved in it, macroallocation enables actualisation of the ethical aim by 
compensating for clinical practice’s failure – by virtue of the singularity of the 
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relationship between doctor and patient – to deliver on the mutual recognition, 
reciprocity, and community encompassed within Ricoeur’s idea of living ‘with and 
for others’. Of course, doctors who elect supererogatory professional and private 
activities (Huddle, 2011, 2013) other than engagement in macroallocation may find 
the possibility of actualising the ethical aim in those pursuits.  
 
The notion of solicitude also points to some areas wherein Ricoeur’s ethics abuts 
other ethical frameworks that are drawn on traditionally in medicine and health care. 
First, Ricoeur challenges the primacy of medical deontology. For Ricoeur, the 
subject’s actions are motivated by disposition and solicitude, rather than duty, 
(Ricœur, 2007, p. 68); in his treatment of medical ethics in ‘Reflections on The Just’ 
(Ricœur, 2007, pp. 198-212), Ricoeur claims that medical deontological approaches 
are over-valued, and in any case are unsuited to matters that affect public health or 
expenditure of public funds, and he offers his ‘little ethics’ as a more valid option, a 
position to which my data lend support.  
 
Second, via solicitude, Ricoeur’s ethics has an interesting intersection with care 
ethics, an ethical system that has a particular affinity with health care (Flaming, 2006; 
Kuhse, 1997). Care ethics, due to its inclusion of notions of relatedness and 
reciprocity, offers a counterpoint to principlism and other traditional bioethical logos-
based reasoning (Barton, 2008). Through the notions of solicitude and concern with 
non-intimate others, Ricoeur’s ethics has the potential to extend notions of care to 
areas of medical practice that are not amenable to care ethics on account of the latter’s 
focus on caring encounters between individuals.  
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Finally, Ricoeur’s ethics epitomises virtue ethics in the social world, extending its 
relevance to an aspect of medical practice that is not normally examined using this 
system. According to Crisp (1996, p. 15), the connections between the community 
and virtue are ‘often gestured at but rarely analysed in detail’. This is not the case 
with Ricoeur’s framing of virtue ethics, which has its foundation in communitarian 
ideals, and demonstrates a sensitivity to the links with community that Blum (1996, 
pp. 232-233) associates with virtue ethics: communities help constitute our ethical 
identities, stimulate us to respond to our principles, and provide the setting in which 
we exercise our morality. I suggest that for doctors – whose privileged professional 
and social roles can isolate them from societal customs and standards (Larson, 1977, 
pp. xi-xii) – the social process of macroallocation serves all of these ethical purposes.  
 
As I have written earlier in this thesis, I hoped that my study would shed light on 
whether the policy expert role ought to be conceived as information provider or 
advocate. My initial assumption that the doctor’s role in macroallocation is a form of 
patient advocacy was not supported by the literature on policy making or advocacy, 
which showed it to be, if anything, a minor component of the physician advocate role 
(Dobson, Voyer, Hubinette, & Regehr, 2014; Flynn & Verma, 2008; Hubinette, 
Ajjawi, et al., 2014; Oandasan, 2005; Wright et al., 2005). I found that doctors in my 
sample adhered intensely to the idea that the motivation for macroallocation must lie 
in an interest in achieving some sort of public good, and that purely self-serving 
motivations were unacceptable. Doctors’ motivations in macroallocation lay along a 
spectrum spanning from patient-focused advocacy to an interest in distributive justice 
for its own sake, any point along which might coexist with self-interest. What is 
expected of doctors in the role encompasses the same themes – although, due to the 
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structural vagueness I describe below, the expectations may remain poorly defined or 
unacknowledged at the level of individual macroallocation exercises, and even more 
problematically, at the level of the medical codes that promote the role – for example 
the physician charter (ABIM Foundation, 2004) and the AMA code of ethics 
(Australian Medical Association, 2017).  
 
In the context of my exploration of solicitude and mutuality, neither the data that 
support the relevance of Ricoeur’s ethics to the phenomenon nor Ricoeur’s concept of 
solicitude help to clarify the nature of the act of giving expert input to policy making. 
My analysis showed that although participants uniformly expected participation to be 
motivated by solicitude, they were not of one voice in identifying the targets of that 
solicitude. In Ricoeur’s ethics there is no constraint on the type of communitarian 
actions that might qualify as caring responses to others and to human plurality. Thus, 
in a Ricoeurian framework, there is no special ethical value in acting for society over 
acting for patients, or vice versa. The framework taken as a whole, however, would 
seem to require that we clarify on whose behalf our efforts are being made, since 
failing to do so would undermine our effective performance of reciprocity and 
argumentation. The normative implication of this level of Ricoeur’s ethics in the 
context or priority setting would seem to be that it is legitimate for participants to 
occupy any of several roles, but 1) they ought to be self-reflexive about their 
motivations for engaging in macroallocation; 2) they ought to seek understandings 
with those responsible for each macroallocation process on its objectives and the roles 
they, as individual participants, are expected to play; and 3) they ought to perform 
consistently the role they have undertaken to play. 
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Ultimately, my research fails to disambiguate the advocacy-information spectrum to 
any useful extent; rather, it corroborates the fuzziness of existing conceptions of the 
expert role and highlights some of the consequences of this. Research directed at this 
issue is a priority if for no other reason than to respond to the need to assign words to 
each way of performing the role, even if it turns out that doctors’ positionality in 
macroallocation is best established on a case-by-case basis.  
 
An implication of Ricoeur’s ethics is that institutions play such an important role in 
the ethical life that they demand commitments to sincerity and good faith from those 
responsible for their establishment and oversight, as well as from those who 
participate in them. In Table 9.1 below I summarise the normatively relevant 
implications of the second level of Ricoeur’s ethics for the medical role in 
macroallocation. In Table 9.2 are presented corresponding guidelines for process 
designers, since these are responsible for the creation of the institutional conditions 
for macroallocation.  
Table 9.1 Ethical foundations for performing the expert role in 
macroallocation that arise from the second level of Ricoeur’s ethics 
 
Motivation  
• Macroallocation participation ought to be motivated (at least in part) by solicitude. 
• Macroallocation participation ought to be performed in a spirit of reciprocity.  
• Macroallocation participants ought to be self-reflexive about their motivations for 
engaging in macroallocation. 
Preparation 
• Macroallocation participants ought to become familiar with and recognise the qualities of 
pluralistic policy development models.  
• Macroallocation participants ought to establish, on a case-by-case basis, what role they are 
expected to play, and evaluate their willingness and ability to play the desired role. 
• Macroallocation participants ought to establish in consultation with process designers 
whether there is a need for special skills or knowledge and, if so, agree on how it is to be 
acquired. 
Performance 
• Macroallocation participants ought to adhere to the role they have agreed to play in the 
process.   
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Table 9.2 Guidelines for establishing participant readiness for macroallocation 
that arise from the second level of Ricoeur’s ethics 
 
Preparation  
Process designers ought to be clear and transparent about which policy development models are 
being applied. 
Process designers ought to communicate with participants about the objectives of the policy 
process and what is required of participants.   
Process designers ought to establish whether participants are capable of aligning with process 
objectives; and support those who are not, if they are essential to the process. 
Education 
Macroallocation projects ought to develop shared understandings amongst participants of 
distributive justice ideals and ethical systems. 
Process designers ought to establish and meet participants’ needs for education in distributive 
justice ideals and ethical systems. 
 
 
 
These guidelines might assist, respectively, doctors who are preparing for 
participation in macroallocation, and process designers and managers who are 
aiming to establish an ethical foundation for deliberation that takes account of 
participants’ needs for information, orientation, and education. 
 
9.5.4 Participative justice 
In this section I will address engagement in matters of distributive justice and 
practices of deliberation. 
 
According to Ricoeur, just institutions answer our need for justice (Ricœur, 1992, p. 
172) and provide the setting for exercising our sense of justice (Taylor, 2014). In 
Chapter Four (Values) I showed that doctors valued justice and equity, and derived 
satisfaction from the opportunity afforded by macroallocation for influencing 
distributive justice on a societal scale. I also showed how doctors’ drive for justice 
and engagement intersected with Ricoeur’s recognition of the role the just institution 
plays in extending our involvement in justice to those beyond single, identifiable 
others (Ricœur, 1992, p. 194). In Chapter Three (Advocacy) I hypothesised that 
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doctors sought respite from the unequal relations that exist between doctors and 
patients and from powerlessness within their own clinical and managerial structures 
by becoming engaged – on an equal, collaborative role with other participants – in 
matters concerned with the allocation of resources.  
 
Consistent with Ricoeur’s characterisation of the institution, my findings showed that, 
whilst the institution’s purpose – apportioning society’s resources (Ricœur, 1992, p. 
199) – is important to macroallocation participants, so too is its social function of 
bringing individual participants into contact with non-intimate others in a setting 
characterised by common customs (Ricœur, 1992, pp. 194-195), mutuality, and 
recognition and care of the ‘other’ (Mouton Dorey, 2016). For doctors who engage in 
it, macroallocation satisfies a demand for engagement in justice that is not otherwise 
easily satisfied due to the structure of medical work and relationships (Freidson, 1970, 
pp. 105-125): for collaborative action focused on the achievement of a communitarian 
ideal (De Leeuw, 2017; Pellauer, 2012). Through extending the ethical focus beyond 
the special circumstances of the suffering, dependent patient, macroallocation 
broadens doctors’ perspectives on the worth, moral competency, and convictions of 
the other (Ricœur, 1992, pp. 262-273; Yeager & Herman, 2017). 
 
Although Ricoeur explored applications of his ‘little ethics’ chiefly in the area of the 
law, and to a lesser extent, clinical medicine (Ricœur, 2000, 2007) it is not a 
framework aimed at any profession or particular facet of life; rather it is a general 
guide for an ethical life. In the context of my research, two questions arise from this. 
First, how can I claim that Ricoeur’s ethics has special relevance to doctors in 
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macroallocation, rather than to doctors in general or, indeed, humans in general? 
Second, in what particular way is it relevant to the medical role in macroallocation? 
 
To the first question I respond that it is not necessary to show how it might be 
relevant to other fields in order to justify its application to a particular field; 
furthermore, other activities in other lives might perform the same role as 
macroallocation does for its practitioners. It is worth noting, however, that doctors 
engage in a wide variety of non-clinical professional activities, according to their 
preferences and abilities (Huddle, 2013), in institutions that offer opportunities for 
mutuality similar to those offered by macroallocation. On this basis, I suggest that the 
participative justice encompassed in the ethical aim is relevant to medicine broadly, 
and that the observations I will make below about the potential normative applications 
of the third level of the ‘little ethics’ might equally apply to the wider medical field. 
 
The second question can be considered by examining Ricoeur’s ethics in the context 
of this research’s goal of providing norms for practice. If we recognise that fellowship 
and collaborative engagement in deliberative justice have special meaning as ethical 
priorities for doctors who engage in macroallocation, then macroallocation processes 
ought to be designed and conducted in ways consistent with these priorities. Likewise, 
doctors seeking to flourish in this role ought to perform it in a way that recognises that 
it has an ethical value beyond attracting funds for health care; the guidelines for 
practice that I propose in this section are sensitive to these priorities.  
 
Although the adequacy of institutions is a subject on which Ricoeur says little 
(Tholen, 2018), the ‘little ethics’, in including the just institution as a constituent of an 
 
 
304 
ethical life, would seem to demand of such institutions that they meet standards 
sufficient for the achievement of just results and, of deliberation in any such 
institution, that it comply with the norms of that institution. For macroallocation, as I 
have established in the preceding chapters, these norms are generally to be found in 
procedural justice ethical frameworks, of which Daniels and Sabin’s A4R (2008) is a 
notable example. Later in this discussion, I will show how Ricoeur’s ethics supports 
the development of an additional condition for procedural justice that responds to 
deficiencies in the framework. 
 
I reported in this research that, although my participants enjoyed engagement with the 
institution of macroallocation, and had faith in its potential to deliver just 
distributions, some of the procedural deficiencies they encountered shook their 
confidence in the justice of the enterprise and others affected their wellbeing. I 
showed that macroallocation institutions fails in several ways to meet participants’ 
needs and expectations, and I argued that any process affected by these deficiencies 
fails to comply with A4R – in particular, with its relevance and transparency 
conditions. In Chapter Six (Procedural Justice), I attributed this situation to 
macroallocation’s lack of care for participant welfare, and made a case for care for 
participant welfare being an essential criterion for procedural justice. I also noted that 
A4R lacks a standard explicitly focusing on the practical and moral comfort of 
macroallocation participants, and that while this notion appears to be implicit in the 
relevance and transparency conditions, it is insufficiently visible and rarely taken into 
account. I stopped short of making a recommendation affecting the integrity of 
procedural justice frameworks, opting instead for a checklist addressing patient 
welfare – to be used in conjunction with any macroallocation procedure, whether or 
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not guided by a normative framework. With hindsight, I believe I should have 
claimed that care for participant welfare warrants a stand-alone place in any 
procedural justice system. I will address this claim later in this chapter.  
 
The process of deliberating is an aspect of priority setting that has that has been 
acknowledged as inadequately articulated and lacking transparency (I. Williams, 
Dickinson, & Robinson, 2012, p. 93). In the following paragraphs I will reflect on the 
descriptions of deliberation in my data and use my findings evoking Ricoeur’s 
accounts of phronesis and ethics in deliberation to show the relevance of the ‘little 
ethics’ to the development of norms for doctors’ deliberative practice in 
macroallocation and for deliberation generally; I will also suggest what form such 
norms might take.  
 
In Chapter Five (Skills) I made connections between my data and the work of scholars 
who conceptualise experts’ policy work as phronesis, and of those who recognise and 
value the expert’s use of rhetoric. I noted the disjunction between this way of 
performing the role and the accepted view of how policy work should be performed: 
that contemporary priority setting procedure is founded on positivistic reasoning and 
rational arguments (Fischer, 1998; Gottweis, 2007; Oliver et al., 2014; Russell, 
Greenhalgh, Byrne, & McDonnell, 2008), and that rhetoric is problematical (Tholen, 
2018). Jill Russell, whose work I cited in that chapter (Greenhalgh & Russell, 2009; 
Russell et al., 2008), went on to write a PhD based on a rhetorical policy analysis of 
deliberative priority setting (Russell, 2017). Russell’s research focused on 
microallocation issues elevated to the institutional level by virtue of their cost and 
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complexity as well as on macroallocation – issues that shared deliberative content and 
dramatis personae. 
 
Russell provided an empirically derived description of the constituents of rhetorical 
deliberation as ‘the disclosure of ideas, careful listening, reflection on values, critical 
questioning, thinking things through in a way that evokes emotions and beliefs’ and 
demonstrated how they support wise, rather than merely reasoned, decisions (Russell, 
2017, p. 241). This description, which resonates strongly with my findings on valued 
deliberative practices, evokes an ideal for priority setting that is consistent with 
Ricoeur’s concept of virtuous deliberation. I find in this concordance reinforcement of 
my claim for the relevance of Ricoeur’s ethics to deliberative practice in 
macroallocation. 
 
Russell found that while participants experienced deliberation as phronesis, they 
undertook it in a community that subscribed intellectually to an evidence-based model 
of decision making (Russell, 2017, p. 242). This is consistent with the tensions I 
reported in Chapter Five (Skills) between contemporary policy making models and 
the way it is actually performed, and with the opacity about policy roles and 
objectives I reported in Chapter Six (Procedural Justice).  
 
Together, my study and Russell’s make a case that the macroallocation institution – 
together with the procedural justice ethics systems that it often uses – focuses on 
procedural and structural detail at the expense of attending to the role of individuals, 
and their words, actions, and interactions in the actualisation of justice. In Chapter Six 
I theorised that the flame of procedural injustice in macroallocation is sparked by a 
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lack of care for and attention to the welfare of macroallocation participants and 
fanned by deficiencies in fellowship, communication, and information sharing.  
 
A number of explanations for my findings come to mind. It is possible that the 
macroallocation processes experienced by my participants were not ideal – perhaps, 
as my participants posited, due to the inexperience or incompetence of bureaucrats. It 
is also possible that they were adequate, but not appreciated or reported as such by my 
participants. It is more likely, however, that the social process of macroallocation is so 
fraught with power imbalances and divergent objectives (Gibson et al., 2005; Hunter, 
2015; Kingdon, 2002, pp. 97-115) that it seems preferable to keep it underspecified 
and obscure. For what is the right way to confront an altruist with their self-interest? 
Or a devoted participant with the limitations structured into the role? And how can the 
role of judgment be acknowledged when it is an article of faith that decisions are 
evidence based? Failures in communication and care may mask the difficulty of 
confronting the aporias inherent in the reliance of priority setting on the commitment 
of conflicted experts. This is an area that clearly warrants further research if we are to 
develop a basis on which structural ambiguities and social avoidances might be 
addressed – although as I remark in Part 9.3 above, that the problem has parallels in 
the researcher: participant relationship bodes ill.  
 
I look here to Ricoeur’s ideas on ethical argumentation and its contribution to the 
achievement of the ethical aim in order to establish what role Ricoeur’s ethics might 
play in overcoming the deficits in care and communication that affect macroallocation 
interactions and in advancing recognition of the importance of practices of caring, 
communicating, and relating to each other. Its embrace of mutuality and respect for 
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the convictions of others suggests that the ‘little ethics’ might have a role both in 
guiding doctors’ performance of the role and in harmonising deliberative practices 
amongst macroallocation actors generally. According to Ricoeur, the just institution 
demands moral and epistemological humility, and recognition of the equal worth, 
moral competency and convictions of the other (Ricœur, 1992, pp. 262-273; Yeager 
& Herman, 2017). Convictions are at the creative core of Ricoeur’s idea of phronesis; 
they are not in opposition to reason, but are a component of the rationalising process 
(Mei, 2014). Respectful treatment of the convictions of others is what enables 
impartiality and leads to what Ricoeur holds to be the appropriate outcomes of 
deliberations: decisions based on shared understanding rather than on agreement 
(Ricœur, 2007, p. 89).  
 
This conceptualisation of deliberative justice has a significant implication for 
macroallocation. First, it suggests that the practices of argumentation I reported on, 
which served to make macroallocation participants influencers rather than mere 
imparters of information, are consistent with the ethical aim, as constructed in a 
Ricoeurian framework; indeed, it may be both futile and unfair to mandate otherwise. 
The practical consequence of this is that it opens up the possibility of doing away with 
the idea that the expert can be a neutral informant – which is represented in segments 
of the literature, for example by Rich (2004) and Sklar (2016) – and replacing it with 
a frank acknowledgement that every participant in macroallocation is a stakeholder 
(Hunter, 2015; Little et al., 2002). Ricœur (2007, p. 240) incorporates Habermas’s 
discourse ethics in his ideas on ethical deliberation on the basis that its foundation in 
translating conflict to language makes it particularly suited to matters of distributive 
justice (Marcelo, 2014). Habermas’s ideas that deliberation should include those with 
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‘the competence to speak and act’ and that they each have a right and a duty to put 
forward their best argument (Habermas & Outhwaite, 1996, pp. 180-192) and are of 
importance in the macroallocation setting for the tolerant conception of participation 
they imply, but require tempering by Ricoeur’s ideas on generosity in deliberation if 
they are to conclude in shared understanding. Proper acknowledgement of interests 
would create the substrate out of which structures might be grown for fair and honest 
management of the ethical challenges of macroallocation, notably conflict of interest, 
dual agency, inequitable representation, and testimonial injustice. In short, it is only 
by naming the role accurately and with honesty that we can arrive at a basis on which 
the risks caused by human frailty can be managed.  
 
I described in Chapters Four and Five (Values and Skills) how these notions were 
expressed in my data. Here, drawing on Ricoeur, I propose the terms in which they 
might be expressed in an ethical framework for deliberating in macroallocation. My 
findings support the inclusion of the notions of moral and epistemological humility, 
that is, openness to the ideas of others on what is right and what is true; recognition of 
the convictions of others, that is, willingness to respect and to try to understand the 
origins and justifications for others’ beliefs; linguistic hospitality, that is, willingness 
to tailor communication to the needs of others; and acknowledgement that the 
objective is arrival at shared understanding rather than agreement. In Table 9.3 below, 
I set out guidelines for deliberation in macroallocation that arise from this analysis. 
The guidelines encompass both individual practitioner and collective perspectives, 
although the special role of the process leader in setting the conditions where 
respectful deliberation is possible needs to be separately acknowledged.  
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Table 9.3 Guidelines for deliberation in macroallocation that arise from the 
third level of Ricoeur’s ‘little ethics’ 
 
1. When deliberating, with others, in priority setting seek to: 
• Be open to the ideas of others on what is right  
• Be open to the ideas of others on what is true  
• Be willing to respect and to try to understand the origins and justifications for 
others’ beliefs 
• Be willing to reflect on and share the origins and justifications for your own beliefs, 
including those that might relate to competing interests 
• Recognise your, and others’, rights and obligations to put forward your best 
argument 
• Be willing to tailor communication to the needs of others 
• Be willing to arrive at shared understanding rather than agreement 
 
2. Partiality in deliberation is acceptable if it is approached in accordance with Guideline 1 
 
It needs to be recognised that these notions of ethical deliberation existed – as 
performed practices and as their antitheses – in my data in tandem with instances of 
procedural injustice. Although most of the latter do not directly concern deliberative 
practices, testimonial injustice as it affects women is a significant exception. An 
approach to bias is encompassed in the conditions for deliberation I propose below, by 
virtue of their promotion of ethical relations generally amongst participants; I also 
address bias in the empirically derived checklist for participant welfare I presented in 
Chapter Six (Procedural Justice), which I reproduce in Table 9.4 below.  
 
The matter of the threat to justice that results from bias against the input of women is 
a profoundly serious one that is well beyond the scope both of the instruments I have 
developed and of this thesis. It is an area that demands further research as a matter of 
priority. It is especially urgent to establish a greater understanding of its impact on 
health policy decision making in light of evidence that systematic bias has a direct 
effect on clinical care and outcomes for women – see Khan et al. (2018) for a recent 
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example. Investigation of the matter of representation of minority groups deserves 
equal attention for similar reasons. 
Table 9.4  Macroallocation participant welfare checklist  
Domain Topic Question 
Knowledge  Orientation Has there been an orientation to this priority setting 
process that sets out objectives, operating principles, 
participant roles, and required knowledge?  
Training Have participants’ needs for role-related training been 
addressed? 
Participant  
support 
Specialised 
support  
Is adequate specialised technical support provided to 
participants?  
Psychological 
support  
Are mentoring and psychological support available? 
 
Workload 
monitoring  
Is there a system for monitoring and, if necessary, 
modifying the workload of participants, taking into 
account other calls on their skills and knowledge? 
Inclusiveness Diversity Have efforts been made to mitigate structural bias and 
promote diversity?     
Skilled leadership Are those leading the process capable of conducting it in 
a way that models and manages inclusiveness and respect 
for all perspectives? 
Accountability Feedback Is there a mechanism for feeding back to participants the 
reasons and contexts for the decisions made by the final 
decision maker?  
Accountability 
for welfare 
Are those responsible for the welfare of participants and 
the quality of the processes held to account?  
 
Making explicit the moral significance and practical performance of Ricoeur’s ideal 
of deliberation through application of the guidelines for deliberation might serve to 
motivate generous interactions aimed at mediating ethical pluralism and arriving at 
just decisions. That this ideal might enable refiguration of beliefs and values and 
enhancement of the coherency of putative universal claims (Mei, 2014; Yeager & 
Herman, 2017) adds to its attractiveness and utility, since changes to the convictions 
of those who come together to exchange ideas in macroallocation could serve to close 
the gap of understanding between them in a lasting way.  
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At the individual practitioner level – as well as guiding practice in the expert role – 
the guidelines and checklist might help those confronted with an opportunity to 
participate in a priority setting exercise to determine whether it meets the conditions 
that support the ethical intention and the virtuous functions of health care institutions, 
by prompting questions concerning the adequacy of the process as a vehicle for 
bringing about just distributions of resources, the sufficiency and aptness of doctors’ 
skills, and the availability of support to do the task well.    
 
For designers and leaders of macroallocation processes, the guidelines and checklist 
could serve as conditions to foster through leadership and structural, procedural, and 
educational interventions. 
  
I reported in Chapter Six (Procedural Justice) that, although procedural injustice 
troubled doctors, it was never sufficient to provoke abandonment of the role of or a 
particular process. While doctors’ tolerance of bureaucratic deficiencies might be 
explained by priority setting’s importance in their lives (see above) and by the values 
and customs they share with bureaucrats (Brint, 1994, p. 135; Larson, 1977, p. 206), it 
is nonetheless problematical if it prevents the exercise of judgement and thereby the 
perpetuation of procedurally unjust conditions. For doctors and bureaucrats alike, 
Ricoeur’s ethics and the practical norms I have derived from its interaction with my 
data have the potential to empower participants to challenge unjust deliberative 
conditions in order to restore the possibility of actualising the ‘the good’ in 
macroallocation.   
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I conclude this section with a reflection on partiality, drawing on Ricoeur’s ideas 
about ethical deliberation. Doctors’ partiality in favour of their patients is a 
cornerstone of medical ethics, but in priority setting it is problematical for the 
challenge it presents to this setting’s utilitarian reasoning systems. Scholars have 
justified contravening the norm to sanction partiality in this setting on the basis of its 
potential to increase the overall good in the system – which would be diminished if 
patients could not trust their doctors to represent their interests (Kopelman, 1999) – its 
role in supporting patient representation (Holm, 2011), its inevitability (Daniels, 
2016), and its desirability as an element of the good life, a position taken by 
Nussbaum, drawing on Aristotle (Tholen, 2018). The ‘little ethics’ offers a framework 
for the ethical examination of partiality in macroallocation, principally through its 
engagement of Habermas’s discourse ethics, but also through Ricoeur’s recognition 
that, since objectivity is impossible, the generous process of deliberative engagement 
‘under the gaze of others’ (Mei, 2014) transforms our natural partiality into shared 
understanding. This configuration sanctions partiality as long as it is accompanied by 
generosity and is helpful in prompting realistic expectations about the degree to which 
priority setting participants can and should perform impartiality.  
 
9.5.5 Ricoeur’s ‘little ethics’ as the basis for a procedural justice condition  
My work appears to be the first to expose relational factors and care for participant 
welfare as potential influencers of the deliberative process in macroallocation – and, 
thereby, of distributive justice – and to contemplate the implications of that influence 
in the context of procedural justice frameworks.  
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In Chapter Six (Procedural Justice) I made a case that processes that treat participants 
in macroallocation unfairly or cause them to have moral unease about the justice of 
the enterprise are incompatible with the conditions for procedural justice set out in 
Daniels and Sabin’s (2008) A4R. I acknowledged, however, that for distributive 
justice to be achieved, the procedural formula set out in A4R requires an 
interpretation that encompasses the just treatment of the people who constitute the 
process. I claimed that although such an interpretation is possible, it is seldom made – 
probably because this dimension is implicit, rather than clearly stated. In this 
discussion will I extend these ideas to any system of ethics relying for its authority on 
legitimacy (W. R. Smith, 2018) and propose an additional procedural justice condition 
based on my analysis.  
 
Procedural justice ethical frameworks respond to a belief that decisions will be 
accepted as just if the institutional conditions for deliberation are ‘right’ (Daniels, 
2016; Klein & Williams, 2000, pp. 20-21; Sandberg, Persson, & Garpenby, 2018), 
and if it can be demonstrated that they have been subject to rigorous and fair due 
process (Ham, 2000; I. Williams et al., 2012, p. 97). Daniels and Sabin’s (2008) 
‘accountability for reasonableness’ framework (A4R) is the paradigmatic procedural 
justice model (Friedman, 2008). It establishes macroallocation as a collective 
enterprise on which legitimacy is conferred by democratic participation and critique 
(Bærøe, 2009). In the A4R framework four conditions must be satisfied if a process is 
to be considered just: relevance; publicity; the possibility of appeals and revision; and 
regulative/enforcement mechanisms (Daniels, 2016). The relevance condition is the 
cornerstone of the framework: it is the element that most closely focuses on the 
deliberative act. It states that ‘a rationale will be relevant if it appeals to evidence, 
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reasons, and principles that are accepted as relevant by fair-minded people who are 
disposed to finding mutually justifiable terms of cooperation’ (Daniels & Sabin, 
2008). 
 
In Chapter (Introduction) I discussed some of the important criticisms of A4R. That 
the conditions are necessary is generally undisputed. Most debate challenges their 
sufficiency; while the possibility has not been ruled out (Gibson et al., 2005), a strong 
case for additional conditions has yet to be made. The relevance condition is the most 
common focus of criticisms, amongst which are claims that ‘fair-mindedness’ and 
‘reasons’ in the relevance condition are not sufficiently well specified to enable 
agreement on what count as relevant reasons (Friedman, 2008; Resnik, MacDougall, 
& Smith, 2018; Russell, 2017, p. 58) and on appropriate responses to agreed-upon 
reasons (Hasman & Holm, 2005).  
 
The writings of Daniels and Sabin have been virtually silent on the social and 
relational dimensions of deliberating and absolutely silent on the matter of care for 
participants. Recently, however, Norman Daniels touched on the social world of 
macroallocation in a paper in which he identified a number of research priorities for 
A4R (Daniels, 2018). He acknowledged the potential impact on justice of deliberators 
with unequal power or charisma, and called for research on the process of fair 
deliberation. Other scholars who have dipped their toes in the water of interactions in 
deliberation are Hasman and Holm (2005), who recognised that the institutional 
conditions of a process and the characteristics of its participants may influence what is 
considered ‘reasonable’, and Friedman (2008) and Resnik et al. (2018) who 
acknowledged that power differentials between macroallocation participants are 
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problematical. This is the closest the bioethics literature comes to recognising the 
communicational and relational aspects of macroallocation, dimensions that were also 
unrepresented in the political science and public policy literature that I drew on in my 
work on skills in macroallocation in Chapter Five (Skills).  
 
In the empirical literature on A4R implementation, references to the relational 
dimensions of deliberation were also scant: Gibson et al. (2005) described power 
differentials and Sinclair et al. (2008) reported that participants’ experience 
attempting to reconcile multiple perspectives as onerous. The literature reflects the 
essence of the problem: that while procedural justice frameworks have directed 
attention onto the structural conditions of macroallocation, what goes on in the ‘black 
box’ of deliberation has been profoundly neglected. Specifically, that the quality of 
both ‘reasons’ and decisions stands to be impacted by poorly briefed, inadequately 
supported, and fatigued participants has not been recognised.  
 
In conclusion, whilst the relational aspects of priority setting and the notion of care 
for the welfare of macroallocation participants may be already implied in A4R, they 
have little visibility. I have found no evidence that they are prominent in scholars’ or 
practitioners’ interpretations of the A4R conditions, which do not appear sufficient to 
promote and protect these notions in a practical way. I have found a small amount of 
support in the literature for the idea that what happens in the ‘black box’ of 
deliberation may be significant.  
 
Amongst the other procedural justice ethics systems I reviewed in Chapter One  
(Introduction), the framework for deliberation proposed by Gutmann and Thompson 
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(2002, pp. 77-94) is unique in acknowledging, albeit to a minor extent, the idea that 
communication and interaction might have a bearing on the justice of a procedure. 
The framework includes as a standard of justification for decisions the idea of 
‘respectful reasons’ (Gutmann & Thompson, 2002, p. 86), which responds to the 
inevitability of disagreement even amongst good-willed deliberators, and is based on 
reciprocity and mutual respect. It demands ‘a [mutually] favourable attitude toward 
and constructive interaction with people with whom one reasonably disagrees’ 
(Gutmann & Thompson, 2002, p. 87), which ought to be extended to both those 
affected by and those participating in decision making. This standard, although not 
obviously informed by it, calls up Ricoeur’s notion of just deliberation. The role this 
standard plays in my argument is to draw out the current status of the idea of 
respectful deliberation in priority setting scholarship and to show that it falls well 
short of addressing comprehensively the deficits in care of participants that – I have 
argued in this thesis – underlie deficiencies in communication and relations in 
macroallocation. It also serves as a foundation on which establish my claims for 
Ricoeur’s ethics. 
 
At this point in my argument, I will take stock. On the basis of my empirical data and 
ethical analysis, I have attempted to establish: 1) that the prospect of distributive 
justice is influenced by factors at the social and interpersonal levels of 
macroallocation processes; 2) that these factors are not sufficiently clearly articulated 
in procedural justice frameworks or taken into account in practice; 3) that lack of 
attention to them renders unachievable the conditions for procedural justice; and 4) 
that attending to them is necessary if we are to restore the possibility of meeting the 
conditions for procedural justice, and by that means, improve the prospect of arriving 
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at just distributions. I will now use the notion of ‘care for participants’ that I have 
explored in this thesis to support a proposal for an additional condition for procedural 
justice.  
 
In developing this condition, I found relevant the rationale Gibson et al. (2005) used 
to claim a place for their ‘empowerment condition’ in A4R:   
 
• It is qualitatively similar, in terms of its normativity, generality, and reach, to 
the existing conditions 
• It ‘goes beyond’ the relevance condition’s concern with the solicitation of 
reasons – setting the scene for their acceptance as factors shaping decisions, 
and 
• It engages with discourse ethics and other safeguards against coercion, which 
are not otherwise represented in A4R. 
 
To these I add: 
 
• It goes beyond the relevance condition’s concern with the solicitation of 
reasons – drawing a focus onto the personal dimensions of reasoning by 
optimising the conditions in which deliberators make their contributions. 
 
An additional condition that responds to the gap I have identified in procedural justice 
frameworks and to the ethical dimensions of my analysis would need to accommodate 
the ideas of ‘care for deliberators’ – which I developed in Chapter Six (Procedural 
Justice) and summarised above – and ‘care in deliberation’, which arises from the 
analysis of ethical deliberation I undertook in the preceding section and in Chapter 
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Five (Skills). (This division is most clearly understood by considering the guidelines 
for deliberation in Table 9.3 above, which summarises what is at stake in the former, 
and the instruments focused on the roles of process designers (Tables 9.2 and 9.4), 
which summarise what is at stake in the latter.) I will express this condition as the 
‘respect condition’, since the notion of respect succinctly recognises that the concept 
of recognition of ‘oneself as another’ is at the heart of this condition, where it 
provides the ethical motivation for the necessary caring; the term also recognises the 
connection between Gutmann and Thompson’s (2002, pp. 77-94) idea of ‘respectful 
reasons’ and Ricoeur’s notions of ethical deliberation. The essence of the ‘respect 
condition’ is that deliberations on limit setting ought to be designed and conducted so 
as to recognise and support the exercise of the equal moral agency of all participants. 
Such a condition would subsume Gibson et al.’s (2005) ‘empowerment condition’. 
 
9.5.6 Ricoeur’s ethics as an ethics for macroallocation practice 
In Figure 9.2 below, I reproduce Figure 9.1 from earlier in this chapter, which I have 
now populated with the products of this analysis. In the context of this schema, the 
ethical instruments I have developed in the preceding sections of this discussion might 
be seen, variously, as practical guides to compliance with the ‘respect condition’ for 
doctors and for those responsible for designing and leading macroallocation 
processes. The schema integrates information on how I have achieved the primary 
normative aim of this research – providing ethical guidance of use to doctors who 
engage in macroallocation – and on the normatively relevant implications of my 
research for macroallocation broadly.  
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On the basis of the comprehensiveness of the applications I show here, I claim to have 
demonstrated the relevance of Ricoeur’s ethics not just to the doctor’s expert role in 
macroallocation, but also to deliberative priority setting generally. Further work will 
be required on how to expose Ricoeur’s ethics to settings in which it might influence 
the development of macroallocation ethics and medical ethics systems, and on how 
the results of this research might be introduced to practice. These are challenging 
issues, especially when considered in light of the low impact already available ethical 
guides have in the macroallocation setting. 
 
Figure 9.2 Summary of the domains of the recommendations arising from this 
analysis 
 
 
 
9.5.7 Conclusion 
I have shown the explanatory and normative relevance of Ricoeur’s ethics to doctors’ 
performance of the expert role in macroallocation and to priority setting more 
broadly. I have proposed ways in which it might guide the development of procedural 
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justice frameworks, support ethical practice in a number of dimensions of the medical 
role, and guide the actions of those designing and leading macroallocation processes. 
Ricoeur’s ethics extends the notion of caring into the dimension of non-patient 
focussed medical activities, and provides special insights into medical prioritisation of 
non-patient-facing roles and partiality in the macroallocation setting. It is also helpful 
in evaluating the tension between informing and advocating. I found care for 
macroallocation participants to be deficient in macroallocation practice and theory, 
and that adding a ‘respect condition’ to procedural justice frameworks was a 
warranted response.  
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Chapter Nine Part 6: Reflections on my experience with the grounded moral 
analysis methodology (GMA) 
 
 
 
9.6.1 Introduction 
The primary role of empirical studies of this kind is to elicit the implicit norms under 
which agents act. In using GMA to make an empirically derived contribution towards 
the identification of a distinct ethics for doctors’ macroallocation practice, my aim 
was to describe the norms that emerged from the qualitative data.  
 
This research is unusual in its approach. Conceptually, it begins with empirical data, 
searches for implicit assumptions – which might be considered to be quasi-norms – 
and then seeks to find whether there exists an ethical system within which these quasi-
norms have already been framed. I found in my data an Aristotelian adaptive and 
heuristic response to context, and a valuation of engagement with the macroallocation 
institution, for which Ricoeur’s ethics was the best fit. It is more common for 
researchers to enter into such studies with an ethical theory in mind, which they test 
for its fit with the data they collect, than to attempt to derive an ethical theory from 
the data.  
 
By electing to work within the principles of grounded theory (GT), via its variation, 
GMA, I was committed to grounding theory in data. Ricoeur’s version of virtue 
ethics, whose elements pervaded participants’ accounts of practice, became 
implicated in my research only because of its presence in the data. The emergence of 
a best-fit ethical theory for the practice signifies, at the most fundamental level, the 
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success of GMA in allowing the derivation of an explanatory and normatively 
relevant ethical theory for a practice from empirical data. This section reflects on my 
experience in implementing the methodology.  
 
GMA is a relatively new empirical bioethics methodology, which was described by 
Dunn et al. in 2012 in their paper ‘Toward Methodological Innovation in Empirical 
Ethics Research’. In Chapter Two, Methodology and Methods, I described its 
theoretical and practical features, my reasons for selecting it, and how I implemented 
its principles.  
 
The description of GMA offered by Dunn et al. is brief (see Appendix 3). The authors 
state that they intend it to stand as ‘a starting point on the journey of methodological 
development’ (Dunn et al., 2012). I am one of its early users; it has, to my knowledge, 
been attempted fully in only one study, an honours thesis undertaken in the University 
of Otago by Libby Dai (2013). On this basis, I am in a position to contribute to the 
refinement of the methodology through offering insights into its practicality and its 
potential to be of use in empirical work concerning the moral analysis of bioethical 
issues. In this section I address principally the topic of validating emerging ethical 
theories, which assumed importance as I experienced working with GMA, and I will 
deal briefly with GMA’s functionality in the context of a domain of practice.  
 
9.6.2 The process for validating emerging ethical theories  
GMA’s originators, in describing the iterative process by means of which data and 
theories interact in the methodology, specify that ethical perspectives emerging from 
early analysis are to be used to direct the sampling frame and refine the interview 
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schedule so as to ‘engage [later] participants in reasoning through the relevant 
perspectives’ in order to arrive at a normative claim that is grounded in participants’ 
experiences and intuitions (Dunn et al., 2012). This objective raises the questions: 
What does it mean to ‘reason through? How might ‘reasoning through’ be done so 
that the methodology retains its connection with GT? 
 
Dunn et al. also state that ‘where appropriate, theories or principles are drawn on 
within interviews in order to challenge or support participants’ accounts’ (Dunn et al., 
2012). This step contains three noteworthy ambiguities: 1) it appears to be 
discretionary, 2) it is unclear whether or not theories are to be explicitly made visible 
to participants, and 3) it is not clear whether the ‘theories or principles’ to be drawn 
on are high level – formal – moral theories, or theories for the practice emerging from 
the data (Charmaz, 2014, pp. 225-260). Arising from these features are several 
questions: Are there circumstances might it be inappropriate to introduce ethical 
theories to participants? And if so, can it still be said that GMA is actually taking 
place? Might it be necessary to expose both a high level ethical theory and tentative 
theoretical insights to participants? To what extent is explicit exposure of theories and 
principles necessary and is such exposure compatible with the parent methodology of 
GT? In practice, how might theory be exposed to participants?  
 
My window on GMA is too narrow to allow me to respond to all of these questions, 
but I hope, in describing and reflecting on my process, to address some of the 
ambiguities in the methodology as it stands.  
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In my implementation of GMA I iteratively and progressively subjected my findings 
to ethical analysis. I used the tentative theories emerging from this analysis to direct 
my sampling and interview guide, and exposed them to participants for challenge or 
support. As I have described in Chapters Two and Five (Methods and Skills), from the 
outset, my participants’ principal ethical intuitions lay along a seam of virtue ethics, 
and so it was the elements of this theory that I iteratively tested and refined with my 
participants. 
 
It is my view that in order for GMA to justify its claim to have its origin in GT, the 
research principles of GT need to be at the core of its implementation, so when it 
came to deciding whether or not it was appropriate to challenge my participants with 
ethical theories I elected to do so, but, due to my commitment to a ‘broad and deep’ 
interview style that was compatible with GT, I chose to use the open-ended, broad 
questioning that had characterised my earlier data collection. On this basis, I elicited 
later participants’ responses to ethical perspectives indirectly, rather than engaging 
them in a formal reasoning process or in explicitly validating a particular account. 
Focusing on aspects that carried ethical import and on the tentative theories emerging 
from my normative and conceptual analysis, I wove my validating-type questions into 
my open-ended interviewing. In these interviews, therefore, individual participants 
did not transition from one view to another. As a result, although my normative 
claims were shaped by my participants’ intuitions and accounts of practice, and by 
their responses to my indirect probing of the explanatory and normative potential of 
virtue ethics, my participants were not actively engaged with formulating these 
claims, or in settling on a coherent moral account of the phenomenon. 
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I selected an interpretation of ‘theories and principles’ in which it signified formal 
ethical theory. I intended to engage my participants in contemplating the formal 
ethical theory that was prompted by the data, in the indirect manner I described above. 
I believed it would also be necessary to seek participants’ responses to the theories I 
was forming about the practice as a result of my analytic process. I also believed that 
there would be some separation between the two strands of theory, at least initially. 
Because the theory incited by the data was coterminous with virtue ethics, however, 
the two strands coalesced immediately. I had not anticipated such a coincidence of 
theories; I suggest that it is unlikely that the proposers of the methodology did either. 
This outcome did not affect the effectiveness of my enquiry, but opened up the 
possibility of an anomaly in the methodology. I will return to this idea in a subsequent 
paragraph.  
 
Some of the reviewers of my published papers in Chapters Four and Five (Values and 
Skills), whilst recognising the recency and brevity of the methodology, interpreted the 
validation step as requiring direct engagement of participants in endorsing the final 
explanatory and normative theory to emerge from the data collection and analytic 
process. My justification for electing not to do this, which is set out below, was 
accepted in both cases.  
 
I defend my interpretations and decisions on four grounds. First, to eschew calls on 
reasoning and knowledge better maintains coherency with the principles of the GT 
methodology that underlies GMA; GT uses open ended questions that focus on 
phenomena (Charmaz, 2014, pp. 91-102). Second, not presuming any level of formal 
ethical literacy keeps the interview within the realm the researcher has foreshadowed 
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with participants, which is important because the relationship between the interviewer 
and the participant frames what is epistemologically achievable (Carter & Little, 
2007; Mauthner & Doucet, 2003). In this case, trust might not have withstood 
interrogation on abstract ethical concepts – in which, indeed, my data had already 
demonstrated participants to be unversed. Third, to seek participants’ formal 
endorsement of a particular ethical interpretation unfairly privileges the contribution 
of later participants, or else necessitates that early participants are reinterviewed, 
which would seem to be unsatisfactorily circular. Finally, my achievement of a 
satisfactory result by engaging participants with theories through open-ended 
questioning suggests that endeavouring explicitly to elicit responses to ethical theory 
may be unnecessary. 
 
Ultimately, my analysis exposed a picture, grounded in practice, of ethically desirable 
and ethically undesirable macroallocation practices. For some categories, it also 
contained recommendations, based on participants’ experiences, for changing 
practices so that they more represented the ideal. Participants described not only how 
it is, but also how they wanted it to be – redress of neglect, more practical support, 
elimination of sexism, for example. I made the connection between the data – which 
were rich in concepts of virtue – and virtue ethics and used the steps set out in GMA 
to validate my emerging ethical insights with participants. The effect of this interplay 
between data and analysis was to recreate the ‘phenomenologically informed 
hermeneutic approach to ethics’ described by Rehmann-Sutter, Porz, and Scully 
(2012), which I discussed at some length in Chapter Two. This approach harnesses 
the ‘hermeneutical circle’ to make visible the bridge between is and ought, on the 
basis that responsibility for understanding how participants in their research undertake 
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their moral work, explaining it, and making accessible to others resides in the 
researcher. I was, thus, satisfied that GMA enabled me to arrive at normatively 
relevant conclusions in a manner consistent with the intent of the methodology’s 
devisers, its origins in GT, and the understanding of the is/ought bridge I had adopted.    
 
My experience with implementing GMA leads me to draw the following conclusions 
– relevant to the questions I posed above – about the interaction of theory, data, and 
participants:  
 
• It is possible, and probably desirable, to engage participants with reasoning 
about ethical perspectives and ethical theories through indirect questioning 
and without departing from the principles of GT interviewing;  
• It would seem to be essential, rather than discretionary, to expose participants 
to ‘ethical theory and principles’ as to omit this step would be to forgo the 
opportunity to validate the research’s ethical conclusions, and defeat the 
purpose of GMA;  
• Since the researcher must have recourse in their conceptual and ethical 
analysis to formal ethical theory, it is inevitable that it will form part of what is 
presented to participants for challenge or support; 
• It seems likely that the researcher will present formal ethical theory and their 
theoretical intuitions in an integrated fashion, rather than separately, because 
this entanglement will occur as they perform conceptual and normative 
analysis;  
 
 
329 
• Convergence on a formal ethical theory is unlikely to be inevitable. Ethical 
theory specific to practice is likely to be achievable; the scale of the question 
may determine the scale of the outcome;   
• The consistency of this process with that of GT suggests that GMA may differ 
from GT only in the nature of its focus on ethical rather than social theorising. 
 
Researchers using GMA might find it useful to reflect on the tensions and ambiguities 
I have highlighted, make a conscious decision on which avenues to pursue, and make 
their decisions clear in their reports in order to assist with the development of the 
methodology.  
 
9.6.3 GMA’s functionality in the context of a domain of practice  
Normatively oriented empirical bioethics methodologies are generally conceived and 
designed to support the investigation of practical dilemmas in clinical bioethics (Dunn 
et al., 2012; Ives, Dunn, & Cribb, 2016, pp. ix-xii) rather than the exploration of a 
domain of practice. In this respect GMA was no different from other methodologies I 
might have selected. In choosing GMA, I was aware that the methodology was likely 
to lend itself to the examination of classic bioethical scenarios, but it was not so 
obvious that it would support my investigation into an entire medical practice domain, 
especially a non-clinical one. I was interested in exploring GMA’s applicability in this 
context.  
 
The research papers in this thesis and the reflection above suggest that the 
methodology lent itself well to a problem of this type and scale, and to the task of 
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attempting to find an ethical system suited to a practice. It remains to be tested 
whether it would perform as well in a narrower context. 
 
9.6.4 Conclusion 
In conclusion, my research, in representing the most complete published attempt at 
conducting GMA, adds important information to the field of empirical bioethics. 
GMA proved to be practical to implement and capable of facilitating the generation of 
empirically based normative conclusions. I found that it was possible, within this 
methodology, to implement the ‘phenomenologically informed hermeneutic approach 
to ethics’ that Rehmann-Sutter et al. (2012) advance to make visible the bridge 
between is and ought. My experience with applying indirect questioning methods to 
the elicitation of responses to emerging theoretical insights and way of presenting this 
complex iterative study design in linear form may be of use to other researchers 
seeking to apply GMA.  
 
I would recommend the following immediate refinement of the methodology: 
 
• Removing the optionality from the step of exposing participants to theories or 
principles in the interviews on the basis that to fail to do so would call into 
question the point of the methodology. 
 
It will be important for the respective benefits of the form in which validation is 
prosecuted in the interview, that is, whether it should be direct or indirect, to be 
explored by future researchers. 
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In light of these observations concerning the implications of the procedural 
congruence between GMA and GT, especially when viewed in the light of Rehmann-
Sutter et al.’s (2012) theorisation of normative empirical bioethics, it will be 
interesting to learn whether, with further uptake of the methodology, the distinction 
between GMA and GT when it comes to generating normatively relevant theory is 
sustained. 
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Chapter Nine Part 7: Limitations of the research 
 
 
 
The limitations of my research are discussed in each of my empirical papers (Chapters 
Three to Seven). I offer here a brief general comment on the implications for my 
research of the general limitations of qualitative studies. Whilst the qualitative 
methods I used provide rich detail, the findings of such studies are contextually 
bounded, so I cannot be certain that I have captured all of the potential ways in which 
doctors might make sense of their involvement in macroallocation. It is, therefore, 
possible that a different sample of doctors might hold different ethical commitments, 
experience different ethical issues – or make sense of them differently – and have 
different experiences of acquiring and applying skills. To avoid the possibility of 
missing such alternative perspectives, and to boost the generalisablity of my results, I 
included participants from important sub-groups in Australian medicine, purposively 
selected participants for their broad and deep experience of the phenomenon, analysed 
the data at a line-by-line level in order to identify all of the important themes, and 
continued sampling until I was certain that I was eliciting no new information.  
 
Although I was able report on some differences between the experiences of men and 
women, and between the educational aims of younger and older doctors, I was not 
able to draw fine distinctions between other subgroups. Future studies should explore 
whether the barriers to equal participation experienced by the women in my sample 
also affect members of minority populations.  
 
Qualitative studies are influenced by the positionality of the researcher: I 
acknowledge my role in the construction of the results of this study through the 
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unique perspective I brought to the study design and execution. I also acknowledge 
that, as with other interview studies, social desirability bias may have influenced 
participants’ accounts of their views and practices. 
 
The study was designed and conducted in the context of the Australian health system, 
with its mixed model of public and private funding and multiple jurisdictional levels. 
This setting is unlikely to be exactly replicated in any other nation, but it bears strong 
similarities to those of other countries with fully or partially publicly funded health 
systems. In addition, the literature I have surveyed in this thesis describes 
macroallocation institutions at national, regional, and local levels in terms closely 
similar to those in which my participants engaged. Some of my participants had 
participated in macroallocation in other countries or on the international stage. As a 
result I am confident that my results offer insights that might be useful in other 
jurisdictions with at least partially socialised health care systems. My results are, 
however, less likely to apply in countries whose health systems lack socialised 
components, or lack deliberative institutions for macroallocation.   
 
The literature I drew on as background and in the course of the development of my 
ideas was largely generated in North America, the United Kingdom, and Australia, 
with some representation of European and African countries that use English as the 
language for scholarship. It is unfortunate that my linguistic limitations prevented me 
from accessing more literature from the northern European nations with mature 
socialised health systems. Lack of advanced language skills in French prevented me 
from employing some of Ricoeur’s later works and lectures, which covered some 
ground in ethics and justice that might have been of relevance to this thesis.  
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Chapter Nine Part 8: Recommendations for further research 
 
 
 
In each of the papers that form this thesis, and throughout this chapter, I have made 
recommendations for further research. My research and these recommendations are 
timely in view of Hall et al.’s (2018) recent call for research into understanding 
organisational context and outcomes of macroallocation. There is clearly a need for a 
wide-ranging program of research if we are to address ethical impediments to justice 
at the social and personal levels. Understanding and addressing systemic procedural 
bias against women’s input is the area stands out as critical on the grounds of the scale 
and potential severity of its impact. 
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Chapter Nine Part 9: Conclusions 
 
 
 
9.9.1  Introduction  
This thesis aimed to expand available knowledge on the doctor’s role as technical 
expert in macroallocation. To address this aim I conducted an empirical bioethics 
study that investigated the experiences and ethical intuitions of doctors who perform 
the role. Using the GMA methodology enabled me to develop my analysis along 
descriptive and normative lines. In the sections below I describe how my work met 
my study objectives. I also evaluate its contribution to the literature and to practice. 
 
9.9.2 Review of study aims  
The objectives of this research were: 
 
1) To explore doctors’ reasons for taking on the role of technical expert in 
macroallocation,  
2) To describe the values and ethical commitments of doctors who undertake 
this role, 
3) To understand how doctors experienced the ethical dimensions of the role, 
and  
4) To identify an ethical framework with explanatory and normative power to 
assist in understanding practice and guiding moral analysis.  
 
A secondary objective of the research was to test the utility of GMA in the non-
clinical domain of practice presented by this topic.  
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I address each of these objectives in the following sections. 
 
9.9.3 Aim 1: to explore doctors’ reasons for taking on the role of technical expert 
in macroallocation 
 
In Chapter Three (Advocacy) I described the values that impelled doctors towards 
taking up socially focused activities, including macroallocation, and in Chapter Four 
(Values) I described the values and ethical commitments of doctors who include roles 
in macroallocation as part of their professional practices on an ongoing basis. I found 
that doctors’ personal ethics were more important than professional ethics in 
determining their decisions about engaging in the role, and that melioristic objectives 
coexisted alongside objectives focused on personal flourishing. These findings, 
broadly, are novel only in their specific focus on macroallocation practice, but in their 
detail offer insights into doctors’ role choices and their timing in the course of a 
career that have not been previously reported. 
 
9.9.4  Aim 2: to describe the values and ethical commitments of doctors who 
undertake this role 
 
In my work on values and ethical commitments, which is reported in Chapter Four 
(Values), I showed that doctors who engaged in macroallocation held values in 3 
broad domains: personal ethics, justice, and practices of argumentation. Doctors 
valued the opportunity to participate in the institution of macroallocation on the 
project of apportioning society’s resources, and they respected moderate deliberative 
conventions. I found in Ricoeur’s’ ethics a framework for ethical evaluation of the 
doctors’ role in macroallocation that aligned with doctors’ values and practices. To 
my knowledge, no other published literature focuses on doctors’ values in this context 
or attempts ethical theorisation at the level of the individual.  
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In Chapter Five (Skills) I showed that doctors valued exercising practical reason in 
macroallocation and performed the expert role as argumentation, a finding that 
supports Russell & Greenhalgh’s work on rhetoric in priority setting and extends 
theorisation of the phenomenon into the dimension of normative ethics. The thesis 
also showed doctors’ commitment to developing skills they believed would enhance 
their performance in the role, challenging the stereotype of the doctor as failing to 
value the acquisition of non-medical knowledge.  
 
9.9.5  Aim 3: to understand how doctors experienced the ethical dimensions of 
the role 
 
In Chapter Six (Procedural Justice), I described doctors’ experiences, views, and 
intuitions about the ethical issues involved in the expert role in macroallocation. I 
found that, contrary to expectations set by the theoretical literature, role-related 
conflict was dwarfed in importance by the procedural deficiencies doctors 
experienced, which they considered to be both unfair to them at a personal level, and 
capable of diminishing the justice of distributive decisions. There have been no other 
comprehensive descriptions of participants’ perspectives on procedural justice in 
macroallocation – although some of the studies in my review of the qualitative 
literature in Chapter One identify some of the features I described in my empirical 
work – and no prior attempts at theorisation in this area. My work is unique, to my 
knowledge, in proposing as an area of ethical importance the preservation of 
participant welfare in order to create the conditions for just decision making, and in 
making recommendations focusing on the dimension of caring and respectful 
communication within macroallocation procedure. 
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I reported on the matter of role-related conflict in Chapter Seven, showing that 
doctors were, not surprisingly, insensitive to the extent to which conflicts of interest 
and role might influence the way they performed the role. Doctors had confidence, 
however, that the social process of macroallocation would manage their conflicts 
fairly. This finding suggested that collective approaches to the management of role-
related conflict might be superior to the models relying on role ethics and appeals to 
physician virtue that are gaining ground in the bioethics literature.  
 
9.9.6  Aim 4: to identify an ethical framework with explanatory and normative 
power to assist in understanding practice and guiding moral analysis.  
 
Using GMA enabled me to identify, in Ricoeur’s ‘little ethics’, an empirically 
grounded ethical framework for doctors’ performance of the macroallocation role that 
also had potential applications to macroallocation in a more general way. I described 
how Ricoeur’s ethics emerged from my data in empirical chapters Four and Five, and 
elaborated on its relevance to the phenomenon of macroallocation in this Discussion. I 
found in the ‘little ethics’ an ethical system that has the potential to guide 
macroallocation practice in the direction of mutuality and respect. To my knowledge, 
my work is unique in attempting to identify an ethical framework focusing on the 
individual participant in macroallocation and their interactions with others. 
 
9.9.7 Aim 5: to test the utility of GMA in the non-clinical domain of practice 
presented by this topic 
 
As I have discussed elsewhere in the thesis, GMA proved its applicability to the type 
of ethical issue represented by my research. As the most complete implementation of 
the method, this work may provide guidance for other researchers. In earlier sections 
of the thesis I have described and evaluated my method in detail, made 
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recommendations for refining the method’s approach to capturing participants 
normative intuitions, identified other potential methodological refinements, and posed 
questions for future researchers to explore.  
 
9.9.8 Conclusion: How this thesis contributes to the literature and to practice 
Macroallocation is an increasingly prominent feature of the health care landscape as 
governments around the world attempt to control health care expenditure. Doctors, as 
the dominant health profession and as holders of unique knowledge, contribute 
essential expertise to macroallocation processes, and are likely to continue to do so, 
even if more democratic policy making models ultimately prevail. The medical 
profession, through its regulatory, professional, and educational institutions, is 
assiduous in claiming the right of doctors to a place around the macroallocation table, 
notably – in recent times – through promoting the expert role as an individual 
professional commitment. This thesis has been motivated by the need to understand 
the ethical dimensions of the medical role in macroallocation at a time when its 
importance is rising, the challenges involved in undertaking it justly are becoming 
more apparent, and the contests over whose voices are important in it are increasing in 
intensity.  
 
Little attention has been given in either the theoretical or empirical literature to 
doctors’ ethical experiences in the macroallocation role. This research, to my 
knowledge, is the only published work focusing on how it is to be a medical 
participant in deliberative justice; as such it provides novel insights into both doctors’ 
interior ethical landscapes and the social processes of macroallocation. It may prompt 
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further work exploring important dimensions of the role; I have identified some of the 
research priorities in this chapter and throughout the thesis.  
 
In the area of empirical bioethics my attempts at implementing GMA stand as a 
modest contribution to methodological scholarship. I showed that GMA is potentially 
useful for the examination of non-clinical areas of health care practice and raised 
some methodological questions for future investigation. 
 
At a practical level, my identification of Ricoeur’s ‘little ethics’ as an ethical 
framework for the medical role in macroallocation may be of interest to medical 
ethicists and educators seeking to promote an approach to macroallocation practice 
that reflects doctors’ ethical intuitions, is based on solidaristic values, and promotes 
respectful deliberation. It might be used, for example, to build an action guide to 
support the encouragement of medical engagement in priority setting by codes of 
medical ethics, or to provide an ethical framework to support or evaluate medical 
education for socially focused practice. It might also provide a useful framework for 
individual doctors seeking to understand the medical role in macroallocation and its 
ethical import, especially at career cusps – for example, when they are deciding on 
career directions, or reflecting on the meaning of their work in medicine.  
 
The insights into doctors’ values and ethical experiences and the practical instruments 
for ethical evaluation of macroallocation procedure that emerge from this thesis may 
be of use to macroallocation process designers, health executives, and bureaucrats 
who wish to devise ethically robust procedures that promote respectful deliberation 
and take into account the needs and preferences of participants. For individual doctors 
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engaging in macroallocation, the practical instruments might be useful in guiding their 
practices in deliberation. They might also have a role in assisting doctors with the 
selection of procedures in which to participate and the negotiation of the terms of their 
participation. 
 
Ultimately, the most significant contribution of this research may prove to be the 
identification of Ricoeur’s ethics as a viable framework for ethical analysis of areas of 
medical practice that are not accommodated well in any of the systems of ethics 
commonly applied in medicine.    
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Appendix 1: Qualitative records from initial search reviewed in full text, and 
outcomes  
 
Identifier Screening 
criterion* 
If excluded, reason 
Records included   
Bryan, Williams, and McIver (2007) 5  
de Kort et al. (2007) 1,2  
Gallego, Taylor, and Brien (2007) 2 
 
 
Gibson, Martin, and Singer (2005) 1  
Martin, Abelson, and P. (2002) 2  
Martin, Giacomini, and Singer (2002) 1  
McKie, Shrimpton, Hurworth, Bell, 
and Richardson (2008) 
4  
Reeleder, Goel, Singer, and Martin 
(2006) 
4,2  
Total records included:  8   
Records excluded   
Baghbanian, Hughes, Kebriaei, and 
Khavarpour (2012) 
2 Did not deal with doctors’ experiences 
or values 
Dionne, Mitton, Smith, and 
Donaldson (2008) 
1 Concerns ideas about an ideal process 
Gallego, Melocco, Taylor, and Brien 
(2005) 
1 Studied concerns about equity of 
access 
Giacomini, Hurley, Gold, Smith, and 
Abelson (2004) 
2 Studied the values exhibited by 
systems 
Hasman, McIntosh, and Hope (2008) 2 Studied reasons for decisions 
Kapiriri and Martin (2010) 2 Described the characteristics of a good 
process 
Martin, Shulman, Santiago-Sorrell, 
and Singer (2003) 
2 Did not deal with doctors’ experiences 
or values 
Russell and Greenhalgh (2012) 2 Concerned funding requests for 
individuals 
Teng, Mitton, and MacKenzie (2007) 1 Not about or involving doctors 
Wynia et al. (2011) 2  Concerned bedside allocation 
Total records excluded:  10   
Grand total: 18   
 
* Criteria key: 
6. Does it concern doctors’ experiences of priority setting processes (other than bedside)? 
7. Does it concern the values of doctors engaged in priority setting processes (other than bedside)? 
8. Does it concern the motivations of doctors engaged in priority setting processes (other than 
bedside)? 
9. Does it concern issues of ethics experienced by doctors in the process of resource allocation (not 
the ethical principles by which resource allocation decisions are made)? 
10. Does it concern the skills doctors use in resource allocation? 
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Appendix 2: Qualitative records from forward and backwards search 
expansion, and researcher’s database, and alerts reviewed in full text, and 
included  
 
Identifier Screening criterion* 
Eckard, Janzon, and Levin (2014) 5 
Gallego, Fowler, and van Gool (2008) 1,5 
Harris, Allen, Waller, and Brooke (2017)  4,5 
Hodgetts, Elshaug, and Hiller (2012) 1,4 
Russell and Greenhalgh (2009)  1,5 
Sinclair et al. (2008) 4 
Williams, Bryan, and McIver (2007) 4 
Robinson, Williams, Dickinson, and Freeman (2012) 2,4 
Robinson, Williams, Dickinson, Freeman, and 
Rumbold (2012) 
2 
Total records:  9  
 
* Criteria key: 
11. Does it concern doctors’ experiences of priority setting processes (other than bedside)? 
12. Does it concern the values of doctors engaged in priority setting processes (other than bedside)? 
13. Does it concern the motivations of doctors engaged in priority setting processes (other than 
bedside)? 
14. Does it concern issues of ethics experienced by doctors in the process of resource allocation (not 
the ethical principles by which resource allocation decisions are made)? 
15. Does it concern the skills doctors use in resource allocation? 
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Appendix 3: Dunn et al.’s (2012) description of grounded moral analysis 
 
The following material is a verbatim reproduction of Dunn et al.’s (2012) GMA 
methodology. 
“The first methodology reflects the traditions of the constant comparative 
method and active interviewing within sociology, and the philosophical 
tradition of the Socratic dialogue. Here, the research process is iterative and 
inductive. In contrast to the coherentist models for empirical ethics, in which 
empirical data feeds into ethical analysis as two distinct phases of a research 
project, conceptual and normative analysis proceeds contemporaneously 
alongside data collection and analysis. This ensures that there is a continuous 
interchange between the ethical and the empirical, with the research journey 
moving toward the refinement and narrowing of understanding, explanation, 
and argumentation over time (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Grounded moral analysis.  
“The empirical ethicist begins broadly, focusing on characterizing the ethical 
dynamics of practice in the terms described by those participating in the 
project. As a particular ethical issue is identified (or has been documented 
empirically beforehand), the empirical ethicist exposes these emergent 
experiences and understandings to ethical analysis. As with wide reflective 
equilibrium, relevant theories, principles, and arguments are considered in 
order to make sense of individuals’ experiences or attitudes. However, here, 
these ethical perspectives are then used to frame the next stage of the 
empirical research, directing the sampling frame and refining the interview 
guide so as to focus on particular targeted and active questioning that engages 
participants in reasoning through the relevant perspectives within the 
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interactions that constitute the method. Where appropriate, theories or 
principles are drawn on within interviews in order to challenge or support 
participants’ accounts. As demonstrated in Figure 1, this process is repeated 
until the participants’ experiences, attitudes, and intuitions have shaped a 
particular normative claim, such that the argument underpinning this claim is 
valid and grounded in a persuasive explanatory account of the practice 
setting.”  
 
References Dunn,	M.,	Sheehan,	M.,	Hope,	T.,	&	Parker,	M.	(2012).	Toward	Methodological	Innovation	in	Empirical	Ethics	Research.	Cambridge	Quarterly	of	
Healthcare	Ethics,	21(4),	466-480.	doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0963180112000242	
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Appendix 4: Participant Consent Form 
 
 
 
 
 
School of Public Health 
Faculty of Medicine 
  
 ABN 15 211 513 464 
 
 
 
 
  
Dr Claire Hooker 
Senior Lecturer, Medical Humanities 
Centre for Values, Ethics and the Law in 
Medicine 
Medical Foundation Building K25 
The University of Sydney  
NSW 2006 AUSTRALIA 
Telephone:   +61 2 9036 3413 
Facsimile:    +61 2 9036 3436 
Email: claire.hooker@sydney.edu.au 
Web:   http://www.sydney.edu.au/ 
 
 
Coping with a competitive health system: learning experiences 
and tips for clinician lobbyists 
 
 
PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
 
 
 
I, ................................................................................... [PRINT NAME], agree to take part in this 
research study. 
 
In giving my consent I state that: 
 
ü I understand the purpose of the study, what I will be asked to do, and any 
risks/benefits involved.  
 
ü I have read the Participant Information Statement and have been able to discuss my 
involvement in the study with the researchers if I wished to do so.  
 
ü The researchers have answered any questions that I had about the study and I am 
happy with the answers. 
 
ü I understand that being in this study is completely voluntary and I do not have to take 
part. My decision whether to be in the study will not affect my relationship with the 
researchers or anyone else at the University of Sydney or in the Agency for Clinical 
Innovation now or in the future. 
 
ü I understand that I can withdraw from the study at any time. 
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ü I understand that I may stop the interview at any time if I do not wish to continue, and 
that unless I indicate otherwise any recordings will then be erased and the information 
provided will not be included in the study. I also understand that I may refuse to 
answer any questions I don’t wish to answer. 
 
 
 
ü I understand that personal information about me that is collected over the course of 
this project will be stored securely and will only be used for purposes that I have 
agreed to. I understand that information about me will only be told to others with 
my permission, except as required by law. 
 
ü I understand that the results of this study may be published, but these publications 
will not contain my name or any identifiable information about me unless I consent 
to being identified using the “Yes” checkbox below. 
 
c Yes, I am happy to be identified. 
 
c No, I don’t want to be identified. Please keep my identity anonymous. 
I consent to:  
 
Audio-recording  YES o NO o 
 
Permanent archiving of study materials YES o NO o 
 
 
Would you like to receive feedback about the overall results of this study?  
     
   YES o NO o 
If you answered YES, please indicate your preferred form of feedback and 
address: 
 
o Postal:  _______________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________ 
 
o Email: ___________________________________________________ 
 
 
................................................................. 
Signature  
 
 
 .............. .................................................... 
PRINT name 
 
.................................................................................. 
Date 
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Appendix 5: Participant Information 
Statement 
 
School of Public Health 
Faculty of Medicine 
  
 ABN 15 211 513 464 
 
  
 
 
  
  
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 Dr Siun Gallagher  
 PhD Candidate 
 Centre for Values, Ethics and the Law in Medicine 
  
 
 
 
Medical Foundation Building K25 
The University of Sydney  
NSW 2006 AUSTRALIA 
Telephone:   +61 2 9036 3426 
Facsimile:    +61 2 9036 3436 
Email: siun.gallagher@sydney.edu.au 
Web:   http://www.sydney.edu.au/ 
<date> 
 
<Dr XXXXX> 
 
Dear Dr  
 
I am writing to invite you to take part in a research study about doctors’ participation in processes 
concerned with the allocation of healthcare funds. I am conducting this study as part of my PhD 
program under the supervision of Dr Claire Hooker, Senior Lecturer in the Centre for Values, Ethics 
and the Law in Medicine, University of Sydney and Prof David Isaacs, Clinical Professor Pediatrics & 
Child Health, Children's Hospital, Westmead. 
 
This research aims to investigate doctors’ reasons for participating in such processes, their 
experiences in the role and their reflections on its impact. We hope this research will be used to 
improve policy development processes involving doctors and medical education and professional 
development. 
 
You have been invited to participate in this study because you have participated in one or ore 
government resource allocation processes. Participation in this research study is voluntary. So it is 
up to you whether you wish to take part or not. The Agency for Clinical Innovation supports the 
study and is aware that you have been invited to participate but will not be made aware of your 
decision on whether or not to be involved.  
 
This is an interview-based study using qualitative methods. If you agree to take part you will 
participate in a face-to-face interview of 60-90 minutes duration with Dr Gallagher at a venue, time 
and date that suit you. It is expected that the interview will take place in the next few months, but 
the precise timing depends on your availability. The interview will be focused on your personal 
experience of the process, including reflections on your reasons for participating, your role, the 
 
 
 
361 
opportunities and challenges involved and the impact of participation on other aspects of your 
medical practice. The interview will be audiotaped, transcribed and analysed. Strict confidentiality 
will be maintained in the management of the information you provide.  
 
I enclose a participant information statement that provides information about the study and what 
is being asked of you, and a consent form for you to complete if you wish to participate. 
 
Ethics approval has been granted by the University of Sydney Human Research Ethics Committee.  
 
I am happy to respond to any questions you may have about this request, and welcome the 
opportunity to discuss this further in the near future. My telephone numbers are 0434 568 767 or 
02 9036 3426 and I can be contacted by email at siun.gallagher@sydney.edu.au. Dr Hooker’s 
number is 02 9036 3413. 
 
Please let me know within 21 days if you wish to participate. 
 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
 
 
 
Dr Siun Gallagher 
PhD Candidate 
University of Sydney 
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Appendix 6: Final interview guide  
 
 
Demographic: 
Age, country of birth, country of training, specialty, location of practice 
 
Introductory: 
Can you talk about some of the major events in your career, including the decision to 
enter medicine and the choices you’ve made about the course your career should 
take? 
 
Broad: 
How has your sense of who you are and your role in medicine shifted over time?  
 
Prompts: 
How has the role of the doctor changed during that time? 
What has changed in the practice of medicine over the years? 
 
To what extent are government processes that involve doctors in resource allocation 
aimed at engendering real change?  
 
Prompts: 
How does fairness evolve at all in a health system?  
What are the plusses in having a system that effectively pits people against 
each other, competitively? And to what extent are you bothered that you are 
pitted against others? 
 
When you see colleagues who are doing something other than or in addition to patient 
care, what do you attribute it to? 
 
Prompt: 
Why do you think some doctors think it’s their role to go out and seek more 
resources for their services and others don’t? 
 
Focused: 
Can you reflect on your first experience of becoming involved with resource 
allocation?  
 
Can you tell me about some of the things you have experienced in this role?  
 
Can you talk about some of the experiences you’ve had as a participant in processes 
that allocate the health dollar?  
 
Prompts:  
What was the one that was most enjoyable? 
What are you proud of and what brought you pleasure? 
What was the one with the best outcome?  
What was the one in which you were most functional?  
What was the most distressing?  
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What about any disappointments and frustrations you have experienced in 
this role? 
Can you talk about any times where you felt that your perspective wasn’t 
being taken into account? 
 
Can you call to mind people who stand out as being particularly good at advocating 
for resources – what is it about them that makes them good at it? And can you 
describe what they’ve achieved? 
 
Can you tell me, in some detail if you can, but leaving out names, about experiences 
you’ve had in this type of work where you had concerns about the process, or about 
the behaviour or attitude of other participants?  
 
Prompts: 
 
What sort of behaviour is not acceptable? 
What aspects of the process of resource allocation in health cause you 
concern? 
 
What is to be done when members in a resource allocation process exhibit a conflict 
of interest or other ethical conflict? 
 
What about in your own case: experiencing a conflict of interest or being unable to 
look at an issue dispassionately? 
 
Prompt: 
Can you tell me about any times when you had misgivings about advocating 
for your cause? 
 
How do you think you and colleagues who engage in priority setting perceive power?   
 
Can you tell me about times when relationships played an important part in your 
policy activities? 
 
Prompts: 
Can you talk about any times when this was problematical? 
What about where relationships and goals were mixed?  
Many people say ‘it’s not what you know, it’s who you know.’ What does this 
mean in this context? 
 
What skills do you feel you have in this area of practice? 
 
Did you seek specific training for the role? And if so, what? 
Can you think of any additional skills or knowledge that would assist you in 
the role? 
 
Can you talk about the time in your career when you felt most over-committed? 
 
Prompt: 
What about times in your career where you felt something needed to change? 
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Can you reflect on any times where you thought of giving up this type of activity? 
 
What advice would you give to a colleague who was thinking about getting involved 
in processes for allocating health resources?  
 
What's shifted in your thinking about being a doctor in the health system as a result of 
being involved with issues of resource allocation?  
 
What would you most like to change about the processes by which resources get 
allocated in the health system?  
 
Prompt: 
Who should be involved and why? 
 
Concluding: 
Globally, the medical codes of ethics are being progressively changed to include 
advocacy and involvement with resource allocation as core commitments, and 
medical curricula are being changed to include it as a skill. What do you think of 
these developments? 
 
Is there something you expected us to talk about today that we haven’t covered? 
 
 
 
 
